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A Journal Devoted to the Study of Islam
and of Christian-Muslim Relationship in Past and Present

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The Editors covet a warm, intimate association with all readers of the Quarterly and would value the co-operation of their criticism and their help in increasing the circulation among new readers, for the better fulfilment of our obligation to serve a Christian understanding of Islam and a Muslim awareness of Christ.

Except where otherwise stated, the writers of articles and reviews are alone responsible for the opinions expressed.

Published quarterly in January, April, July and October

IN THIS ISSUE

For this issue, which is devoted exclusively to 'the Middle East problem,' we are fortunate to have as our 'guest editor' Dr. Herbert Mason [A.M. in Middle East Studies, Harvard; Ph.D., in Near Eastern Languages and Literature, Harvard]. At present Dr. Mason is engaged in an English translation of the new edition of Louis Massignon's *Passion d'al-Hallaj* (Gallimard) for the Bollingen Foundation Series, and is also translating into English verse the *Diwān* of al-Ḥallāj. Readers of *The Muslim World* will remember his contributions on Massignon in the October 1967 and the July-October 1969 issues.

Dr. Merlin Swartz [Ph. D. in Islamic Studies, Harvard], has spent several years in residence in the Middle East. At present he is teaching and doing research in Beirut.

Professor John H. Marks is a member of the Department of Oriental Studies at Princeton University. He was Director of the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem (Jordan) during 1966-1967.

Associate Professor Samir N. Anabtawi [A.M. and Ph.D., Yale] has served on the faculties of Dartmouth College and the University of California and was a member of the Center for International Studies at Princeton before joining the faculty of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, where he is at present. His essay in this issue was delivered as a talk at the Middle East Conference held at Harvard University on May 10-11, 1969.

Mr. Uri Avnery is Editor-in-Chief of Haolam Hazeh, Israel's largest news magazine. Since 1965 he has been a member of the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), representing the Haolam Hazeh Party (New Force Party), which was created in the same year as a non-Zionist organization promoting the causes of Israeli-Arab peace, civil rights and separation of State and Religion.

Dr. Irene L. Gendzier is Associate Professor of History at Boston University and Honorary Research Associate at The Center for Middle East Studies, Harvard University. Her *Middle East Reader* was published by Pegasus, 1969.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

Part of the challenge to anyone seriously concerned about any given area of the world is first to get at the root of his own people's fear regarding it. The Middle East affords us one advantage in this challenge which apparently Vietnam does not. A considerable number of people in the United States, for example, become passionate when they think of the Middle East and even more passionate when they prepare to confront someone about its crisis. Perhaps the tragedy of Vietnam has come about because the concerned have lacked real passion in their concern, so that Vietnam has been allowed to become a touchstone on many levels for experimental knowledge or 'insight' into one's own problems, rarely a place where actual people who have taken care of themselves in an enduring and, in some ways, beautiful way, live and should be felt by others to deserve to continue to live. Over the Middle East, on the contrary, long-time friendships break once and for all; we snarl like dogs at one another; even our experts' 'objectivity' cannot disguise a position of aesthetic, religious, racial, political or economic bias; and every cool effort to deny the justice, logicality or practicality of 'the other's' position tends to expose the limitation of one's own. Hundreds of teach-ins and marches have been held on Vietnam, almost none on the Middle East. Non-violent radicals on Vietnam have been known to turn violent reactionaries on the Middle East. Deep native undercurrents, as well as nervous foreign embassies, prevent open discourse. Refusal to meet or talk perhaps reveals the deeper passion of our commitment. It is better to have deep passions than academic consciences; but passion, when the issue is not truly clear or is not a response to an immediate or real threat, can be very misleading. Our passion, heightened at home by our political assassinations, 'the atmosphere created by Vietnam,' 'the violence in our streets' and 'campus unrest,' tends to make us react easily to crises abroad. Our fear is about a survival that is enhanced vicariously and therefore assumed to be collective.

It is not sufficient to answer this fear by saying that survival is at stake only to Israelis, not to Americans, for this vicariousness argues possibly from an analogous struggle for the inner power that comes from confidence in roots and indicates an inner life of kindred feelings

that have their own dimension in reality. In fact, the passion referred to is an extraordinary witness to the energy of personal identification. Perhaps this aspect of the crisis has gone almost unnoticed amidst our heated arguments over justice and injustice. Cold rationalists take on the fervor and sacrifice usually associated with religious fanatics; atheists and etatists argue from scripture along lines of theocracy. What was thought to be an age of modernity and a faith in progress takes on a 'medieval' tinge of faith in divinely ordained causes. The Middle East crisis, apart from its harrowing effect on the peoples directly involved, provides a crack in our terrible façade of professional abstractionism. And as such, we note the phenomenon of others' crises bringing us to a deeper feeling in ourselves of life, one which we may have been afraid or ashamed to admit we can manifest in our own setting. If the same passion could be aroused in identification with the Vietnamese people, that land might be free of our machines of war. But paradoxically, if our passion could be calmed on the Middle East, the people particularly in the on-going crisis, the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, might be helped to recognize each other as people again, instead of as the caricatured enemies enhanced by our enthusiasms.

Part of the thesis of this collection of essays is that our passion on this question has been misdirected, and part of its aim is to contribute to a quieting of that passion by presenting, not a position veiled in 'objectivity,' but our knowledge of the history of Arab and Jewish relations and our belief in the translation of passion into cooperation as the only way to break the recurring cycle of wars.

Our passion has been misdirected because it has been put to the service of a negation, in itself wrong, but in this instance especially dangerous to the people with whom many of us psychologically identify—the Israelis. The majority of Western peoples, because of guilt over the atrocities their nations have committed against the Jews, because of Jewish power and influence in their societies, and because of admiration for the identifiably advanced condition of neo-Western Israel itself, have transferred much of their own fear for survival into the mirror of Israel's twenty-one-year history. Israel has been seen as a symbol of renewal from Western ruins, if not resurrection: a renewal that is analogous to that of many Western countries after their Great Wars and much beyond that of most Third World countries. It is a symbol of needed hope. It has not been a renewal free of inner and outer contradictions, however. Advance has a way of creating its own regression. When we are almost 'free' or fulfilled, something binds or diminishes us. In the Israeli case, that something is the Palestinian Arab. In America it is the black man or, as some remind us, the red man. Where race is not a question, it is economics or politics—the presence of genuine social idealists amidst nearly autonomous bureaucracies; or it is religion—the presence of a true believer amidst those

ordained experts who have nearly succeeded in gilding revelation. In someone's human face under our victimization, if we can see, there is to be found our only liberation from our fatal and recurring dreams. All that is asked is that we see; though, of course, that recognition will change us. The other's presence in our consciousness will end his exclusion and deny us our frightened exclusiveness. This is a thought which is extremely difficult to express in the language of our contemporary governmental expertese or academic specialization.

In fact, one of the intentions of this collection is to present essays that are reflective in nature and widely understandable in language. Thus a condition which the editor, in undertaking this collection, sought to remedy somewhat was the 'specialism' diagnosed perceptively by Professor Henry D. Aiken (in the *New York Review of Books*, October 20 and November 3, 1966). The fact that the issue happens to have as its subject a critical area of the world known as the Middle or Near East does not make it important in itself. Only the quality of the essays and the soundness and wisdom of its authors' words can justify attention.

Reflection should be a personal science for achieving respect. Respect should be, as it is in the main Near Eastern religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), the complement of family, tribe, race, nation, species as the basis for community. Reflection is thus a version of the Sufi 'science of hearts' (*ʿilm al-qulūb*) which served periodically, by aiming its practitioners toward experimental wisdom (*maʿrifa*), to regenerate in microcosmic form the larger community that had experienced from inward and outward causes a loss of unity and coherence.

What these papers hope to put forward, beyond the particular perspectives on the subject at hand, is the notion that thought itself is something sacred to be patiently, personally cared for and not given over, as Dante depicted in the lower regions of his *Inferno*, to distortions of truth and such consequent exhalations, found especially surrounding Middle Eastern problems today, as propaganda, suppression of fact, and stubborn refusal to communicate at all; and, finally, these essays hope to put forward the belief that respect must replace the long history of the desire to convert or to displace as the social end of thought.

Though not speaking for all the contributors, whose positions in several instances may differ from his own, the editor has no hesitation in admitting the belief that the injustice which the Palestine Arabs (now called 'Arab refugees') feel they suffered is not a feeling but an experience, one that cannot be looked at abstractly. Furthermore, it is a continuing experience, one that cannot be remedied by time alone. The editor believes that settlement and compensation are the responsibility of Israel and that the cost will be paid not only in lands restored and in money given, but in a change in Israel's identity itself—namely, in an end to exclusiveness and racial preference in the state.

That is the only way to put an end to the tragic insecurity of a state that began by expulsion of those who had known and still consider Palestine home.

The Jewish experience of injustice and atrocity, committed against its people by the Nazis and by Western civilization during the course of centuries, also cannot be remedied by time alone. This civilization owes the Jews an immeasurable repatriation and compensation, only a small portion of which has been represented by its support of the Israeli state. From a certain viewpoint, that state's continuance is Western civilization's direct responsibility, and even that commitment will not be satisfactory repayment for the obvious reason that the dead and the injured of the past cannot enjoy the kind of favors bestowed on their heirs by suddenly responsive states.

But the editor feels unable to say that one injustice experienced can be measured against another or can claim historical priority. No one really knows how to weigh suffering, but only to recognize it.

In these essays (and in the first two sections of the book to be published *) we are attempting to focus on the history of Arab-Jewish relations as a possible basis for reconciliation and to dispel the notion that Arabs and Jews have a long history of mutual hate and open conflict. Section three of the book is an extension of the editor's reflections, that is to say, by persons viewing aspects of the crisis in detachment but not indifference. All persons contributing articles have done so in response to personal letters outlining the kind of book it was to be. The only requirement was that each author pursue reflectively his own thought without conforming to current fashions of 'objectivity,' and each was assured that his views would not be construed as representing his country's or anyone's but his own.

The editor's work of correspondence and assembling of essays for this book all along has been dedicated respectfully to the two teachers who have had the profoundest effect on his thought and approach to the Middle East—the late Professor Louis Massignon of the Collège de France and Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, retired Director of Harvard's Middle East Center. He would like to think this is the kind of book they would wish one of their students would edit in this crisis period involving an area of the world to which they dedicated their lives and tireless reflections. He also wishes to acknowledge his debt to his friends Noam Chomsky, Irene Gendzier, Elaine Hagopian, Merlin Swartz and Jacques Waardenburg without whose suggestions, assistance and encouragement the book might have compromised its intent

* By Mouton & Co., The Hague. The sections of the book are entitled: I. "The Middle East Crisis in Historical Perspective"; II. "Personal Perspectives on the Crisis"; III. "General Reflections on the Crisis." Among the contributors whose essays appear in the book, but not in the present selection, are Professors Noam Chomsky (MIT), Jacques Berque (Collège de France), Arnold Toynbee (retired, London University), Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Edward Said (Columbia), Abdullah Laroui (Rabat University).

or never come to light. All of us involved with this book are grateful to *The Muslim World*'s editors for making available their January 1970 issue for the presentation of this portion.

Belmont, Massachusetts HERBERT MASON

THE POSITION OF JEWS IN ARAB LANDS FOLLOWING THE RISE OF ISLAM

As with every historical event, the significance of the Arab conquest for the history of Jews in the Near East, North Africa, and Spain (lands that were to comprise the new Arab-Islamic empire) can only be accurately assessed when that event is seen in its proper historical context. It will be necessary to begin, therefore, by describing briefly the general condition of Jews in those lands during the period preceding the rise of Islam, when they were under the domination of Christian rulers and a Christian majority.

Apart from the Jewish community in Palestine, Roman Jewry as a whole lived in relative peace and prosperity during the first three centuries of the Christian era. They did, it is true, pay a special tax (*Fiscus Judaicus*) that at times proved burdensome. On the other hand, they were never the object of persecutions as Christians frequently had been. The Roman authorities, it appears, had made an honest attempt to accommodate themselves to their Jewish subjects by exempting them from the obligation to sacrifice to the pagan deities of Rome and by not requiring them to recognize the divinity of the emperor. With the Edict of Caracalla (A.D. 212), which gave all free inhabitants of Rome full citizenship without distinction, the legal condition of Roman Jewry was further improved, for now all free Jews living within the empire were full citizens. This meant, in effect, that Jews as a whole now enjoyed equality before the law with non-Jews. If Jews were distinguished from other citizens of the state, it was by certain privileges granted them in order to make possible the practice of their faith—not by a single discrimination apart from the payment of the *Fiscus Judaicus*.

Such a state of affairs, however, was not to prevail for long. The turning point came with the conversion of the Roman emperor Constantine to Christianity in 312 and the proclamation of the Edict of Toleration which, despite its title, initiated a process leading to the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the empire and the consequent displacement of all other faiths. For non-Christians in general, and for Jews in particular, this meant the eventual loss of their citizenship and most of what they had gained through the Edict of 212. Only Christians could be citizens of the empire, for the state was now, in effect, a Christian theocracy. The Edict of Toleration was followed by a series of enactments designed to clarify the inferior legal status of Jews and to curtail their power and influence. The anti-Jewish sentiment that had been nurtured in the Church for the better part of three centuries was now taken over by the state and informed the official attitude toward Judaism. From 'a distinguished faith,' as it had previously been referred to, it now became a 'nefarious sect.'

Under the brief reign of Julian the Apostate (361-363), the anti-Jewish measures enacted by Constantine were temporarily suspended. With the accession of Theodosius II to the throne in 408 and the promulgation of the famous Theodosian Code shortly thereafter, the old discriminatory laws were not merely reinstated, but were substantially strengthened and expanded. Conversion to Judaism was declared to be a criminal offense punishable by death. Marriage between Christians and Jews was strictly forbidden and, what involved an even more serious departure from the past, the religious affairs of Roman Jewry were, in effect, placed under the jurisdiction of the state.

Though anti-Jewish sentiments in eastern Christendom can be traced back to the first century and are reflected in the New Testament, the discriminatory measures enacted by Constantine and Theodosius II gave a new impetus to these sentiments which, more and more, were openly endorsed and promoted by Church leaders themselves. St. Chrysostom, for example, the most powerful and influential Christian preacher of the fourth century, is known to have used his sermons to launch bitter verbal attacks against Jews. A little later Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, played a key role in the massacre and expulsion of the Jews from that city. Under the Byzantine emperor Justinian (483-565), and with strong ecclesiastical backing, a systematic attempt was made to stamp out organized Jewish life in North Africa. Synagogues were confiscated, public worship was proscribed, and at least one Jewish community—the one at Borin—was completely destroyed.

In the Near East, life for Jews reached it lowest point during the reign of Heraclius (610-641). In the year 629, following the recapture of Palestine from the Persians, the Jewish residents of Jerusalem were massacred. Three years later, and just one year before the Arab armies were to appear en masse on the northern frontiers of Arabia, Heraclius issued a decree forbidding the public exercise of Judaism and ordered all Jews within his realm to submit to baptism.

The history of Spanish Jewry in those early centuries followed a pattern strikingly similar to the one we have just observed. For them, too, an important turning point came with the conversion of the royal house to Christianity. Under Recared (586-612), the first Catholic king of Spain, a series of discriminatory measures were enacted which prohibited Jews from proselytizing, entering into a marriage with Christians, or holding public office. In 613 King Sisebut (612-620) issued a decree requiring all those of Jewish faith to submit to baptism.

For the greater part of a century following Sisebut, the public practice of Judaism was virtually impossible. The legislation of Sisebut was further refined and reinforced by successive Church Councils meeting at Toledo. These reprehensible laws received their final formulation in 694 at the Seventeenth Council of Toledo. There all Jews were declared to be slaves of Christians. Jewish children seven years and older were to be removed from their parents and placed in the custody of Christian

homes or monasteries where they could be brought up as 'Christians.' The property that remained in the hands of Jews was to be confiscated. Those Jews who did submit to baptism were asked to demonstrate the authenticity of their conversion by eating the flesh of swine.

Thus by the opening decades of the seventh century, Jewish communities in the Near East, North Africa, and Spain had witnessed the progressive deterioration of their position both legally and materially. Through a process of legislation, much of which had been inspired by leaders of the Church, Jews found themselves stripped of most of the rights they had once enjoyed, and isolated socially, economically, and politically. In certain areas, such as Spain, they had been reduced to a state of virtual enslavement. It must not be supposed, however, that all of these discriminatory laws were systematically enforced. They were not—not even in Spain. The mere fact, however, that such laws existed was more than sufficient to divest Jews in those lands of any sense of dignity and rendered their situation always precarious at best.

For Jews in the Near East, North Africa, and Spain, the Arab conquest marked the dawn of a new era. Those forces that had led to the progressive isolation and disruption of Jewish life were not only checked, they were dramatically reversed. Few Jews, however, had any idea of the far-reaching forces of change that were about to be set in motion when the Arab-Muslim armies first broke out of Arabia in 633. Indeed, many Jewish communities were initially seized with fear, for they had heard of Muḥammad's expulsion of the Jews from Medina and the surrounding oases some years before. The course of events, however, very quickly demonstrated this initial apprehension to be without ground. And with their fears allayed, Jews in one region after the other began throwing their support behind the advancing Arab armies. The sources are replete with moving accounts of the assistance rendered by these Jewish communities.[1] In many areas the Arab armies were openly and enthusiastically welcomed as 'liberators' from the oppressive rule of Christian overlords. And the Arabs, for their part, soon came to regard these Jewish communities as allies in a common cause.

Though some of this support may have been dictated by considerations of expediency, there is, on the whole, no reason to doubt its well-intentioned, even spontaneous, character. R. Simon bar Yohai, writing during the period of the Arab conquest, described ʿUmar (the one primarily responsible for launching the conquest) as "a lover of Israel who repaired their breaches." "The Holy One," he went on to insist,

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[1] See, e.g., Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān* (Cairo, 1956), 162, and 167-169; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-Rusūl wa'l-Mulūk* (de Goeje ed., Leiden, 1879-1881), I, 2403; and Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi't-Tārīkh* (Beirut, 1965), II, 501. Cf., T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (London, 1913), 132; and S. D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs, Their Contacts Through the Ages* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 62 ff.

"is only bringing the Kingdom of Ishmael in order to help you from the wicked one (Christians)." [2] A Jewish document widely circulated during the first century of Arab rule described Islam as "an act of God's mercy." [3] Indeed, taken as a whole, the sources make it quite clear that the Arab conquest was widely hailed among contemporary Jews as a divine intervention by God on behalf of 'His People' and was regarded, therefore, as an event full of promise for the future. [4]

Contrary to what is popularly believed in the West, the indigenous Jewish communities in the conquered areas were not coerced into accepting Islam. The old image of Muslim armies forcing conversion at the point of the sword is a blatant distortion that has its roots in Crusader propaganda. Taking seriously the Qur'anic injunction, "There is to be no compulsion in matters of religion," [5] the conquering armies permitted Jews and Christians to remain such. Indeed, during the greater part of the first century of Arab rule, conversion to Islam was officially discouraged—primarily, it would seem, for economic reasons. During the early centuries of Arab rule, there were few Jewish converts to Islam. Only at the end of the medieval period did they go over to Islam in significant numbers and then it was in response to the magnetic pull of Islamic mysticism (*taṣawwuf*), and not to external pressures of any sort.

But if Jews were shown tolerance in the new Arab-Islamic empire, this tolerance was not a matter of temporary sufferance, not the result of a willingness to co-exist for the present with no real guarantees for the future. [6] On the contrary, Jews both individually and collectively were granted a positive legal status in the new state. Based in part on precedents established by Muḥammad in the constitution of Medina and in part also on pre-Islamic tradition, the right of Jews to life, property, protection, and the free exercise of their faith (so long as it did not prove offensive to Muslims) was guaranteed by Islamic law. In the spheres of religious practice and personal life, Jews were to be governed by their own law. Only in their relations with the larger non-Jewish community were they to come under the jurisdiction of the law of the state. On the other hand, individual Jews could always have recourse to Islamic law if they preferred. And from the sources we know that occasionally, at least, they did avail themselves of this privilege.

Furthermore, Islamic law made no distinction between Jews and

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[2] S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, 1957), III, 93

[3] S. D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, 63.

[4] While it is true that many Christian communities also welcomed the Arab armies, it must not be forgotten that the conquest did not have the same long-term meaning for Christians as for Jews. In contrast to Christianity which gradually declined in the Arab-Muslim world (and, in some areas, virtually disappeared), Jewish communities in many regions not only continued to survive but flourished (cf., Baron, *op. cit.*, II, 110 ff.).

[5] Surah II, 256.

[6] Cf., Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Darmstadt, 1963), 32 ff.

other minority faiths. Together with Christians and Zoroastrians, Jews formed part of a much larger class of 'protected persons' (*ahl al-dhimma*; dhimmis).[7] All members of this class, irrespective of creedal, ethnic, or other differences, were recognized by and enjoyed the same standing before Islamic law. In return for protection and the other rights guaranteed by that law, dhimmis were to pay a poll tax (*jizya*). The payment of this tax generally does not seem to have been regarded as a sign of subjugation. It was a tax paid in return for certain benefits, and when those benefits could not be guaranteed, Islamic law stipulated that the tax was to be returned.[8] In order to prevent it from becoming a burden to dhimmis, the law further stipulated that it could only be collected from those who were capable of paying it. Women, children, the elderly, the blind and crippled, the poor and unemployed were exempted. One early Jewish writer referred to it as a "slender poll tax" in return for what he described as "an almost boundless toleration."

While dhimmis did enjoy equality among themselves, they were not, however, on a footing of equality before Islamic law with Muslims. Dhimmis had fewer rights and were subject to special restrictions which did not affect Muslims. Jewish and Christian physicians, for example, were not to practice their profession among Muslims. Dhimmi merchants were to pay double the amount of duty for goods they imported. (Very interestingly, however, the *ḥarbī*—i.e., a Muslim citizen of a non-Muslim country—was to pay twice the rate required of dhimmis.) Moreover, Christians and Jews were not to erect new houses of worship, though they were allowed to keep the old ones in a state of good repair. Perhaps most seriously of all, dhimmis were required to indicate their identity by wearing special badges or styles of clothing.

The fact, however, that these restrictions were rarely observed in practice is significant, for it meant that in real life the position of dhimmis was much more nearly one of equality with Muslims than legal theory allowed. And in this one respect, at least, Muslim practice down through the centuries has shown itself to be decidedly superior to the letter of Muslim law and, undoubtedly also, a more faithful reflection of the inner intention of Islam. (The existence of such laws, however, must have had a certain adverse psychological affect on dhimmis.) It should also be noted in this connection that in certain specific areas, dhimmis did, in fact, enjoy equality with Muslims. Thus according to Ḥanafite and Ḥanbalite law, the blood of dhimmis and Muslims was held to be equal in value and, therefore, in the case of homicide, for example, the amount of blood-money required as payment to the wronged party was to be the same for both. In cases where property was owned jointly by a Muslim and a dhimmi, Islamic law went out

[7] For a fuller explanation of this term and its legal content, see C. Cahen, "Dhimma," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), II, 227-231.
[8] T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, 61.

of its way to insure that the rights of the latter were protected. It is also highly significant that dhimmis were granted the right to travel and reside where they chose. There were no laws of any sort restricting the residence of dhimmis to special quarters in the cities or towns.

The tendency among western writers to characterize dhimmis as 'second class citizens' is partially understandable inasmuch as they did not enjoy complete equality before the law with the Muslim majority. Such a characterization, however, overlooks several important points and is thus not entirely accurate. First of all, it fails to take into account the fact that while dhimmis did have fewer rights before the law, they also had fewer obligations. The equality of right and obligation in Islam is an important legal principle; and a serious attempt was made in Islamic law to maintain a careful balance between the two. It is worth noting in this connection that in Islam dhimmis are regarded essentially as guests. In view of the fact that Islam incorporated within itself the ancient Near Eastern tradition of hospitality in which the honorable treatment of guests was regarded as a sacred duty, the status as guests took on special meaning. [9]

In the second place, the use of the term 'second class' in describing the status of dhimmis tends to ignore the whole course of Islamic history. In short, it fails to reckon with the fact that in actual life dhimmis enjoyed virtual equality with Muslims and, in some respects, enjoyed advantages.

There can be little doubt, then, that for Jews the Arab conquest meant a marked improvement in their legal condition. From a previously degraded class of aliens, almost always resented by the Christian majority and frequently the object of open persecution, they were now elevated to a new position and granted a positive legal status with clearly defined rights guaranteed by law. And what is equally important, they were no longer regarded as a separate entity, legally or otherwise, but were thought of as part of a larger class of protected persons in relation to whom they enjoyed full equality. No longer were Jews as Jews the object of special laws or a special minority status.

If the Arab conquest brought immediate release from conditions of a most degrading sort, it also had long-term implications that were not less important. The new conditions resulting from the conquest (including the legal changes just noted) made it possible for Jews to gradually break out of the isolation in which they had previously lived and paved the way for their eventual integration into the mainstream of life in Arab-Islamic society. This process of integration, representing as it did a dramatic reversal of past trends, constitutes, in many ways, the most prominent, most characteristic feature of Jewish history during the early centuries of Arab rule. And in its wake, this process brought changes unprecedented in the history of the Jewish people.

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[9] L. Gardet, *La cité musulman vie sociale et politique* (Paris, 1961), 58.

With the mass penetration of Jews into the main sectors of Arab-Islamic society and their intimate involvement in this non-Jewish milieu, both the outward form and inner essence of traditional Jewish life were deeply affected and, in some cases, fundamentally transformed. In what follows I shall attempt to trace this process of integration in outline form and take note of some of its more important consequences for the economic, political, and social life of Arab Jewry.

In the economic sphere, integration began early and resulted in a gradual, but marked improvement in the material well-being of Jewish communities. These communities, many of which had lived for long periods under conditions of privation and stagnation, quickly came to life and entered a new period of economic growth and prosperity. This was not, furthermore, an isolated phenomenon, confined to this or that region. From the borders of Persia in the east to Spain in the west, it formed a clearly observable, new pattern and provides a striking contrast to the conditions of poverty that had generally prevailed among Jews in those areas prior to the rise of Islam.

In actual practice economic discrimination against Jews appears to have been virtually unknown. Islamic law, as we have seen, did call for the imposition of certain restrictions on the economic activity of dhimmis. In real life, however, these were all but ignored. The degree of economic freedom enjoyed by Jews can in part be seen from the wide variety of professions and crafts which they practiced. There was scarcely an occupation (from the humblest to the most lucrative and prestigious) in which they were not to be found. They did, at times, tend to predominate in certain crafts such as dyeing; there is, however, no evidence to suggest that this was the result of pressure or exclusion from other occupations. Contrary to what is commonly believed, they were not prohibited from owning and cultivating land. What they were deprived of was the right to purchase and develop virgin lands, for these were regarded as the common property of the Muslim community.

The degree to which Jews succeeded in penetrating the mainstream of economic life is shown most strikingly in the extent to which the outward form and material base of their economic life was transformed during this period of their history. From a nation of peasants, traditionally tied to the soil, they were gradually transformed into a nation of international traders, manufacturers, and financiers. This was a change hitherto unparalleled in the previous experience of Jewry. Never before in their history had such a large segment of the Jewish people turned to mercantile occupations.[10] More significant, however, is the fact that this transformation was part of a much larger transformation which involved the economy of the empire as a whole. Through the development of trade made possible by the political and administrative unification of large areas and the growth of industry in the urban

[10] S. D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, III.

centers, the old agricultural economy gradually gave way to one based primarily on commerce, manufacturing, and banking. That Jews as a whole not only profited materially from this 'bourgeois revolution,' but participated in it and were themselves transformed by it, indicates to what extent the old economic barriers had indeed been broken down. From the evidence available, it seems clear that already by the end of the fourth century of Arab rule, the process of economic integration had gone far.

In the economic sphere, the record of medieval Islam's treatment of Jews stands in sharp contrast to that of medieval Europe where they were progressively and systematically excluded from one sector of the economy after the other, so that by late medieval times only the most degrading and menial occupations were open to them.

In the political sphere, the effects of integration were equally impressive and far-reaching. The relative absence of Jews in public office during the first century of Arab rule is explained largely by the fact that Jews had traditionally been excluded from this sphere of community life and, therefore, had not been given the opportunity to acquire the necessary skills or experience. This state of affairs, however, was not to continue for long. With the growing involvement of Jews in the larger economy and their pursuit of bourgeois occupations, the requisite fiscal and administrative skills were gradually acquired. By early ᶜAbbasid times the services of Jews were being increasingly sought by Muslim rulers. Particularly in Iraq, Egypt, and Spain (the three major political centers of the Arab world), Jews rose to positions of power and influence. Not a few were called to serve as advisors and counsellors to caliphs and their chief ministers. Despite their elevation to positions of prominence within the government, Jews in general appear to have remained aloof from partisan politics and most of the perpetual intriguing that went on in political circles. They chose rather to concentrate on the mastery of technical skills and on the development of a bureaucratic tradition within their own ranks. This two-fold policy proved to be a wise one. First, it made them less vulnerable to reprisal during periods of political upheaval and, secondly, it rendered them increasingly indispensable as public servants. It was not without reason, then, that Jews frequently found it easier to survive changes of government than did their fellow Arabs.

Despite the brilliant achievements of Jewish public officials in Spain and Iraq, it was in Fāṭimid Egypt that Jews were to rise to the peak of their power and influence in governmental circles. Under the early Fāṭimid caliphs (many of whom were known for their liberal attitudes) Jews found their way into government service in unprecedented numbers. By the reign of al-Muᶜizz (953-975), they had come to play such an important role in the affairs of state that people were frequently heard to remark (whether out of jealousy or admiration, we are not told) that nothing could be done any more without the assistance of

Jews. Under this same caliph, Egypt's most important province of Syria was administered by a Jewish governor. Few, indeed, were the levels of Egyptian administration that did not feel the impact of Jewish influence. In addition to all this, a number of important non-administrative posts in the caliph's court were held by Jews. Awed by the extent and effectiveness of Jewish influence throughout the government, an Arab poet of that time composed the following lines (as reported by al-Suyūṭī): [11]

> Today the Jews have reached the summit of their hopes
> and have become aristocrats.
> Power and riches have they, and from them
> councillors and princes are chosen.
> Egyptians, I advise you, become Jews
> for the very sky has become Jewish!

The holding of public office by large numbers of Jews did occasionally arouse resentment among the Muslim majority and at times made it necessary for Muslim rulers to dismiss their Jewish employees in varying numbers. We hear of such reactions during the reigns of al-Manṣūr, Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Mutawakkil, and several other lesser caliphs. It must be pointed out, however, that these reactions were always strictly limited and, with one exception, never affected the wider Jewish community. Only those who held public office were threatened by such moves and, even then, Jewish officials were never threatened as Jews, but as dhimmis. Insofar as Jews suffered from such measures, they did so together with other dhimmi officials. There is no record of a single attempt in the whole of Islamic history to exclude Jews as such from public office.

The only anti-dhimmi reaction that ever affected Jews on a wider scale, including both those in and out of office and which, therefore, forms something of an exception to what I have just said, occurred ironically enough in Egypt during the Fāṭimid period. Under the caliphate of al-Ḥākim, and through the latter's initiative, a persecution broke out in Egypt which caused widespread suffering among Jews. What role, if any, resentment of Jewish power and influence played in triggering this outburst is not clear. It is clear, however, that the persecution was not directed just against Jews but against the larger dhimmi community in Egypt. Thus, even though Jews suffered severely during this time, they did so along with other dhimmis. Fortunately, al-Ḥākim soon saw the folly of what he had done. Under the influence of apparent feelings of remorse, he ordered an end to the persecution. In what seems to have been a sincere attempt to restore the liberal tradition of his predecessors, he invited Jews back into public office

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[11] A. Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam* (London, 1937), 58; cf., A. von Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen* (Wien, 1875-1877), I, 188.

and made every effort to repair the damage that had been done to Jewish property, particularly to synagogues. To those Jews who had converted to Islam in order to escape persecution he gave the privilege of re-embracing their ancestral faith, despite the fact that to do so he had to fly in the face of Islamic law which required the death penalty for those who turned their backs on Islam after having embraced it.

That there were limits to the political integration of Jews is clear from the foregoing. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that despite these limits, significant progress had been made in giving Jews a place in the political life of the Muslim society. Moreover, as we have seen, those reactions from which Jews had to suffer occasionally did not in any way form part of a consistent pattern or reflect an anti-Jewish bias.

Here again, the record of medieval Islam contrasts sharply with that of Europe where, already at this early date, anti-Jewish feeling was widespread and persecution of Jews part of an emerging pattern. Even in those areas of the Arab world that were temporarily occupied by European powers, the consequence for the local Jewish population was one of unmitigated disaster. During the Crusader occupation of Palestine the Jewish population of that region was cruelly reduced. The massacre of the Jewish residents of Jerusalem in 1097 was but one episode in a tragic series which virtually put an end to organized Jewish life in that land. The same story was repeated in North Africa when re-christianized Spain captured Oran in 1509, Tunis in 1535, and Bougie in 1541, and ruthlessly reduced the local Jewish communities in each of these cities. [12]

The integration of Jews into the economic and political life of the Arab world could hardly have advanced as far or as rapidly as it did had it not been for a larger, more encompassing form of integration best designated, perhaps, by the term 'social.' In treating the matter of social integration, I shall relate it more specifically to the process of arabization, i.e., that process whereby Jews as a whole assimilated Arabic-Islamic culture. It was this process, in the final analysis, that made possible the entrance of Jews on a large scale into the central stream of Arab social life and enabled them, in turn, to participate in both the material and non-material spheres of that life in a most amazing way. Through this process of assimilation and integration, Arabic-Islamic culture, and all that was bound up with that culture, made an indelible impression on the deepest levels of Jewish being.

One of the earliest and most crucial aspects of this process of arabization was the adoption by Jews of the Arabic language as their primary vehicle of communication. The assimilation of Arabic, which began during the period of the conquest, proceeded rapidly and affected a wide area so that by the end of the third century of Arab rule, Arabic had

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[12] C. Roth, *A Short History of the Jewish People* (London, 1936), 271.

almost entirely replaced Hebrew and Aramaic as the language of daily life for Jews. Even among themselves Jews gradually came to employ Arabic almost exclusively. Hebrew did, of course, continue to be used but it was mainly for liturgical purposes and, to a limited extent, also as the language of religious scholarship.

Arabization, however, was not limited just to linguistic matters. It touched almost every facet of Jewish social life and, in many cases, involved a radical transformation. It meant the assimilation of Arab social customs generally, Arab patterns of behavior (both public and private), and Arab social tastes. The adoption of Arab habits of dress and the appropriation of Arabic personal names in place of the old Hebrew ones are but two among a vast number of instances that could be cited to illustrate this process. It is remarkable that these two could become universal practices among Arab Jewry since they were officially prohibited by Islamic law. The Jewish community had to face and overcome the opposition of Islamic law which explicitly prohibited them. While the capitulation of Islamic law may be seen as further evidence of Islam's liberal attitude toward dhimmis, it also indicates, I think, something of the great force behind this process of arabization, something of its almost-tidal-wave proportions in the face of which the law was helpless.

On the most elemental level, the assimilation of Arabic-Islamic culture led to an extensive re-shaping in the outward forms of Jewish social life. Those external features of Jewish social life that had traditionally symbolized their ethnic distinctiveness vis-à-vis the non-Jewish world were gradually lost. Arab Jewry, for all practical purposes, ceased to be a separate ethnic entity. (This meant that Arab Jewry's identity became more exclusively a function of religion.) Whatever else the loss of their external, ethnic separation may have meant, from the point of view of social integration, it marked an important advance. No longer was the identity of Jews as Jews revealed directly and immediately through the outward forms of their life in the way that it traditionally had been. By decreasing their visibility, both individually and collectively, arabization made possible a much larger measure of anonymity in the public sphere. This meant, in turn, greater freedom of movement, both socially and physically. The trend toward increased physical mobility, in part, explains why the Jewish ghetto never made its appearance in the medieval Arab world. It is true that in the larger cities such as Baghdad, Jews tended to congregate in certain quarters. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that they did so under pressure. Large numbers of Jews were always to be found scattered throughout the city as were their synagogues. The trend toward greater social mobility is seen in the growing ease with which Jews were able to find their way into the various social classes, occupations, and public offices.

If arabization led to important changes in the outward, material shape of Jewish life, it had an even greater impact upon the internal, non-material aspects of that life. Arabization meant a great deal more than the appropriation of the outward forms of Arab culture. Along with the assimilation of the Arabic language and Arabic-Islamic cultural patterns, there went the assimilation of Arab values and tastes, Arab modes of thought and patterns of communication, Arab attitudes and sentiments. Arabization meant, in short, the absorption of fundamentally important features of the Arab mind and the Arab spirit.

Changes of the sort described above were bound, in time, to precipitate a crisis in identity for Arab Jewry. And this, perhaps, was the most important consequence of arabization, for through it Jewry acquired a new understanding of itself—a new self-image. With the mass assimilation of Arabic-Islamic culture in both its exterior and interior forms, it became increasingly problematic for Jews to regard themselves as fundamentally and irrevocably different from their fellow Arabs with whom they shared so much and so deeply. It became progressively more difficult for arabicized Jews to think of themselves as Jews in the traditional sense, as Jews pure and simple. Though the arabization of Jews did not mean the loss of their Jewish identity as such, it did mean a significant diluting of that identity. If Jews continued to think of themselves as Jews—as they certainly did—they thought of themselves as Jews of a special kind, viz., Arab Jews.

It is in the context of this change in self-understanding that one must see the practice of adopting Arabic personal names. For the Semitic mind, it must be remembered, names were much more than arbitrary, external forms of identification. A man's name was viewed as participating in the very essence of his person and, as such, revealed something of the essential character of his being. This meant, in effect, that a man's name was bound up in the most intimate way with the question of his identity. A change in one could not occur apart from a change in the other. For Jews who shared the Semitic outlook, the adopting of Arab names was of the greatest significance. It symbolized, in short, a new understanding of their identity. It did not signify, as I have already said, a surrender of their Jewish identity, for they continued to adhere to the faith of their fathers. What it did signify was an important modification or diffusion of that sense of separateness that had figured so prominently in their traditional self-image. Arabicized Jews were Jews who felt a genuine sense of kinship to, and solidarity with, their fellow Arabs—something non-arabicized Jews could never have shared.

Through the integration of Jewry into the mainstream of Arab society and their almost wholesale assimilation of Arabic-Islamic culture, a great many of the old material, psychological, social and intellectual barriers that had separated Jew from Arab were gradually

torn down. With these old walls removed, the way was paved for a direct encounter between Judaism and Islamic civilization on the deepest religious and intellectual levels. For Judaism, however, any such direct confrontation involved considerable risk in view of its minority position. In any genuine, face-to-face encounter with the youthful, vigorous, vastly more powerful Islamic civilization, Judaism stood in danger of either being absorbed or else overwhelmed, forced into retreat and, perhaps eventually, into oblivion. In actual fact, however, the results of this historic encounter were precisely the reverse of what might have been expected. Instead of being either absorbed or forced into retreat, Judaism was stimulated by its encounter with Islam and the result for Judaism was a new period of unprecedented intellectual and religious florescence.

It is not without reason, therefore, that later Jewish historians looked back on this period in their history as a golden age. The extent to which this flowering owed its inspiration to medieval Islamic culture is shown by the extent to which the new Judaism bore the imprint of this culture. The influences of Islamic culture on Judaism were many and varied, but in three areas (literature and language, philosophy, and religious piety) it was particularly significant.[13] I shall consider these areas briefly, beginning with that of literature and language.

At the time of the Arab conquest, the majority of Jews in the East appear to have been bilingual. In general, apart from some local variation, they employed Aramaic as the language of daily life, with Hebrew being used primarily for religious and literary purposes. The process of arabization referred to above involved much more than the adoption of Arabic as the language of daily speech in place of Aramaic. Indeed, it also meant that Arabic took over the place of Hebrew as the primary medium of literary expression and of scholarship. Almost all of the important and influential works produced by Jewish writers during this period were composed in Arabic. Bahya's *The Duties of the Heart* and *The Guide for the Perplexed* by Maimonides are but two instances of this phenomenon. To an astonishing degree, Arabic also replaced Hebrew as the language of scripture. The Old Testament, along with the Mishna and other sacred texts, were translated into Arabic and were widely used in that form. So highly was Sa'adya's translation of the Old Testament regarded that it eventually acquired a sacred status in its own right. The study of the Old Testament in the form of Sa'adya's Arabic translation was regarded by many as an act of special piety. Commentaries on the Jewish scriptures (many of which bore striking resemblances to the Qur'anic commentaries) appeared in Arabic with greater and greater frequency. What is perhaps even more surprising, works dealing with the Hebrew language and Hebrew

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[13] See S. D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, 125 ff.

literature were composed widely in Arabic as well. Thus, the most important and influential work on Hebrew poetry to come out of the Middle Ages—that composed by the famous Moses ben Ezra—was written in Arabic. Only within the confines of the synagogue did the use of Hebrew continue more or less unchallenged.

This almost overpowering influence of Arabic, far from bringing about the demise of Hebrew, led eventually to its modification and revitalization. On the literary level, vigorous new forms of Hebrew prose and poetry, owing much of their inspiration to Arabic models, gradually came into being. New themes, styles, and techniques, hitherto known only in Arabic, found their way into Hebrew and came to be extensively employed by Jewish writers. Through this encounter with Arabic, the Hebrew language was broadened and enriched, made more flexible and powerful as a vehicle of literary expression. In the sphere of linguistics, as well, the stimulus provided by Arabic proved to be equally significant. Under the influence of Arabic, entirely new sciences of Hebrew grammar, philology, and lexicography came into being and patterned extensively after Arabic, which earlier had developed its own linguistic sciences. With the development and elaboration of these new Hebrew sciences, the Hebrew language, for the first time in its history, became the object of systematic analysis and this, in turn, led to the eventual flowering of a vast Hebrew literature in this field. For the development of both the Hebrew language and Hebrew literature, therefore, the influence of Arabic proved to be of fundamental importance.

The contributions of Islamic civilization to the intellectual development of Judaism were many and varied. None was perhaps more dramatic or more important for the future of Jewish intellectual life than the role played by Islamic civilization in mediating Greek culture and learning to the larger Jewish community. It must be remembered, of course, that Judaism had been exposed to the influences of Greek culture long before the rise of Islam. It is this very fact, however, that points up the special character of the Islamic contribution. Even though Judaism had lived for centuries in a milieu thoroughly permeated by Greek culture, it had stubbornly refused to embrace that culture as Christianity had done. For the vast majority of Jews, Greek culture and learning were regarded as a threat to Jewish values and beliefs. There were, of course, individual Jews and isolated Jewish communities that had drunk deeply at the fountain of Greek learning long before the rise of Islam. But this had had little affect upon Jewish thought or the larger body of Jewry. As H. A. Wolfson has shown, Philo, that towering Jewish philosopher of the first century, remained virtually unknown to Jews as a whole until medieval times. Once, however, the great works of Greek literature, science and philosophy began to appear in Arabic translations and in a kind of Arabic-Islamic veneer, Greek culture suddenly appeared to Jews in a new light, with the result

that much of Judaism's traditional hostility to things Greek disappeared. From the tenth century on, Jews took up the study of Greek thought on a scale hitherto unknown, and with a genuine sense of excitement and enthusiasm. Out of this encounter with Greek culture, there grew up within Judaism a brilliant tradition of Jewish philosophy and a distinguished line of Jewish thinkers. Eventually Jewish philosophers, in their turn, were to play a most important role in mediating Greek thought, as they had learned it from the Arabs, to the Christian West via Spain.

How was it that the larger body of Jews, who for centuries had remained uncompromisingly opposed to Greek wisdom, suddenly, when they encountered that wisdom in an Arabic-Islamic form, embraced it with undisguised enthusiasm? Though it will not be possible to give an adequate answer to this question here, several points may be offered as a partial answer. It must be remembered, in the first place, that by the time the great masterpieces of Greek learning began to appear in Arabic translations, the process of arabization had already gone far. For Jews, therefore, to encounter Greek thought in an Arabic-Islamic form meant to encounter that thought in a form with which they were thoroughly familiar. Through a process of 'arabization' Greek thought had been robbed of something of its foreign quality. Secondly, the integration of Jews into medieval Islamic society and their direct exposure to a non-Jewish environment that was, for the most part, open and tolerant, did much to dissipate the traditional and deep-seated Jewish suspicion of things non-Jewish. Islam's contribution, therefore, is not to be seen so much in the content of what it mediated to Judaism—that was in the present case essentially Greek and thus non-Islamic—as in the transformation which it effected in Judaism's attitude toward the non-Jewish world. Islam's contribution was essentially social and psychological in character; and this, in some ways, was an even more crucial contribution than the actual content of what it mediated to Judaism.

On the religious plane, the encounter between Islam and Judaism led to deep mutual sharing, with important consequences for both. But on this plane, too, it was Judaism that was most profoundly affected by the meeting. Under the influence of Islam, Jewish theology and law underwent important modification and took on their final forms. It was in the sphere of religious piety, however, that Islam was to make its most important contribution to Judaism. Under the impact of Islamic asceticism (*zuhd*) and mysticism (*taṣawwuf*), there developed within Judaism new Jewish forms of asceticism and mysticism bearing the clear marks of their Islamic origins.

The ascetic ideas of Islam appear to have found their way into Judaism for the first time through the writings of Bahya, a Jewish scholar-saint of the eleventh century. It was in his *The Duties of the Heart*, written originally in Arabic, that Bahya made his greatest con-

tribution to this development. Throughout the work, Bahya based himself almost exclusively on Muslim sources, and even at those points where he could very well have drawn on Talmudic materials he chose to rely consistently on Islamic texts. Within a relatively short time, Bahya's work became one of the most widely used books of devotion in medieval Jewish circles, and eventually was translated into Hebrew. Out of the inspiration provided by Bahya and his disciples, there rapidly came into being a vibrant Jewish literature devoted to ascetic themes and concerns, and giving evidence of its Islamic affinities.

Sufi ideas and practices made their appearance in Jewish circles in the twelfth century, the same century that witnessed the rise of the great Muslim Sufi brotherhoods. The first significant Sufi influences are to be found in the writings of Maimonides, perhaps the most impressive religious thinker to appear in the world of medieval Arab Jewry. It was not until the following century, however, and particularly in the writings of his son Maimuni, that the mystical teachings of Islam were to become an all-consuming passion in Jewish circles. In his most important work, *The Complete Guide for Servants of God*, Maimuni repeatedly insisted that the great Sufi masters of Islam had followed the Hebrew prophets of old more faithfully than had the Jewish people themselves. Sufism in its Judaized form attracted large numbers of Jews and very quickly became a vigorous movement. The size and power of this new movement clearly indicates that it corresponded to a deeply-felt need among Arab Jewry at the time. Moreover, Jewish Sufism did not fade out of the picture with the passing of the medieval age, but continued to play an important role in the religious life of Arab Jewry down to the modern period.

Before moving on to the final section of this essay, some attempt must be made to summarize what has been said thus far and, in so doing, to indicate something of Islam's significance for the history of Arab Jewry.

There can be no doubt that the Arab-Muslim conquest struck a massive blow at the vicious spiral of anti-Jewish sentiment in the Near East, North Africa, and Spain. It put an end to the intolerable conditions of oppression under which Jews had previously lived in those areas, and ushered in a new age of tolerance enshrined in, and guaranteed by, law—a tolerance that was not, therefore, at the mercy of the unpredictable, fluctuating moods of the non-Jewish majority. These, moreover, were not isolated changes, but formed part of a general condition that prevailed throughout the empire.

The new conditions created by the Arab conquest paved the way for the progressive integration of Jews into the mainstream of Arab-Islamic society and, in so doing, subjected them to sweeping changes affecting the outward forms a well as the inner core of Jewish existence. From a poor peasant class, excluded from public life, they were

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transformed into an urban, bourgeois people possessing considerable economic power and playing an important role in the political life of the Arab world. Under the impact of the powerful forces of cultural assimilation, they lost most of their separate ethnic identity and, in the process, absorbed much of the Arab-Islamic ethos itself. These changes left their mark on the deepest levels of Jewish being; they permeated the very depths of the Jewish psyche creating, in turn, a new self-image which, though not totally discontinuous with the old self-image, was sufficiently different to warrant being called new. The arabicized Jew was a new kind of Jew—an Arab Jew—and he viewed himself as such.

This complex, multifaceted process of integration with the sweeping changes that flowed from it, made possible an historic encounter between Judaism and Islam of the greatest importance for both. That Judaism was more deeply affected than Islam by the meeting was perhaps inevitable given the latter's superior position, its youthful vigor, and its size. Through the inspiration and stimulation of this encounter Judaism entered a new period of cultural, intellectual, and religious creativity and flowering—one might even call it a renaissance. The direction of influence, however, was not one-way. The encounter involved serious exchange, a genuine dialogue, a give-and-take from which Islam, as well as Judaism, benefited enormously. Islam for its part learned much and deeply from Judaism.

The history of Arab Jewry demonstrates in a rather remarkable way the extent of Islam's commitment to the ideal of openness and tolerance. [14] It was this, it seems to me, that ultimately made possible Islam's enormous impact upon the Jewish people and their faith. Because Islam, on the whole, never posed a threat to Judaism, the latter never found it necessary to assume a defensive, apologetic stance vis-à-vis Islam. Arab Jewry, thus, never had to develop a rationale for their existence in the way that European Jewry had to do. Under Islam Judaism was able to recover much of its long-lost sense of self-respect and dignity. With this new sense of worth and self-confidence, it was possible for Judaism to enter into a dialogue with Islam with a sense of openness and receptivity that would not otherwise have been possible.

In the preceding we have looked at the experience of Jews in Arab lands during the early and medieval periods of Islamic history. In order to complete our survey, something also must be said regarding the history of Arab Jewry in more recent times.

With the passing of the medieval age, classical Islamic civilization entered upon a period of gradual decline that was to last well into the modern era. That both Arab and Jew shared alike in this decline and eclipse indicates further to what extent the history of the two peoples had come to be intertwined. Just as the flowering of Judaism had co-

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[14] Cf., Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, 32 ff.

incided with the golden age of Islam, so now its recession went hand-in-hand with the recession of Islam. If they shared in a common glory, they also shared equally in a common decline. Apart from the temporary improvement that followed the Ottoman conquest of the Near East, the history of Arab Jewry up to the beginning of the present century was one of general decline and stagnation. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the fate of Jews in Arab lands during this period was the result of general cultural, economic and political decline, and not of deliberate policies, consciously formulated and directed against Jews. Where (and when) Jews suffered from conditions of poverty and backwardness, as they did, it was not as Jews, but along with the indigenous population. [15]

The only real exceptions to this last generalization have occurred in the present century and are to be seen almost entirely, I think, as Arab reaction to the Zionist movement and the establishment of the State of Israel. They are an expression of Arab outrage at the displacement of the indigenous Arab population of Palestine through the organized efforts of Zionism and the establishment of an alien state in a land that had been theirs for thirteen centuries. While this reaction, with its resultant anti-Jewish feelings, is not to be excused, it must be seen in its proper historical context. It must be remembered that anti-Jewish sentiment, insofar as it is to be found in the contemporary Arab world, is *strictly* a modern phenomenon, and one that runs counter to the time-honored Islamic tradition of fraternity and tolerance. The very widespread popular notion that present day Arab-Jewish hostility is but another chapter in a long history of mutual animosity is totally false. If there is one thing that the past makes clear, it is precisely that Arabs and Jews can live together peacefully and in a mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationship. History also makes it clear that as heir to the Islamic tradition of openness and tolerance the Arab people have at hand the moral resources adequate for the forging of any such fraternal relationship. Will they choose to fall back on that heritage appropriating its resources, or must they go down the devious paths of narrow, self-centered nationalism charted for them by the modern West? Israel for its part, however, will be called upon to renounce its present form as an outpost of Western political influence, its quasi-racist character, and its blind and arrogant faith in military supremacy as the answer to its problems. As long as Israel retains its present form it will inevitably remain isolated not only from the larger human community in the Near East, but also from the moral resources of its own heritage—a heritage as rich and humane as that to which the Arab world stands heir. We in the West must remember, however, that we have little right to stand over either the Arabs or

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[15] S. W. Baron, *op. cit*, III, 172.

THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

The Palestine problem, which today involves achieving peace between Israelis and Arabs, was created and is basically sustained by the western world. The roots of the problem lie in the Middle Ages when large numbers of persecuted Jews left Christian states for the milder regimes of the East, and in the seventeenth century when European powers began seeking first to penetrate and later to control Near Eastern territories, in order to share in the luxury trade further east. These two roots with their more recent tentacles underlie and support the present world dilemma in Palestine. The United Nations' partition of Palestine in 1947 and the subsequent recognition by member nations of the new state of Israel simply placed the old problem of what was to happen to Palestine in a new setting, and the twentieth-century confrontation between Israel and her Arab neighbors has exposed to view hidden ramifications of the problem. A brief account of events leading up to the present political impasse is the story of this paper.

The spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries brought to the Jews in Palestine a welcome relief from Christian and Byzantine persecution.[1] Under the Muslims medieval Jewish communities flourished in parts of the Arab Muslim Empire, while Christianity was gradually disappearing from the Arab world.[2] Jewish growth under Muslim domination did not result from special privilege so much as from Jewish alliance with the Arabs in their wars of conquest. Jews considered Muslim domination preferable to Christian oppression, while the formerly dominant Christians sought to escape their new inferior position.

The Arabs guaranteed to non-Muslims free exercise of their religion so long as their conduct remained inoffensive to Muslims. Notwithstanding this general religious tolerance, however, Muslims did restrict Jews and Christians from holding government posts, from the use of riding-animals, and from building new synagogues or churches. The law enjoined Muslims from securing the services of Christian or Jewish doctors, discriminated economically against non-Muslims by doubling customs' duties on their mechandise, rejected in the courts non-Muslim witness against a Muslim, and in general made of the non-Muslim population second-class communities. The discriminatory laws were not always enforced, but it has been reasonably asserted that even where they were, the position of the non-Muslims under Arab Islam was on the whole "far better than that of Jews in Medieval Christian Europe."[3] Conditions varied, of course, according to the general state of

[1] For a concise treatment see James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (New York, 1949), pp. 65-103.

[2] See S. D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs* (New York, 1964), pp. 62-88, on which this discussion depends; Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1965), p. 28.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 84. This judgment is illuminated by Bernard Lewis. "If tolerance means the absence of persecution, then classical Islamic society was indeed toler-

Muslim society and the strength and influence of the non-Muslim communities.

The Crusades brought much of Palestine under Christian rather than Arab control, but when the last crusaders were finally driven back to Europe in 1303 Palestine was left a Muslim country of peasants and bedouins. The remaining Christian minority increased slowly, but the Jewish communities continued to shrink in size, while for two centuries Palestine remained a provincial area under Egyptian control. Then, in 1516, the vigorous Ottoman, Selim I (1512-1520), drove the aged Egyptian ruler and his armies from Palestine, and authority in Palestine passed from the Mamluks of Egypt to the Ottomans of Turkey. For the next three hundred years Palestine ceased to engage more than stereotyped Eureopean interest, while the European powers discovered and developed the New World. Indeed, an archaeologist and historian of Palestine declared in 1912 that Palestine during Ottoman rule had no history, and that verdict has generally remained unchallenged by western historians whose interests tend to follow the fortunes of their own states. [4]

In Europe, however, the Inquisition had expelled the Sephardic Jews from Spain in 1492. Since France was closed to them also, these refugees settled in Italy, North Africa and the Levant, only to be driven from Italy in the middle of the sixteenth century. Both Selim and his successor, Suleiman 'the magnificent' (1520-1566), were sympathetic to the plight of the homeless and offered them asylum in Ottoman territories. Non-Muslim religious communities were known as millets. In Ottoman times the major millets were the Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenian. The activities of these groups, including the settling of their disputes and collecting of their taxes, were largely the responsibility of their leader who answered to the government. This system gave Jews a measure of independence that was often impossible in Europe. With

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ant to both its Jewish and its Christian subjects—more tolerant perhaps in Spain than in the East, and in either incomparably more tolerant than was Medieval Christendom. But if tolerance means the absence of discrimination, then Islam never was or claimed to be tolerant, but on the contrary insisted on the privileged superiority of the true believer in this world as well as in the next." "The Pro-Islamic Jews," *Judaism*, 17 (1968), p. 402. If to be tolerant means not to insist on "the privileged superiority of the true believer" Jews and Christians are scarcely in a position to boast!

Mrs. Wadi' Z. Haddad reports, e.g., a dirge used at Jewish burials in Aleppo. It illustrates the local Jewish attitude toward unbelievers. "O death, why did you take him? He never hit his wife, He never broke the Sabbath, He never advised a Muslim, He never befriended a Christian. O death, why did you take him?"

[4] "If the nation be happy that has no history, then Palestine for the next three centuries was truly favored. A better illustration of the foolishness of this stupid proverb could not be found. The people of Palestine had no relations with the great world around except through the intermediation of the Turkish taxgatherer—no distractions or interests or resources or employments—nothing in short to occupy them save the ancient and unprofitable pastime of quarrelling among themselves." R. A. S. Macalister, *A History of Civilisation in Palestine* (Cambridge, 1912), p. 118.

Palestine thus again opened to them, the Jews immigrated in such large numbers they soon outnumbered the indigenous, Arabic-speaking Jewish population. Jerusalem, which in 1488 numbered seventy Jewish families, harbored 1500 Jewish refugees at the turn of the century. The relatively new village of Safad in the province of Galilee received an even larger number of immigrants than Jerusalem and became a center for Jewish mysticism.[5] There the first Hebrew printing press in Palestine was established in 1577.[6] Tiberias, lying in ruins on the shore of the lake, was rebuilt between 1560 and 1565 and became a rival to Safad as a center for Jewish learning.[7]

Yet in spite of the welcome given to Jews early in the century, by its close the numbers of Jews in Palestine were considerably reduced. Plague took its toll. In addition, the indifference of Turkish governors to the welfare of their subjects[8] freed local bedouin tribes, petty officials, Druzes and others to reduce the country to a level of desolation it had not known for centuries. "Traveller after traveller reported desert and marsh where there had been fertile fields, and ruins where there had been towns and villages."[9] A visitor to Jerusalem in 1590 complained that of the city only part of the wall remained, and "all the rest is grasse, mosse and Weedes."[10]

Relief from Istanbul could not be expected, for the Turks were engaged first with the rising Austrian monarchy and later with the expanding Russian state. The invading Turks were defeated by Austrian forces at Vienna in 1683, and in the counter-offensive that developed against them were forced at the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699 to withdraw from most of Hungary. The victorious Austrians had thus made significant inroads into Ottoman territory, but their victory also disturbed commerce in the Mediterranean. As a result there dawned the recognition that henceforth European policy toward the Ottoman Empire should be to preserve it. The Ottoman Empire must be preserved to check the expansion of any European power into the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean or the Levant. Clearly, Palestine's history under Ottoman rule was to become an extension of the struggle among European states and the gradually declining Ottoman state for control of Ottoman territories.

British interest in the Near East also had been growing throughout the sixteenth century. Unable to share in direct trade with India after the Portuguese under Vasco da Gama had rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 and thenceforth secured the sea route to the East, and

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[5] M. Franco, *Essai sur l'Histoire des Israelities de l'empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1897), pp. 42 ff.
[6] Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine* (New York, 1935), p. 335.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[8] H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, (2 vols.; London, 1950), Vol. I, pp. 207 ff.
[9] James Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
[10] Jacob de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

blocked from overland trade by the Venetian and Genoese control of eastern Mediterranean ports, the British sought an overland route to India through Syria and Mesopotamia. After several Turkish sultans had granted British merchants trade privileges in Turkish dominions, Queen Elizabeth in January 1592 granted a charter to "The Governor and Company of Merchants of the Levant" to trade by land through the Ottoman dominions with the East Indies. Thenceforth, even after England defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588, chartered the East India Company in December, 1600, and began using the Cape route to India for the bulk of her trade, the overland route remained important for the transport of mail and personnel. The company stationed an agent in Baghdad, responsible primarily for camel transport of mail between Baghdad and Damascus, and the maintenance of this corridor to the Indian Ocean became a principle goal of British foreign policy. [11]

By the eighteenth century, therefore, maintenance of a European balance of power required "the independence and integrity" of Ottoman territory, as the British were later to insist. [12] The Turkish state, too weak to threaten either sovereignty or independence of the European states, was to be preserved from dismemberment. During the century Russia expanded gradually southward until in 1774 Catherine the Great (1762-1796) forced the defeated Turks to sign a peace treaty at Kuchuk Kainarji on the Danube, the terms of which gave Russia control of the northern shores of the Black Sea, admitted Russian ships to the Straits, and gave Russia the right to intervene in Turkish affairs to protect the interests of Christians anywhere in the Ottoman empire. This final provision led to bitter rivalries among the Christian communities in Palestine and set a precedent for European interference in Palestinian affairs. But the European powers stopped her from proceeding further by the threat of general war and the offer of a portion of Poland in exchange for letting Turkey off lightly. The Turkish state, thus embroiled in the affairs of Europe, was able to give little attention to Palestine beyond collecting its 'tribute.' [13]

The campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte at the close of the century brought the first radical change in the situation of Palestine, making it, as it had once been in the first millenium B.C., a bridge between Egypt and the East. Napoleon's abortive Syrian campaign awakened his rivals to the danger of forfeiting that bridge to France, and William Pitt (lived 1759-1806), in order to counter the French and preserve England's route to the East, proposed the preservation and maintenance of Turkey's 'integrity' as an article of British foreign policy. [14]

[11] John Bagot Glubb, *Britain and the Arabs* (London, 1959), pp. 23 ff. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record: 1535-1914* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 5-15.

[12] Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London, 1956), p. 10.

[13] See the discussion by Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 200-234, "Government and administration in the Arab Provinces."

[14] See E. Kedourie, *op. cit.*, ch. 1, "The Bases of English Policy in the Middle East, 1830-1914."

The debate in Europe over whether the Ottoman state should be preserved or allowed to die stretched over the nineteenth century.[15] But the Ottoman Empire declined to its eventual dismemberment in the disaster of 1914. It was followed by the creation of the Near Eastern 'mandates' and the world's present woes in the Near East. Whatever the reasons for Napoleon's landing at Alexandria on July 1, 1798, two consequences of his brief Near Eastern campaign have endured. One was the irreversible attraction of Palestine into the vortex of western world politics; the other was the stimulation of western interest in Palestinian history, which began with the work of the archaeological and scientific expedition that accompanied Napoleon to Egypt. Both consequences have endured as elements in the problem of Palestine.

Napoleon's intentions for Palestine are not known for certain, and his attitude toward the Jews was not consistent. The evidence strongly suggests, however, that for a short period in the spring of 1799 he was a Zionist.[16] Bonaparte seems to have been the first to recognize the political advantage accruing to the state that could organize and enlist for itself the support of European Jews by offering them Palestine in exchange for their assistance. A dispatch from Istanbul appeared in the official French Gazette, the *Moniteur Universel*, on May 22, 1799, attributing to Bonaparte a proclamation inviting the Jews of Africa and Asia to march under his banner for the restoration of ancient Jerusalem. It seems clear that news of a proclamation was released with Napoleon's permission, even though the proclamation itself does not exist in any of the Napoleonic papers. The notice, moreover, reveals as much about contemporary Jewish dreams as it suggests about Napoleon's political acumen. Had there been no contemporary Jewish aspirations for a restoration of Israel, Napoleon's suggestion would not have arisen. A letter addressed to his Jewish brethren by a French Jew in 1798, however, expresses what must have been current Jewish sentiment: "We are more than six millions of people scattered over the face of the earth; we possess immense riches; let us employ the means that are in our power to restore us to our country. The moment is pro-

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[15] Alphonse de Lamartine, after a trip to the Near East made in 1832-1833, declared that the Ottoman state was ready to fall. Therefore, he said, prophetically as it turned out, "Let destiny accomplish its purpose—observe, wait and be ready.... Let a congress be assembled of the principal powers bordering on the Ottoman empire, or having important interests in the Mediterranean, to establish the principle that Europe withdraws from all action or direct influence upon the internal affairs of Turkey, and abandons it to its own vitality and the chances of its destiny; and to agree beforehand, that in case of the fall of this empire, whether by a revolution at Constantinople or by successive dismemberments, the European powers shall take, under the title of protectorates, such portions of its dominions as shall have been assigned to each by the stipulations of the congress..." *A Pilgrim to the Holy Land* (2 vols.; New York, 1848), Vol II, pp. 303 ff.

[16] Philip Guedalla, *Napoleon and Palestine* (London, 1925), p. 31. The available material has been assembled by Nahum Sokolow, *History of Zionism* (2 vols.; London, 1919), Vol. I, pp. 63-66; Vol. II, pp. 220 ff.

pitious, and to profit by it is our duty." The writer then suggests the election by world Jewry of a legislative and administrative Council to oversee the proposed Jewish occupation of southern Palestine and Lower Egypt ("liable to such arrangements as shall be agreeable to France"). That geographic position, he continues, "which is the most advantageous in the world, will render us, by the navigation of the Red Sea, masters of the commerce of India, Arabia and the South and East of Africa." His final argument for mutual cooperation between Jews and France was a bold *quid pro quo*: "The Council shall offer to the French government, if it will give us the assistance necessary to enable us to return to our country, and to maintain ourselves in the possession of it, 1) Every pecuniary indemnification, and 2) To share the commerce of India, etc., with the merchants of France only." [17]

Napoleon must have known that suggestions like this were being advanced, for in 1807, some years after the failure of his Syrian campaign, he issued an order to convene a Jewish *Sanhedrin* (Supreme Council) in Paris. This body assembled early in February of that year "to reconstruct European Jewry on French imperial lines, with a religious center in Paris." [18] From this one may surmise that Napoleon's political motivation was to unite world Jewry behind his imperial ambitions. The Jewish deputies to the Council were apparently alert to the political circumstances of their meeting, for they believed that Napoleon was planning their "political redemption, in the land of Egypt and on the banks of the Jordan." A contemporary English commentator could thus hazard the supposition that Napoleon's "gigantic mind entertains the idea of re-establishing them (the Jews) in Palestine, and that this forms a part of his plan respecting Egypt, which he is well known never to have abandoned." [19] The English thus recognized any French plan to restore Palestine to the Jews to be "a political instrument in the hands of an ambitious conqueror." That political possibility did not go unrecognized by statesmen in Austria either. In his book, *Memoirs upon the Jews*, published in 1797, Charles Joseph, Prince de Ligne, a general, nobleman and adviser at the imperial court in Vienna, reasoned as follows:

> If the Turks have a little common sense they will try and attract the Jews to them in order to make them their political, military and financial advisers, their police agents, their merchants, in short to become initiated by their advisers into all wherein lies the strength and weakness of the Christian states. Finally, the Sultan will sell to them the Kingdom of *Judah*, where they would act better than aforetimes . . . The Jews who would have found again their country would be compelled to make therein flourish the arts,

[17] Cited by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 221 f.
[18] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 83.
[19] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 87.

> industry, agriculture and the commerce of Europe. *Jerusalem*, a horrible nest at present, giving a heartache to the pilgrims who come there now, would become a splendid capital. [20]

Thus at the beginning of the nineteenth century, five hundred years after the last of the crusaders had been driven from the Near East, Palestine was again part of the Mediterranean world rather than a remote eastern center for a few western pilgrims. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and Palestine was an attempt to cut England's overland ties with India. Beyond that, however, he brought to Egypt the printing press, which was to transform Egyptian education and intellectual life, and a body of scholars to investigate and describe this ancient, new world. The publication of their work between 1809 and 1828, the justly famous *Description de l'Egypte* in nineteen folio volumes, together with the accidental discovery of the trilingual (Greek, Demotic and Hieroglyphic) Rosetta stone in 1799, was the start of archaeological, linguistic and historical discovery that has continued in the Near East to the present day. In the wake of that discovery Christian scholars were drawn irresistibly to Palestine to startling opportunities for biblical research. England meanwhile steadily increased its political and economic position in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and increasing Jewish longing for Palestine culminated finally in the first Zionist Congress at Basel on August 29, 1897, almost exactly one hundred years after Napoleon had landed in Egypt.

The history of Palestine during the century after Napoleon is marked by the effects on that country of European struggles for control of the Ottoman state or its territories, [21] the steady arrival of increasing numbers of western travellers and scholars, and the remarkable surge in Jewish immigration. These interrelated facts were the foundation for the ugly political impasse that appeared in Palestine at mid-twentieth century.

The magnitude of Jewish immigration to Palestine during the nineteenth century is not everywhere appreciated. For Israelis its supports their claim to the land; for Arabs it emphasizes the extent and long history of their present, acute struggle for their own land. Muslim rulers seem seldom to have refused Jews from foreign countries permission to settle in Palestine, a privilege not always granted to western Christians, [22] and the nineteenth century was no exception. The Jewish population of Palestine in 1845 was 12,000; by 1882 it had doubled; in 1895 the number had reached 47,000, and on the eve of the first World War it had grown to 85,000. Between 1914 and 1936 Jewish population in Palestine quadrupled, mostly as a result of immigration. [23] In 1873

[20] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 90.
[21] See the discussion of E. Kedourie, *loc cit.* (note 14 above).
[22] James Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[23] F. Notestein, "Population Problems of Palestine," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 25 (October, 1945), p. 327 f. Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 275, gives the 1914

Jews were estimated to be increasing in Jerusalem at the rate of 1200-1500 per year, and Claude Conder reported in 1894 to the Society known as the Palestine Exploration Fund that when he first saw Jerusalem in 1872 there were only a few scattered villas outside its walls. But at the time of his report "there is now a Jewish suburb, extending for a mile along the western road... I suppose that the present Jewish population of the Holy City [out of a total population of 51,000[24]] cannot be reckoned at less than 40,000 souls, which represents a trebling of the total population in twenty years."[25] The Jewish settlement was primarily in the cities. Of the 7000 Jews who settled in 1882, 4000 stayed in Jerusalem, 2000 in Jaffa, and 1000 in Hebron.[26]

Most of the immigrants came from Europe to escape a Christian fanaticism far more bitter than Muslim discrimination.[27] In 1860, e.g., as a result of European indignation aroused at the kidnapping by the Church in Bologna two years earlier of a seven-year-old Jewish boy, Edgardo Mortara, presumably because he had been baptized into the Christian faith, there was organized in Paris the Alliance Israélite Universelle. This group was formed to defend Jewish rights wherever they might be attacked and to spread western education to the deprived Jewish communities of the world. The persecutions that began in 1881 in Russia, for reasons that remain obscure,[28] sent great numbers of Jews to Palestine and led to the formation of a movement known as the "Lovers of Zion" (*Chovevé Zion*).[29] The Dreyfus affair in 1894 drove Theodor Herzl (lived 1860-1904) in 1896 to write his pamphlet, "The Jewish State," which heralded the modern Zionist organization.[30] Earlier in the century affairs in Damascus and Rhodes had brought Sir Moses Montefiore (lived 1784-1885) from England to Palestine to take up the cause of innocent Jewish martyrs and seek the establishment of Jewish refugee colonies in Palestine. Jewish national feeling has always been aroused and strengthened by Jewish suffering, and the strongest argument in the Jewish case for Palestine is the demand for security from oppression. One of Montefiore's last utterances summed up the rising mood of world Jewry: "I do not expect that all *Israelites* will quit their abodes in those territories in which they feel

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population as between 90,000 and 100,000, including: 50,000 in Jerusalem; 12,500 in Safad, and 12,000 in Jaffa-Tel Aviv.

[24] de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

[25] C. R. Conder, "The Future of Palestine," in *The City and the Land*, 1894 (Palestine Exploration Fund, 1894), p. 45.

[26] de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

[27] See Laurence Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead* (New York, 1881), p. 15; Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 112.

[28] But see James Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 267. "In 1881 the Tsar Alexander II was murdered, and the bureaucracy, seeking for a scapegoat, laid the blame on the Jews."

[29] M. L. Margolis and A. Marx, *A History of the Jewish People* (Philadelphia, 1927), pp. 691 ff.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 702 ff.

happy . . . but Palestine must belong to the Jews, and Jerusalem is destined to become the seat of a Jewish Commonwealth." [31]

Not all immigrants came from the West. At mid-century a Zionist movement arose in Baghdad, "impelled by real love for Zion and Palestine," which led many Jews to leave their native city and emigrate to Palestine. Baghdad contained at the time a prospering Jewish community, boasting fifteen synagogues that were open and frequented for public worship. In the summer of 1868 this community established a society for promoting religious life in Baghdad, whose concerns were not limited to the local poor, but included especially the poor of the Holy Land. [32]

The existence of these poor was well-known in the West. The Jews in Palestine in 1881 were described by one traveller as being "for the most part of a mendicant class . . . deprived of that protection they would enjoy under the auspices of a company and a charter securing them a certain amount of self-government." [33] Another exclaimed, "The town of Tiberias is chiefly remarkable for the exceeding filthiness of most of its streets, and especially in the Jews' quarter. How any civilized European Jew can see his people degraded as they are in Tiberias and then come back to his own gilded home in the west, and leave his brethren to wallow in such a mess beside that lovely lake, is beyond conception. Jews amongst us Gentiles in England have refinement, cleanliness, luxury, and elegance—why don't they send to the Rabbis of Galilee, at any rate, besoms and soap." [34] Conder, however, wrote of the Jews in Jerusalem in 1894 that "the trade of the city has fallen chiefly into Jewish hands, and they are no longer a timorous

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[31] Cited by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 120.

[32] David Solomon Sassoon, *A History of the Jews in Baghdad* (Letchworth, 1949), pp. 146 ff., 173.

[33] Lawrence Oliphant, *Land of Gilead*, p. 17. See Bernard Lewis, *loc. cit.* "European travellers to the East in the age of liberalism and emancipation are almost unanimous in deploring the degraded and precarious position of Jews in Muslim countries, and the dangers and humiliations to which they were subject." Oliphant made some amusing remarks about the need for encouraging Muslim financial selfishness that cast a revealing light on life in Palestine for Muslims of the period and laid the foundation for his argument that Palestine should be given to those who can make it bloom, namely, the Jews. He wrote: "It is much more difficult to satisfy the pecuniary expectations of Christians than of Moslems: indeed, one would imagine that it was rather the Koran than the Bible which denounced the love of money as being the root of all evil—so much keener are Christian than Moslem cupidities; but as the result of a more enlightened financial selfishness is a higher state of civilization, I suppose it should be encouraged. Unless we can stimulate the Moslem to devote his whole energies to preying upon his neighbor, and can increase his greed for money and his necessities generally, the cause of reform in Turkey is hopeless. I am not now speaking of the bureaucratic class, who have been either educated in Europe or taught by contact with enlightened foreigners how 'to turn an honest penny'—but of the simple peasantry and provincial folk generally, who are not mixed up in administrative vices, and who suffer from the absence of those avaricious instincts which enable Christians to thrive and prosper when the Moslem earns but a scanty living—not because he is less industrious, but because he is less covetous and astute" p. 377.

[34] J. MacGregor, *The Rob Roy on the Jordan* (New York, 1870), p. 389.

and oppressed minority, but something more resembling the masters of the city." [35] And as early as 1843 a visitor to Damascus reported that "as a class the Jewish foreign merchants of Damascus (where the Jewish population was estimated at 5000) are the most wealthy." [36] This made them a prey, of course, for Ottoman extortion, and Jewish bankers in Damascus seem to have been subject to particular abuse. [37]

It is worth observing that the total number of Jews in the world in 1881 was estimated to be some six or seven million, distributed as follows: in America about one and a half million, in Europe about five million, in Asia over two hundred thousand, and in Africa nearly one hundred thousand. More than half of the European Jews (2,621,000) lived in Russia; 1,375,000 were under Austrian rule, more than half of whom were living in the Polish province of Galicia; half a million were in Germany, and more than a quarter million in Rumania. Turkey numbered more than one hundred thousand, while Holland with seventy thousand, England and France with fifty thousand each, and Italy with thirty-five thousand comprised the rest. Of the Asiatic Jews twenty thousand were thought to be in India and twenty-five thousand in Palestine. [38] What happened after 1881, obviously, was a major shift in Jewish population westward from eastern Europe, the horrible extermination of Jews in the 1930s and 1940s, and continued massive Jewish immigration into Palestine. This phenomenon forced world attention to Palestine, where the problem of relief for persecuted Jews and the rights of local inhabitants became more and more acute.

Christian interest in Palestine grew stronger with every increase in knowledge of biblical history. British residents and officials of the East India Company in Baghdad had revealed to the world early in the century some previously hidden splendors of Mesopotamian civilization, and as a result, in 1847, the first Assyrian room was inaugurated in the Louvre, followed shortly thereafter by a collection in the British Museum. The cuneiform script of Mesopotamia was slowly but surely deciphered and by 1857 an Assyrian text had been translated thus opening to the world the hitherto closed records of a civilization known only in snatches from the Bible and Herodotus. The stimulus given to biblical studies by this feat led to the establishment of the Palestine Exploration Fund in 1865, and by the end of the century scholars had begun to penetrate the mysteries of ancient Near Eastern history and civilization and to establish for themselves resident schools and research centers in Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Beirut. The majority of these men were students of biblical history, and their interest was primarily in the fortunes of ancient Israel. Conditioned by biblical

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[35] *Loc. cit* (note 25 above).
[36] Cited by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75.
[37] Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 224.
[38] Oliphant, *Land of Gilead*, p. 16.

reports of the splendors of the Davidic kingdom (ca. 1000 B.C.), they viewed the current state of Palestine [39] as hopeless unless improved by some "lovers of Zion" who would work enthusiastically for its improvement. They therefore encouraged the return of Palestine to the Jews who longed for it. [40] The American consul revealed the increasing Zionist mood in his report of 1892, that to the consternation of those "who think that Palestine belongs to the Jews" practically no Jews arrived in Palestine during the previous year. [41]

In the wake of the scholars came increasing numbers of travellers, who returned home with tales of their experiences and superficial observations about life in the Holy Land. Some travellers stayed long enough to understand local customs and recognize problems of land development. These men often concluded for themselves and convinced their statesmen at home that the best way to modernize the land was to encourage Jewish immigration. Palestine "wants capital and population," wrote Lord Shaftesbury in 1876. "The Jews can give it both . . . It would be a blow to England if either of her rivals should get hold of Syria . . . A nation must have a country. The old land, the old people. This is not an artificial experiment: it is nature, it is history." [42] "It remains for England to decide," wrote Oliphant in 1881, [43] "whether she will undertake the task of exploring (Palestine's) ruined cities, of developing its vast agricultural resources, by means of the repatriation of that race which first entered into its possession three thousand years ago, and of securing the great political advantages which must accrue from such a policy." Mr. Oliphant reminded the Ottoman Sultan [44] that he would win the support of "a large section of the British public" if he would inaugurate a policy of restoring Palestine to the Jews, and he enunciated explicitly "the advantages of an alliance with the Jewish race, to any Power likely to become involved in the impending complications in the East, which may possibly involve a general war . . ." He wrote: "The nation that espoused the cause of the Jews and their restoration to Palestine would be able to rely upon their support in financial operations on the largest scale, upon the powerful influence which they wield in the press of many countries, and on their political cooperation in those countries—which would of

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[39] James Parkes, *op. cit.*, p 170. "It was in the early part of the 19th century that the cumulative effect of centuries of neglect and destruction (in Palestine) reached its culmination." As late as 1925 David Lloyd George complained, "There are about 600,000 Arabs in Palestine, which once held millions." See Philip Guedalla, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[40] See Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1948* (London, 1950), p. 12; de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 428 f. The story of Jewish colonization of Palestine is told by the same author, *Palestine, the Rebirth of an Ancient People* (New York, 1917), chs. 10-14.

[41] Cited by de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

[42] Cited by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 209.

[43] *Land of Gilead*, p. 29.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 405 f.

necessity tend to paralyze the diplomatic and even hostile action of Powers antagonistic to the one with which they were allied. Owing to the financial, political, and commercial importance to which the Jews have now attained, there is probably no one Power in Europe that would prove so valuable an ally to a nation likely to be engaged in a European war, as this wealthy, powerful, and cosmopolitan race." [45]

Travellers occasionally reported examples of Jewish, Muslim and Christian relations. From these the secondary status of the Jewish communities in the Muslim country is evident. Also evident is the Arab-Jewish ability to live together in peace; the relations between Arabs and Jews were on the whole good. [46] Oliphant reported in 1887 [47] that a Jew who had accompanied him into the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem, "that most beautiful and sacred of Mohammedan temples," was not permitted "even to enter the street in which stands the Christian Church of the Holy Sepulchre." Basic Muslim attitudes were, however, prejudiced against Jews. Earlier, in 1870, the adventurer, J. MacGregor, who travelled through Palestine with his canoe, "The Rob Roy," [48] recorded that attitude on two occasions. Once his guide reprimanded an Arab, suspected of being partner to a plot on MacGregor's life, with the words, "And so to save him from drowning, or being lost, you thought it best to shoot him? Ah! dogs, brutes, pigs, Jews!" Another time MacGregor recollects, "Here, as well as some twenty years before, I heard men in Palestine call their fellows 'Jew' as the very lowest of all possible words of abuse." But MacGregor also knew Jews who had prosperity and status in their communities. He told of his two-day stay with a Jewish family at Acre. [49]

> Among the busy group, when I landed, one said to me in good English, "Come and have coffee with me." It was just the very thing I wanted—a cup of hot coffee—so I went, nothing loath, and on the way he said, "I wish to show you my young wife." This seemed odd enough, but I was ready for any thing that might turn up. The lady was a clever Lancashire lass, who had been six years in this funny little town of Acre, and now she prattled Arabic like a Turk, and sat cross-legged on a divan, while her nargilleh gurgled its blue cloud. I staid two days, delighted with this kind Jewish family.

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[45] In the mid-twentieth century such an argument would evoke a charge of anti-Semitism, but in 1919 Nahum Sokolow (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 207) could assign Oliphant "a place of honour in the realm of England's Zionism."

[46] de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

[47] *Haifa or Life in Modern Palestine*, 2nd ed. (London and Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1887), p. 298.

[48] *The Rob Roy on the Jordan*, p. 273.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 447.

Nearly forty years later, when the news came to Jerusalem in August, 1908, that a constitution had been adopted in Turkey, there was jubilation in the city. R. A. S. Macalister reported: [50] "Next the whole mob, Muslims, Jews, and Christians, went in a body to the Haram—the most sacred enclosure of the Holy Rock, the ancient Temple Site, where without a permit and a military escort none save the followers of Muhammad dare set their foot—each singing songs of their respective Faiths. For once there was neither Jew nor Greek—all alike were *Ottomans*! Supercilious old Muslim sheikhs and bigoted Jewish rabbis might be seen embracing in the streets. On all sides was heard the glad cry hurrîyeh—'liberty!' "

In the west, however, the political event that was to engulf and rend Palestine, i.e., the eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, was developing. Three stages may be distinguished. The first began in the aftermath of the Turkish repulse from Vienna at the peace of Karlowitz in 1699 already mentioned. It was a period during which the empire was held together for the most part because the jealous European powers were unwilling to risk a general war for the sake of their own possible gains in the Ottoman dominions. But this European 'hands off' policy could not last, partly because of Ottoman internal weakness. In 1805 the Albanian Mehmet Ali (lived 1769-1849) became pasha of Egypt. Profiting from the weakness of Turkish central authority under the sultan, Mahmoud II (1808-1839), he made himself practically independent of Istanbul, and between 1831 and 1839 his son Ibrahim overran Palestine and Syria. It was during this period of Mehmet's rule that western visitors were permitted to enter Palestine and Syria and open their first schools and hospitals.

In 1839, however, the British answered an appeal from Mahmoud to intervene in the dispute between himself and Mehmet Ali. British intervention, which compelled Mehmet to withdraw from Syria, was of course intended to prevent any Russian diplomatic or territorial gains at Ottoman (and European) expense. It was a move intended to reduce Mehmet to "obedience and subordination to the Sultan," and thus preserve the "integrity" of the Ottoman Empire. Significantly, perhaps, the first British consul was appointed that same year to Jerusalem, for the British defeat of Mehmet Ali stirred discussion in England about what should be done with Syria and Palestine. Public sentiment was divided between returning the territories intact to Turkey and annexing Acre and Cyprus to guarantee England free overland passage to India. [51] British policy, however, demanded the "integrity" of Turkey, and the territories were restored.

One of the British policies respecting Turkey was that it "should apprentice itself to Europe," so that it might finally "emerge in the

[50] *Op. cit.*, p. 127.
[51] The situation is summarized by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 104 ff.

likeness of a European state," [52] able to withstand external pressures for its dissolution. Partly in response to western pressures for reform, but primarily to invigorate the empire so that it could deal with Europe as an equal and not as a European protectorate, the new Turkish sultan, Abdul Mejid (1830-1861), issued in 1839 the document known as *Hatti-Sherif* of Gulhané, in which he promised security of life, honor and property to all Ottoman subjects, without discrimination as to race or creed. This was the first step on the way to the new Turkish constitution of 1876. To Russia, however, the prospect of Ottoman modernization was unwelcome, for the Tsar (Nicholas I, 1825-1855) hoped to profit from any dismemberment of the declining Turkish Empire. Turkish and western resistance to this Russian hope precipitated the Crimean War (1853-1856), which involved ostensibly Russian imperial protection of Christians in Ottoman domains. In fact it was fought to keep the Russo-Turkish frontier inviolate. At the close of the war the powers meeting in Paris agreed jointly to maintain the "integrity" of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government also renewed the reforms of 1839 in a new document, the *Hatti-Humayoun*, which gave non-Muslims equality before the law with Muslims and eligibility for the army and civil service. This reform-document was made part of the peace, and the Ottoman desire for reforms was accepted as genuine, the powers agreeing to give Turkey a chance to carry them through. [53]

The Crimean war inaugurated a second phase in the Ottoman decline. This was a period of reforms attempted at Istanbul along western lines, and it was marked by the 'rule' of western ambassadors at Istanbul and western consuls at Jerusalem and Beirut. [54] These foreign officials looked after the interests of Jews and Christians in addition to those of their own nationals and assisted in Palestine in resolving disputed Christian claims to holy sites. Reform in Turkey, however, proved for the time being to be abortive, and by the time Russia once more declared war on Turkey in 1877 in an effort at Pan-Slavism, Palestine was virtually independent of Constantinople. "Palestine was merely the bedraggled tassel of the bespattered and much buffeted Turkish fez, the emblem of a hated bureaucracy." [55] By then, however, the Suez Canal had been completed (1869) and Britain had become the principal stockholder in the company (1875). Russian success in the eastern Mediterranean would jeopardize Britain's seaway to the East, and when, therefore, the Russians in 1877 forced Turkey to yield territories south of the Caucasus and west of the Black Sea, Britain clamored for

[52] E. Kedourie, *op cit.*, p. 13.

[53] The Russian defeat by England, France and Turkey left Russian influence in Palestine intact, and architectural evidences of it are still a prominent part of the Jerusalem skyline.

[54] Great Britain sent a consul to Jerusalem in 1838; France, Prussia and Sardinia followed in 1843, and the United States in 1844. In 1849 the Sardinian consul was replaced by an Austrian. Spain sent a representative in 1854. A Russian consul arrived in Beirut in 1839.

[55] de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

war against Russia. General European war was averted, however, largely through the efforts of Bismarck, and at the treaty of Berlin in 1878 the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire continued.

So far is it affected the Near East, the initial break meant that Britain took Cyprus, and the French who forty-eight years earlier had occupied Algeria expanded into Tunisia. The peace satisfied no one, except perhaps the British, who, to guard their economic interests in Egypt and preserve order there landed troops in 1882, thus making Egypt a British protectorate. The French responded to British policy in Egypt by increasing their own control of North Africa. Soon the major European powers were involved in fateful scramble for Ottoman territories, and the world was ultimately catapulted into the war of 1914. In that war the Turks, seeking an ally against their old enemies, Russia, France and Great Britain, joined with Germany, and the Arab East with British assistance withdrew from the Ottoman Empire.

Meanwhile, however, the Turkish government, regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine as dangerous, since most of the immigrants came from Russia, restricted immigration and attempted to prevent by any means possible the transfer of land ownership to Jews. In 1901 Arabs were forced to agree that they would not sell land to Jews or permit the building of churches or schools on their property, and the Zionism of Theodor Herzl and his followers in 1897 stiffened Turkish restrictions on Jewish immigration and land ownership. The Turkish government in 1899 issued passports to Jews good for three months maximum, but forbade them from becoming permanent residents in Palestine.[56] Laurence Oliphant, who believed that Jewish settlement in Palestine would help to stabilize the Ottoman Empire, summed up the situation in 1887: "There are three prejudices which have operated against the colonization of Palestine by Jews, and which are all absolutely unsound, and these are first, that the Jew cannot become an agriculturalist; secondly, that the country is barren; and, thirdly, that it is unsafe. The real obstacle in the way to Palestine colonization does not lie in any of these directions, but in the fact that the government is most determinedly opposed to it."[57]

In 1908 a group of Turkish army officers, known as the 'Young Turks' won control of the Ottoman government and restored the constitution of 1876, according to which elections were held and a parliament representing all regions of the Ottoman Empire was assembled. The immediate effect in Palestine was that thrill of rejoicing already reported above at the dawning of a new age of freedom. But the new constitution did not come sufficiently to grips with the problems of adequate Arab representation in the government, the status of Arabic

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[56] *Ibid.*, p. 442.
[57] *Haifa or Life in Modern Palestine*, 2nd ed., p. 62.

as an accepted, official language, or the thorny issue of government centralized at Istanbul or decentralized throughout the provinces. Turkish nationalism, represented by the 'Young Turks' emphasized the distinction in the Ottoman Empire between Turks and Arabs, thus contributing to the rise of a sense of Arab destiny. This led finally to laws in 1913 and 1914 granting the provinces a large measure of local autonomy, but though life in Palestine remained essentially unchanged thereafter, Arab 'loyalty' to the empire had been shaken. Then in August 1914 Jerusalem awoke to the fact that Palestine was part of a struggle that would radically change its history, its character, and its destiny, for the war of 1914 brought about finally the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. [58]

The crisis that had been developing throughout the nineteenth century in Palestine arrived at Britain's door in 1914 and at the world's thirty-three years later. The western allies in the war had attempted to buttress the Arab leaders' belief that their hopes for freedom and independence from Turkey rested with an Allied victory. If Germany and Turkey were not defeated, then hope for a favorable future in the Near East would be indefinitely postponed; independence for the Near Eastern principalities lay therefore in cooperation with the British and French to defeat the Turks. Similar efforts at persuasion and reassurance were made with respect to the Jews, as the letter of Mr. A. D. Balfour, dated November 2, 1917, to Lord Rothschild makes clear. That document was an official declaration of British sympathy with "Jewish Zionist aspirations." It expressed approval of "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" and pledged "to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." Obviously the British goal with regard to the Zionists was the same as that respecting the Arabs. It was to gain their political and economic support for the war effort against Turkey, and for the achievement of these goals Britain offered vague and contradictory promises to both groups. Some years later (May 25, 1925) Mr. Lloyd George in some brief remarks to the Jewish Historical Society in London said honestly, "It is not our conception, and I am certain it is not the conception of the Zionists, that anyone should be driven out of Palestine who does not want to go ... Palestine was never a land exclusively of Jews." [59] British policy respecting Palestine was obviously far from precise.

Zionist goals at the time were also ambivalent. Nahum Sokolow in 1919 disclaimed any Zionist intention of forming an independent Jewish state: "It has been said, and is still being obstinately repeated by anti-Zionists again and again, that Zionism aims at the creation of an

[58] de Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 449.
[59] In Philip Guedalla, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

independent 'Jewish State.' But this is wholly fallacious. The 'Jewish State' was never a part of the Zionist programme." [60] But at a demonstration conducted in the London Opera House on December 2, 1917 to express Zionist gratitude to the British government for the Balfour declaration, Moses Gaster had spoken somewhat differently. He had declared that Zionists "wanted to establish in Palestine an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth in the fullest sense of the word. They wanted Palestine to be Palestine of the Jews and not merely a Palestine for Jews. They wished the land to be again ... a land of Israel. The ground must be theirs." [61] Sokolow himself wrote: "Give to the Jews a footing on their own soil, house and home of their own! Palestine (and gradually the thinly populated neighboring districts) can become a great outlet for Jewish population: Palestine can again be made to 'blossom like a rose,' and be capable of supporting a great population as in the glorious days of David and Solomon." [62] "Zionists want a commonwealth of Jewish colonization and labor, a settlement of Jewish pioneers and workers who will be able to create and develop a civilization of their own, undisturbed by any restrictions. This is possible only in Palestine, and is the paramount necessity of the whole Jewish people all over the world." [63] In the light of statements like these Zionist disclaimers about an independent Jewish state sound hollow indeed.

The allied effort in the Near East in 1915 was aimed at preventing Muslim acceptance that the war was a *jihad*, a holy war, support of which would be obligatory on all Muslims. Such an acceptance would have allied all Muslims from Africa to India with Germany and Turkey against Britain and France. For a declaration of *jihad* to have force, however, it would require the support of Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, guardian of the holy cities and of the Prophet's flag. Western intrigue, therefore, was directed at him and his son, Faisal, who acted as his emissary to the western leaders. The British High Commissioner in Egypt, Mr. A. Henry McMahon, after securing authority from his government, in October 1915 promised Hussein, in exchange for Arab support in the war, that Britain would with one exception "recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca," i.e., a western boundary consisting of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersin. The British, seeking to protect themselves

[60] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. xxiv f.
[61] Reported by Sokolow, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 109.
[62] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. xxiii.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. xxvi. Sokolow stated the objectives of Zionism (p. xxv): "A home for Jews who are materially or morally suffering. A home for Jewish education, learning and literature. A source of idealism for Jews all over the world. A place in which Jews can live a healthy Jewish life. A revival of the language of the Bible. The resurrection by civilization and industry of the old home of our fathers, long neglected and ruined The creation of a sound, strong Jewish agricultural class."

from trouble with the French, who claimed the area west from Damascus to the Sea, excepted from the Arab demands "the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo." [64] On the basis of this agreement Arabs entered the war on the side of Britain, and the Turks were defeated.

At its conclusion the allied victors assembled in Paris in the winter of 1919 "to reconstruct the world." In the process the Ottoman Empire disappeared, Syria and Lebanon going as League of Nations mandates to France, and Palestine and Iraq as mandates to Great Britain. Britain was now required to make good her vague promises both for the sake of her own national honor and to support the general principle of the Versailles treaty, namely, the rights of all peoples to national self-determination. President Wilson had stated the American position when he insisted, "one of the fundamental principles to which the United States adheres is the consent of the governed. From the point of view of the United States of America the only idea is whether France will be agreeable to the Syrians . . . The only way to deal with the question is to discover the desires of the populations of these regions." [65] Subsequently, in the summer of 1919 the American King-Crane Commission travelled through Syria and Palestine assembling opinion on the merits of self-determination. The report of the Commission showed that Zionist aims in Palestine were "practically complete dispossession of the non-Jewish inhabitants," and that "nine-tenths of the population were most emphatically against the entire Zionist programme." [66] The Commission's report, however, was not reflected in the final document, the Covenant of the League of Nations, article 22 of which directed: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory." It had become clear, however, that the Zionists would have to encourage Jewish immigration in order to counteract the existing Arab majority, and the number of immigrants to be allowed in Palestine became a significant issue, particularly after outrages against the Jews in Europe began in the 1930s when increased Jewish immigration to England and the United States was not allowed. [67]

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[64] See E. Kedourie, *op. cit*, ch. 5; J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality* (New York, 1939), ch. 6; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia, 1938).

[65] Cited in Jeffries, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 299 f.

[67] The question of immigration is discussed by Parkes, *op. cit*, pp. 309 f., 320; A. M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate* (London, 1950), ch. 6; J. B. Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

The Palestine Mandate was finally adopted in September 1923, [68] "framed unmistakably in the Zionist interest." [69] The document showed unawareness of the legitimate Arab complaint that their position within the mandate was left almost totally undefined, and it intensified their fears of a complete Jewish takeover of Palestine. Furthermore, the Jews in Palestine looked for assistance from the world Zionist organization which appointed the Executive for Palestine, over whose appointment the Mandatory had no control. The Arabs, for their part, owned the land, and the continued success of their neighbors in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in achieving by force some of their demands from the British and French, was not lost on the Palestinian Arabs. Riots occurred in Palestine in 1929, which led to the Hope-Simpson report that recommended a reduction in Jewish immigration into Palestine. Massive Zionist objection to that recommendation led to British explanations and consequently to renewed Arab charges of invincible Jewish influence in London.

After 1929 the mandate gradually proved less and less workable as Arab and Jewish expectations became irreconcilable. By 1936 it had become clear that British vague promises of twenty years previous could not either be repudiated or fulfilled. The situation in Palestine was more complex than ever, for a Jewish national home did in fact now exist, and Palestinian Arab nationalists were convinced that the Zionists alone prevented them from self-rule. Jews and Arabs, on the basis of those earlier promises and their partial implementation, now had rights in Palestine. Since the mandate would not work, perhaps a solution to conflicting claims would be geographical partition. This was the finding of the British Peel Commission that was in Palestine from November 1936 to January 1937. Arabs, however, rejected the idea categorically; Zionist leaders had much to gain by considering it, but the Zionist Congress meeting in Zurich in August 1937, though they endorsed the idea, rejected the proposed plan finally on the grounds that Jews had an 'inalienable right' to all of Palestine. In May 1939, therefore, the British government, seeing World War II on the horizon, and seeking to preserve its position in the Near East, issued a White Paper, explaining that Britain had never contemplated subordination of "the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine"; that British policy had never been that Palestine should become a Jewish state; that a further 75,000 Jews would be admitted to Palestine over the next five years, at the expiration of which time Jewish immigration would cease unless the Arabs of Palestine would agree to its continuance; and that the High Commissioner would control or prohibit the sale of land to Jews in certain areas. [70] The Zionist Congress, meeting on the eve of the war at Geneva in August 1939, rejected

[68] The text is given in Jeffries, *op. cit.*, pp. 547-553.
[69] Notestein, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[70] J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York, 1950), pp. 101 ff.

the White Paper, but world attention was by then focused elsewhere. The Germans invaded Poland on September 1, and two days later Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.

The plight of European Jews now became brutal, and extreme pressures were placed upon the Mandatory to offer fugitives asylum in Palestine since offers of refuge were not abundant elsewhere.[71] Since Britain did not relax the immigration quota of the White Paper, the war years in Palestine were filled with Jewish terrorism, while Britain tried desperately to control Jewish immigration, accepted Jewish assistance in personnel and material for the European and North African war effort,[72] and sought generally to strengthen the Arab position while not abandoning the commitment to Jewish rights in Palestine. Jewish terrorist activities were directed against the British, whose authority in Palestine they considered to rest on force alone, to the continuing detriment and destruction of large numbers of European Jews.[73] The Arab leader was the astute, ambitious and unscrupulous Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, who never seems to have understood politics to be the art of the possible; his successors have, like him, continued to lament past grievances and to appeal for abstract justice, i.e., an end to the Jewish state in Palestine.

After the war ended in May 1945, President Truman suggested in a letter to Clement Atlee in August that Britain take steps to end the Jewish problem in Europe by admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine; but Parliament did not act. In November of the same year the United States government joined with Britain in a fresh look at Palestine as a National Home for Jewish refugees in Europe, but Secretary Bevin properly declared that Palestine alone could not solve the problem of European Jews, and the Committee in its report of May 1946 endorsed the future creation of a binational state together with the immediate conversion of the mandate into a United Nations' trusteeship. Finally in January 1947 Winston Churchill demanded in Parliament that Britain abandon the mandate and withdraw from Palestine. Shortly thereafter, at the end of Febuary, the British government submitted the matter to the United Nations, which recommended unanimously in August 1947 that the mandate should be terminated and later, on November 29, 1947, that the country should be partitioned. The Jews accepted the scheme; the Arabs rejected it by a general strike which soon became open war against the Jewish community. The British set the date for their withdrawal at midnight, May 14th, 1948. On that day, before the British began their announced withdrawal, the Jewish National Council

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[71] It has been suggested that Zionists exploited the situation, devoting their efforts to transporting helpless fugitives from Europe illegally to Palestine, in order to strengthen their cause in Palestine, rather than using their power to find asylum for them elsewhere. Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

[72] These trained men later formed the cadre of the Jewish defense army, the Haganah.

[73] See James Parkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 347 f.

formally declared the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in the fertile area allotted to the Jews by the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations admitted the new state as a member early in May 1949.[74] The epilogue to the creation of Israel has been a continued state of war in Palestine, with no forseeable prospect of peace.

The Israeli case rests on the legality of the Balfour declaration, the mandate and the United Nations' recognition of Israel. The Arab position is that neither the Balfour declaration nor the mandate were legally valid. They point out also that in 1947 they were willing to accept the results of those illegal documents and even to admit Truman's 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. What they refused to consider, however, was the Jewish Agency's talk of millions. But the crucial force in the conflict remains the Big-Power rivalry, with its focus in the Near East on Israel. It seems ironic that just as the reform and preservation of the Ottoman Empire became a focus for European political rivalry in the nineteenth century, so the preservation of the Israeli state is becoming in the twentieth. Those who believed with Lord Palmerston (lived 1784-1865) that "the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquility, the liberty, and the balance of power in the rest of Europe"[75] have as their latter-day counterparts those who believe the state of Israel to be a major force for order and freedom in the Near East today, and a stronghold in the western struggle to contain Russian, i.e., Soviet Communist expansion.[76]

Palestine has become inextricably entwined in western world politics and now is a pivot around which revolves western and Near Eastern strategy. What the western powers decide still determines in large measure the fate of the Near East and the world. Alphonse de Lamartine's cold-blooded political realism of 1833, which led him to recommend what he considered to be the proper European action following the certain Ottoman collapse, remains essential to proper assessment of the problem of Palestine.

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[74] For a full account of Palestine since 1936, against the background of the second World War, see J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York, 1950).

[75] See J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Document # 46.

[76] For a discussion of the problem see, e.g., Ralph Magnus, "Political-Strategic Interests," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *United States Interests in the Middle East*, Analysis # 17 (October 1968), pp. 5-38. A prevailing American view was given by Martin Luther King, shortly before his death, to the Rabbinical Assembly of the international association of Conservative Rabbis in the U S.: "Israel is one of the great outposts of democracy in the world. It is a marvelous example of what can be done, how desert land can be transformed into an oasis of brotherhood and democracy." Quoted in "Land of the Bible Newsletter," published by the Israel Information Services, # 48 (May 1968), p. 1.

> As I have just observed, in certain cases capability is right. The lesser powers ought not to embarrass the greater, in whom actually resides the preponderating voice, from which there is no appeal, in the great European council. When Russia, Austria, England, and France understand each other, and have promulgated a firm and unanimous decision, who can prevent their executing whatever their dignity, their interests, and the welfare of the world shall dictate to them?—Certainly no one. The inferior diplomacies may murmur, may intrigue, may write; but the work will be accomplished, and the vigor of Europe renewed. [77]

But it may be that the Powers have overplayed their hands and that world peace rests now with "the inferior diplomacies." Surely, if the future appears bleak, the western powers have themselves in large measure to blame.

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[77] *Op. cit.*, pp. 309 f.

THE PALESTINIANS AS A POLITICAL ENTITY

One of the most interesting developments to come out of the Middle East conflict of 1967 is the increasing awareness on the part of Westerners as well as Middle Easterners of the Palestinians as a distinct political community. For nearly twenty years the Western world has viewed the Palestinians in charitable and humane terms, a people whose lamentable lot was the regrettable product of irreconcilable regional and world forces. From time to time visual and touching accounts were given of the miserable conditions of their existence in refugee camps, thus spurring well-meaning individuals and organizations to increase or supplement the amount of aid that had been given to them. If any questions were raised, they were raised around such technical matters as to whether the Palestinians were evicted from their homeland or whether they left of their own volition, whether UNRWA figures regarding the number of refugees were indeed accurate, whether the seven cents' worth of daily rations per refugee was too much or too little, whether the United States and other Western Powers should increase or diminish their voluntary contributions, how many could be realistically repatriated to Israel in the eventuality of a political solution, and how best to resettle the remainder in the Arab countries with or without international or Big Power assistance. In short the Palestinians were regarded as a tragic people whose suffering should and could be alleviated if common human decency and genuine goodwill on the part of all were to prevail. That this blight on the conscience of mankind was allowed to exist for nearly twenty years was deemed to be the result of ambitious and immoral politicians who sought to perpetuate the refugee status of the Palestinians and to use them as a football in a political game aimed at furthering their selfish goals.

In the Middle East itself, the view of the Palestinian refugee has been quite understandably somewhat more complex. The Israelis, in the main, saw the refugees as an unfortunate and underdeveloped people whose sordid life could have been ameliorated long ago were it not for the cynical leadership in the neighboring Arab states. Those Israelis who may have felt some pangs of guilt in this human tragedy, and there are more of those than many Arabs think, often assuaged their conscience by arguing that the Arab refugees were after all the problem of their kinfolk, that the Palestinians left their native homes of their own accord and with the prodding of radio broadcasts from neighboring Arab capitals, that except for a relatively small number Israel could not in any event allow the refugees who so wished to return to their native lands without jeopardizing its security and upsetting its ethic composition, thereby calling into question its very *raison d'être*. Besides, many felt, Israel had absorbed a vast number of Jewish immigrants from Arab lands, and in effect an exchange of populations had for all intents and purposes taken place. Since Israel

had settled those Jewish immigrants, it was only fair and proper that the Arab states should settle the Arab immigrants in their midst.

In the Arab world, interestingly enough, there has not been over the years one single and uniform attitude that was all pervasive toward the Palestinians. Instead, there were, and perhaps still are, despite all that has transpired since the June War, a number of attitudes depending on the ideological orientation and the socio-economic status of the observer. To the rabid nationalist the Palestinians were first and foremost an uncomfortable reminder of what he keenly felt to have been the worst calamity to befall the Arab nation in modern times. His sense of personal involvement in their lot did not stem from his humanitarian impulses, or from his sense of compassion, but from his political consciousness and his nationalistic perceptions and aspirations. I do not wish to imply that such a person is necessarily callous or insensitive to the plight of many of the refugees, but merely to state that his feeling of outrage was more directed at the origins and political consequences of the Palestine problem than the result of his revulsion at the nature of the refugees' existence. Indeed, it is doubtful that many Arab nationalists have been fully acquainted with the conditions of life in the refugee camps, and even if they have it is quite possible that their sense of empathy might have been blunted by their familiarity with not too dissimilar standards of living which they probably observed among their own compatriots. Nevertheless, it is his feeling of shame that the Arabs were unable to stem the forces of Zionism that wounds him; it is his sense of soiled honor that grieves him; it is his frustration at having been unable to erase a grave political injustice that gnaws at him. And the Palestinians are a living presence that endlessly brings to recall those distressingly uncomfortable multitudes of passions. The intensity of these emotions is often so overwhelming that it generates as a defensive mechanism a disposition to lash out at the Palestinians themselves and to accuse them of having been the cause of the current Arab predicament.

There are, however, those Arabs whose ideological commitment to the 'Arab cause' is less complete, and to whom Palestinians have not been as much a source of deep anguish as they have been a stumbling block in the pursuit of personal and/or limited national aspirations. I refer here to those individuals who, while sharing in the all-pervasive yet somewhat vague yearning for Arab unity and glory, and while capable in times of heightened Arab-Israeli tensions of emotional involvement, are nonetheless more intimately concerned with the attainment of more personal goals and the satisfaction of material desires. On a day-to-day basis it is not the refugees in the camp that concern them, but the educated, skilled, urbanized, and entrepreneurial Palestinians who have insinuated themselves into all sectors of the neighboring Arab societies, and who gradually came to be perceived as competitors in the marketplace, education, etc., even in certain corridors of

power. Ordinary feelings of resentment, jealousy, envy and hostility, common to all such sociological situations wherein real or imaginary fears of displacement give rise to class or group tensions, were further aggravated by the Palestinian literati who (1) continued to maintain their separate national identity often despite the acquisition of the legal benefits of citizenship from the host countries; (2) assumed a posture of superiority through derogatory references to the governmental, administrative, and organizational machinery of the Arab states, as well as through constant reminiscences about how things were done in Palestine; and (3) chided other Arabs for their lack of preparation and weak resolve in their confrontation with Israel. Understandably enough all this and much more hardly served to endear this Palestinian diaspora who in the eyes of many have come to be looked upon as the 'new Jews' in their midst. Indeed, charges of ingratitude were often levelled against them, and many a Palestinian could recall being told in the heat of an argument to leave the country if he did not care for the way things were.

It would be presumptuous and inaccurate, of course, to suppose that the above classifications exhaust all the feelings and attitudes regarding the Palestinians that are current throughout the world and in particular the Arab portion of it. There are probably as many reactions to the Palestinians as there are individuals. However, what is above all else common to all these views is that none of them sees the Palestinians as a corporate political entity, possessed of preferences and aspirations, and having an independent will of its own that is sufficiently crystallized as to have merited consideration in the determination of affairs in the region during the past twenty years. On the contrary, the underlying supposition that is frequently betrayed in the discourse of individuals, at all levels of public accountability, be they Arab or non-Arab, is that the Palestinians are a malleable group that can be politically distended or constricted, as the case may be, to conform to the shape of any political agreement that may ultimately emerge. They are essentially regarded as a "problem," an "impediment," a "cancer," as C. P. Snow recently put it, whose solution, removal, or excision must be accomplished in order that the larger and more significant goal of peace can be reached. Just exactly how this task is to proceed, or what will become of the Palestinians is never clearly spelled out. Instead, vague generalities are given. The now celebrated November 1967 resolution of the U.N. Security Council calls for a "just settlement of the refugee problem." World leaders speak of an 'honorable' solution. Others talk of 'fair' compensation. Some discuss 'minimum' repatriation, while still others advocate 'resettlement.' Aside from the simple fact that no one seems to know exactly what is meant by 'just,' 'honorable,' or 'fair,' or how many would be repatriated, or where the remainder would be 'resettled,' there is the implicit assumption that the Palestinians will meekly accept, and comply with, whatever scheme that

may be worked out by others. Indeed, one suspects that the Palestinians are regarded as morally obligated to submit to any solution that may be devised by the international community no matter how repugnant or unpalatable they may deem it. Even certain Arab leaders, in their attempts to find a solution to the current impasse, assure the world that once agreement has been reached with Israel regarding her withdrawal from occupied territory, the Palestinians would no longer pose a 'problem,' and if they did they would be muzzled.

How is it that a people have come to be seen in this light? What regional and global forces have come to play during the past two decades which would gradually cause what was once an active and corporate Palestinian Arab community to be viewed as an amorphous entity whose character can be molded to suit the predilections of others? What factors made a rapidly multiplying population so recede into the background for more than twenty years? And why is it that the present Palestinian movement, as symbolized in part by the activities of the fedayyeen, should have taken the world by surprise?

Answers to such questions are not easily obtained, and I do not pretend to have them. Neither can they be found in the simplistic and glib accounts that are ordinarily given in the press and which surprisingly enough receive credence in academic circles. Certain clues, however, may be derived from an examination of some aspects of the struggle for Palestine during the past half century.

Even though the current Arab-Israeli impasse is viewed by the world community with justified alarm, and despite the fact that it has captured the attention of the major statesmen of our time, it should be remembered that in its early history, what came to be known as the Palestine Question barely merited more than a footnote in the chronicles of the post World War I period. The Balfour Declaration which now looms so large in the minds of many hardly had the resounding international repercussions that, say, the Truman Doctrine had thirty years later. The struggle for Palestine between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews was regarded, first and foremost, as an internal one which, despite its significance to certain world-wide interests, was hardly one with which the international community was concerned. Britain was, as the mandatory power, definitely involved. But its role tended to seek a balance between what eventually proved to be irreconcilable commitments made to the principal parties. The League of Nations, though technically exercising suzerain powers over the country had, owing to its internal and constitutional make-up, no more than superficial involvement in the dispute which gradually took on the character of a communal strife, albeit with occasional international overtones.

However, when the United Kingdom, for reasons beyond the scope of this inquiry, decided to unburden itself of what it eventually came to feel as a taxing responsibility by placing the future of the Mandated territory before the U.N., the Palestine Question had already begun to

assume international proportions. The plight of Jews in Europe during the War and the horrid revelations of the Nazi extermination camps captured the sympathy of human beings everywhere and brought international support, particularly from the United States, to the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state already long advocated by Zionist groups.

The 'internationalization' of the Palestine problem placed the Palestinian Arab community at a distinct political disadvantage. Lacking adequate organization, inexperienced in the by-ways of mid-twentieth-century diplomacy, wanting the necessary apparatus with which to wage a diplomatic offensive, unskilled in the techniques of propaganda, devoid of the unequivocal support of a Major Power or the staunch advocacy of a powerful constituency therein, the Palestinian Arabs were in no position to mount an effective campaign in international forums. They were further handicapped by a leadership that was heavily tinged with semi-feudal and theocratic colorations and which was not at all receptive to dissent or at least open inquiry which is a necessary requisite of rational planning. If anything, it was given to unyielding and exaggerated rhetoric that was often a source of embarrassment to friends and disenchantment to those who might otherwise have been in their camp.

It was almost natural in such circumstances for the Arab States to step forward and to fill this diplomatic void. They were, after all, independent political units, recognized by the international community, possessed of all the trappings of sovereignty, and having representation in world capitals as well as in the United Nations. Their reach and influence extended into circles to which the Palestinians had no access. Furthermore, the Arab States had only recently banded together to form an international regional organization (the Arab League), which provided the mechanisms for unified and concerted action that aimed at magnifying their diplomatic effectiveness.

Whatever else these transformations may have accomplished, they caused the entire Palestinian Question to be cast in an entirely different light. It was no longer perceived as a localized dispute between the Arabs and Zionists of Palestine, but as a much wider confrontation between Arab and Jew, encompassing far larger communities. From this vantage point the Palestinians' identity was gradually being submerged or diluted in his Arabdom, a development which was further accentuated by the outbreak of armed hostilities in which the armies of the neighboring states took part and which, significantly enough, came to be known as the first Arab-Israeli War.

The consequences of the 1948-49 conflict are now a matter of history. They have been analyzed and dissected in countless books. Strategy has been studied, heroism extolled, accountabilities unravelled, deficiencies noted, and remedies exhorted. Rarely, however, has attention been devoted to its impact on the Palestinians in political terms.

Aside from the fact that the majority of Palestinian Arabs found themselves all of a sudden as refugees, with all the human, legal, economic, social and psychological liabilities that this naked status entailed, politically speaking they were a bludgeoned group. Scattered throughout the neighboring states, denied the requisites of freedom of movement across state boundaries, their leadership discredited and defunct, whatever rudiments of organization they possessed in Palestine was now tattered and irrelevant. Furthermore, the immediate and burning issue before them was no longer the fundamental question of the future of Palestine, but of their right to return to their homes, lands and property, and to escape the privations and indignities which their newly acquired refugee status often brought. Efforts to revive the old political networks through the establishment of a government met with little enthusiasm on the part of the younger westernized Palestinian intelligentsia that was often contemptuous of the policies and personalities of the past and which could no longer be intimidated into silence. Besides, the creation of a vigorous and vociferous Palestinian movement would not have met with universal blessing from every Arab quarter. For all of its intrinsic tragedy, the Palestinian problem nevertheless did not eliminate old rivalries or dissipate deeply harbored ambitions. Indeed, in some instances it provided new opportunities for aggrandizement and the satisfaction of long-held desires.

In any event, the political initiative had long passed from the Palestinians to the Arab States who, in the aftermath of defeat, became steeped in a tumultuous soul-searching that unleashed a period of severe political instability and which gave added impetus to a long-felt desire to adjust a pattern of relationships with the Great Powers that derived from an imperial past. The general consensus was that the Palestine Question could not be tackled until internal political and economic stability was accomplished, a goal that was, in turn, deemed attainable only after the shackles of the colonial era had been entirely removed. So for the next few years the Palestinians had to take a back seat to such matters as the renegotiation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, agrarian reform, withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Base, the future military ties with the West, Baghdad Pact, Aswan Dam, Glubb Pasha, etc.

One should not assume that what eventually ensued in the next several years after 1948-49 was the result of a well-conceived and rational process. Some of it was, of course, the product of planning. But much of it was the by-product of accident, fortuitous circumstances and of what that great sixteenth-century Florentine secretary (Machiavelli) called the caprice of fortune.

The 1956 Suez Crisis, far from refocusing attention on the Palestinians, served only to divert attention from them. The conflict over Palestine, once a localized, and subsequently an 'internationalized' dispute, had now become global in its overtones. It now brought the omi-

nous prospect of U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvement in addition to that of England and France. The issues posed had now transcended those of the region; the peace of the world was deemed at stake. The likelihood of nuclear warfare in an ever-shrinking universe in which local and regional conflicts could no longer be neatly separated from total world disorder had rapidly impinged on the consciousness of thinking human beings everywhere.

However, even when the spectre of nuclear disaster had faded, the Palestinians did not come into view. The international community was far too concerned with the immediacy of the issue attending Suez to pay them heed. Instead, the resources of the United Nations, and the surprisingly fertile imagination of its statesmen, were devoted to such matters as the future of the Canal, the modalities of British, French and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt, the creation, deployment and mandate of a United Nations Emergency Force, demilitarization, Sharm el-Sheikh, Straits of Tiran, Gulf of Aqaba, shipping, etc. One might say that, ironically enough, the more complex and magnified the Palestine Question became, the less visible were the Palestinians.

The events of 1967 hardly served to change the picture. Aside from the spate of humanitarian resolutions calling upon Israel to allow the new refugees to return to their homes, resolutions similar to the scores that had been passed over the last twenty years by various organs of the U.N., and which perhaps by their very repetitiveness seemed to have deprived them of their potency, the Palestinians did not seem to count a great deal in the new equations. Indeed, if anything, they were pushed even further into the background. True enough, the November 1967 Security Council resolution "affirm(ed) ... the necessity ... for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." But the bulk of that resolution was directed at such questions as the termination of belligerency, withdrawal of Israeli forces, acknowledgment of sovereignty, boundaries, territorial inviolability, navigation though international waters, inadmissibility of territorial annexation by conquest, demilitarization, designation of a Special Representative, and so on and so forth.

However, even though they may have been drowned out in the U.N. by what they may have considered tangential matters, in the Middle East itself the Palestinians were coming into their own. In the aftermath of the shattering defeat of the Arab armies, all the elements converged to bring them into prominence.

It was obvious to nearly everyone that the traditional and orthodox methods employed by the Arab States in dealing with Israel had proven themselves a failure. It was also clear that the highly vocal Arab leadership which had been so shrill prior to the War had now been tarnished, if not altogether disgraced. It was further evident that the remnants of the old Palestinian leadership, as symbolized by Ahmed Shukairy, which still pretended to speak in the name of the Palestinians, and

which was heavily reliant on, and indeed subservient to, the will of the Arab League and some of its members, could no longer claim the Palestinians' allegiance. And in the probing self-examination and remarkably open debate that followed the Six-Day War, the voices of hitherto silent and none too prominent younger Palestinians came to be heard. These were in the main the voices of the children of the old Palestinian middle and lower-middle classes that despite their severe dislocation somehow managed to provide their sons and daughters with a university education. These offspring were individuals who were much more performance oriented than their elders, far less given to pompous pronouncements, a little better adept at organizational skills, and far more possessed of a sense of political realism.

An examination of the history of the past two decades finally convinced them of the futility of their dependence on the Arab States. They could clearly see that far from saving Palestine for the Palestinians, the Arab States only succeeded in surrendering more of the territory to Israel after each try. And far from holding what remained of it in trust for the Palestinians after 1949, they dispensed with it in a manner suited to their interests. Furthermore, some of the Arab States were now so anxious to preserve their own territorial integrity that in exchange for Israeli troop withdrawals they were ready to concede the loss of Palestine through the recognition of Israel and the ending of all claims to belligerency.

The general feeling among this younger generation of Palestinians was that the road back to Palestine could only be paved by the Palestinians themselves. They drew inspiration from the activities of the Algerians, Cubans and Vietnamese, and a few of them were well-versed in the literature of guerilla warfare and national liberation. Some went so far as to establish contacts with these groups and even received training and support from them. Gradually, the rudimentary beginnings of a few guerilla organizations came to be formed.

It was not, however, until after the 1967 June War that they finally came into prominence. The few attacks that they mounted in Israel and in the occupied areas were seized upon by the Arab masses and their governments as a sign that the struggle with Israel had not yet ended, that resistance was still in effect, and that while the Arabs may have lost a few battles the war itself was far from over. Contributions came pouring in from all corners of the Arab World. Money, supplies and weapons were sent. And in the publicity given the Israeli raid on Karameh in Jordan, recruits were easily obtained. Somehow the movement captured the imagination not only of the Palestinians in the refugee camps, but also of the ones in the universities, medicine, law, engineering and other professions. Donations of skills became readily obtained. Bases were established, clinics installed, and schools staffed. Almost overnight what was only an incipient movement turned into a well-structured and intricately woven organization, with a will of its

own that is increasingly becoming an important factor in the new Middle East equation.

Expressed in plain and simple language, the object of the movement, according to some of its leaders, is the return of the Palestinians to their homes in a Palestine that would be de-Zionized. In other words, Palestine would revert to its old self when it consisted of two communities working in harmony side by side as they once did, under a political arrangement wherein Judaism would not bestow any special privileges. Just exactly what sort of government would be established, whether a 'balance' would be built into the political system, how Arab property would be restored and what would become of the Jews currently in possession of it, are not clearly spelled out. The impression is that at the moment the attention of this new Palestinian leadership is focused far more on the operational and military aspects than on the long-range political ones. Nevertheless, they seem tenacious in their determination to return to Palestine regardless of the obstacles and possible consequences. Toward that goal they are willing to sacrifice almost anything and to risk the ever-increasing likelihood of escalation and total conflict. Neither will they allow the Arab Governments to assume control over them, or to restrict them in their military conduct, as the current clashes in Lebanon have shown. Indeed, some have been known to express the belief that no Arab Government should be allowed to remain aloof from the struggle, and if its involvement ultimately resulted in military defeat and occupation by Israeli forces, then the chances for ultimate victory would be enhanced. In such circumstances the Israelis would then constitute a minority within a framework far better suited to waging guerilla warfare.

It is not my purpose to indulge in forecasting the likelihood of this possibility coming into being, but to indicate the type of thinking and activity that seems to be rampant among Palestinians. There is the tendency in certain quarters, particularly in Israeli ones, to play down the military effectiveness of the fedayyeen. The argument usually presented is that the Palestinians are obviously no match for the Israeli Army, that they are merely a small thorn in its side, and that in the final analysis they fall in the category of a nuisance that cannot, in all realism, pose a serious threat to the survival of the Jewish State.

Such a view, to my mind, is myopic. It merely concentrates on the present and places far too much emphasis on its military aspects, as the Israeli policy regarding the Palestinians clearly indicates. The sending of Israeli jets across the Jordan River or into Syria to strike at Fatah and other bases has become an almost daily affair. Inside the occupied territories unrest is met with incarcerations, expulsions, curfews, demolition of homes and other forms or threats of sanctions. Policies of this kind are probably due to the increased role of the professional military in the decision making process, the emergence of a new form of nationalism in Israel, and the readiness to submit to demands for reprisals

from the rank and file. But it is also due, one suspects, to a distorted and uncomplimentary picture of the Arab in general, and the Palestinians in particular, in the Israeli mind. The image carried is that in the final analysis he is incompetent, lacking in organization, discipline or resolve, unable or unwilling to comprehend reality, having an infinite capacity for self-delusion, capable of understanding only force, and ever unlikely to sacrifice personal comfort for the demands of national goals. These and many other unflattering associations, further re-enforced by three Israeli military victories, have somehow planted in many an Israeli a *Herren* mentality where the Arab is concerned, one not unlike the intellectual framework which governed the behavior of nineteenth-century Europeans toward their colonial subjects. Indeed, so prevalent is this image that it has even been transmitted overseas to American shores.

The simple fact is that despite assertions to the contrary, many Israelis do not know the younger generation of educated and Westernized Palestinians. There are a great many Israelis, born since the creation of Israel twenty-one years ago, whose contacts and associations have been almost exclusively with the Palestinian minority in Israel which in the main is not one that has been able to achieve great economic and educational attainments. There are not many Arab students studying in Israeli universities. Nor are there many Arab scientists, doctors, or engineers working in Israeli laboratories, hospitals, or factories. The Palestinian Arabs now in Israel largely fall in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Besides, they are politically suspect, and feelings of hostility and suspicion further accentuate the gap or distance to which class discrepancies give rise.

Neither can it be said that the 'Arabicized' or 'Islamicized' Jew who came from the Arab countries is acquainted with this new breed of Palestinian. Indeed, whatever their previous conceptions may have been toward the Arabs in general they very likely had, since coming to Israel, undergone great transformations. Largely unskilled and uneducated, the Arabs in Israel were their competitors in the labor markets. Furthermore in their efforts not to be confused with the Arabs, they reacted in accordance with classic sociological patterns by seeking to dissociate themselves from them and by quickly incorporating the dominant values of the European group which again were replete with derogatory stereotypes of the Arab.

The one thing that Israelis, and incidentally many others, do not seem to realize is that the current Palestinian movement is directed by an impressive elite whose academic credentials would do credit to any country. It is not anything like that which dominated the various paramilitary groups that came into being prior to the establishment of Israel and which some older Israelis may still remember. There are estimates that there may be as many as fifty thousand Palestinians today holding university degrees. And an increasing number of these have been

moved by the activities of the fedayyeen to join in the general movement. It is interesting to note that Yasir Arafat, the present head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is a university trained engineer, and that the leader of the Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a medical doctor—a graduate of the American University of Beirut. Admittedly the rank and file are not of such educational attainments and many are recruited from the refugee camps. But they are receiving superior training and direction which is already becoming a source of greater discomfiture to Israel.

I do not mean to suggest that they are likely to attain such an overwhelming military capacity that they could defeat Israeli forces in open combat. But by their activities they may spur a greater number of Palestinians, presently under Israeli occupation, to join the struggle. Elements are quickly converging which may propel a substantial body of Palestinian youth to participate in the resistance movement. There are already conditions of privation in Gaza. Unemployment is widespread, and under-employment is high. Secondary school graduates—and bear in mind that this June the third class will have graduated since the occupation, with 4,500 in each class—are cut off from universities in Arab lands and face a future of continued idleness with severe consequences to their lives and to those of their families. Despair may drive them to acts which may in turn bring on an ever-widening cycle of sabotage and repression whose consequences can only bear ill to the future of the region.

For Israel the resort to military measures cannot help but in the end prove morally and institutionally corrosive. A society cannot maintain its professed character with repression in its midst. The impact of emergency laws enacted, of violence and counter-violence, of the deep hatreds that are engendered, would most assuredly shake the foundations of any society. Reliance on force would become automatic, and the continued and increased suspension of civil liberties would be constitutionally debilitating. Indeed, the greatest threat to Israel, it seems to me, is the one that may rise from within itself as a result of its increasing dependence on military means. No society espousing democratic principles can ultimately maintain its values and at the same time become a praetorian state.

The Palestinians, the Israelis must realize, if any peace is to be achieved in the region, are a living reality. It does not do Israel, the Middle East, or the world, any service to pretend that they never existed. Unlike what many Zionists would have had the world believe, Palestine was not a land without a people to be earmarked for a people without a land. Neither was it a desert which Israelis in the span of twenty years made bloom. Palestinians lived there for centuries. They ploughed their fields, planted their crops, ran their small industries and tended their commerce. They were not, of course, as technologically advanced as the European Zionists who came to settle in their midst.

But that does not mean that the Palestinians are a kind of ***untermenschen*** that can be continuously expelled to give way to settlement and security questions. Neither does it mean that they can be herded into a corner of the West Bank, integrated economically but deprived of citizenship rights. Such notions are outmoded and untenable. The economic cannot be separated from the political, or the other way around. Nor are the Palestinians, in any case, willing to concede that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirming that man is endowed with inalienable rights that include life, liberty and dignity falls short of covering them. And unless Israelis recognize this, I fear that the worst is yet to come.

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THE THIRD YEAR OF THE SIX-DAY WAR

Today—May 2—is Israel's Independence Day, 1969. Exactly two years have passed since General Rabin whispered to Levi Eshkol that Gamal Abdel Nasser had started to concentrate his forces in Sinai. This morning, the usual artillery battle took place along the Suez Canal. One soldier was killed. Along the Jordan River, fighting followed the familiar pattern.

The greatest event of today was the annual giving of Israel Prizes to outstanding personalities. This year, the most important one was given to Israel's biggest expert on the Crusades—he had just 'proved' again that there is no similarity whatsoever between Israel and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. (I happened to hear the broadcast of this ceremony while in Ceasarea, once an important city of the Crusader kingdom. The blue-white national flags were waving gaily over the ancient Crusader fortress, and American Jewish tourists were climbing excitedly over all the ruins.)

Another event in today's celebrations was the choosing of the winning entry in the annual Israel Song Festival. The public's choice was a ballad praising the bravery of a medical soldier who sacrifices himself to save a wounded comrade during a skirmish on the Jordan River. Most of the other entries dealt with the war, too.

Throughout the day, the radio has blared out military songs. One has had only to move the knob a bit in any direction to hear the equivalent Arab songs of patriotism and revenge. Two years after the 'war's end,' our region is still at war. The Six-Day War did not really start on June 5, 1967—nor did it finish on June 10. It started ninety years ago, and it goes on with gathering momentum.

It is my feeling that, despite the seemingly endless artillery battles, the decisive struggle of today is not being fought on the canal or along the Jordan River—it is not being fought between the Israelis and the Arabs at all. Rather, it is a struggle between the Israelis among themselves on the one side and between the Arabs among themselves on the other.

In this double battle, there exists an extraordinary cooperation—even coordination—between the extremists in Israel and the extremists in the Arab states. Whenever we in Israel try to convince the government, or the general population, that a peaceful settlement is now possible, the latest article of some Arab journalist or the latest speech of some Arab politician is brandished in our faces, making us look ridiculous even in the eyes of our own audience. Whenever some new approach gains ground in the Arab world, it is usually met, and hit squarely on the head, by the latest statement of an Israeli cabinet minister, talking about the sacred right of the Jews to the whole of Eretz Israel.

Between Migs and Phantoms, terrorist outrages and Napalm retaliation, the Chauvinist International in the Middle East thrives. Unfortu-

nately, no such cooperation exists between those Israelis and Arabs who believe that the mutual willingness of the extremists to cooperate with each other will lead, eventually and inevitably, to mutual nuclear extinction.

Yet, can one be angry? Can one even be surprised? Since the war, as much as during the events which led up to the war, both sides are behaving according to the established mental patterns, acting their roles according to a script written long ago. Let us try to examine these attitudes, in order to understand the situation of today—the starting point for any new initiative.

For Israel, that first few weeks after the war was a time of Great Expectations. The mood was enthusiastic, if not delirious. Everything seemed possible. Following the intense anxiety which had preceded the war, and the incredulous feeling of redemption during the days of victory, there was a feeling of profound change. Everything, thought the average Israeli, is going to be different now. The Arabs have learned their lesson. Now *they* will make peace.

"Why 'they,' and not 'we'?" the foreign reader will ask. But here we return to the basic mental pattern. The average Israeli is quite convinced—nay, is absolutely certain—that we have always wanted peace, that it is the Arabs, with their perverse obstinacy, who have thwarted this profound desire at every turn of history. But now, so it seemed, the Arabs would have to behave differently.

Had there been, at that precise moment, any real leader, any wise and resolute personality—on either side—peace would have been possible. The mood was there, the situation was there. The tremendous shock of both sides made deep changes possible, even plausible. There were voices, there were warnings. But no leader with real political power emerged.

I believe that the decisive initiative should have come from Israel. It was up to the victor to start the ball rolling, to astonish the vanquished and the humiliated by a show of magnanimity and respect. In this spirit, on the seventh day of the war, I wrote an open letter to Levi Eshkol, urging him to grant immediate self-determination to the Palestinian people, now largely under Israeli occupation, offering them freedom, sovereignty and independence in return for peace.

Nothing happened. Masses of Israelis poured into the occupied territories and bought up everything that looked exotic. They were a new breed: tourist-conquerors, more curious than arrogant, buying instead of plundering. Yet the physical contact did not create a mental one. Social contact remained nearly non-existent. The Arab way of thinking about the conflict remained a closed book to the Israelis who streamed into Arab towns, drank coffee and fingered the oriental wares. Strangeness was not reduced by closeness.

In government circles Levi Eshkol personified the general trend. No decision. No haste. Postpone. Don't give away anything. Wait. Let's see what happens. We are in possession, the status quo is in our favor. Moshe Dayan, making extravagant and contradictory statements, none of them intended seriously, succeeded in befuddling everyone, and most of all himself. Abba Eban, lost in narcissism and grandiloquence, battled the Soviet and Arab speakers in the United Nations, sunning himself in the admiration of his American-Jewish television audience.

In short, the historical moment did not find historical leadership on our side. A tragic, but not unusual situation.

After the stage of Great Expectations came the stage of Waiting. Waiting for what? No one quite knew. But time did not seem pressing. Dayan assured the Israeli public that the military occupation could go on endlessly. People began to believe in the Liberal Occupation—a very contradiction in terms—as a means for winning Arab affection. The ridiculous mission of Gunnar Jarring went on and on, fortifying the status quo. Terrorism seemed on the verge of being finally vanquished. Arab armies looked ridiculous. The great powers were neutralizing each other. On the home front, the great coalition, under the paternal and tranquilizing presidency of Eshkol, signified unity and a comfortable immobilism.

During this stage, something like a Great Debate started within Israel. The traditional chauvinistic, orthodox and right-wing elements started their campaign for the official annexation of all occupied territories. Several fringe-groups—fascist, Canaanite, ultra-religious—cooperated with them in creating the Movement for the Whole of Eretz-Israel (or Greater Israel). Yet, to their own intense surprise, this movement did not gain ground beyond the traditional fifth or quarter of the population which was always for the expansion and annexation. No real mass-movement was generated.

On the other side, another minority, about half as large, was actively propagating peace. My own party, the Haolam Hazeh (New Force party), adopted a detailed peace-plan in March 1968. Several other groups took up similar, if less detailed, positions.

But somehow, the Great Debate never really got off the ground. The status quo seemed frozen, the great coalition was immobile, and no encouraging signs came out of the Arab world. Everybody else seemed to be waiting, too. Annexationists and anti-annexationists neutralized each other (no mean feat for us anti-annexationists, and our biggest achievement so far). Slowly, imperceptively, the mood changed. Instead of overt chauvinism and outright annexationism, something else set in. It signified the third stage in Israel—the present one.

What can we call this new stage? No ready name presents itself. It is the stage of despairing of peace, of a whole people resigning itself

to endless war, not unwillingly, but rather with a sigh of relief, preferring the known and usual to the unknown and bewildering.

The passing away of Eshkol somehow personifies the change. He was a classical Zionist, as stubborn and extreme as any, but he looked like a compromiser. No such illusions could cling to his successor, Golda Meir, the righteous kindergarten-teacher, Mrs. Immovable par excellence.

What is this new mood? The average Israeli—not an abstract figure this time, but nine out of ten Israelis stopped at random on the street—would put it this way: "The Arabs don't want peace; they never wanted it. They will never recognize the existence of Israel. Any idea of peace is Utopian, perhaps a dangerous delusion. If they did not make peace in 1967, after such a shattering defeat, peace is impossible. We shall have to fight again and again. There is nothing we can do about it."

Once such a mental pattern is established, it is extremely difficult to dislodge it. Hussein or Abdel Nasser made a moderate speech? That just shows you how devious Arabs are. And even if they were sincere, who says that they really control anybody? And why, if they want peace, are they shooting?

Such simple attitudes would not count so much if we had in Israel a political class, as in England or France. But no such thing exists here. There is no real difference between the view aired in a cafe on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv, and those pronounced ponderously in the Knesset, or knowingly in the cabinet. Foreigners find this difficult to believe, but it just is so.

If anything, the political circles of Israel are more chauvinistic than the general public, because they are far more imbued with the traditional Zionist attitudes. In spite of everything, the Israeli public is still remarkably sensible, and the younger the age-group, the less chauvinistic it is. The army, the youngest institution in the country, is on the whole more sober and sensible than both the government and the public at large.

If today a clear choice between annexation without peace and peace without annexation were placed before the Israeli public, peace would win by a great majority. But no such choice presents itself. To the Israeli public, the choice simply does not exist. Yet I am convinced that such a choice *does* exist, exactly in these terms. Why, then, is this denied by our government, by our parties, by our establishment as such? Because by denying it, it can be evaded.

If our Zionist establishment had to make the choice between annexation or peace, it would be torn asunder by conflicting emotions: on one side, the idea of a homogeneous Jewish State, with Jewish Labor; on the other side, new territories with new colonization; in between, a desire for peace and a profound mistrust of the Arabs, any Arabs. It

is significant that in the present government, comprising twenty-two ministers, there is not one ready to make peace without any annexation. The twenty-two cabinet members, some of whom arrived at their present station by pure accident, long before the Six-Day War, can be divided roughly into three categories, cutting across party lines:

a) Those who want to annex all occupied territories. They are led by Menachem Begin, the Herut leader, but some of them would certainly claim to be leftist. This group comprises about 25% of the cabinet.

b) Those who want to annex much, but not all. They are agreed, more or less, on the so-called Allon Plan which insists on annexation of the following: the Golan Heights; the whole Jordan Valley down to Jericho (but not including it), and some areas along the former border near Latrum and Kalkilia; the entire Jerusalem areas; the west coast of the Dead Sea up to Hebron; the Gaza Strip; Northern Sinai with el-Arish; and the Red Sea coast, including Sharm el-Sheikh—in short, everything except Southern Sinai and the inhabited areas around Nablus and the town of Hebron.

This group includes the great majority of the cabinet and all important ministers, such as Yigal Allon (whose name the plan bears), Golda Meir, Abba Eban and Moshe Dayan (who wants the hills near Nablus, too).

c) Those who want some annexation. They include the two Mapam ministers and several others. Mapam officially demands the annexation of the Jerusalem area, the Golan Heights (already in the process of being colonized by Mapam men), the Gaza Strip, and certain areas along the former frontier with Jordan, for security reasons.

The point is that no Arab leader is going to accept annexation even within the limits of the Mapam plan. And, since all cabinet members agree that without an official peace treaty with Arab governments not an inch of territory will be given up, there is no practical difference between Mapam and Herut, cabinet moderates and cabinet extremists. This explains why Mapam ministers insistently favor right-wing ministers remaining in the cabinet, knowing that their chief objective, openly proclaimed, is to prevent any cabinet decision for a compromise peace-plan.

(It also explains why Mapam, the traditional Zionist peace party, is in the process of disintegration. It will not take part in the coming elections as an independent party, but only as a part of the Labor Party, headed by people like Golda Meir and Dayan—and including even some extreme annexationists. Within another year, Mapam will be officially submerged in the Labor Party, in keeping with the general process of cartelization within the Zionist establishment.)

This being the state of affairs, one can hardly wonder that this establishment prefers the axiom of the Impossibility of Peace to a more complex picture which would present options and necessitate decisions.

Thus, on the second Independence Day since the war, the Israeli man-on-the-street is faced with a picture reflecting only the continual operation of a vicious circle.

Perpetual warfare on the cease-fire lines and acts of terrorism claim several Israeli lives every week. Nearly every day one sees in the paper a photo of a nice, sympathetic young person—yesterday's victim. The public now pays nearly three times more for security than in the year preceding the Six-Day War—an illustration of victory's price.

All this seems natural, even inevitable—a state of affairs that will go on forever. Everyone in Israel hears this daily, hourly—on television, over the radio, in all mass-circulation newspapers and magazines (except, of course, *Haolam Hazeh*), and in nearly all public speeches. One has to be a very strong person, supremely immune to brain-washing, to retain a different opinion.

Yet this is not brain-washing in the literal sense, instigated and executed by some sinister Ministry of Thought Control. Rather, it is the general consensus, embracing all strata of Israeli society, shaped by ninety-years of war and Zionist thought-patterns, and fed by reactions from the other side.

What were these reactions? We must now examine what happened to Arab thought-patterns under the impact of these same events, especially those Arabs in the occupied territories.

The first reaction of the Palestinians was one of intense shock. The world, so it must have seemed in Hebron and Nablus, had come to an end. When the population awoke from this shock, and the reality of the occupation became clear, feelings were mixed. There was surprise, because on the whole the Israeli conqueror behaved honorably. (Exceptions did, of course, occur.) There was curiosity. (So this is what the Israelis are like. This is how Western Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa look now.) There was humiliation. There was a general, instinctive urge to behave with dignity.

There was also, I think, something equivalent to the Israeli mood of Great Expectations. All accepted truths had broken down. Now everything will change. The Jews are clever. The Arab leaders will have to do something. In short, out of this cataclysm, peace will emerge.

One great act of statesmanship, one great dramatic gesture, would have opened a new chapter in our history. Instead of that, there came the resolutions of Khartoum—no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with her, no peace-treaty.

Khartoum was a calamity for the Arabs, a catastrophe for the Palestinians. For the annexationists in Israel, it was a phantastic gift.

One can understand why these resolutions were adopted. The Arab armies were shattered, the regimes shaken. Something was needed to

offset humiliation, to salvage Arab dignity. Yet when the destiny of nations is concerned, should understanding lead to forgiving?

Khartoum consolidated the status quo. The status quo was the Israeli occupation. Khartoum dominated the scene for nearly two years—two years in which the world got used to the fact of occupation, while the Israelis themselves did everything to make it permanent. How different would the situation be today if the Nasser-Hussein initiative of April 1969 had come in September 1967?

For the Palestinians living under occupation, Khartoum ushered in the second stage—for them, as for the Israelis, a stage of Waiting. Waiting for what? For whom? For some kind of settlement that would liberate them from a military occupation, without further destruction. Perhaps the King would do something. Perhaps the Americans. Perhaps the Russians. Perhaps even the Israelis.

Newspaper stories were read, studied, analyzed. Rumors followed upon rumors. During all this time, the population suffered the occupation with dignity, cooperating in essential services, but not providing any quislings. The occupation authorities behaved as correctly as possible, with very little brutality, trying to avoid friction. The Palestinian guerilla organizations were admired, but not actively aided by the population. The military courts did not impose death penalties. Captured guerillas or terrorists were sent to prison. Everybody was waiting.

One can ask: why did no strong, independent Palestinian leadership emerge in the occupied territories during this time? Why did no one stand up and say: here we are, Palestinians, ready to negotiate with the Israelis for our own destinies?

Many reasons for this were advanced, at my urging, by my Palestinian friends: the fear of becoming Israeli tools; the fear of being considered traitors by the Arab world; the fear of being deported by the Israelis, as happened to several nationalist leaders; the fear of becoming victims of a direct deal between Israel and Hussein; the conviction that Israel was not ready to offer anything.

All these are logical reasons. It certainly requires a special kind of moral courage to assume responsibility during a military occupation by the enemy. Yet in a national emergency like this, a nation needs this kind of courage.

The deeper reasons why no Palestinian leadership has emerged are a result of the recent history of Palestine. For too long Palestinians have been governed by others, their destiny decided by Egyptians and Jordanians. No united national leadership could emerge while the fate of Palestine served as a ball in the intricate game played by the Arab governments.

The population in the occupied territories could boast of many highly intelligent personalities—local leaders, the heads of great families, mayors, former functionaries of the Jordanian regime. Some of them

are very impressive persons who see clearly what is happening around them. Yet even they were divided among themselves.

Roughly, there were three general trends among these personalities:

a) The Jordanians. These said: the Palestinians have merged with the Jordanians; there is no sense in creating a Palestinian state. We want to return to Jordan. (Some of them qualified this: We want to return to Jordan—and then we shall overthrow the regime there.) This sentiment was found mainly in Nablus.

b) The Palestinians. Those who said: we must take our destiny into our own hands. The only way to liberate ourselves is by creating a Palestinian state, which can then settle its affairs with Israel. For this we do not need any confirmation from those Arab states who have made such a mess of our lives. This sentiment was found among some of the most respected leaders. Its centers were Hebron and Ramallah.

c) The in-betweens. Those who said: the most sensible solution is a Palestinian state, in peace with Israel. But first Israel must offer us this. Then we shall go to Cairo and get the Arab world's consent to this plan. If Abdel Nasser gives us the green light, as we assume he will, we shall go ahead.

If a constructive initiative had come from Israel, such a solution would have been implemented—I am quite certain of this. My party issued a peace plan along these lines which was personally approved by most of the Palestinian leaders concerned as a basis for negotiation. But while some Palestinians voiced their opinions loudly and clearly, no unified leadership stood up to demand it. As we have seen, the Israeli government was wholly unsympathetic to this idea, knowing that a peace between Israel and Palestine could only be based on the frontier of June 4, 1967—a frontier which not one single cabinet minister was ready to re-establish. When Golda Meir said, in April 1969, that her government objects to setting up a Palestinian state, she also said in that same speech that "the frontiers of May 1967 are as dead as the partition lines of 1947."

By this time, the mood of the population in the occupied territories had changed. Real opposition had started. Only an empirical mind like Moshe Dayan, supremely contemptuous of the experience of others, by his very nature unable to see beyond the immediate present, could believe that the Palestinians would forever submit passively to the 'liberal' occupation. (As a Jerusalem Arab, an ex-Colonel in the British Army, once told me: "If I have a splinter in my eye, I don't care whether it is iron or gold.")

Occupation, even the most intelligent one, breeds humiliation and rebellion. Humiliation breeds sabotage. Sabotage breeds retaliation. Retaliation breeds terror. Terror breeds counter-terror. Thus another vicious circle is born.

A year ago, in a meeting with the most prominent notables of Nablus, I asked them if they had any concrete complaint. They answered that their only complaint is the fact of occupation itself. Two weeks ago, when I posed the same question to the same people, I was answered with a multitude of specific complaints. Dayan has become their enemy, their oppressor. His effigy was burned the other day during a routine demonstration, which ended in routine reprisals.

The deterioration of the occupation regime is most severe in the Gaza Strip, where economic conditions, bad to start with, were deliberately worsened in order to encourage emigration of the inhabitants, mostly refugees of the 1948 war, to the West Bank and beyond. As all members of the cabinet are resolved that the Gaza strip must be annexed to Israel, this seemed to them a logical course.

The result was intense sabotage, repression on a grand scale, rampant terrorism. When Jordan closed the bridges in the face of Gaza inhabitants, emigration stopped. Too late, the Israeli authorities started to ameliorate the economic situation there.

What is happening today in Gaza is bound to happen tomorrow in Nablus, where conditions are already worsening, and the day after in Hebron, where conditions are still best — thanks to the intelligent leadership of Mayor al-Jabari. The days of Liberal Occupation are over and classical occupation methods begin to take their place.

In the face of this situation, Moshe Dayan, who has shed his liberal pose, now demands the setting up of Israeli counties and townships throughout the occupied territories, the 'integration' of the territories into the Israeli economy, and the application of Israeli law there. In one word: annexation, pure and simple.

All these events and moods were overshadowed by one new factor: the Palestinian fighting organizations. Seen through Arab eyes, they are armies of liberation and resistance. Seen through Israeli eyes, they are gangs of terrorists and saboteurs. I do not intend to indulge in semantics. It is a general axiom that your own people are liberation fighters, while the opponents are terrorists.

Prior to 1967, these organizations resembled the ghost of Hamlet's father. They were rather ineffective personifications of the Palestinian identity, a reminder that Palestinian nationalism refused to die. Their military and political power was negligible. But this war has changed their potential decisively, turning them into a major power in the Arab world. There are several main reasons for this:

First, they were the savior of Arab honor—a very important consideration in a society whose culture places great emphasis on honor and dignity.

Three great armies were shattered in a stupendous debacle, coming on the heels of the most extravagant boasts. Contempt for Arab efficiency, military prowess and masculine virtue was universal, especially in the Arab world itself. Honor seemed irredeemably lost—when sud-

denly a small band of fighters, with primitive weapons, took up the fight against the victorious enemy. The fact that from a military point of view their fight against the vastly more efficient Israeli army was quite hopeless did not detract from the admiration accorded them—on the contrary, it heightened it.

A second reason was more rational, Up to June 1967, these organizations were fighting solely for the destruction of Israel. But since the war, they have been fighting also for the liberation of occupied territories which no one in the world recognizes as belonging to Israel. Turning the wheels of history back, supplanting an old injustice with a new one, is one thing. Fighting to liberate a subjugated population from the yoke of military occupation is something else altogether. Thus, as resistance fighters, they now enjoy a measure of support and sympathy to which they could not have aspired as wreckers of the peace. Arab governments, who could dare to oppose them before June 1967, could not and did not dare to do this now, unless a general settlement were to be reached and approved by the Arab world.

The third reason is paradoxical, but perhaps even more important. By its very victory, Israel has resurrected Palestine and given Palestinian nationalism a new sense of purpose and direction. For the first time since 1948, all of Palestine is now united under one rule—an enemy rule, certainly, but nevertheless a unifying rule. (One should remember that India and Algeria, for example, were both united for the first time by foreign invaders.) Thereby, unintentionally, Israel did a great service to Palestine.

Israel has also given the Palestinians new purpose—the fight against the occupation. (As a Palestinian told me the other day: "Whether we want it or not, you are turning us into a new people, teaching us to fight.") Today, the Palestinian fighting organizations are a significant part of the picture. They exert a growing influence on the whole Arab world, competing with and undermining Arab establishments, dictating political developments. They control great parts of Transjordan, where they have established a kind of 'liberated territory,' with its own taxes, schools, prisons and hospitals. How will they influence the crucial fight for peace?

No unequivocal answer can be given to this question. Attacks on women and children, perpetuated by one of these organizations, mar the picture. Extravagant and completely ridiculous claims—such as having killed Levi Eshkol, wounded Moshe Dayan—injure their reputation, making it easy to regard them as ineffective jokers. But if the organizations mature into a responsible national force, they might possibly facilitate conditions for peace. If I am right in believing that the Palestinian nation is the main potential role of any or all of these organizations, their significance cannot be over-estimated.

Last December, before an audience of a thousand in Haifa, I asked one of Israel's most respected military figures, General Haim Hertzog,

whether he envisioned the day when we would sit down and talk with the saboteurs. "Certainly yes," he answered. "If we want a dialogue with the Palestinians, it will probably start between us and the leaders in the occupied territories. But in the course of these negotiations, at some stage, we will have to call in the leaders of the fighting organizations." The public, I would like to add, took this quite calmly, in spite of recent outrages—another proof that the Israeli public is by far more sensible than it seems.

But do the Palestinian guerilla organizations want to be partners in peace? Are they not committed, irrevocably, to a course of uncompromising war until the final destruction of the State of Israel? The official ideology of el-Fatah and the other organizations leaves no room for compromise. Yet, as an old ex-terrorist myself, I may be forgiven for discounting much of the ideology while speculating on the authentic dynamism of such groups.

As long as Israel does not present to the Palestinians a clear choice between a just, reasonable and honorable peace and endless, hopeless war, the fighting organizations will perforce remain in their present ambiguous posture as agents of both destruction and resistance. But offer a choice—posing the immediate prospect of a sovereign, national Republic of Palestine in a part of the country, against a war without the possibility of victory for the whole of ancient Palestine—and something is bound to happen. The reasonable people, the idealists who are not fanatics, the fighters who joined the battle to liberate their hometowns, but not for a chimera—will become honorable partners to a peace structure, a 'Peace of the Braves.'

In the meantime, as the Palestinian fighting organizations were showing increasing dynamism, the Arab governments were frozen in their misfortunes, prisoners of their own mentality, and to some extent victims of their own propaganda, which did not allow them any freedom of maneuver.

King Hussein's main objective was to regain the West Bank, and he knew that this could be achieved—if at all—only through a settlement. He could look for such a settlement only with the consent of Abdel Nasser. By October 1968, he received it, with one qualification. Abdel Nasser told him, according to reliable sources, "You can do what you want. But if you give up Jerusalem, Arab history will never forgive you."

During that month Hussein had secret conversations in London with several Israelis. The most important ones were Abba Eban and Dr. Jacob Hertzog, Eshkol's chief political adviser. The King said that he was ready to open official negotiations with Israel, in New York, provided that Israel declared in advance that it seeks no annexation whatsoever. (However, it was understood that Hussein was prepared to agree to some special status for the Arabs in Jerusalem in order to keep the city united, as well as some minor border rectifications.)

ing the status quo in the Golan Heights until Syria changes its mind; joining the Gaza Strip to Jordan; recognition by the Arabs of Israel's frontiers, sovereignty, and integrity; abolition of belligerency (and the Arab boycott); free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran; some compromise solution of the refugee problem, by returning some and paying compensation to others; international guarantees for the frontiers.

This settlement is, by now, accepted by Abdel Nasser and Hussein, both of whom are eager to bring an end to the status quo. But the Egyptian leader is committed to a course of non-negotiation with Israel, while Israel is committed to a course of refusing any settlement at all, unless by direct face-to-face negotations with Arab governments, leading to the signing of a classic Peace Treaty.

In order to evade this obstacle, the Yost strategy is to advance by stages: a) reach agreement between the Two Powers, each of them consulting its clients; b) consolidate the agreement with a Four-Power statement; c) call upon the Arabs and Israelis to participate in the Four-Power conference, allowing the Israelis to pretend that these are direct negotiations, while allowing the Arabs to cling to the contrary interpretation; d) twist the arms of both sides until they agree to the terms already agreed upon by the Two Powers; e) embody the agreement in a contractual document, again, allowing one side to claim that this is a peace treaty and the other side to claim that it is something else; f) finalize the whole thing by some form of international guarantee.

Two factors in the Middle East object to this strategy: the Israeli government and the Palestinian guerilla organizations—the Israelis, because, as stated before, all cabinet members demand annexations much beyond anything possible under the Security Council Resolution, and the guerillas, because a settlement would cripple their fight for a free Palestine and induce the Arab establishments to destroy them physically. They have no illusions at all about this.

The logical course would seemingly be for the two sides to unite in a common fight, but for reasons already given, this is impossible. In view of this double opposition, has the Four-Power initiative any chance of success?

One may doubt whether the Arab governments are still strong enough to withstand the onslaught of the Palestinian guerillas. Much will depend on the mood of the Arab world. Much will also depend on whether Nasser succeeds in his present efforts to divide the guerillas by winning over Arafat and integrating him into the Arab establishment.

If the guerillas compel Nasser to stiffen his terms, thereby compelling the Soviets to do the same, agreement between the Powers may become impossible. This is the great hope of the Israeli government.

An even greater hope of Golda Meir and her twenty-one colleagues

lies in the general mobilization of American Jewry, with all its vast influence in the field of mass communications and in Congress, against the Nixon administration. This was always successful under Democratic administrations, but Nixon is far less dependent on Jewish votes. The oil interests play a great part in his administration. And people like Yost may hope that the mood of the American people for peace, in the face of global nuclear dangers, will be so strong that even the well-organized Zionist groups will find it difficult to mobilize the Jews against it.

Indeed, this may be the major test of Zionism, as an ideology: will American Jews, in a clash between the American government and Israel, take the side of Israel? Or will they seek to avoid the clash by pressuring Israel to change her policy?

Three courses are open to Israel now: accept the imposed settlement; stay put and risk total isolation; move towards a direct peace with the Palestinians.

The first course is in direct line with the traditional Zionist policy of cooperating with at least one Western power. But retreat, bordering on surrender, is not impossible, although highly unlikely. It would demand a moral courage and a political constellation which it is difficult even to imagine.

(If the Arabs were right in their dogma that Israel is but a creation of Western imperialism, Israel would, of course, have to follow this course. But to their utmost astonishment, the Arabs may yet find themselves allied to both Western and Soviet imperialism, in a clash with a recalcitrant Israel.)

The second course suits Jewish psychology even more. It would isolate Israel in the world community. It might cut off her arms supplies, compelling her to rely on an independent nuclear deterrent. It may cut off American money and necessitate the agonizing reorganization of Israel's economy, with either greatly diminished or greatly enlarged Jewish support. Today, this course seems the most likely to be followed. The mood of the country, stiffened by incessant propaganda in all mass media, is geared to it.

The third course would be to create a completely new situation by direct Israeli peace initiative, aimed at the Palestinians, including the guerillas and, through them, the whole Arab world.

I believe that this third possibility is the only peace which would last—because it would not be 'imposed,' not come from the outside, but from within. It would not only settle concrete problems, important as these are, but it would first of all create new mental attitudes, a willingness to live together, to cooperate in forging a new structure for the region.

Without new attitudes, what prospect does peace have? An imposed solution, accepted under duress and bringing no change to the basic outlook—how long will it last?

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Only direct action, motivated by new attitudes and in their turn creating new mental patterns, can create the basic change needed. This action must bring together the two originators of the struggle, the two great national movements which have clashed in this country for so many years.

Today, one may think that this is the least likely of the three courses to be followed. But things are moving under the surface, both in Israel and in the Arab world. Under the pressure of events, new forces and new trends may ripen more quickly than expected.

(Member of the Israeli Knesset) URI AVNERY
Tel Aviv, Israel

LETTER TO A FRIEND: AN ESSAY ON A HOPE FOR PEACE

September, 1968

My friend:

I am writing this to you because you have taught me many things and with you I have learned to feel hope again.

I have just returned from the Middle East, as you well know, to the United States. It is a shock to return; a disagreeable shock. Don't envy anything you may believe we have. If you think yourself brainwashed, remember that to fear the condition is proof enough of the opposite. We live here surrounded by anonymity, by the triumph of the machine, by the death of life and the continuity of what used to be man. Here we exist and act frenetically, and when we stop, we are rushed to our psychiatrists who adjust us to what their profession has taught them to call normality. We speak of democracy and of the common man. We have given them all enough to die of, but the words are so strong and the myth so great that it will be a long time before the people awaken. Perhaps they never will. They may be better off not knowing what it is that has happened. So you see, it is those who have not yet succumbed to the bliss of adjusted life who still speak. Do you remember how we spoke of our children, of your son and of mine? When I came back here, I was seized with the fear that my son would grow up like the objects around him. My fear in this society is to survive as a human being. It is not quite a 'political act' in the normal sense. Your fear is to survive intact in a country which is yours and yet against you. I cannot help thinking that these two goals are related.

I never believed the hostile critics of the West who spoke with such happiness of the agonizing alienation they felt. I never realized to what depths of despair a man can be driven so that his happiness resides in his being able to express his misery, and his humanity consists in his deploring its absence. I am that man now, and my humanity is the consciousness of what I have lost. When I returned to the United States, the Democratic convention was about over. Do you remember the photographs of that performance? Do you remember the police, the riot police and their clubs, protecting the greatest democratic country in the free world? Do you remember the faces of the delegates? Do you remember how we talked of Vietnam and of the lust of battle; of the terrible quantification of death; of the sinful abuse of patriotism and the desecration of nationalism? I despise this sickness of nationalism; this worship of an exclusive illusion. I despise the words that lead men to battle and that makes death of life, and life of death. I am not against nations. I am against nationalism. I am not against men, I am against the idea of the 'masses,' the heroes of cynics who would not mingle with a crowd but who isolate themselves and dream the dream

of the greatness of the multitudes. Is it the machine age, the triumph of industrialization, that has created this monster of efficient, irresponsible anonymity? Violence existed before the so-called modern age. But it seems to me that the real success in controlling society came only with the advent of communication, with the advent of new weapons, with the advent of centralization, with the advent of those conditions that made total control a possibility. I know how you yearn for your people to be free and independent and prosperous. I remember how sad you were to see the plains of Jericho so barren. But I pray that you and those who work with you will succeed in making the plains green again without destroying the men who will profit from your labor.

Many years ago, I came and I travelled through the countries that we call Arab and through Israel. I travelled and I saw many things. I met men and women. I met them as a human being, French born of Russian origin, and an American citizen. I should add that I was a refugee myself, the daughter of refugees, a Jew. Maybe for me to be a Jew and to be a refugee were then synonymous. When I travelled to the Arab East, to Cairo, to Damascus and to Beirut, I was a Jew, because to those Muslims and Christians who met me, it was natural to identify me in that way. It was not natural to me. I came to understand what it meant for them to call me a Jew. For some it was a mark of identification. For others, it was to associate me with Israel, with the United States, with 'international Zionism,' with the West, with all the things that were feared or hated, or both. I was shocked. I did not understand. When I began to understand, I was all the more grateful to those who recognized me, a Jew, as having a personal dimension rather than being just an occasion for attack or automatic rejection.

I had known anti-Semitism and the memory of it and the fear of it, and I met it again. But I also met men who were innocent of this, whose lives were dedicated to other matters, or whose indifference covered up this destruction. I saw lands that I had not known but that I recognized. I saw people whose faces were strange to me but who expressed the welcome of friends. I saw people who had not forgotten how to live. All this I saw without saying it. It is necessary to say only when one loses it—and then the memory becomes myth. I saw injustice, indifference, men of sublime corruption, others of passionate goodwill. Do you remember Michel Aflaq? Do you remember how touched I was, like so many others, by his early ardor; by his courage to say that it is in you that the change must come first, and then the world will change. Do you remember his rival, the saintly pragmatist, Kemal Jumblatt? Do you remember the conversation about Israel, about justice? I did not know then what their history was—these young men and women. It was not mine. But was I forever barred from understanding it? All of this touched me, the me I knew, the Jew in me, the me and the Jew that I had not known. When I left and entered Israel,

for the first time twelve years ago, I was carrying all of this invisible luggage. I left with questions, with a heavy sadness at meeting hatred, and with a heavy sadness at parting from friends. The Mandelbaum Gate, to me, was the last frontier, and the guards who said good-bye and those who said hello, did more than they ever knew. Do you remember who took me to the Gate in Jordanian Jerusalem? I have not forgotten his name and when I understood the risk he ran by accompanying me that far, I knew that I would not forget him. He and those like him who had risked the contempt and the hatred we had seen and heard in those endless discussions of Israel and the Arabs, gave me the love and courage to fight the same elsewhere.

I came to Israel. It was a different world. You know Israel better than I. It is your country. I came as a Jew then to Israel, perhaps because if one is a Jew, one comes to Israel first as a Jew. But I came having seen and felt the world outside of Israel. I came from the land of the 'enemy' and I spoke in a way that disturbed those whose vision of the enemy was as clouded as the enemy's image of him. I will not tell you what I thought then of Israel or Israelis. I was not a Zionist, nor am I now. But I was happy and proud and curious and sad. There was anger, hatred and ignorance here too. Why not, after all? Normality is a robe of many colors. There are those who rejected the concept of normality and who lived the dream of a chosen people. I accept history. Mine is different from yours. But I do not worship mine to denigrate yours. I cannot believe that in the eyes that exist or that we have created—of the Creator—there is any difference between you and me. I cannot accept that a people is chosen, only that its history is unique, peculiar, and in the case of the Jews, long and strange and difficult and rich, and in this century, signed by the greatest madness of mankind. In Israel, then as now, I met people who would never forget that past and others for whom it is an unknown, a legacy they would like to forget. I met people who were curious about their neighbors, others who were distant, narrow, chauvinist, in other words, like the population of any country. I remember going to a synagogue the first night that I arrived in Jerusalem. I was overcome by so many emotions. The Israeli guard who had admitted me at the Mandelbaum Gate was not particularly happy to see where I was coming from, nor that I hoped one day to return 'there.' His unhappiness was a foretaste of things to come. And those who waited for me expected me to tell them how relieved I was, at last, to be safe. But these were not my feelings. I was happy, very happy to have arrived, but not happy to have left the other side—simply because it was the Other side. I went to the synagogue to think if not to pray; to ask why it is that one must always choose to be with one against the other. Why not be for men and against wilful misunderstanding and hatred? There were very few people in this synagogue on that Friday night, only some elderly women who seemed surprised at my visit.

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I remember the endless discussions in Israel as in Egypt on the relationship between concentration camps, Israel and the Arab world. I remember the feeling of utter despair at trying to compare what is incomparable. I remember hearing what we have all heard about how the concentration camps were the responsibility of Europe and how the Jewish question ought to be solved in Europe. I remember last June reading Lotfallah Soliman's article in the special issue of the *Temps Modernes* in which he said the same thing, with such finality. There are problems for which it seems to me there are no logical solutions. There are historical situations which one is forced to face and deal with that cannot be easily or entirely justly squared away. It is perhaps banal to think this or to write it, but is seems to me that under the circumstances it is a reflection that ought to be repeated.

The connection between the Second World War (with its attempted Final Solution of the Jewish Question) and the State of Israel, is one that obsesses Jews and Arabs alike. To some it appears that there is a direct relationship between Hitler and the creation of the state of Israel. But this view is too simple, it overlooks the fact that the forces of Zionism were at work before the Second World War, and it overlooks the fact that anti-Semitism was not the only factor that drew Jews to Palestine. Of course, if the War had not involved the Jewish question then the course of history would have differed, European history as well as that of the Middle East. The attitudes of many non-Zionist Jews would have differed, and the attitudes of those governments whose silent complicity was something to atone for after the War, would also have differed. But the War did not create a situation that did not already exist in Palestine. It is also true that the friendships of the Arab governments and the Axis powers designed to help the former expel the Mandatory occupations, did nothing to improve the later relations of Palestine Jew and Arab, or Israeli and Arab. And again, although this tangle of contrary friendships can be explained as the long-term result of the forced entry of the western imperialists against whom anything was allowed for the purpose of obtaining independence, the existence of these arrangements should discourage us from separating the European experience from that of the Middle East entirely. The Jewish question and the phenomenon of the Third Reich belong in the realm, unfortunately, of western experience. But after it has been made clear that the experience of the Jew in the Muslim world differed radically from that of the Jew in Christian Europe, and after having understood the nature of European colonialism in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is imperative to understand and to admit that in those complex circumstances that followed the First World War, the history of Middle East and West were no longer totally independent of one another. This is not to put the responsibility for the behavior of one group on the other; it is merely to do away with the myth of completely separate and totally unresponsive action.

Now where do the Jews fit in? I do not believe that the Palestinian Arab, be he Christian or Muslim, or a Lebanese of Greek Orthodox descent, is in any way responsible for the deportation of French, German, Polish and other European Jews. But I believe the time has come to say more: we, Arabs, are not responsible for what you, Europeans, perpetrated against the Jews. I believe the time has come for all men, Arabs as well as others, to say what many have said: we, as human beings, respond to and are responsible for what happened, regardless of who we are and of who you are. In so far as we are touched by what happens to man, as Lotfallah Soliman wrote,[1] then we are concerned with the holocaust, as with Hiroshima. It is not a question of the transfer of guilt; that is indeed another matter.

If I believe this, I also believe that the time has come for westerners, Jews and non-Jews alike, to learn what the history of the Middle East was prior to 1948. It is time to discover what cross-cultural and comparative studies have apparently not succeeded in teaching us, that the history of peoples does indeed differ, and that their experience is sometimes different and not inferior to ours. I persist in believing what you know better than I, what Nissim Rejwan has written so convincingly about in the same *Temps Modernes* issue of June, 1967, and which remains true regardless of what has happened since. I refer to the period of Arab-Jewish coexistence, and not only to the manner in which Jews were tolerated in Muslim society, but how they regarded their Muslim compatriots, how they regarded themselves, how they and others lived in pre-nationalist days. Is there not something we can learn from this today? I do not write this to you, for whom this is a live memory. Unfortunately, my own compatriots, for whom it is not a live memory, neither believe in its possibility for the future, nor in its reality in the past.

The tragedy of the Palestinian-Israeli situation is not that the survivors of European concentration camps came to Palestine. It is that the creation of one homeland should have, ultimately, resulted in the deprivation of another people from their land, the same land.

Do you remember the morning we went to Yad Vashem?[2] You asked me how it was possible and I said I did not know. I do not know. But I said that those who ask have more protection against becoming murderers than those who observe in silence. I was happy that you came with me. I asked you to come because it was not your history and yet its reality has affected you. And I wanted you to come because before you had seen Yad Vashem you had already taught me that it was possible to reconcile the despair of two nations.

There will never be a way to convince a man with a number on his

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[1] *Temps Modernes*, June 1967, p. 271.

[2] Yad Vashem is the memorial to the Jews massacred by the Nazis during the Second World War.

arm that there is anything more important than his survival. And what more can one ask of him? There will never be a way to convince a man who has lost his home that the conditions that forced him to go were just. There is no justice here, and there can be no solomonic decision that will bring both men all they want. But can we not find an alternative to throwing up our hands and saying, with one side or another, "Let us fight for everything, anything less is suicide."

There must be an end to mystification. There must be an end to the wilful confusing and confounding of each other's motives. There must be a beginning, and, indeed, since the June War there is evidence of such a beginning of collective self-criticism and reappraisal. But how far will it go?

There are those, Israelis and non-Israelis, who believe that the Zionist phase of Israel's history is approaching its end, but this is not equivalent to saying that the State of Israel is approaching its end. It implies that the ideological bases of the state may change now that the historical circumstances, internally and externally, have changed. Among such people, the prospect of creating a pluralist society which would one day become a completely integrated society, including Jew, Muslim and Christian alike, is a distinct hope. There are those, particularly among ardent socialists, and often among the most sincere Arab socialists who are conscious of fighting the same battle at home, for whom the goal is also to help create a secular state. The reactions to such expressions are predictable. But one issue which emerges repeatedly from these reflections, whether by Israeli or Arab, is the urgent need to clarify the relationship between Jews and Zionists, and simultaneously to define the nature of nationalism in the Middle East today. If we cannot provide the answers to these questions, at the very least, the time has come to pose them. The critical views expressed by Ahmed Baheidine, Lotfallah Soliman and Gebran Majdalany on this score, are not merely to amplify the attack against the present state of Israel. They represent the position of men for whom Judaism, the Jewish question, and the state of Israel remain separate problems, to be considered separately and not to be inevitably merged. All three are profoundly concerned with the nature of anti-Semitism and its impact on the Jewish question. All three are devoted to the liberal ideal of assimilation which they do not regard as a preliminary step to conversion. All three are hostile to the exclusively Jewish nature of the present state of Israel, and to what they consider to be its racial and religious exclusivism. Although all three are sympathetic to the concept of the European transfer of guilt—not in any inhuman fashion—they are sufficiently knowledgeable about the West to suspect its motives and its reputation with respect to Jews and anti-Semitism.

To be sure, for those dissenting Israelis who are patriots and who will not be the last to defend Israel, there is an urgent desire to re-examine the relationship between Jews and Zionism, between Jews and

Israelis. Among these Israelis, I include Israeli Arabs as well as Jews, especially those of non-western origin. That these are, in practice, the marginal men of Israel, reflects something about the nature of the State, and not about the loyalty of these groups.

The political solution did not eradicate the Jewish question: in the Arab world anti-Semitism has increased since 1948. I do not interpret this to mean that the state of Israel should therefore be destroyed because a happier and more successful solution cannot be found. It is still important that the roots of Zionism be understood by the Arab world, that the nature of European anti-Semitism be understood, and that the contemporary Arab anti-Semitism, which is different in nature and in origin, also be exposed and eradicated. If anti-Semitism should cease to exist, then it is not inconceivable that the political effort to concentrate all Jews in Israel would also diminish. If it is possible for Jews to live outside of Israel, as full Jews, not as dismembered men who live in the knowledge that in times of crisis they will be able to go or they will be forced to go to Israel, then a new relationship will exist between Israeli and Jew. There are those who will oppose this on religious grounds, those whose presence in Israel is not related to anti-Semitism and for whom discussions of political conditions or situations are totally irrelevant. But it is not to be forgotten that there are also Jews outside of Israel who feel themselves members of a community which is not limited by political boundaries. If they are not to be excommunicated, in spirit, then their ties to Israel will assume a less ambiguous nature than they have at the present. The relationship between the 'two Israels' will then change, a situation which cannot but have profound repercussions on the state of Israel and on the Zionist ideology which now dominates it. This in turn will affect the position of non-Jews within Israel, and ultimately of Israel and its Arab neighbors.

We have often lamented the fact that those who should speak against fanaticism are silent. You have asked me where are the voices of reason in the Arab world? They are there but we do not always hear them. And today, I have received a letter from a Lebanese friend who asks where are the voices of those Israelis who share your dream and mine, who want the end of hatred and war and who are not afraid to confront the choices that exist? There are those who will always be ready to sue the evidence of danger as a reason to silence the voices of moderation. Who will risk counseling caution when there is a responsibility for life and death? But we have lived through this before. This, it seems to me, is also a tragedy: those who speak for reason, for sanity, for life, for Jew, for Palestinian, for Arab, cannot hear each other except through the distant echoes of intermediaries who beseech them to have faith. This is the first barrier that must be breached. You may tell me that the barrier exists where there is no longer a frontier, in Israel between Israeli and Palestinian of the West Bank. I agree and I do not

minimize the internalized forces of caution and hostility, on both sides, that make meeting where it is physically possible, emotionally difficult. But where there are physical barriers that exclude those with whom talk is possible, then it is more lamentable. It is not a question of agreement, it is a much more primitive matter of putting human beings in touch with one another and putting those who share the possibility of a common language in contact. There is very little room for optimism, but the alternatives are so grim that I wonder how much longer we can avoid trying everything short of war.

This morning the news of terror is in the newspaper with photographs of Tel Aviv. What is one to do? What is one to think? I remember the conversation with the owner of a restaurant in East Jerusalem who insisted that he was going to leave because it was no longer safe. I remember the evening at our friends' home, when everyone listened apprehensively to the radio. I know the fear for children, for the innocent. And I fear for those who fall victim on both sides of this border. I remember the conversation I had with an Israeli official who angrily decried the Jerusalem blasts of August 18, 1968, because they lessened the chances of a political solution. Terror only polarizes sentiment, it does not make for moderation. But I also remember the man we met in one of the West Bank towns who proudly identified himself as the "someone" who had been quoted in an American newspaper as saying that if a member of al-Fatah came to his home, he would not throw him out, though he would not invite him to come in the first place. You know what I think of al-Fatah. You know that I was impressed by the members of al-Fatah I met in Beirut, by their talk of bi-nationalism, by the politics that grew out of their despair, by their confrontation with reality. You will tell me that one cannot smile at al-Fatah in Beirut and condemn their activities in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. I answer that it is not either/or, it is a matter of understanding what the signs mean. In Beirut, in Amman and other places, the Palestinians are sympathizers of al-Fatah, if they are not members. They have seen the cynicism of the governments of their 'brother,' they know that they can expect little, and they continue to be deceived. You will tell me that they deceive themselves even more by believing the stories they write about their successes in the Jordan Valley. I agree. There is no use in perpetrating lies or myths. There must be an end to such things, since they are a hindrance to any just cause. In Beirut, and how much truer this is in other places, the ability to confront the position of the Palestinians, and the ability to confront Israel (and I do not speak in military terms) are predicated on the ability to confront one's own society. Just as in Israel, I believe that the inner integration of that society and its ruthless self-examination is a prerequisite to the integration, not the disintegration, of Israel into the Middle East.

Everywhere the talk is about realism. Have the Arabs become more realistic? Have the Israelis become more realistic? For the Israelis, the

answer is recognition of their own existence as a sovereign state. For the Palestinians, it is recognition of their existence as a nation deprived of its homeland. To the extent that they identify with the Palestinians, which is no longer something to accept as a matter of course, other Arab governments share the same desire as their Palestinian brothers. In the most general sense, this involves recognition of the validity of the claims made, and recognition of the reasons for hostility towards the Zionist movement. It may sound paradoxical and naïve, but is it any more so than asking Palestinians to understand Zionism and the movement that they consider to have robbed them of their land? It is only by rediscovering the past, the two different pasts that have been forcibly merged, that a common language about a common present and future can emerge.

There are specific demands, the satisfaction of which, or at the very least, the recognition of which, will one day also denote a new realism. The solutions to the refugee problems of 1948 and 1967 are part of the Palestine problem. Their solution will form part of the larger solution which must be negotiated between Palestinians and Israelis. Whether or not this solution will terminate what we call the Arab-Israeli question is another matter. It is far more important today, and far more problematic, to ponder how this initial and most urgent issue can be resolved. Any attempt to deal with it forces both Israelis and Palestinians to cope with far more than the contents of a political solution. Whether or not you agree that this is necessary for an immediate solution of the Palestine question, you must agree that the June War has confronted both Palestinians and Israelis with what we may call the problem of their respective identities. And I persist in believing that this aspect of the situation will affect the possibility and the nature of an accord that can eventually be worked out between the two.

We come back to the questions that were raised earlier about Israel, and that have been raised again since the June War, which resulted in the occupation of one million Arabs in Israeli territory. What is the future of these people? What is the future of the Israeli Arabs? Are the first to be expelled and the second to be permanently reduced to the status of a politically irresponsible minority? I do not have to tell you with what anguish this question is discussed, nor can I pretend to do anything but give you my own views. I stand with those in Israel who wish to see the Arabs of Israel integrated into the State; with those who wish to see an end to the exclusively Jewish nature of the State. I stand with those who are for a pluralist society; and eventually a totally integrated one; who wish to see Arabic and Hebrew the spoken languages of Israel; who wish to see both Arab and Jew as equal citizens of Israel. I stand with those who want to let the Israeli Arabs into all political parties, to lift all bans against them, and to cease treating them like the members of a suspect minority. I stand with those who look forward to the day when Jews will again become citizens

without fear in all of the Arab world; when they will live as a minority that is not suspect, that is more than tolerated and that is not considered foreign.

The time for the Arabs of Israel to become integrated completely into Israel is now. Their integration must proceed simultaneously with the integration of the Oriental Jew into Israel; not his assimilation into the State. I do not fear the de-Europeanization of Israel, I welcome the thought that Israel will be what its majority is, that is to say, that it will not be a preserve for European, and East European Jews. Why should we perpetuate the idea that Judaism is the religious cultural and political experience of Eastern Europe alone? Why should there be a policy of assimilation and absorption into what is considered the dominant culture? Why should there not be a policy of allowing the different ethnic communities in Israel to live their own lives; not to be assimilated and 'raised' to the level of their western colleagues. Is it sentimental naïveté to believe that the Iraqi and the Yemenite and the Palestinian have the right to live what they are and to cease being fed into the charitable machines that promise material salvation and transformation?

Do you think that I have strayed far from what we are interested in? I do not think so. In Israel, the Arab ranks below the Oriental Jew in the esteem which his Israeli colleagues have for him. The reasons for the hostility involved in each case are different. After all, the Oriental Jew is a Jew and the Israeli Arab is Christian or Muslim. But their integration into Israel depends on different facets of the same problem: what is Israel? The answer to that question will provide an answer to the question of what position Israeli Arabs may have in Israel. And like you, I believe that if the position of Israeli Arabs was improved, then these Israelis could act as mediators between their brothers outside Israel and the Jewish Israelis. And then, one day, when there will be a choice between living as a Palestinian Arab in Israel, or in an Arab Palestine, you will be able to make that decision out of something other than frustration. When that day comes, it may also be possible for Iraqi and Egyptian and Lebanese Jews to decide freely whether they wish to live in Iraq, Egypt, or Lebanon, or in Israel.

We are all depressed by the absence of peace, and we are all depressed by the apparent irreconcilability of the total demands of Arabs and Israelis. But it seems to me that we are beginning to learn what is possible between those alternatives. The war forced one million Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza into Israeli controlled territory. This has made the greatest change in the world. The map of 1967 is the map of 1947 and we are again confronted by the choices that existed at the earlier time, only now we have the experience of twenty years in between. I know that the Palestinians of Ramallah and Hebron and Qalqiliyah are divided; that East Jerusalemites will not follow

what they hear from other Palestinians living elsewhere. This atomization is something that you must help them to overcome. Is this not the same problem that exists in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world? The absence of a sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility? What does it matter by what name we describe it? The results are intolerably expensive and destructive. Before the Palestinians can face the Israelis in order to negotiate, they must have some internal unity. Yes, I know you will remind me that there are Palestinians outside of Israel and their predicament is the same. I know this is so, and it is one of the conditions that is symptomatic of the world. But after all, the Palestinians have been scattered. They have been aided by the Egyptians or the Syrians, or the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This is also something that the war has exposed.

How will you answer those who say that Palestine never existed as an independent entity? I know that the history of nationalism is young in the Middle East. It is a complicated problem, and perhaps we had better admit that we have not yet found the answers that apply to the Middle East. There is no doubt that there is a Palestine, that there are Palestinians who are nothing else, and whose connection with their land is beyond doubt. Also, there is the negative proof that the Palestinian is not an Egyptian, a Syrian, an Iraqi, or a Lebanese. He has not been integrated: he has remained separate. He has experienced the Sartrean definition of what it is to be a Jew: the Jew is one whom the others define as a Jew. I personally do not accept this as a total definition—it is the definition of the Jew in the Gentile world, who has always been the Other! But what of the Jew himself? What of his experience in his own world that is not merely a response to what he is not? Here lies the wealth and the reason and the history that is not merely the history of anti-Semitism. So for you, if to be a Palestinian is more than to be a non-Jew in Israel, and to be more than something that is not accepted by those who speak of Arab unity, then the time to learn and reaffirm those reasons is now.

This is also true for those who are suffering the crisis of conscience in the rest of the Arab world, for those who have suffered the full dimension of what June 1967 has meant. The defeat by Israel has brought the Palestinians into a new perspective; moreover, it has forced thinking men to question the relationship between what was said and what occurred. What is it to be an Arab? What is the nature of society, in Lebanon, in Egypt, and elsewhere?

You asked me what the people talked about in Beirut. You looked at me skeptically when I said that they think and they suffer, and they ask themselves where to begin. But it is true. The night after I had visited the refugee camp of Siblin outside of Beirut, I went to speak with a friend in the rue Mazzra. We spoke of the refugees, of what it is to be a Palestinian and a Lebanese, of the nature of resistance rebellion. I asked him, how can you live this way? How do those who

live in the huts on the hill look at Beirut and not erupt? I asked him how it was possible for men to accept and accept and live with the truth of indifference and apathy not only in refugee camps but in private apartments. When and how shall change take place? Is it the sense of time that must change? Is it the sense of the past? What is the past? What are the glories and what are the dreams that prevent future glories? What is the mystique of language that lulls the brain with its intoxicating power? The revolution has been betrayed. We know that. But this is not the time to continue that process of internal self-criticism, to pursue it relentlessly until the new dawn arrives. How does one make men responsible to and for one another? How does one develop a critical sense of the present and the past? How does one make it possible for men to understand that they may criticize the present without destroying themselves in the process? I mean this in a symbolic and in a practical way. The ability to contemplate one's past in a dispassionate manner, to analyze it, to reconstruct it, to evaluate it and to surpass it must precede any of the profound changes that are desired. But it must first be possible to criticize society openly, without paying a fatal penalty for this. If this is not yet possible, there are enough men who know that it must become so, and they are struggling to realize that right. I feel with them a total solidarity in this struggle and I impatiently await the day when it will be possible for them to write, to publish, to proclaim all that they now proclaim, in the loudest voice to the largest number of people. This is possible in some places, in some parts of the Arab world. You know that as well as I do. But for those who conceive of their destiny as linked to all men who live in the entire region of the Middle East, the spaces of freedom are not sufficient. Until the day comes when it will be possible to speak critically of the state, of the army, of religion, there will be no internal revolution or evolution regardless of what regimes have come. The day of mystification are finished, there is no time left to sink into indifference or to be seduced by what comforts the soul but eludes the mind. The need for change, the need for an internal revolution in the Arab world will not disappear with the solution of the Palestinian question, nor would it have disappeared with the disappearance of the state of Israel. The emergence of Israel and its perpetual challenge have affected the course of that revolution. But it is a dangerous myth to believe that the revolution for the freedom of Arab men has been permanently arrested by the existence of Israel. That is a position which makes it possible to remain irresponsible and to accept the status quo until external changes have taken place that make maximum internal stability or security possible. But this is precisely the same argument which one hears in Israel, which progressive Arabs reject. If one accepts the dynamic relationship between internal events and foreign affairs, then it is an axiom that internal changes—which will ultimately affect foreign relations—must take place even under conditions of less than maximum

BOOK REVIEWS

Religion in the Middle East. General editor: A. J. Arberry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Vol. I (Parts 1 & 2), 595 pp. Vol. II (Parts 3 & 4), 750 pp., Glossary, Bibliography, Index. $22.50 the set.

This is a symposium that contains religious information about Jews in Palestine, other Muslim lands, Europe and America; about Christians of several denominations native to the Middle East and the West; as well as about Muslims in the Arab world, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Europe and Africa. The mere geographical scope of the book goes far beyond the indication of its title and what is usually called "the Middle East," in spite of the fact that the general editor in his foreword advisedly understands by the term "the lands of the Fertile Crescent, Arabia proper, and the territories to east and west, north and south affected by the Arab conquests and the spread of Islam."

This unrestricted proliferation has led to unequal topical treatment of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the three parts of the book reserved for them. Whereas in "Judaism Today," by Jakob J. Petuchowski, Judaism was treated on the world level, Islam has not received such treatment and there are areas, notably Indonesia and the Far East, which were completely left out. On the other hand, religious groups in the Middle East proper—though of insignificant numbers—such as the Zoroastrians in Iran, the Sabians or 'Christians of St. John' in lower Iraq, the Samaritans, and the Muslim minority in occupied Palestine were ignored, while the Druzes and the Ibāḍīs, as well as the Jewish minorities in Oriental countries, were each given a chapter.

These anomalies aside, the general editor and the subject editors (E. I. J. Rosenthal for Judaism, M.A.C. Warren for Christianity, and F. C. Beckingham for Islam) are to be commended for bringing together, each in his part, noted scholars to deal with aspects of their subject. If there is any criticism in this direction, it will be one for omission. For example, the writers of Part 1 on Judaism are not only Jews but also Zionists. The impression is therefore given that Judaism has developed in history to become modern political Zionism and its Israeli entailment. While the identification of Judaism with political Zionism is historically incorrect, it is also refused by a number of Jews on ideological, doctrinal and spiritual grounds. This is the position of the American Council for Judaism, of some Reform and Orthodox Jews and others who do not want to sully Judaism with the crimes of political Zionism in its morally unjustified efforts to displace or summarily eliminate the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, dispossess them of their human and civil rights by the use of force and international intrigue, and forge by sinful human hands the coming of God's kingdom. Whereas this Jewish opposition to political Zionism, though perhaps a minority, is in fact the wakeful conscience of modern Judaism, it has not been represented—not even in the bibliography—and could easily have been by such writers as Rabbi Elmer Berger, author of *The Jewish Dilemma, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism, A Partisan History of Judaism* and other books, or else by such as Moshe Menuhin, author of *The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time*, or even by Zionist

Jews whose conscience has recently begun to move at the crimes they perpetrated, such as Uri Avnery, member of Israel's Knesset and author of *Memoirs of an Assassin: Confessions of a Stern Gang Killer* and *Israel without Zionists* (1968). This does not detract from the scholarly character of the chapters of Part 1, especially that masterly one by S. D. Goitein on "The Jews of Yemen." But their Zionist assumptions are here questioned as well as the subject editor's purpose in ignoring non-Zionist Judaism.

The nine writers of Part 2 on Christianity are all Christian scholars and an attempt has been successfully made except in a couple of cases, that each of them be of the denominational church of which he is writing. The result is a felicitous and factual account of the history and present state of the Churches in the Middle East, both Eastern and Western. But no account has been given of the effect of the ecumenical movement on these Churches.

When we come to the writers of Part 3 on Islam, we observe that of the eighteen scholars represented, only two are Muslims, namely, Seyyed Hossein Nasr who wrote on "Ithnā ᶜAsharī Shīᶜism and Iranian Islam" and Asaf A. A. Fyzee who wrote on "The Ismāᶜīlīs," the others being Western Christian and Jewish scholars. While I do not question the scholarly approach of these non-Muslim writers, I do question the inconsistency of the editorial policy which could have given Muslim scholars a greater share in writing this Part, to make it parallel to the previous two Parts, and equally give a picture of Islam from within, so to speak.

The main contribution of this book is not its admittedly succinct treatment of religions in the Middle East in the last one hundred years against their historical background, though for the general reader this is a worthy purpose. To this reviewer, the main contribution is rather the interpretation, sometimes the correction, of our knowledge about religions in the Middle East as well as its enhancement by the personal observation and investigation of the authors concerning the most recent times. Political, social, economic and cultural factors were taken into consideration for the understanding of the religious experience and the contemporary religious situation of the area. First-hand information of the authors was brought to bear on the study and make it more vivid.

Part 4, which studies the three religions in concord and conflict, may be the most exciting of the book. ᶜAbd al-Tafāhum (whose style and argumentation are so characteristic that the use of the pen name seems unnecessary) wrote a chapter here on "Doctrine." His belief that the Church is the "new Israel" obviates political Zionism but does not hide the Church's puzzlement and anguish at the ongoing existence of Judaism or Islam. A. L. Tibawi in an original contribution on "The Cultural Aspects" studied the factors that brought Christian Arabs and Muslim Arabs together in the last hundred years against the West and Zionism but he does not consider a rapprochement to include spiritual Judaism in the Arab world. It is W. Montgomery Watt in "Religion and Anti-Religion" who predicted, in the last chapter, that it is by no means impossible that by the end of this century some spectacular change will bring Judaism, Christianity and Islam together.

The book, however, was written between 1964 and 1966, that is, before the Middle East war of June 1967. It seems to me that not until peace and justice are restored in Palestine will any prediction of the sort hold any water. Will the de-Zionization of Judaism be "the spectacular change"?

The Hartford Seminary Foundation ISSA J. BOULLATA
Hartford, Connecticut

Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. Edited by Kemal H. Karpat. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. pp. 398. Paperback, $3.95.

This may be one of the most important books on the Middle East published in recent years. Unlike many studies in which 'Western' authors offer their own interpretation or that of other foreign writers about the different social and political doctrines in the Middle East, this volume presents a wide range of selections by different Middle Eastern authors in which they discuss various issues and problems which beset their countries and in which they express their views on the social and political ideologies that shaped the development and the direction of change in this area. The book is divided into three parts, with each part subdivided into many sections. The first part (279 pages) deals exclusively with social and political thought in the Arab countries; the second (72 pages) presents a selection from Turkish writers; and the last (15 pages) offers three selections from Iranian writers. A comparison with Sylvia G. Haim's *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962) would be of interest; while Haim's introduction seems more significant than that of Karpat, the latter's selection and arrangement of the material seems preferable. The editor classifies the material under the following headings: Background of Arab Nationalism, Modern Arab Nationalism, Regional and Local Nationalism, Islam, Modernism and Socialism, Arab Socialism, Socialism in the Doctrine of the Baath, Nasserism, Arab Thought and Contemporary Western Civilization, Arab Unity and Ideology.

Notwithstanding the reviewer's admiration for this volume, a number of objections can and should be raised. Firstly, the editor seems to underemphasize the role of Islam and its influence on the social and political thought in the Middle East. This can be seen from the few articles that are concerned with the subject. Only four out of sixty-two deal with Islam and these are out-dated and do not reflect the current thinking of many segments of the societies in question. Islam by all account played and will continue to play a significant role in this area. It affected and it will continue to affect both the rate and direction of change and the form of the process of modernization. After all, people still identify with Islam and continue to program their action within its framework. Secondly, the editor totally ignored, without offering any explanation, Arabic thought in North Africa. A number of North African writers in the last decade or so have been influential

in the social and political currents in the Arab East. Algerians and other writers from North Africa—many of them classified as 'leftist'—enjoy favorable response among many Arab writers. *Revolutionary Choice in Morocco* by al-Mahdi Ben Baraka is but one among many books from North Africa which exert tremendous influence on the mind of Arab youths. Furthermore, the selection seems to underrepresent or underestimate the thinking of army officers. In the Middle East at present they play a prominent role, and all governments of the area are either directly or indirectly governed and influenced by them. Thus their way of thinking and their view of the various processes of development are of utmost importance. Some officers produced many works and contributed numerous articles to magazines published either by the army or civilian agencies. Thirdly, while on the whole the editor rendered a service in providing a short biographical note about the authors whose writing is included in the book, much of the information is unchecked and inaccurate. For example, we are told that Abdul Aziz al-Duri (p. 33) was Dean of University College from 1949-1960 while, in fact, he was Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1949-1958. He was dismissed from this job in the wake of the July 14, 1958 revolution. Also, we are told that al-Bazzaz became Prime Minister in 1962 while, in fact, it was in 1965. More care should been taken in checking this biographical data. Lastly, the editor fails to include any selection that takes up the problem of minorities which is besetting many countries in this area, particularly Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Neither the Kurds nor the Shīᶜa, Christians nor other minorities who inhabited the area for many centuries are treated. Consequently, the book does not help the reader to form a complete picture of the ideological development in this area.

In spite of these criticisms, Karpat's book remains a significant work that contains many penetrating observations on the evolution and the nature of social and political thought in the Middle East. The work undoubtedly will be of great interest to scholars concerned with political thought in general and the Middle East in particular.

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AYAD AL-QAZZAZ

The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. By Roger Le Tourneau. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969. pp. viii, 127. $5.00.

"My principal aim," says Professor Le Tourneau in the Foreword "is to try to understand how the Almohads succeeded in uniting all of North Africa under their dominion, and, in addition, why they failed to maintain this unity." In pursuit of this aim, the author devotes the largest of the three chapters to a detailed, and often brilliant, analysis of the career of Ibn Tumart, who was proclaimed Mahdī in 1121. The charge that Ibn Tumart was an impostor who was activated by ambition is firmly rejected (pp. 36 ff). The thesis that the Mahdī was solely responsible for the initial Berber challenge to the Almoravids is re-

peatedly emphasized and the view that his consciousness of his mission gradually unfolded and was not the result of a sudden revelation is convincingly defended.

The second chapter, "Building an Empire," traces the growth of the Almohad domain under ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and his successors, and contains a masterly analysis of the military position leading to the conquest of Marrakesh in 1147, and of the significance of the defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. The third chapter follows the decline beginning with the accession of the fifth caliph, Yūsuf al-Mustanṣir, in 1213, to the final collapse which Professor Le Tourneau places at 1248 with the death of al-Saʿīd. The last section of the book, "A Note on Sources," is valuable.

This first-class scholarship, however, is interspersed with confusing and sometimes inconsistent statements. For example, it is asserted that the Almohad empire spread over the "whole" of North Africa (pp. 43, 57), although it did never encompass Egypt. It is difficult to conceive of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, a twelfth-century ruler, as one of the most talented "founders" of Islamic civilization (p. 64). We are repeatedly informed that the Berbers did not harbor rebellious ideas, yet it is stated "we may safely assume that they were ready to follow anyone who would oppose the Almoravid masters" (pp. 13 ff). The author categorically states that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin "struck two blows from which the Almohad empire never completely recovered." The first blow was the introduction into Morocco of some Arab bedouin tribes who became "a force for anarchy and instability" (pp. 58 ff.). Later, however, the author rejects, "after careful study," a similar position by Professor Henri Terasse and declares: "... so they cannot be held responsible for Almohad decay: they only aggravated it when it was probably irremediable." One must be careful not to exaggerate their destructive influence, the author adds (pp. 103 ff.).

The second blow, which was "the worst" to happen, was making the government hereditary. The situation in Tinmel at the death of Ibn Tumart and in Medina at the death of the Prophet were remarkably similar, and an ill-defined system of succession had disastrously failed by the time of ʿUthmān, the third Rightly-Guided caliph. It is difficult to see how the author expected the empire to expand and flourish otherwise, considering the corrupt state of Almohad shaykhs (who did not oppose the institution of the monarchy), the inter-tribal feuding, and the inequality among the dominant tribes.

The statement that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin bears the primary responsibility for the decline of the Almohads (p. 105) because his hereditary rule destroyed the essential nature of the Almohad movement which had consisted "in the cooperation" of the Berber tribes directly contradicts the subsequent statement that the "main reason" was the conqueror-attitude of the Maṣmūḍa tribe, to which the Muʾminids did not belong. The over-emphasis on the destruction of the "soul" of the movement by the hereditary principle of the first caliph somehow sounds unconvincing in view of the fact that the decline occurred four generations later, and that the empire reached its zenith precisely after the loss of "soul." This over-emphasis is strange considering that the author gives

as a reason for the downfall of the preceding Almoravid empire that its rulers were "prisoners of their religious origins" (p. 14).

Such shortcomings, however, should not detract from the other brilliant deductions of the author. Professor Le Tourneau says in the Foreword that this book is a series of reflections on the Almohads and is in no sense a history of the movement. As such it is a highly stimulating book. The danger is, with the dearth of works on the subject in the English language, that some persons may view it as a history of the movement, contrary to the author's expressed intention.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation BADIE NIJIM
Hartford, Connecticut

Etudes Arabes: Feuilles de Travail. Rome: Institut Pontifical d'Etudes Arabes. No. 22, 1969 2ème tr. pp. 88.

Since 1962, the Pontifical Institute of Arabic Studies in Rome has been offering students of Arabic, especially those knowing French, a wonderful opportunity to further their studies in Arabic and Islamic culture. At quarterly intervals, it has published stencilled work-sheets at a subscription rate of 1250 Italian lire per year. Each quarterly publication contains about eighty separate quarto sheets in a folder, and presents a rich array of Arabic selections from classical and modern books of Qurʾān exegesis, Tradition, history, theology, philosophy and literature accompanied by masterly and often annotated translations in French. It is also supplemented by a number of cards containing, in French, biographical and bibliographical data on modern Arab authors.

Number 22, as an example, contains the following:

1. The last pages of *Fī Malakūt Allāh maʿa Asmāʾ Allāh* (Cairo, 1967) by the contemporary Egyptian Muslim revivalist ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd Muḥammad Sālim, consisting of a long prayer using the ninety-nine names of God, presented and partially translated by Jean Macquet.
2. A collection of hadiths on those who love each other in God based on Qurʾān 8 : 63, with the commentary of Zamakhsharī and Ṭabarī, and quotations from Mālik's *Muwaṭṭaʾ* and the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī and that of Muslim, all presented and translated by Michael Fitzgerald.
3. The first of the forty hadiths of Nawawī with his commentary, translated and amply annotated by Louis Pouzet, director of the Religous Centre for Arabic Studies at Bikfayyā, Lebanon, who is completing the French translation of D'Alverny, the intention being the serial presentation of the full Arabic text of Nawawī with the French translation.
4. Chapter 5 of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's *Mudhakkirāt* (Beirut, 1967), which is the sequel to his two-volume autobiography *al-Ayyām*. This chapter is beautifully translated by Michael Fitzgerald and Jean Macquet, the episode here presented being from Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's early

student days at the Egyptian University and his recollections of his teachers Aḥmad Kamāl, Nallino, Santillana, Meloni and Littman and his admiration for their methods and courses.

5. The Arabic text of "The Manifesto of June 5, 1967" by Adonis, [ʿAlī Aḥmad Saʿīd] as published in *al-Ādāb*, Beirut, July-August 1967, very ably translated by Adrien Van Leeuwen. This is an Arab intellectual's anguished reaction to the June War of the Middle East and a poet's insight into the causes of defeat in terms of deep analysis and frank criticism of Arab moral and civilization values.
6. The Arabic text and French translation of a poem composed and set to music by the Raḥbānī brothers and sung by Fayrūz, entitled *Zahrat al-Madāʾin* (The Flower of Cities), the reference being to Jerusalem and the subject being Arab love for the Holy City, rue-fulness at its sad condition under the Israelis and hope for its re-turn with peace and justice to its Arab owners.
7. Handwritten letters intended to exercise the student in the reading of cursive writing as well as in the different styles of epistles.
8. Finally, the bio-bibliographical cards, dealing with the poets Aḥmad Zakī Abū Shādī, Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm, Khalīl Muṭrān and Nizār Qab-bānī.

Etudes Arabes should, I am sure, have many readers among students of Arabic because it periodically brings them valuable readings in Arabic and Islamic literature and, with serious concern, keeps them abreast not only of the culture of the Arab world but even with the mood of its people. As work-sheets for individual or class-room study, it is excellent for its purpose, notwithstanding the few typing errors which, it is hoped, may be eliminated.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation ISSA J. BOULLATA
Hartford, Connecticut

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

GRANTS by the Ford Foundation:

World Council of Churches—$ 140,250 grant, to support an Exploratory Committee on Society, Development, and Peace, jointly sponsored by the World Council of Churches and the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace. Because churches are now reexamining the function of missions and the propagation of Christianity in Asia and Africa, the committee is concerned with development assistance to countries on these continents. Another program, which is closely related to its effort to establish world cooperation for development, will include efforts at better understanding of Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist religions, Marxism, and other ideologies and value systems. Peace and the institutions for world community will also be major concerns of the committee.

American University of Beirut—$ 167,000 grant, for a science education center. The center, to be staffed by three young science educators, will provide pre-service and in-service training of science and mathematics teachers and research and consultation on the improvement of science education throughout the region. Science education is considered to be of particular importance to the Arab countries because of its relation to the process of modernization. The training program will acquaint teachers with recent developments in science and mathematics teaching and help them to adapt these developments to their classrooms.

Social Science Research Council—$ 455,000 grant, for training and research in Middle Eastern and African studies. Since 1962, the council has awarded 291 fellowships for field study in Africa and fifty-eight for study in the Middle East. The grant will provide twenty-two awards annually for two years—fourteen for Africa and eight for the Middle East. In making the awards, the council will emphasize research in fields directly related to the development process.

Functional Literacy Seminar in Beirut. One of the crucial problems facing the Arab countries today is the high rate of illiteracy, a problem seen by experts as an obstacle in the way of social, economic and cultural development programs. Seventy-six per cent of the Arab population over 10 years of age is estimated to be illiterate, according to the latest UNESCO statistics. In one study, it was found that 65 per cent of the Arab laborers between 14 and 64 years of age is illiterate.

In order to find ways and means to cope with this problem, a seminar on functional literacy, organized by the Region Rural Functional Literacy Center for the Arab States (located in Egypt), was held in Beirut, August 11-30, 1969. The seminar was attended by 32 delegates representing 13 Arab countries as well as representatives

of the regional and international organizations. About twenty papers were presented, all emphasizing the role of education and functional literacy in socio-economic development.

This new concept of functional literacy aims at improving the efficiency of the learner in his work and enabling him to participate actively in the activities of the community to which he belongs. It is characterized by its selective approach, selective in the sense that it chooses specific production sectors, e.g., industrial plants, agricultural schemes, etc., and concentrates on the teaching of illiterate workers engaged in such establishments. The stages of functional literacy teaching constitute one entity, starting from the time the illiterate begins learning and continuing until he has a good grasp of both work and communication skills.

From *The Asian Student*, Sept. 27, 1969

A Literary Quarterly. *Mahfil*, a quarterly of South Asian literature, is now being published by the Asian Studies Center at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. Currently in its fifth year of publication, *Mahfil* offers a wide sampling of Indian and Pakistani literature, with particular emphasis on the contemporary scene of South Asia.

Subscription rates are $4.00 per year for the United States and Canada; other countries, $5.00. This year, as a special encouragement to students, a student rate of $3.00 per year is being offered. Persons interested in subscribing or in obtaining more information may write to: *Mahfil*, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48823.

Contributors should write to: *Mahfil*, Box 39, Foster Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

From *The Asian Student*, Sept. 27, 1969

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

I. General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries. History of Islamic Studies.

II. Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.

III. Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs. Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.

IV. Theology. Movements, sects; Shīʿa. Philosophy. Sciences.

V. Sufism. Saints.

VI. Law. Politics; state; government. Nationalism. Socialism. Economics.

VII. Arabic and other relevant languages. Literature, culture, art. Education. Universities.

VIII. History of Muslim peoples, generally and in various areas (including studies on pre-Islamic period). Islam in modern history.

IX. Islam and other religions, civilizations, philosophies and ideologies.

X. Christianity and Islam (from a Christian point of view). The Church in Muslim environments.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	*American Anthropologist,* Journal of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C.
A.A.W.	*Afro-Asian Writings,* Cairo.
A B.	*Analecta Bollandiana,* Bruxelles
Ac As.	*Acta Asiatica,* Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture, The Tōhō Gakkai, Tokyo.
Afr.	*Africa,* Journal of the International African Institute, London.
Afr. A	*African Arts,* University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Afr. M.	*African Music,* Journal of the African Music Society, Roodepoort, Transvaal, South Africa.
A.H.R.	*The American Historical Review,* Washington, D.C.
And	*al-Andalus,* revista de las Escuelas de Estudios Arabes de Madrid y Granada.
A Q.	*Anthropological Quarterly,* Washington, D.C.
Ar.	*Arabica,* Revue d'Etudes Arabes, Leiden.
Aram.	*Aramco World Magazine,* New York.
Arch.	*Archaeology,* Archaeological Institute of America, New York.
Ar.Or.	*Archiv Orientální,* Journal of the Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.
A.S.	*Asian Survey,* Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California.
A S B.	*African Studies Bulletin,* Boston University, Boston, Mass.
A.S.R.	*African Social Research,* University of Zambia, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
B.A.E O.	*Boletin de la Asociacion Española de Orientalistas,* Madrid.

B.C.I.I.S.	*The Bulletin of the Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies,* Henry Martyn Institute, Lucknow, India.
B.I.F.A.N.	*Bulletin de l'Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire,* Dakar.
B.I.I.S.	*Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies,* Alligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
B.S.N.	*Behavior Sciences Notes,* Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, Conn.
B.S.O.A.S.	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London.
Bus.	*Bustan,* Österreichische Zeitschrift fur Kulture, Politik und Wirtschaft der islamischen Lander, Wien
C.A.D.	*Centre of Arabic Documentation Research Bulletin,* Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
C.A.J.	*Central Asiatic Journal,* International Periodical for the Languages, Literature, History and Archaeology of Central Asia, The Hague-Wiesbaden.
C.E.A.	*Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,* Ecole pratique des hautes études, Sorbonne, Paris
C.H.M.	*Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale,* Paris.
Civ.	*Civilisations,* Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, Bruxelles
C.O.C.	*Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain,* Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris.
Cont.	*Continuum,* Chicago.
Crit.	*The Criterion,* Journal of the Islamic Research Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
C.S.S.H.	*Comparative Studies in Society and History,* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Daed	*Daedalus,* The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
D.I.	*Der Islam,* Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients, Berlin.
Dial.	*Dialog,* a quarterly journal of theology, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Diog.	*Diogenes,* The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, Paris and Montreal.
E.M.M.	*Evangelisches Missions Magazin,* Basel.
E.M.Q.	*Evangelical Missions Quarterly,* Springfield, Pennsylvania.
E.M.Z.	*Evangelische Missions-Zeitschrift,* Stuttgart.
Enc.	*Encounter,* Christian Theological Seminary, Indianapolis, Indiana
Eth	*Ethnology,* International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
E.V.	*Eglise Vivante,* Louvain.
F.A.	*Foreign Affairs,* New York.
Fr	*Frontier,* London.
H.L.R.	*Harvard Law Review,* Cambridge, Massachusetts.
H.R.	*History of Religions,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
H.T.	*Hespéris Tamuda,* Rabat, Morocco.
I.A.	*International Affairs,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
IBLA	*Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes,* Tunis.
I.C.	*Islamic Culture,* The Islamic Culture Board, Hyderabad-Deccan.
I.C.Q.	*India Cultures Quarterly,* School of Research, Leonard Theological College, Jabalpur, M.P., India.
I.L.	*Islamic Literature,* Lahore.
In.As.	*Indo Asia,* Stuttgart.
Int.	*Intisari,* Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Ltd, Singapore.
I.P.Q.	*International Philosophical Quarterly,* Fordham University, New York
Iqbal	A Journal of the Basm-i Iqbal, Lahore.
Iqbal Rev.	*Iqbal Review,* Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
I.Q.	*The Islamic Quarterly,* The Islamic Cultural Centre, London.
I.R.	*The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs,* London.
I.R.M.	*International Review of Missions,* W.C.C., Geneva.

I.S.	*Islamic Studies,* The Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi.
ISIS	Quarterly journal of the History of Science Society, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
I.T.	*Islamic Thought,* The Research Circle, Aligarh.
J A.	*Journal Asiatique,* Societé Asiatique, Paris.
J.A.H.	*The Journal of African History,* Cambridge University Press.
J.A.O.S.	*Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Baltimore. Maryland.
J.A S.	*Journal of Asian Studies,* Ann Arbor, Michigan.
J.E S.	*Journal of Ecumenical* Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
J E S H O.	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Leiden.
J.H.I.	*Journal of the History of Ideas,* New York.
J H P.	*Journal of the History of Philosophy,* University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
J.J.S.	*The Journal of Jewish Studies,* Jewish Chronicle Publications, London.
J.N E S.	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* Chicago, Illinois.
J.P.H.S.	*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society,* Karachi.
J R.A.	*Journal of Religion in Africa,* Leiden.
J.R.A.S.	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland,* Royal Asiatic Society, London
J.R.H.	*The Journal of Religious History,* Sydney University Press, N.S.W
J.S.S.	*Journal of Semitic Studies,* Manchester University Press.
J.Th.S.	*The Journal of Theological Studies,* Oxford.
J W.H.	*Journal of World History,* Paris
Ka.	*Kairos,* Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie, Salzburg.
M.A.S.	*Modern Asian Studies,* London.
M.D.	*The Muslim Digest,* International Monthly of Muslim Affairs, Durban, South Africa.
M E.A.H.	*Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos,* Universidad de Granada.
M.E F.	*Middle East Forum,* The Alumni Association, American University of Beirut.
M E J	*The Middle East Journal,* Middle East Institute, Washington, D C.
M I	*Man in India,* A quarterly anthropological journal, Bihar, India.
Mid.	*Midway,* A Magazine of Discovery in the Arts and Sciences, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
M N.C.	*Le Monde non-Chrétien,* Paris
Mus.	*Le Muséon,* Revue d'Etudes Orientales, Tijdschrift voor Oriëntalisme, Louvain.
Nu.	*Numen,* International Review for the History of Religions, Brill, Leiden
O.C.	*Oriens Christianus,* Heft für die Kunde des christlichen Orients, O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.
O.C.P.	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma.
O M	*Oriente Moderno,* Institut per l'Oriente, Roma.
Or.	*Orient,* Paris
ORITA	Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies, Univ. of Ibadan, Nigeria.
Ors.	*Oriens,* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, Brill, Leiden.
Or Suec.	*Orientalia Suecana,* Uppsala.
P A.	*Pacific Affairs,* University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
P.E W.	*Philosophy East and West,* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Ph. St.	*Philippine Studies,* Manila
P O.C.	*Proche Orient Chrétien,* Jerusalem.
P.Q.	*Pakistan Quarterly,* Karachi.
Pr. Af.	*Presence Africaine,* Revue Culturelle du Monde Noir, Paris.
P.S.B.	*The Princeton Seminary Bulletin,* Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.
R.C.A.J.	*Royal Central Asian Journal,* The Royal Central Asian Society, London.

R.E.I	*Revue des Etudes Islamiques,* Paul Geuthner, Paris.
R.E.J.	*Revue des études juives,* Historia judaica, Mouton, 's-Gravenhage.
R.H.	*Revue Historique,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.H.R.	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.I.E.I.	*Revista del Instituto du Estudios Islámicos en Madrid,* Madrid.
R M.	*Rythmes du Monde,* Le Bulletin des Missions, Paris et Bruges.
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R.R.	*The Review of Religions,* Rabwah.
R.S.R.	*Revue des Sciences Religieuses,* Strasbourg.
R St.	*Religious Studies,* London.
S.E.A.J.	*The South East Asia Journal of Theology,* Singapore.
S.I.	*Studies in Islam,* Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi.
S.I.L.	*Studies in Linguistics,* Anthropology Research Center, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
Spec	*Speculum,* A Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
S P N.C.	*Secretariatus pro non-Christianis,* Città del Vaticano.
S.S.R.	*Sociology and Social Research,* University of Southern California, Los Angeles
St in C.R.	*Studies in Comparative Religion,* Tomorrow Publications, Ltd.
St. Isl.	*Studia Islamica,* Paris.
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Th.	*Theology,* London.
V I.	*The Voice of Islam,* Karachi.
W.I.	*Die Welt des Islams,* Leiden.
W.M.	*Worldmission,* New York
W.M.L.M.	*World Muslim League Magazine,* Singapore
Z.D.M G.	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* Wiesbaden.
Z.M.R.W.	*Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft,* Aschendorff, Münster.
Z.R.G.G.	*Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte,* Brill, Köln.
Zy.	*Zygon,* Journal of Religion and Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.

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The Editors covet a warm, intimate association with all readers of the Quarterley and would value the co-operation of their criticism and their help in increasing the circulation among new readers, for the better fulfilment of our obligation to serve a Christian understanding of Islam and a Muslim awareness of Christ

Except where otherwise stated, the writers of articles and reviews are alone responsible for the opinions expressed.

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IN THIS ISSUE

The article by the Reverend Dwight M. Donaldson which is published in this issue is the substance of a paper read some years ago at a meeting of the Middle East Association in Washington. Dr. Donaldson, who has been on the Editorial Board of *The Muslim World* since January, 1937, is the author of *The Shi'ite Religion* (1933) and *Studies in Muslim Ethics* (1953).

We welcome several new contributors to our quarterly. Dr. Newell S. Booth, Jr., Associate Professor of Religion at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, discusses in his article the significance of history in Islam. Dr. Peter Dodd, Associate Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the American University of Beirut, and Dr. Halim Barakat, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the same university, joined forces to produce the article on Palestinian refugees. Dr. Barakat is also known for his fiction, having published two novels and a collection of short stories in Arabic. Dr. James Waltz, Assistant Professor of History at Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan, whose Ph.D. dissertation in 1963 dealt with Western European attitudes toward the Muslims before the Crusades, responds indirectly in his article to Professor Allan Cutler's contribution which was published in *M.W.*, LV, 4 (1965), 321-339.

Dr. Hafeez Malik, who has contributed several articles to our quarterly in the past [LIII, 1 (1963), 33-40; LIV, 3 (1964), 160-169; LVI, 4 (1964), 243-256] focuses our attention on Iqbal and, more specifically, on the concept of *Khudi* as interpreted by the great Indian philosopher.

Dr. Kenneth Nolin's review article reflects once more his concern for a meaningful Muslim-Christian dialogue.

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CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY CENTRAL LIBRARY

THEOCRACY: "GOD-RULE"

Speaking about theocracy we refer generally to a form of government that is exercised under divine authority, i.e., a government which recognizes God as the supreme ruler also in civic affairs and accepts His revelation—interpreted by His 'representatives'—as the basis on which state and society must be built.

This concept is historically connected primarily with Israel, where it began with Moses and was fostered by the Prophet Samuel and especially by King David and King Solomon; with the Byzantine Empire, where the emperors were as such also "defenders of the faith"; and with Islam, which at least in its traditional form does not recognize a separation between 'sacred' and 'profane,' between 'secular' and 'religious.'

The history of these three communities also shows how difficult it is to live up to the theocratic ideals. We think of many Old Testament stories, the records of those 'Christian' "defenders of the faith" who dissipated their strength in self-indulgence and who resorted to the lowest expedients of intimidation and subterfuge to retain their God-given rights and, as far as the Muslim community is concerned, of the repeated rebellions against the cruelty, greed and oppression of individual caliphs.

There is obviously no guarantee that a so-called theocratic government will continue to be inspired and dominated by truly theocratic ideals. For a caliph, priest, or king to be actually a ruler "under God" requires more than designation, ordination or coronation. In order to exercise authority that is consistent with a true theocracy those who govern must be ready for frequent re-examination and re-appreciation of ideals that are generally accepted as God-given.

Several crucial questions arise in the consideration of the relation of God to mankind. Can we believe that any particular country can be designated with certainty as God's country? Can we accept the idea that any special people can be rightly considered and continuously regarded as God's chosen people? Or in a more general way: where and how is God 'accessible' to us so that we may come to know how to shape the life of an individual and the collective life of a community in accord with His character, purpose, plan and desire? That there is according to many people a relation between our knowledge of God and our

ideals for human existence seems clear. Each one of the three monotheistic religions mentioned already has recognized a connection between the qualities or characteristics that are attributed to God and the qualities or characteristics that we think we should strive for ourselves, without, obviously, in any way ignoring the distance between God and man and the wholly unique character and nature of God. Let me give some examples. As far as the Christian tradition is concerned, there is the succinct word of Jesus: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt. 5 : 48). As a second illustration I give a statement from Rabbi Kertzer, for some time Director of Inter-religious Services for the American Jewish Committee: "Judaism holds that man can most genuinely worship God by imitating those qualities that are godly." In Islam, the Qur'ān testifies to a God of Justice (a God who does not 'wrong' man) and calls at the same time the faithful to be "steadfast in justice" (S. 4 : 135/134; *kūnū qawwāmīna bi 'l-qisṭi shuhadā'a li-llāhi*). It is God who enjoins them to "do justice and good, and to give to kindred their due," and to fulfill His covenant, "for you thereby make Allah your surety" (*kafīl*; S. 16 : 91/93). One of the modern interpreters of the ethical principles of Islam, Muhammad ʿAbduh, has written that man "finds beauty in the idea of perfection: God as necessary existence, for example, or the noble, moral qualities of men." [1] This thought in Islamic theology is elaborately developed in al-Ghazālī's *al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā* ("the Highest Aim in Explanation of the Excellent Names of Allah").

In this book al-Ghazālī has stated that

> the perfection of the worshipper, as well as his happiness, lies in imitating (*takhalluq*) the qualities of Allah the Most High, and adorning himself with the meanings of His attributes and of His names, in that measure that may be considered within his right. [2]

The Arabic word *takhalluq*, which may be translated as "imitating," is worthy of further attention. In his Arabic-English Lexicon Professor Lane has illustrated its meaning in this expression: "He affected a nature that was not his own." [3] Here is a clear instance of how in Islamic thought there is a connection that is recognized between the qualities that men attribute to God as His *attributes* and the characteristics that they consider that they themselves should strive to gain through imitation of those attributes.

This idea that it is possible for man's personality to be molded to a God-given pattern, is—in a non-technical sense of the word—a 'theo-

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[1] Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 165

[2] On al-Ghazālī's *al-Maqṣad al-Asnā* (Cairo, n.d.) and in general on 'the most beautiful names,' see L. Gardet's article "al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., I, 714-717.

[3] Edward W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, I, 2, 800.

cratic ideal': the sovereign rule of God can and ought to be realized in the life of an individual person as well as in inter-human relationships. The answer to the question formulated above has therefore immediate implications for life here on earth: the answer to the question who *God* is determines for millions of people the issue what ***their own life*** ought to be and their attitude towards other men. Who, then, is God—where do we find Him, how is He accessible to us?

All three traditions under discussion here point as a part of their answer to Nature around us. "The heavens are telling the glory of God and the firmament proclaims His handiwork" (Ps. 19 : 1). "Ever since the creation of the world His invisible nature, namely, His eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made" (Rom. 1 : 20). And the Qurʾān challenges man: "No defect can you see in the creation of the God of Mercy; repeat the gaze, do you see a single flaw?" (S. 67 : 3, 4).

Within the various communities of believers many have gone beyond the omni-presence of God in nature, and have 'located' God in certain holy places. "Blessed be the Lord from Zion, and He who dwells in Jerusalem" (Ps. 135 : 21). Emphasis fell upon places that were believed to have become sacred by manifestations of God's presence. And yet we know that King Solomon had raised the vital question when they were about to dedicate the Temple: "But will God indeed dwell with men upon the Earth?" (I Kings 8: 27). Later on the prophet Isaiah had represented God as asking this pertinent question, "Heaven is my home and the Earth is my footstool; what is the house which you would build for me, and what is the place of my rest?" (Isaiah 66 : 1). Against this kind of localization of God Jesus also protested, in the conversation which he had with the woman of Samaria, when he said to her, "the hour cometh when ye shall neither on this mountain (Mt. Gerizim), nor yet in Jerusalem (at Mt. Zion) worship the Father . . . but the hour cometh and now is when true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth" (John 4: 21-23).

It is noteworthy and most significant that the New Testament gives no direction for pilgrimages to holy places. Stephen, the very first of the Christian martyrs, had insisted that "the Most High dwelleth not in houses made with hands" (Acts 7 : 48). And in his declaration to the Athenians on Mars Hill the apostle Paul reiterated this same conviction, that the God that made the world and all things dwelleth not in temples made by hands" (Acts 17 : 24).

A reference to another passage from the New Testament may serve the purpose of introducing the final notion to which we wish to draw attention here. As a young man Jesus was asked to read the scripture lesson in the general worship service in the synagogue in his home town of Nazareth. He was given the great scroll of the prophet Isaiah, and he turned to the place where it is written, "I have put my spirit upon him" (Isaiah 42 : 1). Then he read more of what he found in

the great scroll (61 : 1 ff.): "The spirit of God is upon me, because the Lord has annointed me to preach glad tidings to the meek. He has sent me to bind up the broken hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison doors to those who are bound."

How astonished were his friends and neighbors in that home-town synagogue when he sat down after reading and said to them, "This day are these words fulfilled in your ears" (Luke 4 : 21). Could they accept that statement? Was it possible for them to believe that the very spirit of God was dwelling in one of the young men of their own town?

Is it blasphemous to speak of the 'indwelling' of the spirit of God in man? The Muslim position needs very careful consideration in this connection. In the Qur'ān there are statements that God breathed of His spirit into Adam (S. 32 : 9/8; 15 : 29; 38 : 72). The reader is left in doubt as to whether these verses should be interpreted to mean that this breathing of God's spirit was simply to make Adam a living creature, or whether it means rather that God gave to Adam a spiritual capacity, imparting to him something of God's own self, thus making him in the highest sense after the image of God.

There are several references in the Qur'ān that indicate that the bringing of the spirit "at Allah's behest" belongs ordinarily to the ministry of the angels, and that this had been the function of the angel Gabriel in particular.[4] It is not certain, however, that in all cases the spirit must come in the form of—or through the mediation of—angels, for in speaking of *believers* there is this declaration: "On the hearts of these hath God graven the faith, and with His own spirit hath He strengthened them" (S. 58 : 22). Of particular interest in this connection are the Qur'anic texts which link Jesus with the Spirit, S. 21 : 91; 66 : 12; 2 : 253/254; 2 : 87/81; 5 : 110/109. In the last three (Medinan) passages the function of the spirit of God "proceeding from Himself" is specifically mentioned in relation to Jesus: "We strengthened him with the Holy Spirit (*rūḥu'l-qudus*)." Whether this points to communication between God and Jesus, or whether it refers to Jesus' special endowment by birth through Mary is left undetermined. It would appear from the examination of these passages that the Qur'ān itself does not preclude the belief that the spirit of God was *indwelling* in Jesus.[5]

But it is impossible to discuss this subject of the Qur'anic references

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[4] The texts linking the angels and the Spirit (S. 70 : 4; 78 : 38 and 97 : 4) and those speaking about the Spirit from the *Amr* of the Lord (S. 16 : 2; 17 : 85/87; 40 : 15 and 42 : 52) are discussed in Thomas O'Shaughnessy, *The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran* (Roma: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1953), pp. 16-23 and pp. 33-42.

[5] Of interest is also S 4 : 171/169, where Jesus is called "a spirit proceeding from God." The fact that the word 'spirit' in the Qur'ān refers ordinarily to an angel, led Dr. Macdonald many years ago to the conclusion that 'the Jesus of the Qur'ān' was "a half-spiritual being, separate from mankind in birth, life and death" D. B. Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911), pp 245-247

to Jesus here any further,[6] and we turn to other data from the Muslim tradition. It is not surprising that an unorthodox sect, the *Ḥulūliyya*, arose in the Muslim community, a sect that regarded the spirit (*al-rūḥ*) as eternal, and as the sole agent and governor of things by the processes of incarnation (*ḥulūl*) and incorporation (*imtizāj*). They called this spirit the uncreated spirit of God, and they maintained that this spirit is capable of passing from one body to another. The orthodox position was that the spirit must not be regarded as eternal, though orthodox theologians were ready to concede that the spirit did exist before the body, in as much as the prophet Muḥammad had said, "God created the spirit two thousand years before the bodies." The position of most Muslim philosophers is that man is essentially an entity which is not a body, but a *nafs* (soul), which abides after the death of the body by virtue of a spiritual resurrection (*maʿād rūḥānī*). One group of these philosophers held that a man's connection with his body is a connection of directing and of governing, like the connection of God with the world. They were directed to this analogy by Greek thinkers who had written of the similarity that they thought they saw between the *macrocosmos*, the vast universe of creation, and the *microcosmos*, the little world of the self. In each case there is a directing or governing mind or spirit. In the first instance it was the directing and governing agency of God in the vast universe of Creation, and in the second place it was the directing and governing agency of a spiritual entity from God *indwelling in man*.

Once more returning to the Christian position, we think of the witness of the New Testament that indeed—as stated already above in connection with Luke 4 : 21—God's presence made itself felt in the life of Jesus, in inherent goodness, in healing compassion, in discerning judgment, and in forgiving love. That the receptive hearts of his disciples were to be the domain of God's holy spirit was made clear when Jesus proclaimed that "the kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or There! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you" (Luke 17 : 20-21). The most meaningful 'theocracy' is not a divine rule imposed on men and society, but the kingdom and dominion of God as a reality in the hearts of men.

A last word, then, about the challenge which is before us now, shortly before the close of the twentieth century. As fellow believers in the one, eternal God, the God of Abraham, we may be able to come to the agreement that our conceptions of God ought to be no less than the ideals about God that were taught by the Old Testament prophets, not less than the ideals about God that are portrayed in the Qurʾān, and

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[6] To the more recent 'Western' publications on this subject—most of them summarizing Qurʾanic as well as later Muslim data—belong: Michel Hayek, *Le Christ de l'Islam*, Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1959; Henri Michaud, *Jésus selon le Coran*, Neuchatel: Delachauxet Niestlé, 1960; Edward G. Parrinder, *Jesus in the Qurʾan*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965.

likewise not falling short of the ideals about God that were set forth by Jesus Christ. If we are to profit by the enlightenment, wisdom, and spiritual power that is available for us in the scriptures of our respective monotheistic religions, we must have continued appreciation not least of what they teach about God.

Furthermore, there have been immensely important revelations in recent years of God's power and glory in the findings of modern science. Science speaks to us with the authority of a present-day prophet. In our magazines these days there are frequent articles about the world we live in, articles that present a magnificent peroration of the findings of long continued observation and study. These messages of philosophers in the scientific world come upon our minds with tremendous intellectual and spiritual impact. They force us to the conclusion that our ideals about God must, finally, in no way be less than the teachings of modern science demand.

That our theology, with its 'theocratic ideals,' should require reorientation and continued appreciation in the light of all new knowledge is in no way surprising or disturbing. It may well be that in following the gleam of our highest possible ideals about God our separate religions will become more truly united in His praise and in His service. And we will come to know what is best for ourselves by the best that we have learned to appreciate about Him, and bring forth in the near future that which has abiding value, under the guidance of God's own indwelling Spirit of Truth.

Lakeland, Florida DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

THE HISTORICAL AND THE NON-HISTORICAL IN ISLAM

A well-known student of Islam states:

> In some ways history is more significant for Muslims than it is for almost any other group. [1]

Another scholar, himself a Muslim, says:

> To the Muslim, history is a series of accidents that in no way affect the nontemporal principles of Islam. [2]

Can they both be correct? It is my purpose to examine the problem suggested by the apparent contradiction between these statements in the hope of achieving greater understanding of the relationship between the changing and the unchanging, the historical and the non-historical in Islam.

It is undoubtedly true that Muḥammad had a greater immediate effect on the course of history than any other religious leader and that of all religions Islam has been the most fully involved in the events of social and political life. The beginnings of Islam as an organized religion, its early development, and recent efforts to revitalize it have all been historical in a sense that is not true of any other religion. Islam has been inseparable from the political vicissitudes of the Islamic peoples to such an extent that the history of Islam turns out to be political history in a way that is probably unique.

The Muslim era begins, not with any personal, mystical, or supernatural event, but with one that was political and social: the formation of the Islamic state in Medina. Muḥammad's successful statesmanship was essential to his position as the final prophet or messenger of God to mankind. Prior to his time the basic truth about God and His will had been known and proclaimed by many prophets but this truth had never really 'taken root' in the world. Now with Muḥammad it was firmly established among men in a society which was political as well as religious; God's eternal truth was 'grounded' in the history of the world.

Islam, having been so established, was brilliantly successful as it began its earthly career. A dramatic territorial expansion in the first century and equally dramatic cultural achievements in the next two or three centuries seemed sufficient objective confirmation of divine support and power. These events reinforced the Muslim conviction that true faith was indeed inseparable from social and political action in the world.

Such a conviction has also been at the basis of the efforts of those

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[1] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), p 14.

[2] Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Science and Civilization in Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 21.

who have sought in the last two hundred years to reform and revitalize Islam. The programs of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Muḥammad Iqbal, and the Muslim Brotherhood have been political as well as religious. Even this way of putting it is misleading for it suggests the un-Islamic idea that it might have been otherwise, that there could be a religious program that did not have political implications. In Islam politics is not something that may or may not be added to religion but is an essential aspect of the basic obligation of man to obey God in all of life. The very existence of Pakistan is perhaps the most impressive contemporary evidence of this fact; the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent could not dissociate religious existence from political existence. So Smith holds that "for the Muslim, community and history are . . . as for no other, religiously significant. One would be going only slightly too far to say that his society and its history partake of an almost sacred quality . . ." [3]

We will return to a further examination of this statement, but first let us note how Smith goes on to show that the very significance of history for the Muslim has raised a serious problem. For while Islam achieved brilliant objective success in its first three hundred years, and in some areas for a longer period, its history for over half its earthly career, at least in its central Arabic-speaking areas, has generally been rather discouraging. If the early success is evidence of God's favor and power what does its later comparative failure mean?

This problem is not new; perhaps it will be helpful to look at a prototype or 'model' of this situation which occurred during the life of the Prophet himself. The setting up of the Muslim Community in Medina led, rather naturally, to hostile relations with Mecca, whose leaders saw in this union of refugees from their city with the people of a rival city a threat to their political and economic position. Muḥammad took the initiative and won a victory over a Meccan force considerably superior in numbers to his own. This victory at the battle of Badr was taken as a sign of God's favor, achieved through His power. As the Qurʾān says,

> Allah willed that He should cause the truth to triumph by His words, and cut the root of the disbelievers; that He might cause the truth to triumph and bring vanity to naught. . . . When ye sought help of your Lord and He answered you (saying): I will help you with a thousand of the angels, rank on rank. . . . Ye slew them not, but Allah slew them. . . . [4]

Thus God intervened in history to vindicate His message and His messenger. Political success is inseparable from religious success; the victory of Muslim arms is an evidence of God's power and of His support for the faithful.

[3] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[4] Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran* (New York: Mentor Books, 1953), 8 : 7-9, 17.

Does it follow, however, that the reverse is true, that a defeat of the Muslims is also a defeat for God? Again we find a situation in the life of the Prophet, with relevant material in the Qur'ān. The year after the battle of Badr the Meccans approached Medina seeking revenge and again the Prophet moved out boldly, but this time the battle went against him and about all the Muslims could rejoice in was that rather surprisingly they managed to escape complete disaster. How is such a setback to be explained?

Two explanations are given in the Qur'ān. One is that God was testing the Muslims in order to distinguish the true believers from the false:

> If ye have received a blow, the (disbelieving) people have received a blow the like thereof. These are only the vicissitudes which We cause to follow one another for mankind, to the end that Allah may know those who believe. . . . [5]

The other answer is simply that one group in the Muslim army failed to obey the Prophet's orders and thus gave the enemy an opening:

> Allah verily made good His promise unto you when ye routed them by His leave, until (the moment) when your courage failed you, and ye disagreed about the order and ye disobeyed, after He had shown you that for which ye long. [6]

These two explanations, which might be called the non-historical and the historical, are not necessarily inconsistent with each other but they do suggest different approaches to the problem of historical failure, both of which can be found in the reactions of Muslims to such failure through the centuries.

To begin with the second approach mentioned above, we can say that it seeks for an historical explanation of historical failure. If Islam is not objectively strong and successful it is because Muslims have somehow failed in their responsibilities. This is the kind of answer with which Smith deals, giving many examples from Muslim spokesmen of the past seventy-five years. This is the basic answer of al-Afghānī, ʿAbduh, and Iqbal, to name only a few of the most prominent. It is the kind of answer that is given frequently today by Muslims concerned with the problems facing Islam in the contemporary world. If only Muslims would return to pure Islam they would be successful beyond their wildest dreams and the whole world would soon see and embrace the truth and righteousness of God to which they bear witness.

The other, non-historical, type of answer which finds in failure a test from God may seem to encourage the kind of fatalistic submission of which Islam has been accused but which modern Muslims would

[5] *Ibid.*, 3 : 140
[6] *Ibid.*, 3 : 152

regard as an aberration rather than as a truly Islamic attitude. It would probably be seen, in fact, as the kind of attitude which has contributed to failure in Muslim history.

We must look a little more deeply here, however, because this answer appears to come from the Qur'ān itself and is closely related to one of the basic meanings of 'Islam': 'submission' or 'acceptance.' It is central to Islam that God has no need for man; He does not depend upon man in any way. This is made clear in the Qur'ān not only in relation to the *victory* at the battle of Badr, which was God's gift to the believers, but also in connection with the defeat or set-back at Uḥud. Even if Muḥammad himself had been killed, as some thought for a time, it would not have made any real difference: "Muḥammad is but a Messenger; Messengers have passed away before him. Will it be that when he dieth or is slain, ye will turn back on your heels?" [7] But even if men do take fright and run, it does not harm God: "He who turneth back doth no hurt to Allah . . ." [8] The accomplishment of God's purposes does not rest upon the loyalty or disloyalty of any man; it does not even depend on the earthly career of God's messenger. God is not dependent on the outcome of any battle, rather, the outcome of the battle depends on God.

That God cannot in any way be dependent upon historical events is implied in the Muslim witness that "There is no divinity but God," or, as one might interpret it, "Nothing is ultimately sacred but God." Everything is relative except the One, Unique, Absolute Being: "All things perish, except His Face." [9] Personal life or death, a community's victory or defeat, the rise and fall of nations—these make no ultimate difference. To hold otherwise, to believe that what man does can affect God, is to suggest that man is in some sense coordinate with God and thus to commit what Muslims see as the fundamental sin.

What man does, of course, matters to man; history is real on the human level. Thus, whether the Muslim warriors obey or disobey the Prophet makes a difference to *them* Humanly speaking, disobedience opens the door to defeat, while in a more ultimate sense the whole situation provides an illustration of the vicissitudes of life by which man is tested. From both perspectives failure may be usefully recalled as a warning to man by which he may be reminded at once of the need for obedience and the need to accept defeat as well as victory. In neither case, however, is the event ultimately significant in itself.

According to Muslims the Qur'ān is not in any way a product of history. It is uncreated; that is, its existence is outside of history and it remains what it is regardless of the facts of history. The very arrangement, or perhaps we should say, lack of arrangement, of the Qur'ān

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[7] *Ibid.*, 3 : 144
[8] *Ibid*
[9] Arthur J. Arbery, *The Koran Interpreted* (London· Oxford University Press, 1964), S. 28 : 88.

underscores this point. The Qur'ān has no 'plot,' no development; the chronological order is not of any real significance because it is all the eternal word of God. To know whether Muḥammad received a certain revelation in Mecca or in Medina is perhaps humanly interesting and even useful in achieving practical understanding but such knowledge should not be of any ultimate significance from the Muslim point of view.

There is an apparent exception to this: the case of 'abrogation,' in which one verse of the Qur'ān supersedes another. In this situation it is important to know which came first and which came later, for it is the later that remains authoritative. Here an element of history seems to enter into the eternal Message, posing a challenge, apparently, to the doctrine of the uncreated Qur'ān. How can one 'eternal revelation' abrogate another? However, 'abrogation' applies only to commands and "was generally directed to making things easier, and the earlier ordinance was retained as a reminder of God's mercy." [10] Although not legally binding, the abrogated passage remains part of the 'recitation.' Thus the question of chronological priority is largely a mechanical matter which lets us know which verse is legally authoritative. There is no inner relationship and little basis for any idea of an historical development within the Qur'anic material. The apparent exception turns out to be at least a partial illustration of our point.

Even when the Qur'ān deals with an event in which Muḥammad was involved, such as the battle of Badr, the revelation is not thought of as depending in any way on the event which provided its historical occasion. While in human experience and understanding revelation may follow certain historical events and appear to depend upon them, the deeper truth is the reverse of this. The revelation is in existence from all eternity and history simply provides illustrations, positive or negative, of this eternal truth.

Much of the evidence from history set forth in the Qur'ān is, in fact, of a negative kind, composed of examples of what has happened to men who have strayed from God's eternal pattern. The Qur'ān, like human history, is full of such stories, but what one learns from them is that God's judgment falls on those who disobey Him. The more positive qualities of God are likely to be illustrated from nature and personal relationships rather than from history.

We will be reminded that the Qur'ān points to a history in which God has sent a series of prophets to recall man to the truth. Again, however, it is important to note that all these prophets had essentially the same message which later was corrupted in the history of their followers. It is doubtful whether one can properly see in the succession of the prophets an implicitly evolutionary view of history as some have

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10 Richard Bell, *Introduction to the Qur'ān* (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1953), p. 99, interpreting al-Suyūṭī.

suggested. The original message itself is not understood as developing; in fact, history has only served to obscure this message.

Much is sometimes made of the fact that in the Qur'ān the reality and importance of change is constantly referred to and illustrated in terms of natural phenomena. We find, for instance, the following passage:

> Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth
> and the alternation of night and day . . .
> and the water God sends down from heaven
> therewith reviving the earth after it is dead . . .
> and the turning about of the winds
> and the clouds compelled between heaven and earth—
> surely there are signs for a people having understanding. [11]

This passage certainly indicates that change is a part of God's purpose. It does not refer, however, to historical change but to change which takes place within an established pattern and which involves the repetition of a limited number of possibilities, a change without development.

We may now observe the different sense in which Islam is an 'historical religion' from that in which Biblical religion is historical. In the latter God actually reveals Himself in and through the events of history; specifically, through the historical experience of a particular people and in the life of a particular person. The Bible, in large part, is the story of certain decisive events which were understood as clues to the meaning of human existence. Implications of these events are pointed out but in the Bible the events are primary and the explanations or elaborations are secondary. The crucifixion of Jesus, for instance, transcends any attempt to state its meaning. As Butterfield says, Christianity claims to be an historical religion in the particularly technical sense that "certain historical events are held to be part of the religion itself." [12] Because God's revelation would not be what it is apart from these events it must be said that in a sense the God of the Bible depends upon history. One cannot really grasp what the Biblical message is about without at least an elementary knowledge of a certain slice of history.

This is not the case in Islam, for while a knowledge of the life and times of the Prophet throws light on certain aspects of the Qur'ān, the basic message is understood as having no necessary relationship to historical events. The revelation does not come *through* history. To hold that it did would be to make God dependent upon history and thus to compromise His absolute uniqueness. From the Muslim point of

[11] Arberry, *op. cit.*, S. 2 : 155

[12] Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 3.

view this it what Jews and Christians have done: Jews by the association of their own particular history with the ultimate purposes of God and Christians by holding that God has entered history in a particular human personality.

In the Qur'ān, of course, there are many passages in which historical events are used to *illustrate* God's will—especially His judgment. But there is a great difference between using historical events as illustrations and seeing them as actual carriers of revelation. This is a fundamental difference between the Qur'ān and the Bible.

Islam thus carried one step further the process of desacralization which began in the Bible. Pre-Biblical man encountered the sacred in the universe about him, in the sun, the storm, the mountain, the spring; divinity was immediately present in natural phenomena. For Biblical man this ceases to be the case; the environment may provide examples of the power of God, it may mediate the presence of God, but it does not provide an immediate encounter with Him. God is encountered in historical rather than natural events: in the deliverance of His people from Egypt or in the human life of Jesus. These historical events do not simply mediate the knowledge of God; He is present in them. But in Islam history joins nature in providing examples and evidences rather than immediate encounters; it has been desacralized. Or, using the distinction between 'sign' and 'symbol,' [13] we could suggest that for Biblical faith nature can only serve as a 'sign' pointing to the divine presence, while historical events may also be symbols, 'participating' in the reality of the divine. For Muslim faith, however, history, like nature, only provides 'signs.' We might say that in the Bible the relationship of revelation and history is 'organic' while in the Qur'ān it is instrumental; in the Bible God is Himself personally *present* in history while in the Qur'ān He only acts in history.

The way in which the Qur'ān appeals to the natural order as evidence for God may suggest that Islam is more of a natural than an historical religion. Nasr holds, for instance, that

> Viewed as a text, Nature is a fabric of symbols, which must be read according to their meaning. The Quran is the counterpart of that text in human words.... Both Nature and the Quran speak forth the presence and the worship of God. [14]

But it would be going too far to conclude that Islam has 'resacralized' nature. By desacralizing history and thus reducing it to the same theological level as nature, Islam has raised the *relative* level of nature, but its absolute position has not been changed. Appeals to nature have a greater place in the Qur'ān than in the Bible but nature remains only a 'sign'; it has not been resacralized. Only God is sacred and the

[13] See Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper Bros., 1958), p. 41 f.
[14] Nasr, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

fundamental encounter with Him takes place neither in nature nor in history but in the 'recitation' (*Qurʾān*) of His eternal imperative Word.

A contemporary Muslim scholar states that "the difference between Christianity and Islam is precisely this, that in the former, revelation is an event, in the latter it is an idea." [15] As an idea it is not involved in the vicissitudes of history *except* insofar as man is obligated to actualize it through his behavior.

Smith states this distinction very well in a footnote dealing with the relationship between the Jewish and Muslim ideas of history which, he holds, have much in common but also important differences:

> In the Old Testament attitude, history itself is continually revelatory. History is to revelation as subject to predicate, rather than *vice versa*. Classical Hebrew thought learned from history, and ... put what it learned into its scripture. Islamic thought learned from scripture, and put what it learned into history. Ideally, for Islam, history ought to be subordinated to revelation—which is final. [16]

This distinction could be applied not only to the Old Testament but to the Biblical revelation as a whole and, taken seriously, puts a new light on some of the statements regarding Islam and history. For Islam history is not the subject but the predicate; it is not the source but the result of revelation. For the Jew and the Christian history is the arena in which God reveals Himself, while for the Muslim it is the arena in which man obeys God's revelation. To use a different grammatical analogy, for the Jew and the Christian history is understood in the indicative mood, it says something, while for the Muslim it is the position from which God's imperative is heard, that in which man is commanded to act. Smith is thus quite correct when he says that "In some ways history is more significant for Muslims than it is for any other group," [17] but the words "in some ways" need to be emphasized and their meaning spelled out. His further statement that for the Muslim "his society and its history partake of an almost sacred quality" [18] can be true only in the sense that they are the arena in which obedience is demanded or in the sense that they provide examples of God's power in the world, as do events in nature. History, like nature, can be appealed to for evidences of the omnipotence of God but God does not depend upon it in any way. History is not

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[15] Ismaʿīl Ragi al-Faruqi, "A Comparison of the Islamic and Christian Approaches to Hebrew Scripture." *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, XXXI, 4 (1963), 290, footnote 20.
See also Schoun Frithjof, *Understanding Islam*, trans D. M. Matheson (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963), pp. 19, 22f.
[16] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 34, footnote 24
[17] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 14
[18] Smith, *op cit*, p. 24.

ultimately decisive but it is the context in which man makes the decision for obedience or disobedience.

There has been a great deal of historical writing in Islam but it has tended to be a simple recording of facts with little search for meaning in these facts and their relationships. Each story stands by itself and is in a real sense timeless. If the original reporter and the later transmitters were reliable the report must be accepted without question. Thus we find what may be called a 'positivistic' view of history in which things simply 'happen' and are reported without any 'deeper meaning' being discernible in them. Because history was seen as composed simply of facts without any particular relationship to each other there was no basis on which various reports could be evaluated.

It may be noted that this perspective also informs the atomistic philosophy developed in Medieval Islam, according to which relationships are not real in either space or time. "Just as space is only in a series of atoms, time is only in a succession of untouching moments and leaps across the void from one to the other . . ." [19] With such a point of view there cannot be any meaningful historical developments and the only possible locus of meaning is in the direct connection between each atomistic moment and God. "The world is annihilated and recreated at every moment; the cause of all events is the Creator and not a finite, created agent." [20] Any particular event may carry in itself a message from God but its significance cannot depend on its relationship with any other event.

The use to which history was put may also be significant. It seems to have been studied, not so much in order to learn from it as to have available interesting material for conversation or inspiring material likely to motivate people to action. Historical accounts are used to illustrate or support a view already held rather than to stimulate new creativity. As was the case in the Qur'ān itself, so in later Muslim writing, history is primarily illustrative rather than inherently meaningful.

Of course, there is one great name in Muslim historiography whose work appears to be an exception to much of what has been said. Ibn Khaldūn, in his famous *Muqaddima* (*Prolegomena*), holds that it is essential to look critically at received reports and to accept, reject, or modify them in the light of a scientific knowledge of human society in general. Thus the

> criterion for distinguishing the possible from the impossible is to be found in the study of human society, with a view to distinguishing between those of its phenomena which are essential and

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[19] Duncan B. Macdonald, *The Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), p 202 f.

[20] Nasr, *op. cit.*, p 35.

> arise from its very nature, those which are accidental and unimportant, and finally those which cannot occur in it. [21]

Here we have a principle by which we might expect to be able to distinguish some kind of meaning in history. But it is very significant that Ibn Khaldūn did not apply this reasoning to reports directly related to religious faith and practice. The Law, we are told,

> deals with normative prescriptions and injunctions which have been imposed by the Lawgiver and therefore become binding once they are proved to be authentic, their authenticity being best judged by the confidence felt in the narrator's accuracy and integrity. Narratives dealing with actual events, on the other hand, can be judged only by considering their correspondence to reality. Hence an examination of their intrinsic possibility is prior to and more important than the criticism of the source. In other words, the value of a precept or injunction lies in itself, whereas that of a narrative of events lies in its correspondence to external reality. [22]

For Ibn Khaldūn, then, the religious Law is not subject to the same kind of study as other phenomena; it exists on a different plane and is independent of the rules governing historical phenomena. Religious truth, like the natural order, is not involved in the vicissitudes of history; it is essentially non-historical.

It has been suggested that Ibn Khaldūn separated religion from history because he knew that any attempt to deal critically with religious matters would get him into difficulty. But it may be rather that he so expressed himself simply because he was a good Muslim. This view is supported by H. A. R. Gibb [23] and also by Franz Rosenthal who holds that Ibn Khaldūn's

> loyal devotion to traditional Islam ... is beyond doubt. However ... he had to divorce the traditional view from his own historical insights by assuming two different levels of existence, the supernatural or divine, and the human. Both levels, he contended, are normally separate. Human history moves in circles, determined by human material needs and psychological attitudes, and these circles are only very occasionally and irregularly disturbed by some arbitrary, if highly effective, supernatural interference. [24]

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[21] Charles Issawi (ed.), *An Arab Philosophy of History* (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 35. See also Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, tr. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 77.

[22] Issawi, *loc. cit.*; see also Ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.*, p. 76 f.

[23] See H. A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (ed. S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 171.

[24] Franz Rosenthal, "The Influence of the Biblical Tradition on Muslim Historiography" in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, *Historians of the Middle East* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 40.

The reason that Ibn Khaldūn does not include religious faith within his critical study is not that it is unimportant but precisely that it is of supreme importance, that it is absolute and thus not really involved in the vicissitudes of history; it cannot be studied critically as lesser matters can be. He went beyond other Muslims in seeking a pattern in the vicissitudes of historical existence by means of which he could evaluate and relate various fact-claims but this pattern has no ultimate significance.

For Ibn Khaldūn, as for other Muslims, religious faith is based on a sacred absolute above and beyond the events of profane history which does not depend on any historical verification. Of course, true faith requires a certain rather definite kind of action in history, and carries a warning of judgment for the disobedient. Islam provides a pattern *for* history which man disregards at his peril but does not draw anything essential *from* history. The greatest service of history to Islam is the provision of examples of what befalls man when he separates himself from the eternally valid pattern of life provided by God.

Ibn Khaldūn's view of history is essentially cyclical; there is change, but only within a certain range of recurring possibilities. The impression one gets from reading the *Muqaddima* is that from an absolute perspective it doesn't matter very much what people do, for a certain pattern will persist, a pattern of constant change without real difference. "The succession of rulers does not affect society greatly, for they resemble each other closely."[25] What Ibn Khaldūn gives us is really a kind of 'natural history' of man, an account of the way man is bound to act in this world. The lesson to be learned from history is that all human achievement is temporary, that there is no particular direction to history, that things keep changing without advancing; if anything they are likely to become worse. Certainly there is no reason to adjust eternal laws to present human conditions, for these, after all, are only manifestations of a passing phase. It may be significant that in his own work as *qāḍī* in Cairo, Ibn Khaldūn was noted for his rigid, uncompromising application of the law.[26]

Ibn Khaldūn differed from most other Muslim historians in finding a pattern within history but he did not differ in his care to distinguish the historical pattern from the divine pattern. The former is learned from history, the latter is accepted as revealed. The very fact that Ibn Khaldūn used a scientific approach in the study of profane history but not in the study of the sacred Law makes the distinction even clearer in him than in those who did not use a scientific approach at all. His predecessors had assumed that historical facts reported by

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[25] Issawi, *op. cit*, p. 102

[26] See Walter J. Fischel, *Ibn Khaldūn in Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 314 f, and Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History* (London Geo. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957), p. 295.

reliable witnesses were, like the facts of religion, to be accepted without criticism. Ibn Khaldūn clarifies the difference between the sacred and the profane, between historical-relative and religious-absolute knowledge, and thus may even be a better Muslim than his less scientific fellows.

Ibn Khaldūn saw that religious faith is one of the important factors that enters into the historical process. But *it only enters into it, it does not grow out of it.* What people believe helps to explain how they act, but the beliefs themselves, in so far as they are true beliefs, are not to be explained by social processes. We recall again the suggestion that for the Muslim God's word in history is not indicative but imperative.

This imperative word is found in the *sharīᶜa*, the Law of God, and it is here that the relationship between the eternal and the historical, the sacred and the profane, becomes most practical for Muslims. In the Islamic view, the Law exists in the realm of the eternal and the unchanging but is to be applied within the vicissitudes of history. It provides a God-given pattern for all human existence which, at least in theory, does not vary to accommodate the local needs of specific times and places.

Such a view encourages a tendency to preserve the absolute validity of the eternal Law at the expense of divorcing it from practical application. Yet this cannot finally be acceptable, for the historical must be molded by the eternal. It is true that for the Muslim, "Nothing is ultimately sacred but God," yet it is also true that "Muḥammad is the Messenger of God." In the tension between these two statements, I believe, we have the problem facing the modern Muslim, the problem of the historical and the non-historical in Islam.

The first part of the Muslim witness proclaims that there is nothing within the world or within the historical process which is to be taken as finally significant or made an object of ultimate commitment, for this would be to make an absolute out of that which is relative, to confuse the temporal and the eternal, the profane and the sacred. By his insistence on this point, the Muslim bears witness to the unity, the uniqueness, and the 'otherness' of God, whose revelation to man is not in history and therefore is not subject to change. Even if circumstances seem to make it difficult or even temporarily impossible actually to govern human affairs in accordance with the eternal pattern, the pattern itself does not change. The rules are not to be modified on the basis of historical experience; that which is eternal cannot be modified to meet changes in that which is relative. When it is suggested to Muslims that change may be needed to make Islam *relevant* in the modern world, it is not surprising that the reaction is negative, for this suggests that Islam is *relative.*

Because of this attitude, Muslims are sometimes accused of 'living in the past'; in fact, Muslims themselves accuse other Muslims of so

doing. In specific cases the accusation may be justified but in general it is based on a misunderstanding of the fundamental attitude of Islam to history. Islam, as such, is not an historical phenomenon but an eternal truth. As its foundations are not in the past any more than in the present or the future the true Muslim does not live in the past but in eternity. This, of course, can be misunderstood, not only by the critics of Islam, but also by its orthodox defenders who sometimes act as if they want to live in the past. To defend an unchanging past, however, is a hopeless task, for that which is based on the past is relative to the past and will have to change. Only that which is eternal can be beyond historical change. In practice, of course, the distinction may be very difficult to make, both for the critics and for the defenders of Islam.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that the final revelation of the eternal truth cannot be separated from the particular segment of past history in which it took place. In the second half of the *shahāda* the Muslim bears witness that "Muḥammad is the Messenger of God." Here humanity in the form of a personal name, an historical biography, is brought into relationship with the eternal God. The first half of the *shahāda* still holds good; only God is absolute. Muḥammad is not in any sense divine; he is not to be worshipped, for he is only a human messenger, and as such relative. Yet he is the instrument or channel through which the eternal message comes to man. This message is not in any way his invention or the result of his human experience; it is absolute, not relative. It does not grow out of the historical process but comes into this process from the outside, from the eternal, and can be final precisely because it is not involved in the vicissitudes of history. It cannot, however, be separated from the biography of the particular man who was its human channel and whose every word and deed is understood to bear the stamp of the eternal. Thus, that which took place in this portion of history is not simply an event of the past but is of eternal and unchanging significance. That which is historical and relative has taken on the permanent imprint of the eternal and the absolute while remaining historical and relative!

Like everyone else, the Muslim must act, not in the past, nor in eternity, but in the present. We have seen that he, perhaps more than anyone else, is obligated by his faith to act in practical, political, matters. Islam is not, we have suggested, an historical religion in the sense that it is based on history, but it is pre-eminently an historical religion in that it pushes into history. History is the arena in which God commands man to act, applying the pattern and rules which have been laid down from all eternity. The Muslim, therefore, cannot escape the obligation of relating this eternal pattern and these eternal rules to the changing conditions of human history. The Muslim, in other words, ***must*** be ***relevant*** if he is to be faithful to God's command.

History does not change the eternal pattern but must be changed by it, which means that the eternal and the changing cannot be kept in separate compartments by the conscientious Muslim. It is here, I believe, that the fundamental tension in the life of the contemporary Muslim is to be found—a tension between the eternal-absolute and the temporal-relative. The Muslim is challenged by the obligation to make relevant that which can never be relative.

To return to our basic question, is Islam an historical religion or is it not? It is historical in the sense that the faith of the Muslim necessarily involves him in political and social activity to an extent that is perhaps true of no other religion. But history itself has no ultimate meaning for him, it teaches him nothing about sacred reality. Thus, while action in history is prescribed for the Muslim, the outcome of this action is in no way significant for his faith. He is commanded to strive for righteousness but whether he succeeds or fails is ultimately unimportant. The early successes of Islam and its later failures neither prove nor disprove the validity of Islam. Of course, it is understood to be generally true that God rewards faithfulness with success and punishes unfaithfulness with defeat, but this is no absolute rule that can be counted upon, for that would mean that what God does depends on human behavior. God's truth may be illustrated by historical events but it is not in need of historical verification nor in danger of historical falsification.

Thus it appears to be true, on the one hand, that "*in some ways* history is more significant for Muslims than it is for almost any other group," [27] and, on the other, that for Muslims "history is a series of accidents," unrelated to the essence of Islam. [28] It is my thesis that this tension between the irrelevance and the relevance of history is basic for Islam, enshrined as it is in the two parts of the Muslim witness: "Nothing ultimately sacred but God"—"Muḥammad the Messenger of God." Each of the two authors quoted has grasped one of the two poles; a full understanding of Islam requires us to hold on to both of them and to feel the tension this involves.

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[27] Smith, *op cit*, p 14. (Italics mine).
[28] Nasr, *op cit*, p. 21

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES OF 1967: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY [1]

> ...the most formidable obstacle to an understanding, and therefore to a solution, of the Palestine problem lies not so much in its inherent complexity as in the solid jungle of legend and propaganda which has grown up around it. To the ordinary tasks of a student dealing with the facts is thus added an obligation to deal with the pseudo-facts and dethrone them from their illegitimate existence It is as much his duty to expose the fallacies as to assert the truth, and the duty is all the more imperative as he is dealing with a tragedy in enactment, in which innocent lives are being sacrificed every day and human beings kept in anguish and suffering. [2]

1. Introduction

In June and July of 1967, large numbers of Palestinian Arabs crossed the River Jordan, seeking safety on its Eastern bank. They left behind their homes in the villages and towns of the West Bank section of Jordan and, by doing so, became refugees. By the end of July, there were more than 200,000 of these 1967 refugees in the East Bank section of Jordan. [3] Many of them were housed in hastily constructed tent camps. Many more had found shelter in the towns of East Jordan: Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Salt. Their living conditions were miserable and their future uncertain.

In this exodus from the West Bank, history seemed to have repeated itself. In 1948, even larger numbers of Palestinian Arabs had left their homes under conditions of war. The circumstances of their departure have never been clarified: whether they left by official order, out of fear of Israel, or by forcible eviction. In any case, these 1948 refugees have never been permitted to return to their homes. Equally, they have never given up the hope of return. Their situation has been one of the most serious issues disturbing the peace of the Middle East.

During the summer of 1967, much attention was paid to the physical misery of the Arab refugees, to their desperate need for shelter, food, and medical supplies. The conscience of the world was momentarily touched, and the immediate dangers of starvation and epidemic were avoided.

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[1] *Acknowledgments* The research on which this paper is based could not have been carried out without the help of many persons. We are especially indebted to Professors Walīd Khālidī and Munīr Shammāᶜa, of the American University of Beirut, and to Mr. Ibrāhīm ᶜIzz al-Dīn of Amman. Funds for the 1967 interviewing came from individuals and organizations in Lebanon and Jordan. The analysis of the data and the continuation of the research are supported by a grant from the Middle East Area Program of the American University of Beirut.

[2] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965; originally published 1939), pp. 386-387.

[3] United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), *Report of the Commissioner-General for 1966-1967*, General Assembly, Official Records, 22nd Session-Supplement No. 13 (A/6713), 1967, p. 11.

At the same time, little systematic attention was paid to more fundamental questions. Why did the refugees leave their homes? What sorts of people came, and who stayed behind? What were the homes that they left behind, and did they wish to return? What attachments did they have to their home communities?

This paper reports on an attempt to answer the question about the exodus of 1967.[4] The answers are based on research carried out by the writers in 1967 and 1968. Much of the information comes from case studies of 122 refugee families, collected by us and our team of interviewers, students from the American University of Beirut. One hundred of the case studies were collected in the refugee camp at Zeezya (now re-named Talbiya) and constitute a representative sample of that camp. The remaining case studies concern refugee families in Amman.

The questions that we seek to answer do not, in themselves, lead to any solution of the refugee problem. Our answers, however, are essential to an understanding of the problem. They represent an attempt to clear away some of the "jungle of legend and propaganda," to which George Antonius refers. Any solution of the problem must take these answers into account.

We begin this paper with some 'obvious' answers about the exodus of 1967 and show why these answers are not acceptable. We then proceed to a description of the position of the refugees before their departure from their home communities. This leads to a consideration of our central question: the reasons for the exodus of 1967. We close with a description of the refugees' hopes for the future.

2. The Problem of the Exodus

It has often been observed that it is easy to answer questions about human behavior, so easy that many answers are provided to a single question. The difficult task is to decide which answers to accept and which to reject. This observation applies to the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank. Why did it take place?

An obvious answer, and one frequently given, is that civilians in time of war always leave their homes and seek safety elsewhere. This 'obvious' answer, however, ignores crucial facts: the experience of the Palestinian Arabs who left their homes in 1948.

In 1948, about 700,000 Arabs left their homes in areas that then became the State of Israel. Since that time, they have lived in neighboring countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Over the years, many of the refugees have established themselves in their new countries, finding homes and occupations. About one-third of the number,

[4] A more extensive report is *River Without Bridges* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968). In the summer of 1968, Professor Barakat conducted interviews with an additional sample of 135 refugee families. These interviews are now being studied and will be reported on in a later publication.

however, have continued to live in refugee 'camps,' often on the margin of poverty.[5] These refugees have never been permitted to return to their former homes.

The experience of the 1948 refugees became common knowledge to all Arabs, especially those living in the West Bank area of Jordan. By 1967, this knowledge should have acted as a deterrent, keeping people from leaving their homes and becoming refugees. It might have been expected that the West Bank Arabs would not seek refuge, but would stay in their communities as long as possible.

Instead, approximately one-fifth of the population of the West Bank, more than 200,000 people, did leave their homes. Since the time of our fieldwork, in September, 1967, the flow of Arab refugees into the East Bank has continued. It now includes people from the Gaza strip.[6] The knowledge of 1948 and its sequel has not deterred them.

Another common answer is that a panic swept over the West Bank. Moshe Dayan, the commander of the Israeli armed forces, described the reaction of the Arab civilians:

> Their first reaction was one of shock and panic. Streams of Jordanian civilians in flight poured across the river from the West Bank, held by Israel. Now, three months after the fighting, shock and panic have passed, but confusion and lack of confidence remain.[7]

This explanation of the exodus does not tell us what the causes of the panic were. The word 'shock' implies a reaction to an unexpected and strong stimulus. What was the stimulus? The approach of Israeli troops? If so, why should the approach of enemy troops lead to panic? Were there rumors about what might happen under Israeli rule? Were there actual incidents that might give rise to panic? Were the civilians frightened by the Israeli air attack and the use of napalm? In short, what was the nature of the situation, as perceived by the Arab civilians?

The explanation of panic is often linked to an economic explanation of the exodus which states that the refugees were by and large people without steady jobs and without real property, a sort of floating population with few attachments to their communities. Such people, it is argued, would have no reason for standing fast in the face of danger and would be specially liable to panic. They could quickly pack up their few possessions and move to safer territory. This explanation may be called the 'riffraff' hypothesis, since it suggests that the

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[5] UNRWA, *Report of the Commissioner-General for 1967-68*, Table 7, page 62 shows 454,232 persons living in UNRWA camps out of a total registered refugee population of 1,364,294. In addition, there are several hundred thousand displaced Palestinians *not* registered with UNRWA.

[6] A summary report by John K. Cooley is to be found in the *Christian Science Monitor*, April 30, 1969, pp. 9-10.

[7] *Life*, U.S. edition, September 29, 1967, p. 120.

refugees come from the poorest and least stable section of society.

The 'riffraff' hypothesis implies—and this is not always recognized by the people who state it—that the refugees have little reason to return to their homes. In this way, the question of why they left is linked to the question of return.

Among persons familiar with the Middle East, the 'riffraff' hypothesis sometimes takes a more sophisticated form. It is held that the 1967 refugees were already refugees *before* the war, living in UNRWA camps and receiving UNRWA rations. The exodus took place, according to this explanation, because the civilians were afraid they might not receive UNRWA aid in Israeli-occupied areas.

Before the 1967 war, about forty per cent of the West Bank population was receiving UNRWA assistance, as having refugee status from the 1948 period. Many of these people did live in refugee camps and many of them did take part in the 1967 exodus. But these 'old refugees,' displaced by the 1948 war, are *less than half the number* of the 1967 refugees. [8] The explanation leaves out the exodus of 'new refugees,' persons who had never before received UNRWA aid.

A fourth common answer asserts that the Arabs, although they lived in villages, still retained the 'nomadic mentality.' Their settlements, it is suggested, are temporary, like those of the desert Bedouin. Attachment to a particular locality is slight and easily broken.

This reasoning ignores at least two facts. In the first place, our data show that the refugees in our sample had lived in their home communities all their lives. Their parents and grand-parents had also lived in these same communities. In this respect they show no nomadic tendency at all. Their residential mobility is less than that of comparable populations elsewhere. In the second place the Palestinians acted much as the civilians of other countries have, leaving their homes in times of war. The difference is that most other civilian populations have been permitted to return to their homes if they wished to do so.

These are four possible explanations of the 1967 exodus: the 'shock and panic' explanation, the 'floating population' explanation, the 'previous refugee' explanation, and the 'nomadic mentality' explanation. On examination, each is found wanting. Instead of providing answers, each explanation raises further questions.

3. The 1967 Refugees

A. *Introduction*

In this section, we present a description of the 1967 refugees, of their socio-economic status and their ties to their home communities. We shall be concerned with the ownership of homes and of land, with

[8] A report by the Jordanian Joint Ministry Commission for Refugees (Amman, August, 1967) showed that 51% of the 1967 refugees were 'new.' In our sample, 61% were new refugees.

the level of education, and with the length of residence in their home community. These results, based on the 'Zeezya sample,' are applicable, with reservations, to the population of 1967 refugees who were living in tent-camps at the time of interviewing. [9]

One tends to speak of 'refugees' as a collective term, without reference to the individuals and the families that make up the refugee collectivity. It may be helpful, before beginning the description of the refugees as a group, to consider some individual cases.

1. *The family of Naomi* come from Beit Noba, a village of 1400 people. Beit Noba is near the frontier between Jordan and Israel, in the Latrun sector west of Jerusalem. Naomi (in Arabic, Niᶜma) is an attractive girl of 23, engaged to a young Arab who is at present working in West Germany. Her father, ᶜAbdu'l-Raḥīm ᶜAlī Aḥmad, is an elderly man, a retired cook. Naomi's mother is younger than her father, a still vigorous woman of about 50. Other members of the family include Naomi's married sister, Amīna, and her four small children and Naomi's younger sister ᶜĀ'isha, eight years old. All these people are now in Camp Zeezya, living in two adjacent tents. Their main worry is for the schooling of ᶜĀ'isha. (At the time of interviewing, there were no schools in Camp Zeezya.) A few months before the war, they moved to their new four-room house. The story of their departure from Beit Noba is told below.
2. *Khālid ᶜAbdu'l-Ḥalīm*, 28 years old, was born and lived in Sebastia, near Nablus. He is married to ᶜArabiyya, 20 years old, and they have two daughters. The elder daughter is one and a half years old. The younger one, three weeks old at the time of the interview, is named Zeezya, after the place where she was born. Khālid's father is dead, but his mother, al-Ḥājja Salīma, is with them in the camp. al-Hājja Salīma is a registered midwife and has helped to deliver many of the babies born in Zeezya. Also with them in the camp is Khālid's sister, Khayriyya, and her three-year-old son Ṭāriq. Khayriyya's husband is in West Germany.

   Khālid's main occupation is carpentry. He has an elementary school education, reads the newspapers and listens frequently to the radio. Khālid is a Sunni Muslim, but not very religious. He likes people, is always hospitable and always neatly dressed. He enjoys Palestinian folk songs and plays the *shabbābah*, a folk musical instrument resembling a flute. (In June, 1969, news reached us that Khālid, ᶜArabiyya, and their elder daughter were killed in an automobile accident outside Amman.)

[9] It must be stressed that our sample is drawn from the tent-camp section of the 1967 refugee population. The refugees *not* in tent-camps include many more middle-class families

3. *Ṭāhā* is an 'old' refugee, a refugee from the 1948 war. Since then he has lived in Nuwei'meh Camp near Jericho. He is 38 years old, married, with four children between the ages of thirteen and three years. Two of his children are in school. In the camp, they owned a two-room house built of mud bricks. For many years he worked for UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), and had recently started a chicken farm and become active in civil defense.

   On the third day of the war (Wednesday), with many airplanes overhead, Ṭāhā took his wife and children to the fields, with the intention of coming back to the farm. However, he was not able to return. He wants to go back very much, even under Israeli rule. Israeli rule means to him "threats, dishonor, and humiliation." He thinks that the Arabs should rearm themselves to regain their dignity and self-respect, and to regain their country. "As an Arab I can not live without pride, gallantry, and dignity. Your country is where you were born and no other country could be dearer to your heart."

In the crisis of war, families such as these had few financial resources to support them. Once they were cut off from their home communities and from their relatives, they became dependent on public charity. As refugees, they had to accept the subsistence provided by the tent camps.

B. *Socio-economic status before June, 1967*

Four indicators of socio-economic status are used here to characterize the Zeezya sample of refugee families. These are the percentage of literate males, the median monthly income per family, the percentage of families owning their own homes, and the percentage owning land.[10]

In the Zeezya sample, 43% of the male heads of household were literate. This percentage may be compared with literacy figures for similar groups in the West Bank sector of Jordan.[11] The district of Hebron has a literacy rate for men aged fifteen years or over of 40%. The district of Jerusalem has a rate of 55%, while that of Nablus has a rate of 56%. In other words, the literacy rate for the Zeezya sample is lower than the rate for two of the three West Bank districts, but higher than the third. It must be noted, in this connection, that the 'heads of households' are mainly men aged thirty or more. Literacy rates in this age group are known to be lower than for that

[10] This is a condensed summary of data on the socio-economic status of these families. It is presented in detail in *River Without Bridges*.

[11] Literacy figures, from the census of 1961, are taken from *Statistical Guide to Jordan* (Amman: Department of Statistics, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1965), p 17.

in the group aged fifteen to thirty. It appears, therefore, that the literacy rate for this sample is approximately the same as that for similar populations in the district of origin.

A second indicator of socio-economic status is median monthly income of the family. For the Zeezya sample, the median monthly family income is reported to be about 30 Jordanian dinars (about $84 U.S.). Comparison of this figure with income statistics for the Kingdom of Jordan as a whole suggests that the median figure for Jordan would be about 40 dinars, for an ordinary-sized family. The families in the Zeezya sample, it appears, had incomes (before the war) somewhat lower than the national average. The smaller cash income, on the other hand, is characteristic of families from rural districts.

A third indicator is the percentage of families owning their own homes. For the Zeezya sample, 80% of the families reported owning their homes. This relatively high rate of ownership is a characteristic of rural districts, where few families rent their homes. Ownership means that the house belongs to the husband, wife, or to their families.

A fourth indicator of socio-economic status is land ownership. Of the Zeezya families, 61% reported owning land. Of these, about half are relatively small parcels of land (less than two acres), while half are parcels of two acres or more.

These data suggest that the families of the Zeezya sample are about average in socio-economic status in the communities from which they come. This finding takes into account the fact that the families come from the rural areas of the West Bank. Like most families in these areas, their level of literacy and income is not high. They do, however, own their houses and lands.

C. *Ties with the Home Community*

The data on socio-economic status have indicated that the refugees did not come from the poorest sector of their home communities. Judging by their status, many of them had an established position in their communities. People with homes and lands usually have many ties with their communities and a deep affection for them.

There are many indications of this affection in the interviews. People such as Khālid ʿAbdu²l-Ḥalīm speak with pride of their villages, of their particular qualities as communities and of their friends and relatives in the village. Khālid would not play his flute (the *shabbābah*) near his tent lest his wife, sister, and mother "be overcome with yearning for Sebastia and start to cry." One of the most deeply felt of the privations of refugee status is the separation from the home community. They feel they are living in a state of exile and uprootedness. One of our respondents put it this way:

> Your country is like your child (*baladak mithl waladak*); you cannot be separated from it for a long time.

The Palestinian Arabs, especially villagers and small-town dwellers, are person-oriented, community-oriented, and family-oriented. Outside these spheres, they feel lost. [12]

It is possible from the Zeezya sample to make an objective assessment of the proportion of refugee families who have these strong ties with their home community. Four items of information can be taken as objective indices of degree of integration into home communities. Two of these indices have already been described: ownership of homes and ownership of land. The other two indices relate to more 'structural ties': the length of time that the family has lived in the community and the presence of relatives in the community. A family that has lived in one place for a long time usually develops strong ties with its community, whereas a family that has moved around is less likely to have these ties. A family with relatives in the same village is likely to be integrated into that village, whereas a family without relatives nearby tends to be regarded as outsiders, especially in Arab communities.

Data on the structural ties of the Zeezya sample are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Ties with the Home Community

(Zeezya sample "N" is number of families responding to the question All other figures are percentages.)

A. Length of Time lived in Home Community	Old Refugees (N = 37)	New Refugees (N = 61)	Total (N = 98)
Two years or less	3%	0%	1%
3-10 years	0	2	1
11-20 years	94	5	39
21 years or more	3	93	59
	100%	100%	100%
B. Families Having Relatives in Home Community	**Old Refugees (N = 26)**	**New Refugees (N = 48)**	**Total (N = 74)**
Had no relatives	31%	4%	14%
Yes, had relatives	69	96	86
	100%	100%	100%

[12] Westerners, whose orientation is to achievement rather than family find it difficult to understand this fact. Thus, some of them think that were it not for the agitation of the Arab politicians, the refugees would have settled down and accepted reality. For the refugees 'reality' means exile and uprootedness. Two examples of the 'western' viewpoint are: Martha Gellhorn, "The Arabs of Palestine," *Atlantic*, CCVIII, 4 (1961), 45-65, and Marie Syrkin, "The Arab Refugees: A Zionist View," *Commentary*, XXI (1966), 1-10.

The distributions in Table 1 show the large percentage of refugee families having strong ties with their home communities. On the question of length of residence, over half the families (59%) had lived in their communities more than twenty years. The overwhelming majority of the new refugees (93%) had lived continuously for twenty-one years or more in their home communities. Almost all of these families had never lived anywhere else. Their village or town was the only community that they had ever known. Similarly the old refugees tended to live in the same place where they had settled in 1948. Our data show that 94% of them had lived from eleven to twenty years in the same place.

The second part of Table 1 shows the proportion of families with relatives in the same community. This proportion is very high, 86% of the Zeezya families. Ninety-six per cent of the new refugees had relatives. These figures indicate the number of kinship ties between the families and other people in the community. This proportion is characteristic of Arab villages, where kinship links are both numerous and strong.

Both the subjective remarks in the interviews and the objective data in Table 2 refute the 'nomadic mentality' hypothesis and point to the same conclusion: the intensity of the links between the families and their homes. They suggest the loneliness and sadness of people cut off from communities to which they are so strongly attached.

Our findings so far suggest that these people were, prior to June, 1967, well established in their home communities. If this is so, then why did they leave? What caused the exodus of June, 1967? The next section presents a description and an analysis of the exodus.

4. The Exodus: Its Direct and Indirect Causes

A. *Introduction: The Experiences of the Refugees*

Tension in Jordan had been high since November, 1966. In that month Israeli army units carried out a retaliatory raid on the Jordanian village of Samu', near Hebron. Jordanian casualties were high and included civilian deaths and injuries. In May, 1967, a succession of events led to the mobilization of Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). On the morning of Monday, June 5, war broke out. The Jordanian air force, numbering some twenty airplanes, was wiped out in a few hours. With complete control of the air, Israeli army units moved forward and occupied the West Bank area of Jordan. By Wednesday night, the occupation was complete. The Jordanian army had withdrawn across the River Jordan to the East Bank, and a cease-fire was accepted by both Jordan and Israel on the following day.

In the villages along the frontier between Israel and Jordan, the first reaction of the civilians was to find a safe shelter, some place

that would not be exposed to gunfire and aerial attack. Many civilians took shelter in caves and orchards. Others moved to villages that were less exposed to possible fighting: villages further back in the hills, away from the main roads.

This action of seeking shelter was common on Monday night and Tuesday morning. The civilians did not plan to leave their homes permanently. They moved out only for a few hours or a day, until the situation was clearer and it would be safe to return home. As it turned out, it was not possible for many of them to return to their homes.

The case of the family of Naomi illustrates this pattern. In their frontier village of Beit Noba, district of Latrun, Naomi, her sister and her parents heard the fighting begin on Monday evening. The interviewer records that:

> They heard shots and cannons. They could see fire below them in the direction of Jerusalem. All that convinced them that they should leave. The mother put two blankets on her head. They left without food; the mother was barefooted... They reached Beit ʿUr and could see the lights of Israeli jeeps and tanks behind them. The mother put her hand over the children's mouths, when the Israelis passed, so as not to be heard.

Two days later, they made their way back to the village, reaching it in the late afternoon. The interview record continues:

> They saw their homes being demolished. Red soil was put over the place where houses had been. They said, "just like a dream. It's as if we've never been there."

The account of the destruction of Beit Noba was corroborated by a group of Arabic-speaking French missionnaries who visited the Latrun sector later in June. They found the Latrun sector tightly guarded, but managed to evade the guards and to visit the villages of Beit Noba, ʿAmwas, and Yalo. They reported:

> And there was what the Israelis did not want us to see: three villages systematically destroyed by dynamite and bull-dozers. Alone in a deathly silence donkeys wandered or a torn pillow stuck out of the mass of plaster, stones, and concrete. [13]

There are three elements in the experience of Naomi and her family that are repeated in many of the refugee interviews. One is the surprise and the lack of preparation for departure. Naomi's mother took blankets but no food. They did not plan to stay away from home long.

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[13] Sister Marie-Thérèse, "Jérusalem et le sang des pauvres" in *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, XLVII, Oct. 5, 1967. See also the accounts collected by Pierre Andreu, *ibid.*, XLVIII, 1968, "Les refugiés," 47-48.

from Córdoba went to Rheims to negotiate peace in 847, the balance of power along the Pyrenees was already shifting in favor of the emirate. Christian lords there rebelled against Carolingian rule and made alliances and agreements (including a peace in 856) with Muslims, and by 890 the Carolingians had lost effective control over the Spanish March. [11]

The March also involved the Carolingians in the Adoptionist controversy. Heterodoxy flourished in Visigothic Spain, whose rulers formally abandoned Arian Christianity only in 589, were required by the Church to prohibit the exercise of any religion other than Catholic Christianity and were empowered to imprison and confiscate the property of anyone who questioned the Catholic Christian Church. Despite these measures and similar severe anti-Jewish legislation, both heterodox Christian and Jewish communities continued to survive and to attract orthodox Christians even after the Muslim conquest. [12] Adoptionism seemed a more serious challenge. [13] Its proponent Elipandus, metropolitan of Toledo and primate of Spain, maintained that the word *adoptio* in the Mozarabic liturgy and earlier authors referred to the adoption of Christ or his human nature by God the Father rather than to the adoption of human nature by Christ or the adoption of believers as children of God because of the grace of Christ. Therefore Jesus was not truly the incarnate Son of God but was, as man, only the adoptive son of God—a logical extension of Elipandus' earlier stress upon the spiritual nature of God against Migetius' teaching that there were three corporeal persons in the Holy Trinity. That view had similarities if not affinities with Arianism and earlier heterodox formulations, and emphasized the humanity of Jesus and the otherness of God to a degree little removed from Islamic conceptions. Consequently some have seen in Adoptionism an attempt to reconcile Christianity with the Qur'ān or more broadly with Islam; thus the hispanophobe Alcuin, leader of the Carolingian Renaissance, asserted that "the chief fountain of this Spanish unbelief is the city of Cordoba," Elipandus refers to "the brothers who have a correct [his] belief of God" in Córdoba, and Gams traced the origin of Spanish Adoptionism to Nestorian Syrians who followed the Arabs to Spain, occupied a position as intellectual leaders in Córdoba as they did in other Muslim capitals and could, not knowing Latin well, readily misinterpret the word *adoptio*. [14]

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[11] See on these matters Archibald R Lewis, *The Development of Southern French and Catalan Society 718-1050* (Austin, 1965), chapters II, VI.

[12] Colbert, chapter II, treats these matters briefly; a more extended analysis is Aloysius K. Ziegler, *Church and State in Visigothic Spain* (Washington, 1930).

[13] On Adoptionism see Emile Amann, "L'adoptionisme espagnol de VIIIe siècle," *Revue des sciences religieuses*, XVI (1936), 281-317; *idem*, *L'époque carolingienne* (vol. VI of *Histoire de l'Eglise*, eds. Fliche et Martin) (Paris, 1947), 129-52; Ramón de Abadal i de Vinyals, *La batalla del Adopcionismo en la desintegración de la Iglesia visigoda* (Barcelona, 1949).

[14] Alcuin's letter, *MGH, Ep.* II, no. 201; Elipandus' letter, *PL*, XCVI, 881;

ville in his *Etymologies* (*PL*, LXXXII, 333) followed Jerome closely on these points. Jerome further identified the Arab astral deity al-ᶜUzzā with the planet Venus, which became known as an idol of that goddess whom later writers linked with the Kaᶜba.[22] As churchmen fled West from Muslim conquests of Byzantine territory they perhaps brought with them accounts of allegedly authentic religious discussions between Christian and Muslim leaders (the *majlis* or disputation genre of Christian literature regarding Muslims).[23] Perhaps knowledge of that literature aided Felix of Urgel in the composition of a similar disputation, which Alcuin reported available in the library of the bishop of Lyons (see note 15). Certainly Eastern refugees in the west, probably at Lérins, translated into Latin the *Revelations* of Pseudo-Methodius, which foretold the subduing of the sons of Ishmael by "the heavenly and Roman kingdom."[24] Perhaps the "Life of Muḥammad" discovered by Eulogius at the monastery of Leyre near Pamplona grew out of the increasing anti-Muslim sentiment and information in the Carolingian and border territories. D'Alverny supposes it originated near Seville because of references to the Visigothic kings, but a northern origin could also account for those references since early rulers of the Asturias claimed descent from the Visigothic royal house and chronicles containing Visigothic information were accessible in the north. Von Grunebaum suggests a derivation from Islamic polemic against Muḥammad's rivals.[25]

Apparently religious as well as political hostility against Islam and Muslims was developing in Western European Christian states during the ninth century both on a popular level and, to a smaller extent, among opinion leaders and interpreters. At the same time the political-military threat those Christian states posed to Islamic Spain, and the potential for disaffection among Muslim governors in the north, decreased. Freedom of contact and communication between Christians

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[22] Jerome, *Commentaries on Ezekiel* (25 : 1-7), *PL*, XXV, 231-35; Isaiah (21 : 16-17), *PL*, XXIV, 193-95; *Questions on Genesis* (16 : 11-12), *PL*, XXVIII, 181-82; *Life of St. Hilary*, *PL*, XXIII, 41. For some discussion of these pre-Islamic views see Marbury B. Ogle, "Petrus Comestor, Methodius and the Saracens," *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 318-24.

[23] Brief treatments of the *majlis* genre are Aldobrandino Malvezzi, *L'Islamismo e la Cultura europea* (Florence, 1956), chapters I-II, and Erdmann Fritsch, *Islam und Christentum im Mittelalter* (Breslau, 1930), pp. 1-12. Literary evidence is cited in Giorgio Levi della Vida, "I Mozarabi tra Occidente e Islam," *L'Occidente e l'Islam*, pp 676, 678.

[24] Ernst Sackur, *Sibyllinische Texte und Forschungen: Pseudomethodius, Adso und die Tiburtinische Sibylle* (Halle, 1898), pp 53-60 As Manselli observed, the anti-Islamic significance of Pseudo-Methodius is rarely recognized.

[25] Marie T d'Alverny, "La Connaissance de l'Islam en Occident du IXe au milieu du XIIe siècle," *L'Occidente e l'Islam*, pp. 587-89. In the discussion of that paper (*ibid.*, pp 802-03) Gustave E. von Grunebaum noted a possible literary influence (the sura of the frog) upon the Leyre Life from works of the prophet Maslama (Musaylima) published by D. S. Margoliouth, "On the Origin and Import of the Names Muslim and Ḥanīf," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1903), 467-94.

within and among those states undoubtedly spread such anti-Islamic ideas as are attested by the number of surviving manuscripts of the Pseudo-Methodius and the Leyre Life, the several mentions of the cult of Santiago in Frankish writings, recitations of the Charlemagne epic, and Eulogius' visit to and return from Pamplona.[26] With these configurations of the exogenous context of ninth-century Córdoba firmly in mind, we now examine the indigenous context—that of Islamic Spain.

According to the 'standard historiographical tradition' the population of Islamic Spain comprised Slavs (slaves and soldiers), Jews, Christians, two groups of Arabs (northern or Syrian [Qays] and southern or Yemeni [Kalb]), two groups of Berbers (nomad and sedentary) and Spanish converts to Islam. Most students agree with that statement but disagree regarding the number of converts to Islam and the period of their conversion. Thus Arnold, relying upon Dozy, alleges "the converts to Islam . . . soon formed a . . . majority of the population of the country," Hitti affirms that *muwalladūn* were a majority of the population in several cities within a century after the conquest, while Spuler asserts "Islam did not come . . . to prevail as the religion of the majority; . . . the great mass of the subject people remained loyal to the Christian faith."[27] Amid such scholarly disagreement, resulting from insufficient evidence to permit definitive conclusions, Cutler's basing of a major thesis upon the first position is extremely hazardous.[28] It seems safe to affirm that the number of converts to Islam increased with the passage of time, while conversions from Islam were inhibited

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[26] Sackur noted four surviving manuscripts of the Pseudo-Methodius from the eighth century and two from the tenth (pp 57-58), Morales knew two tenth-century manuscripts of the Leyre Life apart from the manuscript of Eulogius' works (Ambrosii Moralis, *Scholia ad omnia sancti Eulogii opera*, part V, "Scholia in Librum Apologeticum," *PL*, CXV, 909) The cult of Santiago is mentioned before 859 in the martyrologies of Florus of Lyons and Ado of Vienne (*PL*, CXXIII, 308-09) and in 875 in that of Usuard (*PL*, CXXIV, 295-96). Paul Albar recounted Eulogius' journey to Pamplona in *Vita Eulogii*, c 3 (*PL*, CXV 712-13); Colbert, pp. 181-92, treats the journey and its dating.

[27] Thomas W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (London, 1913, reprint Lahore, 1965), pp. 133-34; Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 7th ed. (London, 1961), p. 511; Bertold Spuler, *The Muslim World*, I, *The Age of the Caliphs* (tr F R. C. Bagley; Leiden, 1960), 102.

[28] Cutler, art., 322, n. 6 Although affirming that "it is impossible to understand the apocalyptic hopes of Eulogius and Alvarus without first understanding the socio-religious situation in mid-ninth-century Muslim Spain" (art., 322), Cutler finds three groups of Arabs (Kalbites, Qaysites and Syrians) and no Jews, believes the term *mawālī* applies to the ninth century and wrongly equates it with the later polemic term *renegados* and fails to distinguish between *musālima* and *muwalladūn* Then, asserting that persons "recently converted" to Islam "held the balance of power between the other Muslims. and the Christians in the Iberian Peninsula" he endeavors to depict Eulogius and Albar consciously creating a martyrs' "movement" to reconvert those recent converts who were "thoroughly disenchanted with Islam and were in a revolutionary state of mind" to produce the political revolution which would usher in the apocalyptic age (art., 322 f., 330). Uncertainty concerning the number of Christian converts to Islam is only one weakness in that series of hypotheses and assertions.

by the death penalty for apostasy, and it appears that conversions to Islam were more frequent in the first halves and less frequent in the last halves of the eighth and ninth centuries. The conquerors in accordance with Islamic law and custom granted their new subjects *dhimmī* (protected person) status, permitting them to retain their religious traditions and practices with some restrictions (for example, Christians could not use bells or make religious processions and paid regular but not burdensome taxes).[29]

Dislike for such second-class citizenship and for the demeaning and sometimes violent social and economic discrimination which accompanied it stimulated some to accept the dominant faith. Early converts to Islam became *mawālī* (clients of an Arab tribe) but apparently that requirement disappeared with the weakening of the Arab tribal structure during the latter part of the eighth century. Converts (*musālima*, those who submit) sometimes received and enjoyed high positions but also experienced social discrimination. Their children, and children of Muslim fathers and Christian mothers, were to be raised as Muslims and were called *muwalladūn* (those born and raised as Muslims). Some conversions which proved hasty and insincere and some children who, in Dozy's phrase, "suffered for the fault of an ancestor," constituted a group of "secret Christians."[30] Members of each group might therefore feel disaffected toward the dominant Arab minority. But again there is no conclusive evidence for determination of their numbers and the extent of their disaffection.

Increasing Islamic cultural activity and the growing attraction of Arabic civilization encouraged conversions to Islam in Spain. Islamic cultural activity focused upon law or jurisprudence, apart from which the religious sciences were only in their infancy in Islamic Spain. The *fuqahā'* (scholar-jurists) sought to insure that the Islamic community (*umma*) founded on a revealed law (*sharī'a*) would remain entirely faithful to that law, which thereby became also a revealed way of life. During the ninth century main trends of thought on legal matters hardened into schools, one of which, the Malikite, was introduced into Islamic Spain about 800 in the form of a book of questions and answers on points of law. This codification was useful for practical purposes, and theoretical discussion of law was discouraged. Indeed the Malikites opposed the introduction of new ideas and the study of traditions, regarded attempts to analyze their dogma as heresy and be-

[29] Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire*, I, 32-33, gives a Spanish treaty between Christians and Muslims; for a general treatment of the conditions of Christians under Islamic rule, see Arthur S Tritton, *The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects* (London, 1930). Colbert, pp. 25-28, cautions against the too ready assumptions of uniformity of relations within Islamic Spain and of conditions in Islamic Spain with those of eastern Islamic lands.

[30] The Arabic terms are clearly distinguished in works on Islamic Spain; see for example Watt and Cachia, pp. 14-15, 25-26.

lieved rigid dogmatic unity was essential for the preservation of the emirate of Córdoba.[31] They firmly opposed Christians, particularly those who questioned Islam.

At the same time Muslim spiritual zealots, the Sufis, apparently were entering Spain in significant numbers, increasing the popularity of Islamic asceticism. Such heightened Muslim zeal and religious consciousness provoked reaction against the luxurious court of ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān II (822-52), especially among *musālima*, who also figured prominently in a revolt against his predecessor in 817. His deposition of the *qāḍī* Muḥammad b. Ziyād in 848 for failure to order the execution of a Muslim who blasphemed in a moment of anger, and the rapid turnover of qadis during his emirate (ten in thirty years, compared to five, two for second terms, during Muḥammad I's thirty-four-year reign) indicate the growing influence of the Malikite spokesman Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā and a concomitant hardening of the emir's attitude in favor of more rigorous application of the law. The new *qāḍī*, Saᶜīd b. Sulaymān, who held office 848-54 and thus dealt with most of the martyrs, cautiously referred the case of Isaac to the emir for final judgment, but learning from the two examples made subsequent decisions himself.[32] If slanderers of Muḥammad and apostates from Islam received less than the full legal penalties prior to Saᶜīd's qadiship, it may be that unexpectedly rigorous law enforcement helped to account for the great number (28) of martyrdoms during the last (16) months of ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān's emirate.

Ibn Ḥayyān depicts that emir as surrounding himself with men proficient in language, poetry, philosophy and science, thus fostering a literary and intellectual reinvigoration if not a renaissance of Arabic cultural activity.[33] Its appeal is apparent from Paul Albar's famous lament:

> Do not all the Christian youths, handsome in appearance, fluent of tongue, conspicuous in their dress and action, distinguished for their knowledge of Gentile lore, highly regarded for their ability to speak Arabic, do they not all eagerly use the volumes of the Chaldeans, read them with the greatest interest, discuss them ardently, and, collecting them with great trouble, make them known with every praise of their tongue, the while they are ignorant of the beauty of the Church and look with disgust upon the Church's rivers of paradise as something vile. Alas! Christians do not know their own law, and Latins do not use their own tongue, so that in all the college of Christ there will hardly be found one man in a

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[31] The distinction between Islamic (religious) and Arabic (belles-lettres) cultural activity and a brief treatment of the Malikites are given in *ibid.*, chapter 5

[32] al-Khushanī, tr. Ribera, 97-191, esp. 127 ff.

[33] Ibn Ḥayyān, cited in Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire*, I, 195, 269-76.

> thousand who can send correct letters of greeting to a brother. And a manifold crowd without number will be found who give out learnedly long sentences of Chaldean rhetoric. [34]

In addition to the tangible benefits Christian leaders might perceive in a policy of accommodation to rather than antagonism against the dominant culture and its bearers, the use of Christians in various positions in the Islamic government offered opportunity for upward socio-economic mobility to those Christians who learned Arabic and the Arabic culture well. Possibly the increasing use of Arabic among Christians necessitated translation of the Bible into Arabic during the ninth century. [35] Certainly knowledge of Greek disappeared and understanding of clerical discipline and dress diminished among Spanish Christians during the ninth-century—Leovigildus laments the former and seeks to correct the latter condition. [36] And the Council of Córdoba in 839, in addition to condemning a heresy, repeated Pope Adrian I's condemnation (785) of the marriage of Spanish Christians with "infidels." [37]

Assimilation was also apparent in church-state relations. Under the Visigoths those relations were extremely close, as church councils made important decisions regarding the life of state and people. Kings could appoint and depose clergy, set the agenda of councils and by giving formal approval to their decisions give them the status of civil law. [38] The Muslims permitted freedom of communication and meeting among churchmen and retained Visigothic diocesan organization and conciliar procedure; thus the Muslim ruler sent a representative to and could demand and prevent the convocation of councils, which no longer influenced state decisions. Apparently the church retained some authority over Christians through the *dhimmī* and *millet* systems (which required leaders of the religious community to regulate that community according to its own laws and to be responsible for the community's behavior to the Islamic government), but the Muslims sought men for high church offices who were friendly to the Muslims and would reduce or not aggravate Christian-Muslim tensions. Thus opponents of Elipandus, archbishop of Toledo, accused him of being a tool of the emir, while Eulogius' inability to occupy the see of Toledo following his unanimous

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[34] Albar, *Indiculus Luminosus* (hereafter *IL*), *PL*, CXXI, 555-56; tr. Colbert, p 301

[35] The thirteenth-century *Primera Crónica General* gives the date 724 and is followed by Henry S Gehman, "The Arabic Bible in Spain," *Speculum*, I (1926), 220. The date certainly seems too early, and Cutler proposes (diss., p. 24) a confusion with the ninth-century bishop John of Seville.

[36] Leovigildus, *De habitu clericorum*, ed. Luciano Serrano, *Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia*, LIV (1909), 518.

[37] Adrian's letter in *MGH, Epistolae merovingici et karolini aevi*, I, 636-43; Acts of the Council in *España Sagrada*, XV, Introduction

[38] *Ibid.*, see also note 12, above.

election perhaps resulted from direct governmental intervention provoked by his own activity and Toledo's rebellion.[39] Samson, abbot of Pinna Mellaria, writing after the martyrdoms depicts such pliant churchmen. One, Hostegesis (whom Samson punningly calls *hostis Jesu*, Jesus' enemy), whose father and uncle had converted to Islam (the father to avoid punishment for defrauding Christian poor and the uncle because of deposition from the see of Granada "for his evil deeds") became bishop of Malaga at age 19 through simony. By extorting money from Christians he accumulated a fortune which he used to frequent the court at Córdoba. His cousin's husband Servandus became count of Córdoba and persecuted the Christians by taxation, driving them into Islam to avoid payment of the public head tax (which he collected), making basilicas pay tribute to the Islamic government and placing unworthy priests in them. The two endeavored to show Samson a heretic, and his *Apologeticus* defends his true faith and attacks them for heresy, discussing such matters as anthropomorphism, the place of Christ in the Trinity, and the relation of the two natures in Christ.[40]

This cultural erosion, further attested by the appeal of Judaism and heterodoxy for Christians and aggravated by the restrictions the more rigorously enforced Islamic law placed upon activity alarmed Eulogius and Albar. The former was a priest, the latter apparently a layman; both were well educated in Latin culture and zealous Christians. They opposed those Christians (whom later Spanish Christians called *musta*^{c}*-ribūn* or *mozarabes,* almost Arabs) who sought and achieved accommodation and assimilation with Muslims. Although theirs was apparently the minority position, rather than confining themselves to mere negativism they constructed a positive program designed to uphold the values and demonstrate the superiority of Latin-Christian culture to their fellow Christians. Eulogius furthered one portion of the program, the attempt to revive, stimulate and enhance the study and pursuit of Latin literature. Many students, overly impressed by Albar's lament, argue that Latin literature had almost disappeared in Islamic Spain; Colbert clearly demonstrates that was not the case.[41] But Eulogius' travels in northern Spain (848 or 850) and his return with such manuscripts as Vergil's *Aeneid* and Augustine's *De civitate dei* suggest there was a shortage of manuscripts in Córdoba, a situation which may be partly explained by Christian opinions which regarded non-Christian literature superfluous, and also partly by migration of manuscript-bearing clerical and noble refugees from the Islamic conquest who took

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[39] Beatus and Eterius, "Letter to Elipandus" in *PL*, XCVI, 895, make the accusation. On Eulogius' election to the see of Toledo, Albar, *Vita Eulogii, loc cit.*

[40] Samson, *Apologeticus, España Sagrada*, XI, book II, Preface, sections 2-4, 9. Colbert, chapter XV, discusses the work.

[41] Colbert, *passim*, especially Conclusion.

literary works with them to Francia, England and elsewhere.[42] But Eulogius apparently did his work well; Cagigas alleges he had more than 300 codices and volumes in his library. And Albar wrote:

> He was . . . a most accomplished writer and author. Who with a whole river of talent could tell the flame of his genius, the beauty of his speech, the glory of his learning . . . ? What volumes were unknown to Him? What writings could be hidden from him, whether of Catholics, of philosophers, of heretics, or of the heathen? Where were the books of metred poetry, or prose, or history which escaped his study? Where were the verses whose music he did not know? Where were the hymns, or the books from other lands which his fair eye had not perused? . . . Never wishing to know anything merely for himself, he offered everything to us.[43]

Again allowing for the evident exaggeration, it is clear that Eulogius endeavored to obtain and transmit learning, Christian and classical rather than Arabic. He and Albar received from the abbot Speraindeo education which enabled them to read and write Latin with some facility and to study the Bible and the Fathers. While Albar saw language and rhetoric as a means for communicating religious truth, and hence wrote a clear and direct Latin, Eulogius and Samson wrote in an ornate and involved style which Cagigas likens to Gongorism. Eulogius also was a teacher, and several of his students were among the martyrs. But if, as Sage believes, Latin was a dead language and "to write Latin at all was to write for the educated" it would appear that Christian education only created an intellectual elite. But this point, complicated by the lack of early documents in a Romance vernacular, is disputed among the language experts.[44]

Another aspect of their program, conducted primarily by Albar, was an attack upon heresy, understood in the loose sense of belief systems other than Christianity.[45] In 839 a church council met at Córdoba to condemn the heresy of the Acephali or Cassiani, which apparently concerned matters of church discipline and practice rather than doctrine.

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[42] The manuscripts Eulogius brought are listed in Albar, *Vita Eulogii, loc cit.* Albar's letters to John of Seville (*PL*, CXXI, 411-61) indicate Córdoban Christians shared the attitudes of their co-religionists elsewhere in Western Europe regarding the use of secular literature for sacred purposes rather than as an end in itself.

[43] Albar, *Vita Eulogii*, section 8, tr. Carleton M Sage, *Paul Albar of Córdoba: Studies on His Life and Writings* (Washington, 1943), pp. 198-99

[44] Sage, p. 54; Armand Abel, "Spain: Internal Division," in G. E. von Grunebaum, ed, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 207-30.

[45] Albar's letters, discussed here, are in *PL*, CXXI, 411-514. They are studied and re-edited, but not definitively, by José Madoz, *Epistolario de Alvaro de Córdoba* (Madrid, 1947); and examined more summarily by Colbert, chapter VII.

Soon after that Albar entered into an exchange of correspondence with Bodo, a Frankish deacon who converted to Judaism and came to Spain, where he took the name of Eleazar and apparently sought to incite the emirate against the Spanish Christians. In those letters, written during and after 840, Albar, starting from a conviction of Bodo's wrongness and seeking to demonstrate that wrongness, argued that Christ was the Messiah, quoting and interpreting scriptural and patristic passages to prove his own points and show inconsistencies in Bodo's position. He censured Bodo for intemperance, boasting, sacrilege and blasphemy against Jesus and Mary, and assailed the Jew with a variety of taunts and epithets. Colbert concludes that Albar could scarcely hope to convince Bodo to return to Christianity, but that the correspondence was probably preserved because it treated a matter of importance for Christians living in Islamic Spain. Albar also exchanged correspondence (completed by 851) with John of Seville (possibly related to or identical with John the bishop of Seville) and treated the question of the two natures in Christ using arguments from Beatus and Eterius' treatise against Elipandus along with other works (known only by Albar's reference) from the Adoptionist controversy. John's last letter (*PL*, CXXI, 460) concludes with a biographical note on Muḥammad containing information in the Leyre Life and two additional items—that Muḥammad occupied the mind of a camel and that his followers claimed miracles for him. Both accounts apparently differed from a life of Muḥammad composed by Eulogius and Albar's mentor Speraindeo and used by Eulogius in his *Memoriale Sanctorum* (I, 7; *PL*, CXV, 745-46). Existence of these accounts confirms Eulogius' statement that the "learned" (*peritissimi*) Christians of Córdoba were collecting polemical material against Islam.[46] Finally, in an exchange of letters, probably in 851, Albar delineates and Speraindeo refutes a heresy whose adherents, although they claimed to have received the Gospel, disbelieved the Trinity and Jesus' divinity, denied the words of the prophets, rejected the teachings of the doctors and misinterpreted Scripture. Speraindeo upheld the Trinity with an extensive verbatim citation of Pseudo-Vigilius' *De Trinitate* and treated the question of Jesus' divinity in a manner closely resembling that of the religious controversy of Jerusalem, causing Franke to think the heresy is Islam, and Colbert to affirm the errors were Islamic in origin but were held by Christians.[47]

A third feature of the Córdoban Christians' program was intensification of the spiritual quality of the Christian life through maintenance of Spanish Christian practices. Those practices related to the sacrament of penance illustrate that intensification. While baptism cleansed the soul of all previous sin and constituted a man in the new Christian life,

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[46] *Liber apologeticus martyrum*, section 13, *PL*, CXV, 858-59.
[47] Franke, 51-59; Colbert, pp. 160-63.

it could be received only once. Every Christian was expected to avoid grievous sin (that is, one which would prevent his entering heaven) after baptism. For those who did sin grievously

> the Church was willing to use its power of forgiveness once more in Penance, but only once more. Penance, as then administered, was a very rigorous discipline, meant to be both a severe punishment for a heinous offence, and a protection of the weak brother against any future repetition of his sin. Those . . . guilty of grievous sin were brought to the bishop who assigned them a time during which penitential exercises were to be performed . . . Sackcloth, ashes, and often tonsure were imposed at the beginning of the period; and during it the penitent was debarred from Communion, was placed in a special part of the Church, and had to leave with the catechumens. Prayers, almsgiving, and severe fasting, the wearing of a distinctive garb, continence, and inability to carry on business or social life were the most prominent elements of the discipline. When the assigned penance was completed, the bishop by another solemn ceremony reconciled the penitent to the Church and so restored him to Communion. But the reconciled penitent could not return to the ordinary laity; many obligations remained with him for life. He could neither marry nor be admitted to the clergy; public office was forbidden him, and he was to live like a monk in the world, until death. In part, these lifelong consequences were meant to protect him from any relapse into serious sin, for in Spain a relapse after having once received penance was regarded as an irremediable disaster, and the lapsed penitent could only resign himself to the mercy of God. [48]

Clearly the asceticism demanded of the penitent was not far removed from monastic discipline. Penitents were expected to change their residence and to live according to a discipline prescribed by their bishop. Many probably moved to the monasteries outside Córdoba and bound themselves further to the rule of an abbot or abbess; others probably followed a rule for life like Albar's *Confessio*. [49] Monastic life, which many Córdoban Christians entered, was also very ascetic. Some Christians may have turned to asceticism for added strength under Muslim pressures, and secret Christians required penance because of their feeling of guilt. Both groups may have believed that the Muslim stringency was a God-sent punishment for Christian sins, including their own. To an ascetic death was a final stage of asceticism, ending the temptations and afflictions of the world which had prompted his asceti-

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[48] Sage, pp. 104-05

[49] Colbert, pp. 213-14; Albar, *Confessio, PL*, CXXI, 397-412, thoroughly analyzed in Sage, pp 83-183.

cism and insuring that one could not commit grievous sin. And since by dying for truth one gained eternal life for one's soul, martyrdom could and did seem to many more desirable than natural death. [50]

(*To be continued*)

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[50] Attribution of untoward events to divine vengeance upon Christian sins was a commonplace biblical and patristic practice, and appears in the Córdoba literature (*Documentum martyriale,* section 18; *Liber apologeticus martyrum,* Preface, section 5) Death as the consummation of asceticism is remarked by Franke, 19-25, and Colbert, p. 213, and answers Cutler's question, "What then did they have in mind? They could not have been committing religious suicide for nothing!" Diss., p. 44, n. 22; cf. art., 329, n. 42

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF EGO *

Iqbal (1877-1938) occupies a unique position in the modern history of Muslim thought because he was the first one to make a serious attempt to reconstruct Islamic philosophy in the light of recent western thought. Iqbal's early training made him eminently suitable for his role. After obtaining (1899) the degree of Master of Philosophy under T. W. Arnold's care from the Punjab University in Lahore, Iqbal went to Europe in 1905 for advanced graduate studies in Britain and Germany. In London he studied at Lincoln's Inn in order to qualify at the Bar, and at Trinity College at Cambridge University he enrolled as an advanced student of philosophy in order to benefit from the lectures of the neo-Hegelian, Professor MacTaggart, and Professor James Ward. At Cambridge, Iqbal also cultivated friendships with two outstanding orientalists—E. G. Browne and Reynold A. Nicholson. Simultaneously, however, Iqbal submitted his doctoral dissertation, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, to Professor F. Hommel of Munich University, for which the German university awarded him *doctoris philosophiae gradum* in November, 1907.[1]

In 1908 Iqbal started his professional career in Lahore as an attorney, college professor and poet—all at once. At length, however, the true poet-philosopher won out at the expense of the professor and the attorney. Before 1905 the vehicle for his poetic composition had been Urdu, the Muslims' *lingua franca* in India, but in Europe Iqbal shifted to Persian. In addition to two prose works in English, Iqbal composed altogether nine poetical works, out of which six are in Persian, and the remaining three in Urdu.[2] Among these Persian works, *Asrar-i Khudi* together with its complimentary second part, *Ramuz-i Bekhudi*, is truly Iqbal's *magnum opus*. This *mathnavi* contained his innovated doctrine of *Khudi* (ego); all subsequent works of Iqbal supplemented and further refined this central concept.

Only five hundred copies of *Asrar-i Khudi* were first published by Iqbal in 1915, but they raised a storm of vilification against him. The *mathnavi* not only expounded the doctrine of *Khudi*, but was also an indictment of the *waḥdat al-wujūd* (unitarian monism) school of sufism, beginning with a criticism (in thirty-five verses) of Hafiz

* Presented at the American Oriental Society Annual Meeting, New Haven, Conn, on March 23, 1967.

[1] The dissertation was published in 1908 by Luzac and Company, London, and was dedicated to Professor T. W. Arnold Cf also, Muhammad Din Fauq, "Doctor Shaikh Sir Muhammad Iqbal: Mukhtaser Swanih Hayat," *Nayrang-i Khayal*, Iqbal number (Lahore: September-October, 1932), pp. 25-29

[2] The following are the poetical works of Iqbal and the years of their publications. 1) *Asrar-i Khudi* (Persian, 1915), 2) *Ramuz-i Bekhudi* (Persian, 1917); 3) *Payam-i Mashriq* (Persian, 1923); 4) *Bang-i Dara* (Urdu, 1924); 5) *Javid*

(1326-1389).[3] Some ill-informed critics charged that Iqbal was only a Muslim Nietzsche, propagating the worship of power.

Definition of Khudi

In Persian and Urdu literature the word *Khudi* has been used to mean vanity, arrogance and haughtiness.[4] For example, Iraqi in one of his Persian verses says:

اوّل اینست وآخرش دانی چیست
خود را زخودیٔ خود بپردافتن است

The beginning is this, do you know what's its end?
To achieve deliverance of the self from one's own conceit.

In a similar vein the famous Urdu poet Sauda says:[5]

ہائے پہنچا نہ گیا قید خودی سے اُس تک
اپنے ہی دام سے چھٹنا مجھے دشوار ہوا

Alas, I could not reach Him from the prison of my egotism
It has been difficult to be released from my own trap.

Nameh (Persian, 1932); 6) *Bāl-i Jibrīl* (Urdu, 1935); 7) *Pes Cheh Bayad Kard Ay Aqwam-i Sharq* (Persian, 1936); 8) *Dharb-i Kalim* (Urdu, 1936); 9) *Armaghan-i Hedjas* (Persian, posthumously published, 1938) Including their first editions, altogether 305,400 copies of these works had been published by 1959. Cf Faqir Sayyid Wahid-ud-Din, *Rusgar-i Faqir* (Karachi: Lme Art Press, 1966), I, 214-216 In addition to his doctoral dissertation, the other prose work is *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: 1930; subsequently a seventh chapter, "Is Religion Possible," was added and the new edition was published in 1934 in London).

[3] For instance, some of the verses warned of Hafiz:

Beware of Hafiz the drinker,
His cup is full of the poison of death
His garment of abstinence is mortgaged to the cup-bearer,
Wine is the remedy for the horror of the resurrection.

From the second edition of *Asrar-i Khudi*, Iqbal eliminated the Introduction as well as the thirty-five critical verses about Hafiz. "Criticism of Hafiz," stated Iqbal, "was not a personal criticism, but was aimed at a literary objective. In deference to the sensitivity of some friends, those verses have been eliminated and some new were substituted, containing a description of the criterion on which the literature of any nation should be judged." Cf. "Deybacheh Asrar-i Khudi Edition Dowem," in *Maqalat-i Iqbal*, ed., Sayyid ᶜAbdul Vahid Muᶜini (Lahore: Ashraf, 1963), p. 193.

The most noted individuals who continued their polemics against Iqbal included Hakim Firoz-ud-Din Tughrayyi, Malik Muḥammad Kashmiri, Dhauqi Shah, Akbar Allahabadi, Khawja Hasan Nizami, Pirzadeh Muzaffar-ud-Din Ahmad Faḍli. In refutation of *Asrar-i Khudi*, and in defense of Hafiz, Faḍli composed a *mathnavi, Rāz-i Bekhudi* and Tughrayyi composed *Lisan al-Ghaib*. They are now forgotten, and one can hardly find their copies. Cf. Ghulam Rasul Mehr, *Maṭalib Asrar-wa-Ramuz* (Lahore: Ghulam ᶜAlı & Sons, 1960), p. 26.

[4] Cf. the standard work of Steingass: (1) selfishness, (2) conceit, (3) egotism; see also *Nūr al-Lughāt: (1) ananiyat, khud prasti, (2) Khud gharzi, khud mukhtari*, (3) *gharur, nikhwat, takaber*.

[5] For many more examples of this kind, and Iqbal's attitude toward *wahdat al-wujūd* see an excellent study, Abu Sayeed Nur-ud-Dın, *Islami Tasawwuf Awr Iqbal* (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1959), pp. 267-270; also, Muḥammad Farman, *Iqbal Awr Tasawwuf* (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal, 1958); the central thesis of Farman's study is that Sufı tenets are derived from the Qurᵓān, and Iqbal never repudiated Sufism.

Recognizing this semantic difficulty, Iqbal stated that "the other words for the metaphysical fact of the 'I' are equally bad, e.g., *ana, shakhs, nafs,* and *ananiyat.*" He wanted a "color-less word" in order to express the concept of self or ego, "having no ethical significance." At last, "considering the requirements of verse," Iqbal adopted *Khudi* as the most appropriate term to denote the self. He stated:

> Thus metaphysically the word *Khudi* is used in the sense of that indescribable feeling of 'I', which forms the basis of the uniqueness of each individual. Metaphysically it does not convey any ethical significance for those who cannot get rid of its ethical significance... Ethically the word *Khudi* means (as used by me) self-reliance, self-respect, self-confidence, self-preservation, even self-assertation, when such a thing is necessary, in the interests of life and the power to stick to the cause of truth, justice, duty, even in the face of death.[6]

Dictating his views to Nazir Niyazi in 1937, Iqbal explicitly stated that the *Asrar-i Khudi* is based upon two principles: a) "That personality is the central fact of the universe; b) That personality, 'I-am' is the central fact in the constitution of man." The first principle, Iqbal believed, is described in the Old Testament "as the great 'I-am.' The Qur'ān, however, described the ultimate personality in much grander terms (S.59: 23, 24)."[7]

This concept of personality, Iqbal pointed out, is illuminated in the second chapter of the *Asrar-i Khudi*; for instance:

> The form of existence is an effect of the Self,
> Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the Self.
> . . .
> Its self-deceptions are the essence of Life;
> Like the rose, it lives by bathing itself in blood.
> For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred rose gardens,
> And makes a hundred lamentations in quest of a single melody.
> . . .
> When life gathers strength from the Self
> The river of life expands into an ocean.[8]

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[6] "Note on Nietzsche," in *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal,* ed., S.A. Vahid (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), p. 243.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 238; The Qur'ān says (S. 59 : 23):

> God is He, than Whom
> There is no other god;
> The Sovereign, the Holy One,
> The Source of peace (and perfection),
> The Guardian of faith,
> The Preserver of safety,
> The Exalted in might,
> The Irresistible, the Supreme.

The translation given is that of A. Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1938).

[8] Muhammad Iqbal, *Asrar-i Khudi* (Lahore: 1959), pp. 12-13; (tr.) Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Secrets of the Self* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960), pp 16-17.

The second principle of the "smaller or dependent 'I-am,' " Iqbal maintained,

> is variously described in the Qur'ān i.e., *ḍa'īf,* [weak] *jahūl,* [ignorant] *ẓalūm,* [unjust] yet it is also described as *aḥsan al-taqwīm,* the bearer of Divine trust . . . 'I' has the quality of growth as well as the quality of corruption, it has the power to expand by absorbing the elements of the universe of which it appears to be an insignificant part, it has also the power of absorbing the attributes of God (*takhallaqū bi-akhlāq Allāh*: create in yourself the attributes of God). The various stages of its spiritual expression are described in the *Asrar-i Khudi* as follows: 1) *Ita'at,* complete surrender to the Law; 2) *Zabt-i nafs,* self-control; 3) *niyabat-i Ilahya,* vicegerency of God [on earth]. [9]

In the tenth chapter of the *Asrar-i Khudi,* Iqbal maintained that the complete submission to the law is symbolized by the camel:

> Service and toil are the traits of the camel,
> Patience and perseverance are ways of the camel
> Noiselessly he steps along the sandy track
> He is the ship of those who voyage in the desert.
> . . .
> Thou, too, do not refuse the burden of duty:
> So wilt thou enjoy the best dwelling-place, which is with God.
> Endeavor to obey, O heedless one!
> Liberty is the fruit of compulsion. [10]

Regarding the significance of self-control, Iqbal says:

> He that does not command himself
> Becomes a receiver of commands from others
> . . .
> One to whom God is the soul in his body,
> His neck is not bowed before vanity
> Fear finds no way into his bosom,
> His heart is afraid of none but Allāh. [11]

Explaining the concept of divine vicegerency, Iqbal basically developed in his own way the Sufi doctrine of *insan-i kamil* (the perfect man), and did not present Nietzsche's *übermensch* (superman) as an ideal. Here are some of the qualities of the perfect man:

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[9] "Note on Nietzsche," *op. cit.*, p. 239. See also Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii; that Iqbal was stimulated and impressed by the provocative language and thoughts of Nietzsche is not denied. Iqbal has at times utilized Nietzsche's philosophic technique without adopting his ideas. The three stages of *Khudi's* development are very much reminiscent of Nietzsche's "Of the Three Metamorphoses," in which the spirit "becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child." Cf. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (Baltimore: 1961), pp. 54-56.

[10] Iqbal, *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. 45; Nicholson, *op. cit*, pp. 72-73.

[11] *Ibid*, pp. 75-76.

God's vicegerent is as the soul of the Universe,
His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name.

Then Iqbal longs for his arrival on the scene of the world.

Appear, O rider of Destiny!
Appear, O light of the dark realm of Change!
Illumine the scene of existence.
Dwell in the blackness of our eyes!
Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood,
Give us back the cup of the wine of love!
Bring once more days of peace to the world,
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle. [12]

God's vicegerent is obviously not Nietzsche's superman; however, when Iqbal says "Be as hard as the diamond" a superficial similarity develops. In the fourteenth chapter of the *Asrar-i Khudi*, Iqbal compares strong ego to the radiance of the diamond and then concludes:

Whosoever strives hard and grips tight,
The two worlds are illumined by him
. . .
In solidity consists the glory of Life;
Weakness is worthlessness and immaturity. [13]

Unlike Nietzsche's ideal, this is not a message of "callousness or pitilessness." To Iqbal "the diamond" represents "the integration of the elements of the ego so that it may be able to obstruct the forces of destruction in its means towards personal immortality." [14] (Iqbal, thus, emphatically claimed that "in its essence the *Asrar-i Khudi* and Nietzsche are diametrically opposed to each other.")

In the strengthening of ego, *ʿIshq* (love) is the determining factor in Iqbal's philosophic system. "Love means the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realize them." The opposite of love, to Iqbal is *sawal* (asking), and "all that is achieved without personal effort comes under *sawal*." Iqbal also defined love as "the power of assimilative action," and described 'asking' as a synonym for 'inaction.' Partaking in the creative functions of God [15] individual ego demonstrates the power of assimilative action.

Ego, according to Iqbal, remains creative in a state of perpetual tension. If the tension is not maintained, relaxation ensues, leading

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 83-84.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.
[14] "Note on Nietzsche," p. 244
[15] Citing the Qurʾān (S 23: 14) "Blessed is God, the best of those who create," Iqbal stated it indicated "the possibility of other creators than God" (Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. xviii), thus returning to a Qurʾanic argument dating from the classical Muʿtazilite-Ashʿarite controversy.

man to inactivity. Thus the state of tension "is the most valuable achievement of man, he should see that he does not revert to a state of relaxation. That which tends to maintain a state of tension tends to make us immortal... That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad." [16] Iqbal's conception of ego functioned as the frame of reference, enabling him to judge "art, religion and ethics." [17]

Criticism of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd*

In Islam, Iqbal criticized the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, which had been innovated by the Hispanic-Arab mystic Muḥyi'l-Dīn Ibn al-ᶜArabī (1165-1240). Although in his doctoral dissertation Iqbal had paid a glowing tribute to Ibn al-ᶜArabī, in his Introduction to the first edition of the *Asrar-i Khudi*, he repudiated him. [18] To Ibn al-ᶜArabī all "paths lead to one straight path (*al-Ṭarīq al-amam*), which leads to God." [19] The different religions were thus in his opinion identical. Following his views, Ibn al-ᶜArabī's Indic disciples during the sixteenth century had sought to reconcile the symbols of the *Vaishnavite* poetry and other devotional Hindu songs with Muslim beliefs. In 1566, Mīr ᶜAbdul Wahid Bilgrami wrote a treatise, *Haqaiq-i Hind* in which he endeavored to reconcile and integrate "more than fifty symbols of the Vaishnavites" and several other terms of devotional Hindu songs with Islamic beliefs.

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[16] *Ibid.*, pp. xxi.

[17] Consequently, Iqbal became a firm exponent of the theory of purposive art as against art for art's sake. Writing on this subject in 1916, Iqbal said: "the highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully... There should be no opium-eating in art. The dogma of art for the sake of art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power." Muḥammad Iqbal, "Our Prophet's criticism of contemporary Arabian Poetry," *The New Era* (1916), p. 251.

Twelve years later, in a foreword to the work of a young artist, Iqbal stated: "I look upon art as subservient to life and personality... The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive... The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or Changez." Cf. Dr. Sir Muḥammad Iqbal, "Foreword," *Muraqqa-i Chughtai: Diwan-i Ghalib* by Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Rahman Chughtai (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1928), pp. a-b.

[18] Muhammad Iqbal, "Daybacheh-i Asrar-Khudi" in Wahid-ud-Din, *op. cit*, II, 44-52; Muḥammad Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal, 1959), p. x.

[19] Ibn al-ᶜArabī tried to derive this doctrine from the Qur'anic verse: "For each one of you we have made a religion and a pathway" (S 5 : 52). Affifi, a competent authority on Ibn al-ᶜArabī, has stated that "monotheism and polytheism, together with other creeds, are, when interpreted in the light of his [Ibn al-ᶜArabī's] theory, nothing but one universal religion... And so, Ibnul Arabi does not reject polytheism, provided that the worshippers of images and idols fully realise that there is a Reality behind the 'forms' of their gods, regarding the 'forms' as mere *majāli* (*theatres*) of *wujûh* (aspects) or manifestation of this reality." A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dín-Ibnul ᶜArabí* (Lahore: Ashraf, n.d.), pp. 148-149.

For example, Krishna (a Kshatriya hero gradually deified in the *Mahabharata),*[20] and other names symbolized for Bilgrami "[the] Prophet Muḥammad. *Gopis* (cow-herd Krishna's wives), sometimes symbolized angels, sometimes the human race... *Gobra* (cow-dung) symbolized the faults and follies of human beings... Braj of Gokul (a town near Mathura) sometimes symbolized *ᶜalam-i Nasut* (the human world), sometimes *ᶜalam-i Malkut* (the invisible world) and sometimes *ᶜalam-i Jabrut* (the highest world). Jumna and Ganga [rivers] some times indicated the Sea of *Waḥdat* (unity) and at the other occasion *maᶜrifat* (gnosis)..."[21] In order to meet the *waḥdat al-wujūd* brand of Islam half way, "the Hindus also wrote the *Allopanishad*" [*Allah Upanishad*].[22] The Mughal Emperor Akbar's (1556-1605) *Din-i Ilahi*[23] (*Religion of God,* promulgated in 1582), was designed to synthesize Islam with other Indic religions and creeds, and was the triumph of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in India. Iqbal believed that if this synthetic trend had been allowed to continue the distinctive culture of Indic Islam would have been assimilated into the dominant Hindu culture and would have completely disappeared from India. However, this potential synthesis of Hindu-Muslim cultures was shattered by the movement of Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi Mujadded Alf Thani[24] (born in 1564), who subscribed to, and further developed the theory of *waḥdat-al-shahūd* (unity of the Phenomenal), in order to refute the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd.* Finally, the Mughal Emperor,

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[20] Pusalker, a noted Hindu historian, has maintained that "evidence of the different stages in the progress of deification of Kṛṣna [Krishna] will be found in the *Mahabharata* itself. (*Mahabharata,* cr. ed., II, 35, 22-29). In contrast to the earliest portions which clearly bring out the human elements of Kṛsna and portray him as a human hero, he is represented as a semi-divine being in later portions; whereas the parts of the epic that came still later, regard Krṣna as the Supreme God." A. D. Pusalker, *Studies in The Epics and Puranas* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), p. 89.

[21] Mir ᶜAbdul Wahid Bilgrami, *Haqaiq-i Hind* (Aligarh Muslim University Ms. Ahsan Collection), f. 106; cf. also, Saiyad Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Agra: University Press, 1965), pp. 31-39.

[22] "The Hindus were willing to absorb the Muslims; they wrote the *Allopanishad* and went perilously near to making an *avatar* of the Emperor Akbar." Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *India Through the Ages* (Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar & Sons, 1928), pp. 15-16.

[23] For Akbar's and Abul Faḍl's (the high priest of the *Din-i Ilahi*) religious innovations, see ᶜAbdul Qadir Badauni, *Muntakhab al-Tawārīkh* (Calcutta: College Press, 1868), Vols. I, II; cf. also, Vincent Arthur Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mughal* (Oxford University Press, 1917), pp. 160-170.

[24] For the Mujadded's views on the synthetic *Din-i-Ilahi,* and his doctrine of *waḥdat al-shahūd,* see his Persian letters to leaders and officers in the administration of Emperor Jahangīr (1605-1628) Mujadded Alf Thani, *Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani* (Lucknow: Nawal Kashore Press, n.d.), III vols; contain 313 letters; also, Sayyid Imam ᶜAli Shah, *Maktubat-i Qutab-i Rabbani,* ed., Muḥammad Faḍl Naᶜim (Lahore: n.d); Muḥammad Manzur Nuᶜmani, *Tadhkira-i Imam-i Rabbani Mujadded Alf Thani* (Lucknow: 1960), II edition; *Al-Furqān: Mujadded Alf Thani Number* (Lucknow: 1357 A.H./1938), Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1940).

Aurangzeb ᶜAlamgir (d.1707) struck the *coup de grace* which stopped the endeavors toward synthesis.

Since Muslims were outnumbered four to one in India, Iqbal came to believe that the pantheism of Ibn al-ᶜArabī would dissolve their "collective *Khudi*" in the Hindu cultural milieu. *Khudi* (or self-preservation) became the frame of reference for Iqbal's analysis of Indian history. Political forces or persons were virtuous insofar as they strengthened the collective Muslim *Khudi*. Hence Iqbal's lack of appreciation for Emperor Akbar's *Din-i Ilahi*, and its concomittant cultural syncretism, and his approbation of Shaykh Ahmad Mujadded Alf Thani, who spent his life combating the legacy of the *Din-i Ilahi*. Extolling the virtues of the Mujadded, Iqbal says in *Bal-i Jibril*:

> I stood by the Reformer's tomb: that dust
> Whence here below an orient splendour breaks,
> Dust whose least speck stars hang their heads,
> Dust shrouding that high knower of things unknown
> Who to Jahangir would not bend his neck,
> Whose ardent breath fans every free heart's ardour,
> Whom Allah sent in season to keep watch
> In India on the treasure-house of Islam.[25]

By the same token Aurangzeb was considered to have reinforced the collective Muslim ego, because in Iqbal's judgment he understood the reality of the ideological and cultural as well as the ecological struggle in India. Discussing in *Ramuz-i Bekhudi* (the mysteries of selflessness) the personal fulfillment of the individual in society, Iqbal described Aurangzeb ᶜAlamgir as:

> Shah Alamgir, the high and mighty king,
> Pride and renown of Gurgan Timur's [Tamerlane] line,
> In whom Islam attained a loftier fame
> And wider honour graced the Prophet's Law,
> He the last arrow to our quiver left
> In the affray of Faith with Unbelief;
> When that the impious seed of heresy,
> By Akbar nourished, sprang and sprouted fresh[26]
> In Dara's soul, the candle of the heart
> Was dimmed in every breast, no more secure
> Against corruption our Community
> Continued; then God chose from India
> That humble-minded warrior, Alamgir,
> Religion to revive, faith to renew.

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[25] Iqbal, *Bal-i Jibril* (Lahore: 1946), pp. 211-2; V. G Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal* (London: John Murray, 1955), p. 58.

[26] This refers to Dara Shikoh (1615-59), a great-grandson of Akbar, and Aurangzeb's elder brother. In the war of succession Dara was defeated by Aurangzeb.

The lightning of his sword set all ablaze
The harvest of impiety; faith's torch
Once more its radiance o'er our counsels shed.
. . .
He was a moth that ever beat its wings
About the candle-flame of Unity,
An Abraham in India's idol-house. [27]

In the light of the doctrine of *Khudi*, Iqbal's interpretation of Indian history led him to develop the two-nation theory, which was officially adopted by the All-India Muslim League in 1940. Iqbal attributed the development of Indic Muslims as a nation largely to the endeavors of Aurangzeb.

"The political genius of Aurangzeb was extremely comprehensive," wrote Iqbal in his private note-book, which he had started writing in 1910. He continued:

> His [Aurangzeb's] one aim of life was, as it were, to subsume the various communities of this country under the notion of one universal empire... Ignoring the factor of time in the political evolution of his contemplated empire he started an endless struggle [ref. to his fifty years' wars against the Sikhs, Rajputs, and Marathas] in the hope that he would be able to unify the discordant political units of India in his own life-time. He failed to Islamise (not in the religious sense) India just as Alexander had failed to Hellenise Asia... The history of the preceding Muslim dynasties had taught Aurangzeb that the strength of Islam in India did not depend, as his great ancestor Akbar had thought, so much on the goodwill of the people of this land as on the strength of the ruling race. With all his keen political perception, however, he could not undo the doings of his forefathers. Sevajee [Shivaji, the Maratha leader] was not the product of Aurangzeb's reign; the Maharatta owed his existence to social and political forces called into being by the policy of Akbar. Aurangzeb's political perception, though true, was too late. Yet considering the significance of this perception he must be looked upon as the founder of Musalman [Muslim] nationality in India. I am sure posterity will one day recognize the truth of what I say. [28]

Iqbal was not a professional historian and he never did claim to be one. However, he was a maker of history. In view of this, it is not without significance that most Muslim scholars and historians have

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[27] A. J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of Selflessness* (London: John Murray, 1953), p. 17

[28] *Stray Reflections*, Ed., Javid Iqbal (Lahore: Ghulam ᶜAli & Sons, 1961), p 44-46

accepted his interpretation of the Muslim period of Indian history as valid. This also vividly demonstrates the abiding influence of Iqbal's philosophic concepts in the evolution of Indic Muslim historiography.[29]

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[29] For Iqbal's political philosophy see also, Hafeez Malik (Ed.), *Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

AL-USTĀDH AL-ḤADDĀD

(A Review Article)

Durūs Qurʾāniyya, Vol. I, *al-Injīl fī ʾl-Qurʾān* (422 pp.); II, *al-Qurʾān wa ʾl-Kitāb*: Book 1, *Biʾat al-Qurʾān al-Kitābiyya* (280 pp.); Book 2, *Aṭwār al-Daʿwa al-Qurʾāniyya* (pp. 281-1074); IV, *Naẓm al-Qurʾān wa ʾl-Kitāb*: Book 1, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* (202 pp.).[1] By "al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād.[2] (Published in Lebanon, but no information about publisher or date of publication is given for any of the above.)

Recent Arabic publications include many books on the Muslim-Christian encounter, most of them by Muslim authors,[3] with a very limited number of Christians.[4] But in either case, the books evidence little real understanding of, or sympathy for, the other side. Thus this series comes as a refreshing exception.

"al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād" is a Near Eastern Christian who, despite that fact, is thoroughly at home within the world of Islamic scholarship. He has mastered the Qurʾān, not only its text, but also its origins and historical development, and the terms used in Islamic sciences about it—usually quite unknown to men of his faith.[5] In development of his thesis he makes extensive use of the chronological sequence in which the Qurʾanic suras were revealed.[6] The whole range of Muslim exegetical works is included in quotations, from the standard books of the past[7] to those by modern writers.[8] Even stronger evidence for

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[1] Projected additions to the series are: Vol. II, Book 3, *al-ʿAqīda wa ʾl-Sharīʿa wa ʾl-Ṣūfiya fī ʾl-Qurʾān*; Vol. III, *Mā Bayna ʾl-Injīl wa ʾl-Qurʾān*; Vol. IV, Book 2, *Muʿjizāt al-Qurʾān.*

[2] The pen name is as anonymous as its translated counterpart might be, "Mr. Smith," and is used to ensure that a Christian name or ecclesiastical title will not prejudice the reader from the outset. [He is a Lebanese Catholic clergyman. Library of Congress card gives his name as Yūsuf Durrah al-Ḥaddād, 1915 — . Cf. also *M.W*, LIX, 2 (1969), 95, 98-105. Ed.]

[3] See back issues of *M.W.* as, for example, LIX, 3 (1969), 74 for review of the book by ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭīb; LVII, 4 (1967), 342, for the book by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Ibn al-Khaṭīb; and especially LV, 3 (1965), 237 f., where an annotated list is included

[4] The only modern writer to publish extensively in the field is Yassā Manṣūr, a Coptic Orthodox lay preacher of Alexandria, the U.A.R. His books deal with all the main issues of Muslim-Christian controversy; the more recent are answers to Muslim authors' attacks on Christianity. A Lebanese author named Muwaffaq Saʿīd has written a book entitled *Khaṭawāt li Inhāʾ al-Ṣirāʿ bayna ʾl-Masīḥiyīn wa ʾl-Muslimīn*, and more recently, *al-Buʿd al-Abʿad*. In his introduction to the former he claims to be a Muslim, writing to explain the Christian faith to his Muslim co-religionists; actually, the book shows he is convinced of the Christian message.

[5] As, for example, the question of whether the order of suras is *tawqīfī* or *tawfīqī*, II, Book 2, 285.

[6] See I, Part 3, for verses about the Christ, arranged chronologically; and II, Book 2, for the Qurʾān as a whole.

[7] Random examples are al-Baydāwī, I, 52; al-Zamakhsharī, pp. 44, 262; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, pp 229, 263; al-Jalālayn, p. 42, etc.

[8] *al-Manār*, II, Book 2, 570, and Darwaza, frequently in the same volume.

his immersion in the world of Islamic scholarship is the extent of other scholarly works quoted, in almost every area. [9]

Perhaps more important, on the whole, is the author's willingness to accept the Qurʾān as a valid basis for scholarly research by a Christian. It is true that he reaches conclusions favorable to his point of view as a Christian, but one can hardly fault him for this when his way to them has been objective and sympathetic. It is no real contribution to inter-religious thinking to divest oneself of personal conviction. This is not to say that his work will therefore be acceptable to a Muslim, [10] nor even to many Western scholars. But no one can deny that this is at least a long step in the right direction, and that it can only help to lead out of the morass of mutual recrimination by which writing in this field is usually characterized. [11]

Certain weakness should be noted. The author seems to have been limited, in his use of Western orientalists, to those writing in French, [12] or to works in German and English which have been translated into Arabic. [13] At the same time this may actually enhance the value of the series, in its unique function as a purely Near Eastern approach to the subject. Outright mistakes are quite rare—ᶜUzayr is written as ᶜAzīz (or ᶜUzayyiz, depending on the vowelling), at two different places, [14] and one wonders why names for suras are usually given without the article, but only occasionally also, with it, [15] as is the more generally accepted form.

The author is perhaps overselective in the Muslim texts quoted, as in his constant dependence on al-Suyūṭī's *Itqān* [16] He is frank to

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[9] The *Sīra* of Ibn Hishām, II. Book 2, 278; the *Itqān* and *Asbāb al-Nuzūl* by al-Suyūṭī, frequently; Sayyid Quṭb, *al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fī 'l-Qurʾān*, II, Book 2, 397; ᶜAbd al-Razzāq Nawfal, *al-Qurʾān wa 'l-ᶜIlm al-Ḥadīth*, p. 556; M. Ahmad Khalafalla, *al-Fann al-Qaṣaṣī fī 'l-Qurʾān*, p. 559; al-Bāqillānī, *Iᶜjāz al-Qurʾān*, frequently in IV; Ahmad Amīn, *Fajr al-Islām*, II, Book 2, 639; al-ᶜAqqād, *ᶜAbqarīyat Muḥammad*, I, 418, etc.

[10] The author most frequently answered by ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭīb (*M.W.*, LIX, 1 [1969], 74), is al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād; he also seems to resent the anonymity.

[11] See the two answers by Muslim writers to a book by a Coptic priest—Mustafā Ḥasan al-Bikrī (*M.W.*, LVIII, 1 [1968], 74), and ᶜAbd al-Laṭīf Ibn al-Khaṭīb, (*M.W.*, LVII, 4 [1967], 342). None of the three books is noted for its graciousness or understanding of the other side!

[12] Random examples of French books quoted: Tor Andrae, *Les Origines de l'Islam et le Christianisme*, II, Book 2, 653; Blachère and others, p. 290. The Bibliography given in Vol. I, p. *m*, lists non-Arabic texts only in French.

[13] After mentioning Goldziher, he adds, "according to the translation of the Azharite scholars," II, Book 2, 399, Note 1; and IV, 58 This may be only to validate use of the quotation for Muslim readers, but probably has wider implications about the author's ability in German.

[14] S. 9 (*al-Tawba*): 30, discussed at I, 303, 306.

[15] In the introduction to Vol. I, p. *s*, *al-ᶜAnkabūt*, but p.ᶜ, *ᶜAnkabūt*; on 3, *Baqara*, *Nisāʾ*, etc., but 15, *al-Ḥajj*.

[16] In discussion of four suras about which there is difference of opinion, the author comments: "We are inclined, with al-Bayḍāwī and al-Zamakhsharī, to the opinion that they are Meccan, in contrast to al-Suyūṭī, whom we usually follow," II, Book 2, 624.

acknowledge this indebtedness in much of Vol. IV, which is a summary of the *Itqān* chapters on the miraculous style of the Qurʾān,[17] but reference to the book occurs regularly in the other volumes, both for quotations from al-Suyūṭī himself, and for other authors quoted by him.[18] Credit is usually given for these, in footnotes to the *Itqān*[19]—the degree of accuracy at this point seems to be consistently high—and the author is aware that the *Itqān* is a compendium, "a summary of all who had gone before him."[20] He is not as alert to the fact that passages given as al-Suyūṭī's own may also be dependent on other sources.[21] He also returns constantly to books by Darwaza, a more recent Muslim commentator of Palestine, now living in Syria.[22]

The frequent use of the latter author illustrates a tendency which though less pronounced in al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād's work than with others of his faith writing about Islam, is still discernible—a selective use of those comments from within Muslim exegesis which are favorable to his analysis of the Qurʾān. Besides the extensive use of Darwaza, because of his willingness to examine Islamic history and documents with a measure of creativity, the author depends heavily upon the analyses of al-Rāzī at key points—as, for example, the Crucifixion[23] and the Trinity.[24] Variant readings in the Qurʾān sympathetic to the author's Christian position are frequently used as evidence that the Qurʾān can at least potentially bear that Christian interpretation.[25] However, these variants are always justified by reference to the Muslim traditions supporting them, so one cannot hastily criticize the author for his awareness of this area of Qurʾanic interpretation.[26]

Perhaps more offensive to the Muslim reader is the author's way of dealing with the Prophet Muḥammad. The pious invocation used by Muslims after his name never appears, and this symbolizes the author's general point of view—an emphasis upon the purely human elements,

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[17] See the introduction to Vol. IV.

[18] As, for example, al-Bāruzī and al-Bayhaqī, II, Book 2, 386; Ibn Abī ʾl-ʿIṣbaʿ, IV, 63, and frequently, for many authors, in the same volume.

[19] But not al-Zarkashī's *Burhān* quoted without footnote to the *Itqān*, from which the passages certainly came, at II, Book 2, 318, and IV, 113.

[20] IV, p. *j*.

[21] A long section, starting at IV, 50, is quoted from the *Itqān* without indication that most of the material there is taken from a book by Shams al-Dīn b. al-Ṣāʾigh, mentioned in the *Itqān*, II, 79. See also IV, 127ff, where material from al-Suyūṭī's chapter on abrogation is used, much of which is dependent on the *Burhān* of al-Zarkashī. Moreover, it is difficult to sort out what is quoted from the *Itqān* and what is additional comment by al-Ustādh al-Haddād; apparently the use of sources is almost as fluid as in the time of al-Suyūṭī! See the reviewer's thesis on the *Itqān*, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1968.

[22] The books quoted are *al-Qurʾān al-Majīd* and *Sīrat al-Rasūl*, II, Book 2, 287, etc.

[23] I, 254 ff

[24] I, 263; see also al-Zamakhsharī, quoted for the same purpose, at pp 262, 267, or al-Jalālayn, p. 283, etc.

[25] I, 196, for S 19 (*Maryam*): 18; 200, for S. 19 (*Maryam*): 34; 340, for S. 43 (*al-Zukhruf*): 61.

[26] I, 282.

in contrast to the exalted position to which the Prophet has been raised in later Islam. He justifies this approach at the conclusion of Vol. II by means of evidence from the Qur'ān,[27] and it may well be he is actually closer to the Prophet's own view of himself than the traditional outlook of Islam. One of the author's rare moments of impatience is in his analysis of the Prophet's 'illiteracy,'[28] but neither in this nor elsewhere is he insulting or even critical of anything in the Prophet's life, or in the Qur'ān generally. The conclusion of Vol. I is typical of his general approach—al-ʿAqqād is quoted with the highest praise for the Prophet, but then the Qur'ān's own exalted picture of the Christ is contrasted to it.[29] The same pattern appears in discussion of the Qur'ān itself—after a detailed and appreciative analysis of the Qur'ān's miraculous style, the author contrasts it with what he feels is the *iʿjāz* of Jesus, in both word and deed, that is, in the spirit of the Gospel rather than its literal style. Thus, though the Qur'ān is given full credit and praise for its leadership of the Arab people into monotheism, it is emphasized that the impact of its 'miracle' was reserved for those capable of using the Arabic language; by contrast, the 'spiritual miracle' of the Gospel is not in stylistic devices, and is therefore translatable, for use as a world faith.[30] Whether or not this will be acceptable to Muslims is doubtful, but it is at least more palatable an analysis than the condemnatory attitudes of most Christians.

Vol. I will be of most interest for Christian readers, because it analyzes the two key problems of Muslim-Christian relations, and presents the author's basic position about them—the relation between the Qur'ān and the "former Scriptures" (Part 1) and the nature of Jesus as seen in the Qur'ān (Part 3). Part 2, about the high position accorded to Mary in the Qur'ān, seems somewhat unfortunate; it reaches conclusions far beyond the evidence used to support them. Moreover, the Church's teaching about Mary at the time of Islam's inception caused enough misunderstanding that it hardly seems necessary to emphasize it further at this stage.

In Part 1, the author presents his major premise, developed in more detail in later volumes, that the Qur'ān, and Islam as conceived in it, were purposely related to the whole sequence of revelation before them. Quoting al-Ghazālī, he agrees that "Islam is the Judaism of Moses and the Christianity of Jesus together—the Divine guidance granted to them and to those before them, all of whom were God's

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[27] II, Book 2, 1008 ff.

[28] "It is time to put an end to the supposition passed on for many years, that the description of the Arab Prophet with *al-ummīya* meant that he was ignorant of reading and writing, not at all cultured..." II, Book 2, 410. See also 1058 ff. He takes the position that the term is derived from the word for 'the people,' and meant a Prophet from the people outside of those of the Scriptures.

[29] I, 41.

[30] IV, 102, 171.

revered messengers." [31] Though there is a distinct development within the Qur'ān in its attitude toward the "people of the Book," this never comes to the point of denying the essential relationship to their Scriptures.

> He who reads the Qur'ān in order of its revelation . . . will notice an evident development. The [religion of] Qur'anic monotheism was based entirely upon the [earlier] Scriptures; then at Medina it became, because of its legal decisions, a community, nationalistic faith, while still remaining, in its belief and call to the Oneness of God, related to its Scriptural bases. [32]

In the course of this discussion the author also deals rather severely with the troublesome matters of *naskh* and *taḥrīf*:

> Thus the abrogation of one religion by another, or of a book by another book, or a law by a law, as well as the abrogation by the Qur'ān of the Gospel and Tawrāt, is no more than an ill-intended, despicable, insulting innovation, without any basis whatsoever in the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān accepts the guidance of the Bible, its stories and legal precepts, guiding [men] in turn to and by them, without abrogating, refuting or denying them, or even being self-sufficient without them. The abrogation mentioned in the Qur'ān is limited to the verses of the Qur'ān, and does not extend beyond it to anything else at all.[33]

If there is any validity in the accusation that the "people of the Book" corrupted their Scriptures, it was directed toward a small group of Jews and limited to their changing of no more than a single verse or two—about the penalty for adultery by stoning, and perhaps a prophecy about the coming of another prophet. [34] But the author insists there is no justification for expanding this to imply that the Bible as a whole is not dependable.

Having established the basic continuity within which the Qur'ān is to be studied, the author proceeds in Part 3 to give a full exegesis of the verses dealing with the Christ or Christianity, taking them in the chronological sequence of revelation. Generally speaking, the accusations of Christian teachings are taken as directed against deviant groups of Christians, not against the mainstream of the faith. The most troublesome verses, accusing Christians of *kufr* [S. 5 (*al-Mā'ida*): 19, 75] were directed against the Jacobites; [35] that it is an isolated accusation is confirmed by nearby verses favorable to

[31] I, 13. The book quoted is *al-Taᶜaṣṣub wa 'l-Tasāmuḥ bayn al-Masīhīya wa 'l-Islam*
[32] I, 15; see also 35.
[33] I, 46; see also 64.
[34] I, 75.
[35] I, 283

Christianity— its error is no more than *ghuluww*, 'deviation' (5 : 80), there is an affirmation of Islam's deep affection for Christians (v. 85), and several verses give positive confirmation of the Bible's validity (vv. 47, 49-51, 71, etc.).

Vol. II develops this central theme further by examining (Book 1) the environment of Scriptural groups within which Islam developed, and (Book 2) the stages through which its view of these "people of the Book" passed. The latter is the fullest exposition, as it carefully outlines the verses revealed in successive chronological periods, summarizing their dominant characteristics. The first, until the emigration to Ethiopia, is called the "Christian period," the second, ending with the Prophet's personal mission to al-Ṭā'if, is the "Israelitish period," and the third, until the Hijra, is that of "the one community."

This is not meant to suggest that Muḥammad was Christian in the first, nor Jewish in the second, but only that the general characteristic of each period was toward the respective faith.[36] That is, the major influence upon him at the outset was Waraqa b. Nawfal, cousin of his first wife, Khadīja, whom the author establishes as a Christian who had translated the Gospel into Arabic.[37] In the following period the opposition from the Meccans had begun and it was the Old Testament prophet stories which were used to counteract it.

The time at Medina is divided into two periods, that of the "middle nation," meaning between the two opposing faiths (as in legal proscriptions),[38] and the "Islamic period," in which the independent Arab faith came into its own. Because the most intense opposition to the Prophet there was from Jewish tribes, the Qur'ān records severe antagonism toward them, but not because of their religion, or in a way which implied any break in the continuity of revelation. With the Christian faith there was no "civil" disobedience, and members of it were permitted to pay the *jizya* and remain part of the community. Rejection was limited to certain deviant teachings held by isolated Christian groups of the Arabian environment.[39] Thus the message of the Qur'ān was a nationalistic Arabic version of the same monotheism which had persisted through the other two faiths in the series, limited by its very nature to the time and people to which it came.[40]

Many may differ with the conclusions reached by al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād, but they can hardly question the validity of his research. His analysis of the revelatory sequence is well-supported by evidence of Muslim and Western analyses, and is given additional credibility in that he generally prefers the former.[41] He makes frequent use of Muslim

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[36] II, Book 2, 440
[37] *Ibid.*, 412 ff.
[38] *Ibid*, 853, 873.
[39] *Ibid*, 985.
[40] *Ibid.*, 4008 ff.

traditions about "occasions of revelation" in order to place different fragments of revelation in their proper chronological sequence. Some of his criteria, it must be admitted, are derived from his own idea of the development, as, for example, that feelings against "People of the Book" became prominent only in the later ministry.[42] On this basis he concludes that some verses within Meccan suras were added from a later, Medinan revelation, "whether on purpose or not [is uncertain], to make it seem that Muḥammad's religious independence from the people of the Book was from the first, at Mecca, when this is not so."[43] However, this kind of tendentious reasoning is rare; generally the criteria and evidence used are those upon which Muslims agree, the only difference being in what is selected for emphasis, and the conclusions reached.

Vol. IV deals in great detail with the stylistic elements upon which the Islamic claims about Qur'anic miraculousness are based. Even though most of the material is taken directly from the *Itqān*, it is at least to the author's credit that he has worked through it and mastered the infinitely complex analysis of Qur'anic style to which Islam came through centuries of intense focus upon the Holy Book, in research and devotion. Few Christians of the Near East have any awareness of them at all, even though Arabic is their native language. The author places considerable emphasis upon the element called the *mutashābih* in the Qur'ān, the passages which are obscure and are therefore known to God alone (in one interpretation of *Āl ʿImrān* 3 : 7), or also, esoterically, to those of profound insight (in the alternate exegesis of the verse).[44] This fact of obscure elements acknowledged to be present in the Qur'ān becomes a crucial factor in the author's later comparison between Qur'anic and Gospel "miraculousness."

The analysis has seemed perfectly objective until that point, when the book's Christian bias becomes apparent. That the Qur'anic miracle is based on elements of Arabic style emphasizes again the conclusion reached in Vol. II, Book 2, that the Qur'ān was not intended for any but the people of that language, and is not, like the Christian message, capable of translation for all the world.

> Thus there is in the teaching of the Christ and the miraculousness of his Gospel no development from one period to another, nor any wording which is not properly a part of its language, or inserted into it. It has no abrogated passages which may have been affected by some other part, which abrogates them as a whole, or in any of their parts; it has no division of verses

[41] "My personal inclination is stronger for the eastern, Islamic arrangement [of the suras] The owner of the house knows best what is in it," *Ibid.*, 314.
[42] *Ibid.*, 318
[43] I, 30.
[44] IV, 118 ff.

> into "self-evident and ambiguous ones," the latter casting suspicion on the former. It is a carefully developed presentation, a miraculousness harmonious in speech and exalted by the miraculous in action... The Qur'ān supports its claim to the miraculous in revelation, teaching and guidance [of mankind] by referring to the Book which went before: "And before it, the Book of Moses, a forerunner..." [45]

One further bit of evidence for the limited scope of Qur'anic inimitability is found in the chronological location of the verses referring to it. The author points out that the challenge by means of the Qur'ān's miracle of style was directed toward the pagans only, and that when the Prophet came into conflict with the Jews—and secondarily, the Christians—at Medina, he never used this particular stylistic argument. Rather, in addressing them, he made use of the relation to the former books as evidence for the validity of the new revelation. [46]

The author may be guilty at times of drawing his conclusions first, and then working through his evidence in such a way as to reach them. And yet the flaw is minor, compared to his generally sympathetic and thorough scholarly approach to the Qur'ān, within a framework of thinking and expression which is profoundly Islamic. It is hoped that readers—whether Muslim or Christian—will not be hasty to take offense at details which seem inadequate, and fail to take advantage of the progress al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād has made toward a more meaningful Muslim-Christian dialogue.

KENNETH E. NOLIN

[45] *Ibid.*, 201.
[46] *Ibid.*, 171.

BOOK REVIEWS

Alfarabi's Book of Religion and Related Texts. Arabic Texts, edited with introduction and notes by Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut Dar El-Machreq (Imprimerie Catholique), 1967. 135 pp.

Alfarabi's Book of Religion and Related Texts is one of the more worthwhile scholarly publications appearing in Arabic in recent years. Its editor, Muhsin Mahdi, is an acknowledged authority on Arabic literature and has a unique and refreshing understanding of Muslim philosophers. *

This book is not intended for the general public, nor for the beginner in the field of Arabic or Islamic studies, especially if Arabic is not his native tongue. As a critical edition, it rather addresses itself to the intellectual interested in Islam or Muslim philosophy.

The editor divides the book into two major sections: his own introduction (38 pages) and Alfarabi's texts themselves. The introduction considers the historicity of the texts, discussing the history and condition of the manuscripts. For example, in dealing with the authorship of one manuscript (Brilliant Questions and Comprehensive Answers), the editor questions whether it was written by Abū Nasr Alfarabi the philosopher or by his lesser known contemporary, Abū Nasr Alfarabi the man of letters. In the process, the latter's life and works are briefly presented. Such points of interest fill the introduction and lighten the editor's otherwise very technical style.

The introduction also explains how the editor arrived at his final form of Alfarabi's texts, which comprise the main body of the book. He attempted, and in our judgment succeeded, to merge into one single text different versions (often found in different libraries, indeed in different countries) through a painstaking process of evaluating, comparing, and consulting related material, for an entire decade.

The texts themselves will be of interest to the scholar whose concern is Alfarabi's writings, even aside from the question of the historicity of the manuscripts. They include: The Book of Religion; On Political Science, Jurisprudence, and Dialectical Theology; Chapters of the Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City; A Magnificent Invocation; and The Brilliant Questions and Comprehensive Answers. Each text is prefaced with an appropriate short introduction.

The book also contains a short English introduction and a selective bibliography most of which is in Arabic.

Since this book seems to be aimed not only at the Arabic intellectual community but equally at a much wider group of scholars for whom Arabic is not the first language, it would be of great benefit to have it translated. (Muhsin Mahdi's writing lends itself easily to translation into English.) Here, of course, it becomes subject to the risks and difficulties encountered in the area of transliteration and translation. Already the editor has encountered the translation problem in his

* See Mahdi, "Alfarabi," *History of Political Philosophy*, ed by Strauss and Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

short English introduction and most particularly in translating the titles of the various texts. Should the word *millah* indeed be translated 'religion'? Is *aẓim* better translated 'magnificent' (Mahdi) or 'solemn'?

Whatever the difficulties may be, we consider the book very worthwhile and look forward to seeing it translated.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation YOUSSEF EL-NAGGAR

The Arabic Language: Its Role in History. By Anwar G. Chejne. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969. pp. x plus 202. Bibliography and Index. Illustrated. $6.75.

The purpose of Professor Chejne in this book is to introduce the Arabic language and explain its role in history to the general reader. It is not intended to be a history of the language or a study of its grammar. But both its history and its grammar have been touched upon as a means of introducing it to the reader. The author's main concern, however, is to show how the Arabic language has been used as a medium of literary expression, as an instrument of religion and culture and as a mainstay of national consciousness and solidarity.

He has succeeded in presenting his purpose with clarity. In spite of long and mostly unnecessary passages on the political history of the Arabs, he managed to concentrate his attention on their cultural achievements and to scrutinize the role of Arabic in them. He is at his best when writing on the development of philological studies amongst the Arabs and particularly in the modern period since the beginning of the last century.

He studies the problems of the Arabic language in modern times under three headings:

a) The coining of technical scientific terminology
b) The reform of the Arabic script
c) The diglot opposition of Colloquial to Classical Arabic.

He concludes that Arabic has had a firm hold on the Arab people throughout history and that it continues today to be a living language of great aesthetic, religious, cultural and national significance.

The book has a few misprints which an attentive reader can spot. But I believe the author to be responsible for certain inconsistencies and discrepancies. On page 12, he uses Kūfite as an adjective of Kūfa and two lines earlier he uses Baṣrawī as an adjective of Baṣra only to use Baṣrite on page 41. Ibn Khaldūn is referred to as such all through the book, except in Chapter 6 where his name is given as Ibn Kaldūn. More serious are the discrepancies in the dates given for the death of some authors. Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is said to have died in 718 on page 7 and in 728 on page 62; Ibn Sīdah d. 1066 on pages 11 and 47, d. 1065 on page 44; al-Zamakhsharī d. 1143 on pages 45 and 80, d. 1147 on page 67; Ibn Rashīq d. 1030 on page 46, d. 1070 on page 67; al-Ṭabarī d. 922 and 934 on the same page 67; al-Kisā'ī d. 822 on page 43, d. 800 on page 221; al-Kindī d. 850 on page 72, d. c. 870 on page 67. The caliph al-Ma'mūn is said to have ruled 813-33 on page 69 and to have died in 830 on page 74.

On the other hand, the author makes the common mistake of calling

al-Jawharī's book *Ṣiḥāḥ* on page 45 instead of *Ṣaḥāḥ*; of calling the famous Traditionist al-Nisā'ī on page 67 instead of al-Nasā'ī; and of referring to 'union' as *wiḥdah* on page 108 instead of *waḥdah*. He also calls a 'royal decree' in Iraq *al-idārat al-malakiyyah* on page 157 instead of *al-irāda al-malakiyya*.

On page 118 he mentions Haykal (*sic*) among the writers of Palestine, meaning of course, Yūsuf Haykal and not Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal of Egypt mentioned earlier on pages 91 and 106; yet in the index the reference to the former is made under the latter indiscriminately.

These and other little mistakes mar the otherwise scholarly book and should be eliminated in a second edition. The author is to be commended for his documented footnotes and generous bibliography.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation. ISSA J. BOULLATA

The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517). By Robert Schwoebel. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968. pp. xiv plus 257. $ 12.95.

In his *The Shadow of the Crescent* (first published in the Netherlands by B. de Graaf, 1967), Professor Robert Schwoebel, of the Department of History, Temple University of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, who specializes in the history of Western Europe during the Renaissance-Reformation period, presents us with a first book (brief portions of which appeared earlier in two journals, *Studies in the Renaissance* and *History Today*) that is a creative example of the newer cross-cultural emphasis in Medieval and Renaissance Studies. This emphasis informs the work of Professor Schwoebel's distinguished teacher, Professor Kenneth M. Setton (then of the University of Pennsylvania, now of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), whose work on Crusade, Renaissance and Byzantine history has been an important influence on that of his student, as it also informs the work of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, the University of California at Los Angeles, which is under the brilliant direction of Professor Lynn White, Jr., and the Center's new journal, *Viator*.

The Preface of the Schwoebel book takes up the question of the similarities and differences between the Western European-Turkish confrontation of the fifteenth century and the East-West struggles of the present day. Thereafter, in eight substantial and enticingly titled chapters the author takes up the burden of his account. Chapter One, "The Scourge of God," focuses around the Western European reaction to the Turkish capture of Constantinople in 1453. Chapter Two, "The Enemy of the Cross," surveys papal-Turkish relations during the reigns of Nicholas V (died 1455) and Calixtus III (1455-1458). Chapter Three, "Perfidious Infidel," treats of the especially important and strongly anti-Turkish attitudes and activities of the humanist Pope Pius II (Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini). Chapter Four, "The Chivalric Ideal," tells the interesting story of Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy's (1419-1467) dealings with the Turks, part of

which form an important chapter in the history of the revival of chivalry during the Later Middle Ages (1300-1500). Chapter Five, "Chivalry in Action," chronicles the struggle waged by the military orders, e.g., the Society of Jesus and especially the Knights of Rhodes, against the Turks and the unsuccessful Turkish siege of Rhodes and invasion of southeastern Italy (Otranto) *circa* 1480. Chapter Six, "The New Barbarian," deals with the numerous anti-Turkish 'orations' written by the Italian humanists (the leading intellectuals of the day), e.g., by the Filelfos, Francesco, and his son Giovanni Mario, and by the Byzantine exile-intellectuals in Italy, e.g., Cardinal Bessarion and Janus Lascaris. Chapter Seven, "Travelers' Tales," presents a fine analysis of the salient features of the reports written by pilgrims to the Holy Land (who passed through territory on the periphery of the Ottoman conquest) plus a discussion of the achievement of the more adventurous German traveler, Arnold von Harff, who visited the Turkish heartland itself (Istanbul in 1499). Chapter Eight, "The Turk as a Turk," in some ways the most interesting and important section of the book, treats of the exceptional cases that prove the rule, the scattered examples of Western European admiration for Turkish administrative practices, criticism of the concept of the Crusade against the Turks, pleas for a relative degree of toleration for the religious faith of the Turks and calls for peaceful and well-informed efforts toward the conversion of the Turks to the Christian faith (especially by John of Segovia, author of a lost Latin translation of the Qur'ān, and Nicholas of Cusa).

An intriguing suggestion that Professor Schwoebel makes several times throughout the work is that the serious Turkish threat to Western Europe in the fifteenth century helped delay the Protestant Reformation several decades by forcing the various Western European states to unite behind the pope, but that, by the same token, the failure of the papacy to liquidate the Turkish threat to Western Europe via a great all-conquering Crusade was a significant factor in the fatal decline of papal prestige toward the end of the fifteenth century which paved the way for the Protestant Reformation in the following century.

To sum up, Professor Schwoebel's book is a well-researched, carefully-written and copiously documented piece of work, whose facts are well-chosen, plausibly interpreted and beautifully integrated into a fascinating, readable and convincing narrative. *The Shadow of the Crescent* is a worthy addition to the growing list of substantial recent works on medieval and early modern Christian-Islamic relations, among the best of which are Norman Daniel's *Islam and the West* (1960, now followed up by his *Islam, Europe and Empire,* 1966 *), R. W. Southern's *Western Views of Islam during the Middle Ages* (1962) and James Kritzeck's *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (1964).

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* See the review in this issue.

Islam, Europe and Empire. By Norman Daniel. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966. pp. xvii plus 619.

In his *Islam, Europe and Empire* (distributed in North America by Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago), Dr. Daniel, of the British Council, Khartoum, Sudan, who is a medievalist by training, presents us with a powerful second book which brilliantly supplements his highly impressive earlier work, *Islam and the West, The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960, same North American distributor, still in print; cf. James Kritzeck's detailed analysis of the first Daniel book in his article "Moslem-Christian Understanding in Mediaeval Times," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* IV [1962], 388-401).* The two magnificent Daniel volumes are sufficient to establish the author's reputation as one of the world's leading authorities on the history of Christian-Islamic relations and are must reading for anyone interested in the rapidly developing field of cross-cultural studies.

In *Islam, Europe and Empire,* Daniel moves from the Middle Ages into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period of time much closer to our own. Thus, the subject matter of this work is far more controversial than that of his first volume. Yet, Daniel stops short of the twentieth century and thus avoids giving offense to men still living or to their fathers. In this second volume, Daniel has chosen to concentrate again on what Europeans *thought* about Islam, not what they did about it, and this has probably made it easier for him to attempt to achieve his professed aim, namely, to refrain from passing judgment and from supporting either side, a difficult if not impossible task at which no man can be completely successful. Also, in Part Three of the book, "Christian Civilization (1800-1900)," pages 245-369, which studies the concept of a Christian civilizing mission in India, Africa, Turkey and other areas, Daniel steers clear of the very thorny Palestine question, which even in the nineteenth century involved conflicting Ottoman, Western European (primarily British), Arab and Jewish interests.

The sources upon which the work are based are primarily written materials (printed books, manuscript letters, diaries, and dispatches), while the evidence of the visual arts had to be largely ignored (still, there are thirty-four quite apt illustrations) because it would have added little new to the written sources. These written sources, however, the flavor of which the reader is given by numerous quotations cited in the text, represent the views of educated laymen in or from England and France (Spain, Germany and Italy are not included); they do not represent the view of nineteenth-century Western European scholars who specialized in Islam nor the views of the largely uneducated or poorly educated lower classes (at times, of course, these two groups did influence nineteenth-century Western European imperialism as it affected Islamic lands, which is a major subject of the book). The second Daniel book is based almost exclusively on primary sources; secondary works and monographs by modern scholars who have studied the same or similar problems are not too frequently cited.

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* See also Kenneth Cragg's review in *M.W.*, LII, 1 (1962), 59-61. [Ed.]

Daniel holds that the basic Western European attitude toward Islam revolved around three poles—power, sex and religion—and assumed that Islam was a sexually corrupt tyranny based on false teaching (many contemporary scholars are also emphasizing the sexual factor in the history of relations between whites and blacks in the Western world since *circa* 1500). However, Daniel's view that this basic Western European attitude toward Islam, which crystallized in the eleventh century, remained largely unchanged into the twentieth century, may be a bit too hasty. Daniel also holds that Western European civilization did not overtake Islamic civilization until some time during the Ottoman period (certainly by the end of the eighteenth century when Ottoman weakness vis-à-vis the various Christian powers was readily apparent). However, an alternative view, based on the compelling researches of Professor Lynn White, Jr., Director, Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, the University of California at Los Angeles, would argue that Western European civilization overtook that of Islam (as well as that of Byzantium and the Christian East) during the period of the High Middle Ages (1000-1300), the Romanesque-Gothic period of medieval urbanization, the classic period of the Crusading movement, based on the technological revolution of the prior Carolingian-Ottonian period of the birth of Western Europe (700-1000).

Daniel holds that the most important factors which contributed to the improved image of Islam in Western Europe between 1700 and 1900 were the rise of Deism and Enlightenment ideas in the early eighteenth century, the French Revolution (with its liberal and democratic ideals) and Napoleon (who encouraged and exploited local nationalist movements) and the rise of Romanticism, but most important was the movement of men, soldiers and administrators, amateur and professional scientists, tourists, merchants, missionaries and technological experts. It is this movement of men and the improvement of Western attitudes toward Islam which it caused that is the primary concern of the second Daniel book.

Daniel is on firm ground when he suggests that European imperialism was an outflow of energy from a fantastically dynamic and expanding civilization which Africa and Asia were fated to have to absorb. He sees commercial and trade factors playing a major role in the beginning of imperial expansion into Islamic lands but being gradually supplemented by the much more interesting factor of paternalistic motives, the desire to do good for and to non-Europeans. Quite intriguing are Daniel's suggestions that European attitudes toward non-Muslim peoples (e.g., the Hindus of India) were significantly influenced by their attitudes toward Islam (since for many centuries the Muslims were the only non-Western Europeans known to the West and Islamic civilization at one time had exerted an important influence on the West) and that the contrast between French and British colonial policies toward Islamic civilization, the former tending to attempt to supplant Islam, the latter to leave it untouched, may reflect the contrast between the pristine medieval Crusading idea that "the only good Muslim was a dead Muslim," which prevailed in the Western European heartland (especially France) whence the Crusaders came, and the more experienced Crusading ideal

of the 'noble' or battling Muslim, which developed on the frontier out of the actual clash, both physical and spiritual, between Christian and Islamic civilization.

To sum up, Dr. Daniel's book is the fruit of half a decade or more of intensive research, is painstakingly written and heavily documented. Its facts are well-selected, suggestively interpreted and artistically integrated into a captivating, eminently readable and convincing account.

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Madkhal ilā 'l-Ḥiwār al-Islāmī al-Masīḥī By al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād. Jūnī (Lebanon): al-Matbaᶜa 'l-Būlusīya, 1969. 447 pp.*

This volume has been eagerly awaited by many who attended a Near East Council of Churches conference in the summer of 1966, where it appeared as a series of Lectures on "Bases for Muslim-Christian Dialogue." These have been expanded and changed slightly, with the twenty "bases" reduced to parenthetical subtitles for the successive chapters. The delay in publication is puzzling, and is perhaps due to the fact that the author's books have not been translated, and are therefore little known to western sources from which publication funds might have been obtained. As far as local support is concerned, it may well be that neither Muslims nor Christians were ready yet to sponsor the author's radically different approach to relations between the two faiths. For Christians, it is his frank acceptance of the Qurᵓān as scripture which is suspect; the Muslim, on the other hand, will be offended by his overwhelmingly 'Christian' interpretation of the Qurᵓān.

The same major premise is carried on from earlier books (See Review Article in this issue *M W.*, for a review of four in a series of "Qurᵓanic Studies"), that Islam and Christianity are in essential agreement, and that the Qurᵓān may therefore—no, even must—be interpreted as part of the total Scriptural heritage within which it came. The author makes ready use of Qurᵓanic passages referring to followers of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, etc., as 'Muslims,' and insists that Islam *has* been here all the time. The Qurᵓān came simply as the new Arabic form of the one continuing monotheistic faith, sent now to the Arabs who had previously been without a Scripture.

It must be admitted that the author bears down so heavily on Christian conclusions in his inter-scriptural studies that one tends to feel a bit overwhelmed—undoubtedly Muslims will also. One finds oneself asking, "Can the picture really be this neat and absolutely conclusive?!" The Qurᵓān is so thoroughly absorbed into its earlier counterparts that it comes to have little meaning or value in its own right. It came to the Prophet Muḥammad merely as an Arabic extension, a witness to, a confirmation or explanation of the 'Qurᵓān' already present before its

* For translation of a chapter from another book by the same author, see *M W.*, LIX (1969), 98-105.

coming. One looks in vain for values or insights which the Christian can gain, from his side of the dialogue, by a study of the Qurʾān and Islam.

And yet, as is so often true, the point of weakness is also the book's greatest strength. The author has demonstrated to his fellow-Christians that an acceptance of the Qurʾān can be accompanied by a profoundly Christian point of view. Those entering the dialogue—from either side—need not feel threatened by their admission that the other position is equally valid and meaningful.

Granted, this is a one-sided step toward dialogue; but at least it *is* a step. Certainly it awaits—even needs—the corrective balance of a similarly careful and courteous response from the side of Islam. But perhaps the attempt this time, despite its inadequacies, is radical enough that a helpful answer can be expected! After the dismal record of other Muslim-Christian exchanges, al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād's work is a breath of fresh air. And perhaps—or is it too much to hope?—it will open the windows of sympathy and understanding upon the stifling atmospheres of mutual distrust which has too long prevailed within the Muslim-Christian dialogue (see *M.W.*, LVII, 4 [1967], 342-345; LVIII, 1 [1968], 74-75 for several examples).

At last one finds an author who is at home within the concepts and terminology of Islam. He has moved beyond the narrow confines of Christian vocabulary, and speaks about *ṣaḥābat al-Masīḥ* (p. 141; not *talāmīdh*), or of the *basmala* of the Christian faith (280), or of Qurʾanic stylistic devices, such as "the general by which the specific is intended" (several places), etc., etc. He explains the four-fold nature of the Gospel by means of the seven *aḥruf* in which the Qurʾān is said to have been revealed (138-40), a creedal formulation of al-Ashʿarī is used to clarify what Christians mean about the Trinity (295-7), and evidence based on *al-naql* (296), *al-tawātur* (390), or *al-ijmāʿ*, etc., appears regularly. He is at home within all areas of Islamic literature—exegesis, traditions, modern interpretations—but especially the Qurʾān itself. One longs for the Muslim who is willing to pay the price of comparable immersion within the world of Christian thought. And if this review seems to focus on points of inadequacy or weakness in al-Ustādh al-Ḥaddād's work, let the criticism be understood against the background of sincere appreciation for what is generally a wholesome and positive addition to the Muslim-Christian dialogue.

The author's Christian bias is clear from the start, as he tries, in a preliminary way, to lay the foundations for dialogue which will be acceptable to both partners in it. Unfortunately, the conditions laid down from either side are all limitations upon Islam. Muslims, he insists, will not accept a dialogue based on philosophy, theology, mysticism, or comparative religious history; Christians refuse to accept the *sīra*, the traditions, books of Qurʾanic exegesis, or Muslim theological formulations. Though it seems assumed that from the Christian side the Bible will be the only basis, this is never made explicit; nothing is done to examine and eliminate superfluous or secondary elements of the Christian heritage, in order to focus upon an essential minimum acceptable to the Muslim protagonist. Thus the pattern is set for the

entire book—it is Islam which must bend and give way before Christian interpretations or emphases.

Nor is this all. After laying down these conditions, the author proceeds to make use of every area he has rejected, whenever these will further his case! Muslim exegetical works are constantly quoted, as are traditions (for example, those about Christ's nativity, even when patently absurd, on pp. 159, 180-2); as noted above, a creedal formulation is used to express the Christian concept of Trinity (296). This need not offend, since all these are used to inform or clarify the primary basis for discussion from both sides—the Qur'ān and the Bible. But why then the preliminary limitations?

After several chapters establishing his thesis that a basic and purposeful harmony exists between the two books, the author goes on to show that they also have essentially the same view about the Christ. He uses the term common to the Qur'ān and John's Gospel, "the word of God" as a point of meeting, and one verse [S. 4 (*al-Nisā'*): 170] becomes an endlessly repeated refrain. In an appended lecture the author suggests that one confession could express the faith of both groups: "I witness that there is no god but God, and that the Christ, ʿĪsā, the son of Mary, is the Messenger of God, His word cast upon Mary, and a spirit from Him" (434). Using the verses where this term appears, along with other evidence in the Qur'ān, he emphasizes the dual nature of the Christ—as "Son of Mary" he was completely "slave," truly human; as the Christ, the Word and Spirit of God, he was also far more.

As in his other books, the author blunts the edge of Qur'anic criticism of the Christian faith by showing that these attacks are not upon Christianity generally, but upon heretical groups of Christians present at the time of the Qur'ān. For example, he quotes the exegesis of al-Jalālayn to show that it was the Jacobites who are accused of *kufr* [S. 5 (*al-Mā'ida*) : 19, 75], and that their position was rejected by Christianity generally at the fourth Ecumenical Council, in 451 (260). Unfortunately, he does little more to validate this, nor to confirm the exegesis quoted from al-Jalālayn.

Little is new in all this; the author is going over much the same ground as covered in his earlier books, in the same painstaking detail, and, unfortunately, with often interminable repetition. And yet, his argument still awaits the Muslim who is willing to continue the dialogue on the same level of detail and thoroughness. *Is* this a true analysis of the Qur'ān? *Does* it answer the dilemmas inherent in traditional views of the Qur'ān, about conflicts between the two faiths and their scriptures—these dilemmas which have troubled Muslim and Christian alike, over the years? It is not enough to reject, out of hand, the author's 'Christianizing' of the Qur'ān; the time has come to take it seriously and deal with it constructively, in a continuing dialogue.

Having established the principle that the Qur'ān is intended to be understood in harmony with earlier scriptures, the author goes on, in the last chapters, to a more radical reinterpretation of certain Qur'anic passages which are in conflict with his point of view. The much discussed phrase *al-nabiyy al-ummī* is explained away by suggesting it is an erroneous transmission of the Biblical phrase, *al-nabiyy al-atī*

(324 ff.). Its present reading is impossible, he insists, in that to call Muḥammad a "prophet of the non-Scriptured people" (*al-umam*), would have no meaning after he had received a Scripture for the Arabs (335). In the same way, the phrase "whose name is Aḥmad" [S. 61 (*al-Ṣaff*) : 6] causes needless complications, since there is no such prophecy in the Bible. A series of eighteen Biblical passages interpreted in this way by Rashīd Riḍā in *Tafsīr al-Manār* is examined and rejected (345ff.), and the problem of this verse is solved by dropping out the phrase as not essential to the meaning, and probably added at the time when the Qurʾān was being collected. He concludes the section about the two phrases as follows:

> The decisive word . . . is that they are part of the obscure elements of the Qurʾān (*min mutashābihāt al-Qurʾān*), orphans in it, without support from other texts, as is customary for the Qurʾān in its teaching the exposition.
>
> The contextual evidence—both proximate and distant—all indicates that the two phrases are insertions into the Qurʾān at the time of its redaction. Those collecting the Qurʾān were not infallible in knowing the true from the false insertion. The accusation is therefore directed at the gathering of the Qurʾān, not at it as revelation (372-3).

Another verse mars the picture of unity between Christians and Muslims, and again is 'corrected.' "Do not take Jews and Christians as friends [S. 5 (*al-Māʾida*) : 51] is out of keeping with other verses in the immediate vicinity, and should read "Jews and pagans," as in vs. 82 (332). The total new approach to the Qurʾān also means reinterpreting some terms, such as "Those who have, or, have been given, knowledge" (*ūlū 'l-ʿilm, alladhīna ūtū 'l-ʿilm*), taken as an idiomatic circumlocution for 'the people of the Book,' that is, those who previously had knowledge of God and His revelation (383). The term used for the Prophet Muḥammad is re-examined, and a careful distinction made between the usual reading *khātam al-nabiyyīn* and an alternate reading, *khātim* . . . [S. 33 (al-Aḥzāb) : 40]. The traditional interpretation ('the final prophet') is never used of Muḥammad; only the Christ is described as if no other prophet would follow him [S. 2 (*al-Baqara*): 87, S. 5 (*al-Māʾida*) : 49, S. 57 (*al-Ḥadīd*) : 27]. When used for Muḥammad the correct reading means that he came to confirm or validate that which had gone before, that is, to put the seal of approval or finality upon the person and message of the Christ (390).

All this does seem extreme, an overzealous tampering with a text sacred to the heart of many Muslims. And yet, as in the author's analysis of the Biblical background of the Qurʾān, and the picture of Christ found there, this reinterpretation is too carefully done to be shrugged off easily. Each point needs to be examined with the same care, and either accepted or rejected—but not ignored.

Cairo, U.A.R KENNETH E. NOLIN

The Monsoon Lands of Asia. By R. R. Rawson Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963. 256 pp., photographs, maps, diagrams, index, bibliography. pa $2.95

This study contains seven chapters of systematic or topical geography (Structure and Relief, Climate, Natural Vegetation, Soils, Historical Geography, Agriculture, and Manufacturing Industry), and seven chapters of regional geography (two on India, and one on Pakistan and Kashmir, on Ceylon, China, Japan and Korea, and on Southeast Asia). An introduction and a postscript complete the body of the book.

Rawson tries a bit too hard to establish that the territory thus covered is a "geographical region," and he concludes that "material poverty, a predominantly rural population and the urgent need of change in the economy . . . make the area a geographical entity" (p. 17). Surely, under such a definition, there is more reason to include Afghanistan and Iran than Japan. He then asserts that "fundamentally it is bad practice to use a term from physical geography to describe a cultural entity" (p. 20), and then he proceeds to designate the whole book as dealing with monsoon Asia, a region he has just culturally defined!

Several other points may be questioned. His historical geography is uneven and is more descriptive than interpretive. His suggestion that "the overall picture is of strong centralized administrations" (p. 54) will surely be challenged by Indians who pride themselves on having the world's largest democracy. Several maps claim to include modern political boundaries, yet they omit those between India and Pakistan, as well as those of Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim (pp. 57, 59, 62). One may also question the assertion that today India is a world power (p. 88). The page spent on the Kashmir dispute (pp. 146-147) falls short of the mark by stating that Pakistan's case is based "primarily on defense problems"; moreover, it is too facile to dismiss Pakistan's need of eastern Punjab rivers for irrigation on the grounds that the Indus proper carries more water than all of the Punjab tributaries combined, first because fundamental to Pakistan's concern has been a traditional riparian rivalry between Punjab and Sind, and secondly because Pakistan was concerned about seasonality of flow at least as much as about total annual flow. A considerable disparity in coverage is also apparent: whereas Ceylon merits a separate fifteen-page chapter, Japan and Korea are combined in one twelve-page chapter, six pages are devoted to Indonesia, less than two to the Philippines, and less than a page to "the communist effort" in China. The "selected bibliography" is useful, but much too cursory.

On the credit side, one must note the numerous maps, forty-eight in all. These are generally good, relevant, and easy to read. The seventeen photographs are also useful, for they illustrate to the 'western' student a cultural landscape quite alien to him. Several points are well made; for instance, that the push for industrialization cannot be divorced from improvements in agriculture, and that plantation agriculture started as a "notorious financial gamble" (p. 78). Often references for further reading are incorporated within the text, a practice which may be used to advantage by more writers. The inclusion of data on the caloric values of food production and consumption is valuable, for such a

measure makes the concept of "population pressure" more manageable. The overall organization is clear, and the Index is satisfactory.

On balance, one may say that the book was no more than ordinary when it first appeared, so that today it seems rather stale. It may acquire usefulness to illustrate a type of an approach. If read only for its content, however, supplementary reading is needed.

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Cedar Falls, Iowa

The Histories of Nishapur. Edited by Richard N. Frye. London, The Hague, Paris: Mouton & Co, 1965.

The Histories of Nishapur, volume forty-five in the Harvard Oriental Series, includes three books produced in facsimile form. The first of these books is in three parts: (a) a translation into Persian by an unknown hand of al-Ḥākim's introduction to the *History of Nīsābūr,* (b) a list of persons whose biographies are in the same book, and (c) a table of the contents of al-Sulamī's *Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya.* The Persian text of al-Ḥākim's introduction is divided into two parts and deals with a geographical and topographical description of the city. One suspects that the copyist might be responsible for this odd arrangement and not the author himself.

The importance of al-Ḥākim's introduction may hold for a long time to come, till the original book of al-Ḥākim comes to light. Although there is now no clue that helps to trace it, there is much hope that it has not been totally lost. al-Subkī (771/1369-70), who considers this book "the Masterpiece of Histories," [1] drew much on it in his *Ṭabaqāt,* and al-Subkī's great Shaykh, al-Dhahabī, made an abridged form of it, [2] for, as al-Subkī tells us, the biographies in al-Ḥākim's *History* were very detailed .

The second and third books in this edition are related to one author and one work, viz. the book of ᶜAbdul-Ghāfir al-Fārisī called *Al-Siyāq fī Tārīkh Nīsābūr* which is a continuation ذيل of al-Ḥākim's *History.* The first of these last two facsimile reproductions is made from Ismāᶜīl Sāib manuscript No. 1544 (referred to below as I.S.MS). It starts with the biographies of the Ḥasans, a fact which confirms the editor's conclusion (p. 13) that the first part of the book (which should contain the biographies of the Aḥmads and all the names that start with "Hamza" up to the end of the names that start with "Jīm") has been lost. The transmitter of this book is: الشيخ الجليل أبو عبدالله محمد ابن أبى نصر محمد الفاشانى and not: . . . الماسانى السيد الجليل as the editor read it (p. 13). al-Fāshānī, who belongs to Fāshān, a village in the vicinity of Marw, was one of the many shaykhs of al-Samᶜānī. [3]

Professor Frye tends to believe that this volume of ᶜAbdul-Ghāfir is a part of the complete original. Although the biographies are rather lengthy, there is evidence to suggest that it is a mere abridgment. Once

[1] *Ṭabaqāt,* I (Cairo, 1324 H.), 173.
[2] Ḥājjī Khalīfa, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn* (Istanbul, 1941), 308.
[3] al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt,* II, 183; al-Ansāb, under "Fāshānī."

again we should refer to al-Subkī's *Ṭabaqāt*, where the places where *al-Siyāq* is cited are much more than the editor actually referred to in his footnote (p. 15). A cursory comparison can show that the I.S. MS omits many passages which al-Subkī ascribes to ᶜAbdul Ghāfir. It may be strange to mention that the author of *Ṭabaqāt* could not refer to a first hand copy of *al-Siyāq*, a fact which he admits in the introduction;[4] but he knew ᶜAbdul Ghāfir's book indirectly through the citations by Ibn ᶜAsākir in his *Tabyīn Kadhib al-Muftarī*. This latter author refers to *al-Siyāq* in two ways: a) أخبرنا الشيخ أبو الحسن عبد الغافر فى كتابه b) كتب إلى الشيخ أبو الحسن عبد الغافر. al-Subkī is quite certain that Ibn ᶜAsākir quotes ᶜAbdul-Ghāfir verbatim.[5] Comparison in the case of more than one biography confirms the conclusion that this publication is only an abridgment, but one example from the biography of ᶜAbdul-Malik al-Juwaynī may suffice:

Ṭabaqāt, III, 254; *Tabyīn, p. 278*

ثم أخذ من العربية وما يتعلق بها أوفر حظ ونصيب ، فزاد فيها على كل أديب ، ورزق من التوسع فى العبارة وعلوها ما لم يعهد من غيره حتى أنسى ذكرى سحبان ، وفاق فيها الأقران ، وحمل القرآن ، فأعجز الفصحاء اللدّ ، وجاوز الوصف والحد ، وكل من سمع خبره ورأى أثره فإذا شاهده أقرّ بأن خبره يزيد على الخبر ، ويثر على ما عهده من الأثر. وكان يذكر دروسا يقع كل واحد منها فى أطباق وأوراق لايتلعثم فى كلمة ولا يحتاج إلى استدراك غير مراقبة كالبرق الخاطف ، بصوت مطابق كالرعد القاصف ، يعترف له المبرزون ، ولا يدرك شأوه المتشدقون المتعمقون ، وما يوجد فى كتبه من العبارات البالغة كنه الفصاحة غيض من فيض ما كان على لسانه ، وغرفة من أمواج ما كان يعهد من بيانه ، تفقه فى صباه على والده ركن الإسلام .....

I.S.MS, folio 48b

ثم أخذ من العربية وما يتعلق بها أوفر حظ ونصيب ، فزاد منها على كل أديب ، ورزق من التوسع فى العبارة وعلوها ما لم نعهده من غيره حتى أنسى ذكرى سحبان ، وفاق فيها الأقران ، وقرأ القرآن ، وتفقه فى صباه على والده إمام الحرمين .

The editor states that the biographies in the I.S.MS are arranged alphabetically (p. 13), but on closer examination he concludes that the alphabetical order is not perfect. In reality, this drawback is mainly due to the misplacement of some folios and the original arrangement goes on strictly according to the alphabetical order. If this facsimile is to be of use, the reader should arrange it as follows (after folio 30b): 82ab, 86ab, 87ab, 83 ab, 84 ab, 80 ab, 85ab, 31ab-79ab, 88ab-97.

The last book in this edition is another abridgment of *al-Siyāq* done by Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ṣarīfīnī. This same work named *al-Mun-*

[4] *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 173.
[5] *Op cit.*

takhab was seen and consulted by al-Subkī. The number of biographies here is fully retained, but the material was subject to unbalanced omissions. The biography of Ḥassan al-Manī'i for instance (6 pages in I.S.MS) was reduced to three lines in this *Muntakhab*. Nevertheless, it is an invaluable piece because it makes up for the missing part in I.S.MS and gives an idea of the complete entries of *al-Siyāq*

In his introduction to this volume, Professor Frye gives some general judgments which cannot stand close scrutiny. He says: "It became a fixed style in such works to arrange the biographical materials in *ṭabaqāt* or 'classes' for convenience of reference. Exceptions to this are rare, for example, the *History of Isfahan* in which the biographies are arranged alphabetically" (p. 7). It may not be out of place to point out that the *History of Baghdad* by al-Khaṭīb, the *History of Damascus* by Ibn ᶜAsākir, the *History of Aleppo* by Ibn al-ᶜAdīm, not to mention other works, are not arranged according to classes.

When Professor Frye singles out as the main characteristic of these books the "tedious catalogues of the prominent inhabitants" (p. 7), he does much injustice not only to the introductory chapters in such works where the city itself is usually studied from different angles, but also to other objectives and values that these works aim at. One can mention that the *History of Bukhārā*, which deals with the geographical and historical aspects of that city, is not an exception in this connection. The *Book of Baghdad* by Ṭayfūr, the first two volumes of the *History of Aleppo* of Ibn al-ᶜAdīm, the different histories of Mecca, *al-Aᶜlāq al-Khaṭīra* of Ibn Shaddād and other such works run on similar or identical lines.

However, Professor Frye is well aware that "even biographical histories of localities in the Islamic world deserve study for information other than biographical" (p. 7). This fact alone can justify the publishing of the different histories of cities that are still remote among MS collections. And for this reason itself Professor Frye and the editors of Harvard Oriental Series have put interested scholars in their debt for publishing *The Histories of Nishapur*.

American University of Beirut IHSAN ABBAS

The Ancient Near East: Supplementary Texts and Pictures Relating to the Old Testament. Edited by James B. Pritchard Princeton · Princeton University Press, 1969 274 pp. $15 00

Since its publication in 1950, James Pritchard's *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* has become a standard and invaluable resource tool. A second edition in 1955 added important sections of South-Arabian and Canaanite and Aramaic texts to the vast collection of Egyptian, Sumerian, Hittite and respective Akkadian materials. The comprehensive anthology presents the several important ancient Near Eastern literary genres in English translation together with pertinent identification and annotation. A companion volume, *The Ancient Near East in Pictures*, published in 1954, draws principally upon the products of archaeological research to illustrate copiously the respective milieux documented by the *Texts*.

A new revision of each of these volumes is now published—the third edition of *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* and the second edition of *The Ancient Near East in Pictures*. The stated objective of the new editions is to bring up to date the respective coverage of the earlier editions. Therefore the new editions represent more augmentation than revision, and are presented as supplements added to the contents of the earlier volumes. The supplementary sections are now published also in the separate volume bearing the title which heads this review.

The supplement to *Pictures* comprises less than one-fifth of the separate volume. It adds one hundred and thirteen new entries to those of the first edition, bringing the total number of photographs, diagrams, excavation plans and maps to 882. The photographic and diagrammatic reproductions of the supplement measure up to the superb standard set by the original edition. Each item is fully described with bibliographic data attendant in the catalogue. The new materials come primarily from sites in Syro-Palestine and Mesopotamia, and several make important contributions. However, the stated purpose being that of bringing coverage to currency, the omission of some extremely informative discoveries in recent Palestinian excavations at ʿAi, Taʿanak, Tel er-Ras and Gezer is regrettable.

The supplement to *Texts* includes the additional material of the second edition as well as new documents appearing for the first time in the third. The new third edition materials are predominantly Akkadian. Little new material has been forthcoming from Egypt since the first edition was published, with the notable exceptions of some Aramaic papyri included in the second edition, and the very important Coptic documents whose provenance falls outside the focus of this anthology. Some promising documents from South Arabian sites were introduced in the second edition, but they have not been substantially increased in the interim. Hopefully the paucity of textual material from ancient Arabia may soon be remedied, for it is this reviewer's opinion that the answers to many knotty problems of ancient Near Eastern culture must be sought to the south and east of the better documented sources of antiquity.

Two categories may be singled out from the several in which contributions are made in the *Texts* supplements as adding significantly to focal areas of current research: One is the new group of treaty texts from Assyria and Syria included for the first time in this supplement. They provide a great deal of information regarding both the form and the content of documents in that presently much-discussed dimension. The other is the corpus of Akkadian didactic and wisdom literature which has been materially augmented by the translation of several consequential items. The contributors to this work are without exception eminently qualified for their respective tasks of translation and annotation. Any criticism this reviewer might make would be minor and directed solely at particulars in which there is recognized room for opinion.

A comprehensive index has been added to each section of the supplement, covering all materials as they appear in the latest editions. A section of Addenda is included in the *Texts* supplement containing

revisions of annotation and the updating of bibliographical data for materials of the first edition.

It is apparent from the nature of the publication that the value of the separate volume of supplements is relatively contingent upon access to the earlier editions. However, as volumes of translations and plates are necessarily expensive, the publisher is to be thanked for making available this considerable supplementary material in a separate volume to those who would use it to complete the original reference work.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation JOHN WORRELL

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

History of Mideast Since 1950 Catalogued and Computerized. After ten years of investigating and cataloguing the archives and records of nations in and concerned with the Middle East, a group of researchers has arrived at a computerized record of the affairs of the Arab countries since 1950. The record will ultimately stretch back to 1900.

The outcome of the work by Prof. Menahem Mansoor and a team of scholars at the University of Wisconsin has yielded a unique system of access to a vast and complex body of information. It may allow diplomats, scholars, or researchers to pick up a telephone within a few months, and obtain data on major events, documents and individuals.

The ultimate aim is a complete, computerized history. Work on the period since 1950 has been completed, and by May or June, 1970, it will be programmed into the ERIC computer of the United States Office of Education. Upon completion the project will index some 120,000 events, 35,000 documents and 18,000 individuals.

Scholars with no access to the computer will have to await publication of the first of eighteen volumes of chronology and index.

New York Times, November 30, 1969

Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Haifa. Established about six years ago, the University of Haifa now has 3500 students and a faculty of over 300. Among its nineteen departments are those of Arabic Language and Literature and History of the Islamic Peoples, each with a faculty of between twelve to fifteen instructors. The department of Arabic offers each year about forty courses, ranging from "Arabic History of Science" and "The Natural Theology and Ontology of the Falasifa" to "Qurʾanic Exegesis," "Medieval Arabic Philologists" and "Modern Arabic Poetry." In this department, over half the students are Arabs (of which half are Muslims and Druze, especially from the villages of Carmel and Galilee, and half Christians, mostly from Haifa, Nazareth and the surrounding villages), while almost half the students are Jews. The library has 120,000 volumes, and now grows at the rate of 35,000 volumes a year.

A. L. Motzkin, *Senior Lecturer in Arabic*

New Journal. Cambridge University Press, on behalf of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, published in January 1970 the first issue of *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Its editor is Stanford J. Shaw, Professor of Turkish and Near Eastern History, University of California, Los Angeles. The quarterly includes original articles and book reviews concerning the area encompassing Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, and the countries of the Arab World from the seventh century to modern times. Spain, South-

eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union also are included for the periods in which their territories were parts of Middle Eastern empires or were under the influence of Middle Eastern civilization. Attention is paid to history, political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, philology and literature, folklore, comparative religion and theology, law and philosophy.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

I. General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries. History of Islamic Studies.

II. Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.

III. Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs. Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.

IV. Theology. Movements, sects; Shīʿa. Philosophy. Sciences.

V. Sufism. Sufi Orders. Saints.

VI. Law. Politics; state; government. Nationalism. Socialism. Economics.

VII. Arabic and other relevant languages. Literature, culture, art. Education. Universities.

VIII. History of Muslim peoples, generally and in various areas (including studies on pre-Islamic period). Islam in modern history.

IX. Islam and other religions, civilizations, philosophies and ideologies.

X. Christianity and Islam (from a Christian point of view). The Church in Muslim environments.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	*American Anthropologist,* Journal of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C.
A.A.W.	*Afro-Asian Writings,* Cairo.
A.B.	*Analecta Bollandiana,* Bruxelles.
Ac. As.	*Acta Asiatica,* Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture, The Tōhō Gakkai, Tokyo.
Afr.	*Africa,* Journal of the International African Institute, London.
Afr. A.	*African Arts,* University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Afr. M.	*African Music,* Journal of the African Music Society, Roodepoort, Transvaal, South Africa.
Afr R.	*Africa Report,* Washington, D.C.
A.H.R.	*The American Historical Review,* Washington, D.C.
And.	*al-Andalus,* revista de las Escuelas de Estudios Arabes de Madrid y Granada.
A.Q.	*Anthropological Quarterly,* Washington, D.C.
Ar.	*Arabica,* Revue d'Etudes Arabes, Leiden.
Aram.	*Aramco World Magazine,* New York.
Arch.	*Archaeology,* Archaeological Institute of America, New York.
Ar.Or.	*Archiv Orientální,* Journal of the Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.
A.S.	*Asian Survey,* Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California
A.S.B.	*African Studies Bulletin,* Boston University, Boston, Mass
A.S.R.	*African Social Research,* University of Zambia, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

B.A.E.O.	*Boletin de la Asociacion Española de Orientalistas,* Madrid.
B.C.I.I.S.	*The Bulletin of the Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies,* Henry Martyn Institute, Lucknow, India.
B.I.F.A.N.	*Bulletin de l'Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire,* Dakar.
B.I.I.S.	*Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies,* Alligarh Muslim University, Aligarh
B.S.N.	*Behavior Sciences Notes,* Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, Conn.
B.S.O.A.S.	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London.
Bus	*Bustan,* Österreichische Zeitschrift fur Kulture, Politik und Wirtschaft der islamischen Lander, Wien.
C.A.D.	*Centre of Arabic Documentation Research Bulletin,* Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
C.A.J.	*Central Asiatic Journal,* International Periodical for the Languages, Literature, History and Archaeology of Central Asia, The Hague-Wiesbaden.
C.E.A.	*Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,* Ecole pratique des hautes études, Sorbonne, Paris.
C.H.M.	*Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale,* Paris.
Civ.	*Civilisations,* Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, Bruxelles.
C.O.C.	*Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain,* Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris.
Cont.	*Continuum,* Chicago.
Crit	*The Criterion,* Journal of the Islamic Research Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
C.S.S.H.	*Comparative Studies in Society and History,* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Daed.	*Daedalus,* The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass
D.I.	*Der Islam,* Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients, Berlin.
Dial.	*Dialog,* a quarterly journal of theology, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Diog.	*Diogenes,* The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, Paris and Montreal.
E.M.M.	*Evangelisches Missions Magasin,* Basel.
E.M.Q.	*Evangelical Missions Quarterly,* Springfield, Pennsylvania.
E.M.Z.	*Evangelische Missions-Zeitschrift,* Stuttgart.
Enc.	*Encounter,* Christian Theological Seminary, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Eth.	*Ethnology,* International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
E.V.	*Eglise Vivante,* Louvain.
F.A.	*Foreign Affairs,* New York.
Fr.	*Frontier,* London.
H.L.R.	*Harvard Law Review,* Cambridge, Massachusetts.
H.R.	*History of Religions,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
H.T.	*Hespéris Tamuda,* Rabat, Morocco.
I.A.	*International Affairs,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
IBLA	*Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes,* Tunis.
I.C.	*Islamic Culture,* The Islamic Culture Board, Hyderabad-Deccan
I.C.Q.	*India Cultures Quarterly,* School of Research, Leonard Theological College, Jabalpur, M.P., India.
I.E.J.	*Israel Exploration Journal,* Jerusalem, Israel.
I.L.	*Islamic Literature,* Lahore.
In.As.	*Indo Asia,* Stuttgart.
Int.	*Intisari,* Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Ltd., Singapore.
I.P.Q.	*International Philosophical Quarterly,* Fordham University, New York.
Iqbal	A Journal of the Basm-i Iqbal, Lahore.
Iqbal Rev.	*Iqbal Review,* Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
I.Q.	*The Islamic Quarterly,* The Islamic Cultural Centre, London.

I.R.	*The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs,* London.
I.R.M.	*International Review of Missions,* W.C.C., Geneva.
I.S.	*Islamic Studies,* The Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi
ISIS	Quarterly journal of the History of Science Society, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
I.T.	*Islamic Thought,* The Research Circle, Aligarh.
J.A.	*Journal Asiatique,* Societé Asiatique, Paris.
J.A.A.R.	*Journal of the American Academy of Religion,* Chambersburg, Pa.
J.A.H.	*The Journal of African History,* Cambridge University Press.
J.A.O.S.	*Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Baltimore. Maryland.
J.A.S.	*Journal of Asian Studies,* Ann Arbor, Michigan.
J.C.S.	*A Journal of Church and State,* Baylor Univ., Waco, Texas.
J.E.A.	*The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology,* London
J.E.S.	*Journal of Ecumenical* Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
J.E.S.H.O.	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Leiden.
J.H.I.	*Journal of the History of Ideas,* New York.
J.H.P.	*Journal of the History of Philosophy,* University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
J.J.S.	*The Journal of Jewish Studies,* Jewish Chronicle Publications, London
J.N.E.S.	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* Chicago, Illinois
J.P.H.S.	*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society,* Karachi.
J.R.A.	*Journal of Religion in Africa,* Leiden.
J.R.A.S.	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland,* Royal Asiatic Society, London.
J.R.H.	*The Journal of Religious History,* Sydney University Press, N.S.W.
J.S.S.	*Journal of Semitic Studies,* Manchester University Press.
J.Th.S.	*The Journal of Theological Studies,* Oxford.
J.W.H.	*Journal of World History,* Paris
Ka.	*Kairos,* Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie, Salzburg.
M.A.S.	*Modern Asian Studies,* London.
M.D.	*The Muslim Digest,* International Monthly of Muslim Affairs, Durban, South Africa.
M.E.A.H.	*Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos,* Universidad de Granada.
M.E.F.	*Middle East Forum,* The Alumni Association, American University of Beirut.
M.E.J.	*The Middle East Journal,* Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
M.I.	*Man in India,* A quarterly anthropological journal, Bihar, India.
Mid	*Midway,* A Magazine of Discovery in the Arts and Sciences, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois
M.N.C.	*Le Monde non-Chrétien,* Paris.
Mus.	*Le Muséon,* Revue d'Etudes Orientales, Tijdschrift voor Oriëntalisme, Louvain
Nu	*Numen,* International Review for the History of Religions, Brill, Leiden
O.C.	*Oriens Christianus,* Heft für die Kunde des christlichen Orients, O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden
O.C.P.	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma.
O.M.	*Oriente Moderno,* Institut per l'Oriente, Roma.
Or.	*Orient,* Paris
ORITA	Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies, Univ. of Ibadan, Nigeria.
Ors.	*Oriens,* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, Brill, Leiden.
Or. Suec.	*Orientalia Suecana,* Uppsala.
P.A.	*Pacific Affairs,* University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
P.E.W.	*Philosophy East and West,* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
P.F.	*The Philosophical Forum,* Boston, Mass
Ph. St.	*Philippine Studies,* Manila
P.O.C.	*Proche Orient Chrétien,* Jerusalem.

P.Q.	*Pakistan Quarterly,* Karachi.
Pr. Af.	*Présence Africaine,* Revue Culturelle du Monde Noir, Paris
P.S.B.	*The Princeton Seminary Bulletin,* Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.
R.C.A.J.	*Royal Central Asian Journal,* The Royal Central Asian Society, London
R.E.I	*Revue des Etudes Islamiques,* Paul Geuthner, Paris.
R.E.J.	*Revue des études juives,* Historia judaica, Mouton, 's-Gravenhage
R.H.	*Revue Historique,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R H R.	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.I.E.I.	*Revista del Instituto du Estudios Islámicos en Madrid,* Madrid.
R.M.	*Rythmes du Monde,* Le Bulletin des Missions, Paris et Bruges.
R Q.	*Revue de Qumran,* Paris.
R.R.	*The Review of Religions,* Rabwah.
R S.R.	*Revue des Sciences Religieuses,* Strasbourg
R. St.	*Religious Studies,* London
S.E A J.	*The South East Asia Journal of Theology,* Singapore.
S.I.	*Studies in Islam,* Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi
S.I.L.	*Studies in Linguistics,* Anthropology Research Center, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
Spec	*Speculum,* A Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
S.P N C.	*Secretariatus pro non-Christianis,* Città del Vaticano.
S.S R.	*Sociology and Social Research,* University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
St. in C.R	*Studies in Comparative Religion,* Tomorrow Publications, Ltd
St. Isl.	*Studia Islamica,* Paris.
Surv.	*Survey,* A journal of Soviet and East European Studies, London
Sy.	*Syria,* Revue d'Art Oriental et d'Archéologie, Paul Geuthner, Paris
Th.	*Theology,* London.
V I.	*The Voice of Islam,* Karachi.
W.I.	*Die Welt des Islams,* Leiden.
W.M.	*Worldmission,* New York
W M L.M.	*World Muslim League Magazine,* Singapore
Z.D.M G.	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* Wiesbaden
Z.M R.W	*Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft,* Aschendorff, Munster.
Z.R.G.G.	*Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte,* Brill, Köln.
Zy.	*Zygon,* Journal of Religion and Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.

I. *General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries History of Islamic Studies.*

1005 Arabian and African Frankincense Trees. F. Nigel Hepper. *J E.A.* LV (Aug., 1969), 66-72.

1006 Islamic Studies as a University Discipline, II. A. M. Mohamed Mackeen. *I R.*, LVII, 6 (1969), 36-38. (See also no. 960.)

1007 T. E. Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann. The 1919 Attempt to Secure an Arab Balfour Declaration. A. L. Tibawi. *M.E.F.*, XLV, 1 (1969), 81-90; also in *R.C.A.J*, LVI, 2 (1969), 156-163.

1008 A manuscript biography of the Sudanese Mahdi. Haim Shaked. *B.S.O.A.S.*, XXXII, 3 (1969), 527-540.

1009 The Meaning of *Maydan as-Sibaq.* J. D. Latham. *J.S S.*, XIII, 2 (1968), 241-248.

1010 The Place of Independent Religious Movements in the Modernization of Africa. H. W. Turner. *J.R.A.*, II, 1 (1969), 43-63.

1011 Religion in a West African University. Peter D. Varney. *J.R.A.*, II, 1 (1969), 1-42.

II. *Pre-Islamic Arabia Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth*

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Except where otherwise stated, the writers of articles and reviews are alone responsible for the opinions expressed.

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IN THIS ISSUE

We are happy to publish another article by Dr. Muḥammad Abdul Rauf, Director of the Islamic Foundation of New York. An earlier contribution, "Some Notes on the Qur'anic Use of the Terms Islām and Īmān," appeared in *M.W.*, LVII, 2 (1967), 94-105. This time he deals with the much discussed issue of human responsibility and predestination. The article will be printed in two installments, the first discussing the most significant Qur'anic data and the second summarizing the early development of the theological discussions.

Dr. Farouk A. Sankari, who contributes for the first time to the quarterly, is on the faculty of the Department of Political Science at Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh. In his article he compares the political philosophies of Plato and al-Fārābī.

Dr. James Waltz concludes his well-documented article on the voluntary martyrs of ninth-century Córdoba.

Dr. Menahem Milson, of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, whose "The Elusive Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī" was published in *M.W.*, LVIII, 4 (1968), 295-307 [and "Rejoinder" in *M.W.*, LIX, 3-4 (1969), 315-316], presents for this issue a paper dealing with the modern Egyptian novel.

Dr. Dwight L. Ling, professor of history at DePauw University, Indiana, deals with present-day Tunisia, under the theme 'modernization and moderation,' the latter notion applying particularly to its moderate—and in the Arab world almost singular—position in the discussion on the Middle East situation.

Articles by Dr. Sabih Ahmad Kamali have appeared in our pages previously, the most recent being "The Moral Basis of Faith," LV, 1 (1965), 9-18; LV, 2 (1965), 112-116. He is on the faculty of the University of Ghana in Legon and is presently Visiting Lecturer at the Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard Divinity School. Although his present article does not deal with Islamic studies in the more limited sense, we are happy to publish it as a contemporary Muslim reflection on the unity of mankind. With the approval of the author, the original manuscript has been somewhat abridged.

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THE QUR'ĀN AND FREE WILL

This essay attempts to define the position of the Qur'ān on the problem of free will and determinism, and to trace the factors leading to the early theological cleavage among Muslims over this question, to determine the date of the rise of this dispute and to examine the way in which a popular doctrine about this matter was formulated until it assumed an authoritative status and became crystallized as the accepted dogma of the majority. Finally, this article will deal with the role which this dispute played in the process of the coming into being of the early Muslim sects.

The term 'determinism' or 'predestination' in the context of our discussion is used in the theological sense, as distinct from its use in the realm of science. We are seeking to examine the Qur'anic doctrine as to whether the individual in a given situation is free to choose between alternatives, even though the area of his choice is limited, or whether there is a type of relationship between the human behavior and an inevitable divine cause denying an effective role by the individual in producing his deeds. We are not concerned with a scientific mechanical or environmental causality.

Our treatment consists of two parts. In part I, we grope for the assumptions implicit in relevant Qur'anic texts in order to determine as exactly as possible the Qur'anic position with regard to the subject under consideration. Part II will deal with the early dispute over the problem, tracing the roots of the differences of views on the matter and examining how these differences led to the creation of disputing schools of theology.

I

THE QUR'ĀN AND THE PROBLEM

The Qur'anic doctrine rests on the belief that the universe was created and is being sustained by God Who requires man, the highest species of His creations, to observe His revealed guidance enunciated in the Qur'ān or explained by the Prophet. Compliance leads to the pleasure of God and brings His rewards, and failure to comply provokes His displeasure and leads to His punishment. We read:

> So he who does an atom's weight of good will see it. And he who does an atom's weight of evil will see it. S. 99 : 7f.
>
> Whosoever does good it is for his own soul; and whosoever does

evil it is against it. And your Lord is not in the least unjust to His servants. S. 41 : 46

God lays not upon any soul more than it has capacity for; what it has gained stands to its credit, and what it has piled up stands against it. S. 2 : 286

Every soul is held in pledge for what it earns. S. 74 : 38/41.

And no burdened soul can bear another's burden. And if one weighed down by a burden calls another to carry his load, nought of it will be carried, even though he be near of kin. You warn only those who fear their Lord in secret and keep up prayer. And whoever purifies himself, purifies himself only for his own good. S. 35 : 18/19

... That no bearer of a burden bears another's burden, and that man can have nothing but what he strives for. S. 53 : 38 f./39 f.

Whosoever goes aright, for his own soul does he go aright; and whosoever goes astray, to his detriment only does he go astray. And no bearer of a burden can bear the burden of another. S. 17 : 15/16

Hundreds of similar Meccan and Medinan texts speaking of human responsibility could be quoted; but those given serve the purpose well. Holding man responsible for his deeds presupposes acknowledging his freedom of choice; and this freedom is clearly indicated or even categorically stated in several other passages. The following is a representative sample:

You 'desire' (*turīdu*) nothing but to become a tyrant in the earth; and you have no 'desire' to be one of those who set things right. S. 28 : 19/18

And He it is Who has caused the night and the day to succeed each other; (a sign) for those who 'choose' to reflect or 'choose' to be thankful. S. 25 : 62/63

Let him believe, whoever 'wills,' *shā'a*; and let him disbelieve, whoever 'wills.' S. 13 : 29/28

Verily this is a reminder; whosoever 'wishes', *shā'a*, let him take a way to his Lord. S. 74 : 54 f.; cf. also 80 : 11 f.; 81 : 27 f.

Have We not given him (man) two eyes, a tongue and two lips, and showed him the two ways? S. 90 : 8-10; cf. 76 : 2 f.

Besides the overwhelming number of passages with implications which presuppose the admission of human freedom as a fundamentally accepted principle, however, there are passages in the Qur'ān which are popularly understood and also interpreted by some scholars in such a way as contradicts the principle of free will and makes of it a mere mockery. There are, for example, verses which attribute man's deeds to God Himself. There are others which speak of the Will of God as

the driving force bending the will of man one way or the other. Moreover, there are other passages which state that the choice of the right path by some men or some category of men is blocked by God's will or by an action of God's which makes the individual helpless and incapable of making the right choice.

It will suffice to give some samples of these passages which are regarded as adverse to the principle of human freedom, and are usually advanced as evidence by those who accuse the Qur'ān of being fatalistic or inconsistent with regard to this question:

a. ... Allāh is the Creator of everything. S. 13 : 16/17; 39 : 62/63

Make what you say secret or make it public; verily He knows what is in the breasts. Shall not He Who created know? S. 67 : 13 f.

... Do you worship what you have carved; while God has created you and what you do? S. 37 : 95 f./93 f.

You did not kill them (the unbelievers in battle) but it was God Who killed them; and it was not you who threw when you threw, but it was God Who threw ... S. 8 : 17

b. He (God) misleads many thereby (by some revelation) and guides aright many thereby. S. 2 : 26/24

He whom God leads astray, there cannot be a guide to him. S. 7 : 186/185

Do you wish to guide aright him whom God has led astray? S. 4 : 88/90

Verily God leads astray him whom He wills, and guides aright whom He wills. S. 35 : 8/9; cf. 6 : 39

c. Those who associate (partners to God) will say: If God 'willed,' *shā'a*, we would not have set up partners (with Him), nor our fathers, nor would we have made anything unlawful ... S. 6 : 148/149; cf. 16 : 35/37; 43 : 20

If He (God) 'pleased,' *shā'a*, He would have guided you all. S. 6 : 149/150; cf. 6 : 35 f.; 10 : 99; 11 : 118

And even if We would cause the angels to descend unto them, and the dead to speak to them, and if We bring together all things for them, they were not to believe unless God wills, *illā an yashā'a 'llāh*. S. 6: 111

And it is not for any soul to believe except with the 'permission,' *idhn*, of God. S. 10 : 100

And you do not (even) 'will,' *tashā'ūna*, unless God 'wills.' S. 76 : 30; cf. 74 : 56/55; 81 : 29

d. God has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and placed covering upon their sight. S. 2 : 7/6; 45 : 23/22

Verily We have placed veils upon their hearts, lest they should

understand it (the Qur'ān), and in their ears (there is) heaviness. S. 18 : 57/55; cf. 6 : 25; 17 : 46/48

We have set before them a barrier, and behind them a barrier; and We have thrown a cover over them, so they do not see. S. 36 : 9/8

e. Indeed everything we have created with a *qadar*, i.e., a decree. S. 54 : 49

And He created everything, and decreed it a decree.[1] S. 25 : 2.

And (it is He) Who predestined and guided. S. 87 : 3

It is our belief that these texts, if read in the light of their context, without any preconceived doctrines or ideas, will be found to be in harmony with those implying or asserting human freedom. Our investigation will show that the accusation of inconsistency arises from the misinterpretation of the texts. Qur'anic interpreters began to write their works long after certain fatalistic views had been popularized, as we shall see in the next part of this study, as a result of brutal sufferings sustained by the Muslim public, especially those of the Hijaz, during the middle decades of the first century of Islam. One factor that strengthens our doubts as to the existence of a Qur'anic inconsistency over this question is the absence of any traces of such an accusation by the contemporaries of Muḥammad who were eager to attack him on any point of weakness.[2]

Turning now to the texts themselves, and beginning with those under 'a', the first text simply states that God is the creator of everything, and this is not relevant to the question of free will. The context speaks of things and marvels created by God, inviting people to reflect upon them and to benefit from such reflection, which has nothing to do with man's work. Even if we extend the text to include the works of men, as al-Bāqillānī, for example, suggests,[3] distinction has to be made between the term *khalq*, 'to create,' and the term *ʿamal*, 'to do' or 'to make.' To create, in its Arabic sense, is to bring into existence something not yet existing, without the employment of tools or

[1] This way of rendering the verse suits the popular notion of the term *qadar* which will be made more clear later in this essay However, a better rendering of the phrase *wa-qaddarahu taqdīrā*, which suits the context, "and He created it (i.e., everything) in a precise and well-planned measure."

[2] This eagerness on the part of the Meccans to detect any weakness in the Qur'ān can be illustrated and substantiated by the story related about the storm raised by ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zibaʿrā over the verse S. 21 : 98 in which the pagans and what they worshipped would be firewood in Hell. The enemies, extending the warning to characters venerated in the Qur'ān but worshipped by some, like Jesus Christ, accused Muḥammad of contradicting himself. They thought that this was his end, unaware that the relative pronoun used here refers to objects like their idols and does not apply to persons. Cf. Muḥammad b Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī-Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm*, in his treatment of the verse; and Alfred J. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* (Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 33-4.

[3] Abū Bakr Muḥammad b al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *K al-Tamhīd* (Beyrouth, 1957), pp. 305-6.

instruments, or a direct handling by the Creator. [4] *ʿAmal*, on the other hand, is an accomplishment which requires efforts and tools. [5] It is therefore clear that *khalq*, in the Qur'anic usage, is an act of God whereas *ʿamal* is an attribute of man. And thus, while man's work is his *ʿamal*, it may be also described as the creation of God.

Moreover, when the Qur'ān applies the term *khalq*, creation, to the existence of a thing, this does not preclude the fact that the existence is effected through some processes involving human deeds. The Qur'ān, for example, applies the term to the existence of man; and we know that this occurs through well-known biological processes involving certain voluntary human acts. In a similar way, the Qur'ān may apply the term to human deeds, although they come into being through processes performed by man. In other words, to describe a human act as a creation of God and an act of man is not at all inconsistent; and God's creation does not cancel the effective role of man through his free choice, his decision and his performance. God's creation of human acts is not an automatic or coercive cause; man's role is its fulfillment. [6]

This same argument applies to the next two verses in which God is stated to have created man's words and thoughts,[7] or that He creates what man does generally. [8] God's creation of man's deeds does not conflict with man's doing or freedom.

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[4] Edward W. Lane, *Arabic English Lexicon*, 1872, II, 800, defines *khalq* as: "the originating, or bringing into existence, anything, not after the similitude of anything pre-existing... or bringing into existence from a state of non-existence." The Qur'ān, S. 16:40/42 and S. 36:82, states that when God wishes a thing to exist, He would say, BE! and it comes.

[5] Muḥammad b. Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿArūs* (Cairo, 1306 A.H.), VII, 34, relates on the authority of al-Rāghīb that the term *ʿamal* means 'a deliberate animal movement'; and on the authority of some others that it implies some kind of hardship and is therefore inapplicable to God. The term, from amongst 359 Qur'anic verses, is applied only once to the 'hands' of God, namely in S. 36:71, but this is obviously metaphorical.

[6] This subtle and yet clear and fundamental difference between the concepts *khalq* and *ʿamal* eluded the early Muslim theologians who regarded them almost as synonyms. Therefore, those who advocated free will claimed that man creates his own deeds and explained away the Qur'anic texts which apply God's creation to human deeds. Their opponents, on the other hand, used such application as evidence for their theory denying that man does his own acts, as if God's creation of these acts is inconsistent with attributing them to man as the doer. The latter, in their efforts to harmonize between their denial of an effective role by man in producing his acts, on the one hand, and the concepts of divine justice and human legal responsibility, invented the concept of *kasb* which was explained in a variety of ways, none of which gives man a real effective role. One well-known interpretation was that of Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, namely, the *istiṭāʿa* or *qudra ḥāditha*, i.e., a created power which exists only at the time of the production of the human acts but contributes nothing to their coming into being. Cf. *K. al-Lumaʿ fī'l-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Zaygh wa'l-Bidaʿ* (Cairo: Miṣr Press, 1955), pp. 69-70, and 90-91; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥaṣṣal* (Cairo, 1323 A.H.), p. 140.

[7] In this particular text, i.e., S. 67:13 f., the accusative of the verb *khalaqa* is not mentioned. It is an assumed pronoun which refers either to the 'breasts' of men, mentioned earlier in the text, or to man's words and thoughts.

[8] This refers to the third quotation in this group, namely S. 37:96/94 which

The last verse in this group tells the believers, after their victory at Badr, that it was not they who killed the foes but it was God Who killed them, and it was not the Prophet who threw (stones) at them but it was God Who threw. This statement cannot be taken literally; it is obviously a metaphoric turn of phrase emphasizing the role of God and His help extended to the believers at a most critical time, being outnumbered and inferior in arms. It is said [9] that some among the victors were swelled with undue pride at their achievement in battle, and this verse came as a reaction to this attitude in such strong terms. [10]

We can say, therefore, that the texts grouped under 'a' which seem to link God with human deeds—which is not necessarily the right interpretation—cannot be regarded as contradictory to the doctrine of free will.

We now come to the texts under 'b', where God is stated to be leading men aright or astray. In some instances, God is stated to lead aright or astray as He wills, as though people's destiny is determined by an arbitrary divine will.

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reads: "and God created you and *mā taᶜmalūn.*" The interpretation of this verse depends on whether the word *mā* here is to be treated as *maṣdariyya,* i.e., a particle causing the verb which follows it to be in the position of verbal noun, or *mawṣūla,* i.e., a relative pronoun meaning 'what,' or, 'that which.' On the basis of the first possibility the verse means, "and God has created you and your 'action,'" i.e., the act of carving idols. According to the other possibility, it would mean, "and God has created you and 'what' you do," i.e., the material which is carved into idols. al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.,* in treating this verse, gave these two possibilities objectively. But Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ashᶜarī, who revolted against the Muᶜtazila in 300 A.H., probably after the work of al-Ṭabarī had been written (al-Ṭabarī died in 310 A.H.), made this verse controversial. In his *Lumaᶜ, op. cit.,* pp. 69-70, he insists on treating *mā* as *maṣdariyya* so that the accusative would necessarily be the 'action' of man, thinking that this would inevitably confirm his thesis and demolish that of his opponents—as if God's creation of human action is inconsistent with the concept of man's doing it. Ever since, Qurʾanic interpreters became no more neutral. Upholders of human freedom interpret the verse by insisting that *mā* should be regarded as a relative pronoun, and the followers of al-Ashᶜarī chose the other possibility. For al-Ashᶜarī's side, see, e.g., Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ᶜAẓīm* (Cairo, 1948), IV, 13, and al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl* (Cairo, 1320 A.H.), II, 198-9. On the other side, see al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* (Cairo, 1953), II, 505-6 and Abū Ḥayyān, *al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ* (Cairo, 1320 A.H.), III, 367. Fakhr al-Dīn al Rāzī, in his *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Cairo, n.d.) XXVI, 149-50, exposes the futility of the use made by his fellow Sunnites of this verse as a basis for their doctrine and advises them to resort to other means.

[9] al-Bayḍāwī, *ibid.,* I, 273.

[10] The Orthodox exegetes interpret the verse literally and use it as evidence for their doctrine, which will be further explained in the essay, denying that man is the doer of his acts and claiming that acts are ascribed to man by virtue of their concept of *kasb,* acquisition. Cf. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Cairo, n.d.), XV, 139. al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* (Cairo, 1953), II, 9, although he does not share the Sunnite concept of *kasb,* interprets ascribing killing and throwing to God as being through the angels and unseen forces. al-Bayḍāwī, *ibid.,* I, 273, came with an interesting scheme categorizing human deeds into perfect and imperfect acts, and then attributes them to God in their perfect sense and to man otherwise Ibn Qayyim, *al-Tafsīr al-Qayyim* (Cairo, 1949), pp. 287-8, denounces the literal interpretation and condemns it as fatalistic. He then seeks to solve the problem by interpreting the ascription of killing and throwing to man, as by virtue of his starting the act, and to God as by virtue of His making the act effective.

The traditional interpretation of this ascription to God in a literal sense or in the sense of divine predeterminism,[11] is, in our view, a mistake. If we read carefully the verses under discussion and examine the context in the surrounding texts we find that the Qur'ān actually attributes to man the choice of an attitude, and the individual is said to be led either way by God according to the attitude he has chosen. This can be easily seen from the concluding statement in the first verse quoted in this group, which reads:

> ... and He does not lead astray thereby except the miscreants.

Let us also read the following:

> God does not lead aright the folk who are transgressors. S. 2 : 258/260
>
> God never sends a folk astray after He had guided them, until He had made clear to them what they should avoid. S. 9 : 115/116
>
> God leads those who believed to the upright path. S. 22 : 54/53
>
> Thus God sends the unbelievers astray. S. 40 : 74
>
> God does not guide him who is extravagant and a liar. S. 40 : 28/29

It is clear from these contexts that the meaning of God's leading aright or astray is that—by sending down His guidance which provokes different responses by people—God is indirectly causing some people to go aright and others to go astray. God shows the way of righteousness and urges people to follow it; and He shows the way of wickedness and warns against it. Some people hearken and are thus rightly guided by God's revelation; and some others reject the invitation and go against God's guidance. The coming of the divine guidance has thus led to the division of people into those who benefit from it and those who go astray.[12] So it is as though God by sending His guidance has caused some to go aright and some to go astray. The ascription to God of guiding and misleading is apparently a rhetorical style[13] employed

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[11] al-Ṭabarī, e.g., in his *Jāmiᶜ*, *op. cit.*, interprets the term *iḍlāl* which occurs in S. 2 : 26/24 in the sense of 'increasing the erring by adding disbelief,' and in S 4 : 88/90 in the sense of *khidhlān*, i.e., abandoning. al-Bayḍāwī, *op. cit.*, interprets *hady* in S 30 : 29/28 literally, and in S. 16 : 36/38 attributes it to God's decree.

[12] Although *hady* and *iḍlāl*, as Qur'anic terms, chiefly indicate the ideas of 'guiding aright' and 'leading astray,' respectively, the Qur'ān employs them also in some other meanings. The term *hady* may denote the idea of 'leading to the abode of delight or punishment,' as in S. 7 : 42 f. / 40 f. and S. 37 : 22 f. The term *iḍlāl* also denotes the sense of rendering an effort in vain, as in S. 47 : 1, 4/5 and 8/9.

[13] The following Qur'anic statement sheds some light on the meaning of this kind of allegorical use in which God is given as the subject, doer, of leading aright or astray: "Whomsoever God guides, is guided aright; and whomsoever God leads astray you will find for him no guiding friend." S. 18 : 17/16. The second part of this statement alludes to the meaning of the allegorical ascription to God of guiding aright or leading astray. The statement may be rephrased as

for the purpose of emphasis in expressing the positive or negative response of man to the divine guidance. In the positive case, the ascription is an assurance of the validity and genuineness of the divine teachings, being from the most reliable and credited source. In the negative case, it is a severe condemnation of those who do not benefit even from the guidance of God himself. Therefore, we read:

> Do you wish to guide him whom God (even God) has led astray? For him whom God leads astray you cannot find a way (to guiding him). S. 4 : 88/90
>
> He who is guided by God (i.e., positively responds to God's guidance), is indeed led aright, while those whom God leads astray are indeed the losers. S. 7 : 178/177

This rhetorical style is, in some of these verses, further emphasized by the introduction of God's will, a will of wisdom which rewards the righteous and condemns the wicked—not an arbitrary will nor a coercive will.

The factor leading to going aright or astray, we have seen, is the attitude chosen by man himself; and therefore the involvement of God's will here cannot be described as arbitrary. God in His wisdom has willed to guide aright those who hearken and reflect, but to lead astray, or render fruitless the efforts of the miscreants, the aggressors and wrongdoers:

> Indeed there has come to you from God a light and a clear book, whereby God guides into the ways of peace those who follow (the way to) His pleasure ... S. 5 : 15 f./18
>
> Those who disbelieve and turn (men) away from the truth, He renders their efforts in vain (*aḍalla aᶜmālahum*). S. 47 : 1

It is even possible to interpret the will in this context as the will of man, not the will of God. Thus the rendering of the Arabic statement becomes; "God leads aright him who wills, i.e., who chooses the right path, and leads astray him who wills, i.e., who chooses the way of error." The key word here is the assumed subject pronoun of the verb *yashāʾu,* 'wills,' which can possibly refer to the word Allāh, God, or the indeclinable relative pronoun *man,* both of which precede the verb. So, the phrase: *yahdīʾllāhu man yashāʾu* can be rendered either: 'God guides aright whom He wills,' or, 'God guides aright him who wills.' [14]

follows: "Whosoever benefits from the teaching of the guidance descending from God is guided aright; and whosoever follows his own lust and turns away from God's guidance you will find no friend for him to guide him effectively."

[14] It is true that the second possibility does not work in two instances; namely S. 7: 155/154 in which the assumed subject pronoun is in the second person, reading: *tuḍillu bi-hā man tashāʾu wa tahdī man tashāʾu,* and S. 42:52 in which the assumed subject pronoun is in the first person, reading: *ja ᶜalnāhu nūran nahdī bihī man nashāʾu min ᶜibādinā.* But this does not invalidate this interpretation. The context of the first verse is God's punishment with which He visits the sinners; and that of the other text is the divine revelation; and thus the subject is outside the scope of human deeds.

The second possibility is strengthened by instances in which the verb 'will' in the complementary sentence of the relative pronoun is replaced by another, the subject of which has to be human. Let us, for example, read the following:

> And He guides to it, him who turns to Him. S. 13 : 27

We now come to a set of verses given under 'c' above, in which the term *mashī'a*, divine will,[15] is also used in the context of human attitude and human deeds, but in a different way.

The first text, S. 6 : 148/149 relates the argument of the pagans of Mecca in which they claimed that, had God willed, they would not have been as they were, i.e., ascribing partners to God, etc.

Now, were the pagans in their argument speaking seriously and believing in what they said, or were they jesting? A reader of the passage who does not suffer from any preconceived doctrines would see that they were speaking sincerely although wrongly, revealing a strain of inherited 'fatalism.' These pagans who were contemporaries of Muḥammad were the heirs of the traditions of their ancestors who

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Editor's Note: This same suggestion is also found, e.g., in Gustav Weil's *Historische-Kritische Einleitung in den Koran* (Bielefeld: Velhagen und Klasing, 1844), pp. 107f., note 4, with a reference to S. 2:213/209 and S. 35:7f/8f. as arguments for this interpretation. Otto Pautz, quoting Weil, rejects this exegesis, and states that verses like S. 12:56 and 6:83 make it quite clear that in this context God is the subject of the verb 'to will'; *Muhammeds Lehre von der Offenbarung Quellenmässig Untersucht* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1898), p. 108, note 2.

[15] There are three verses in which God's will is denoted by the term *irāda* which means 'to wish.' They are usually interpreted in a way which implies coercion. They are:

> And my advice will not benefit you if I wish to continue to advise you *if God wishes to seduce you.* He is your Lord, and unto Him you will return. S. 11 : 34/36
>
> And [to] whomever God wishes [to extend] His temptation, you will possess nothing to (deliver) him from God. These are those whose hearts God does not wish to cleanse.. S. 5 : 41/45
>
> Whomsoever God wishes to guide aright, He expands his bosom to Islam; and whomsoever God wishes to lead astray, He makes His bosom close and tight as if he were climbing in the upper layers of the skies ... S. 6 : 125

We do not agree with the above renderings. The misunderstanding in the first verse arises from regarding the clause, *in kāna 'llāhu yurīdu an yughwiyakum*, a conditional clause with the particle *in* as the conditional tool, and the previous statement as its main clause. In our view, this main clause is an independent clause indicating Nūh's despair of the use of continuing to preach to his obstinate folk. Then what is regarded as the conditional clause is in fact a fresh, independent statement governed by *in* as a negative particle, or as a conditional particle with the following nominal sentence as the main clause; so that the meaning will be either: God does not wish to seduce you or to deceive you. He is your Lord. Or: If God were to seduce you, He is your Lord. The traditional interpretation makes the style weak as it gives two conditional clauses for one main clause preceding them, and the meaning also is futile.

The rendering of the other two verses in a literal sense is also harmful and ignores the context. There is no physical cleansing of the hearts or physical expansion or contraction of the bosoms. The statements are intended to inspire awe and emphasize the greatness of God in a rhetorical beautiful style, condemning at the same time the enemies of the faith.

entertained a belief in some sort of 'determinism.' [16] When the Meccans were called upon by Muḥammad to discard their idols and devote their worship to God, they thought that this was contrary to the will of God Who made them and their ancestors the way they were. The Qurʾān therefore takes them seriously and accuses them of making mere guesses with no evidence or real knowledge; they were only doing what those who came before them did. [17] The following verse retorts:

> Say: to God alone belongs the reaching evidence. Had He willed, He would have guided you all aright. S. 6 : 149/150

This means that their mistakes were due to them, and to their own choice, and were not to be attributed to the will of God. Had it been for the will of God, with no choice on their part, they would have all been guided aright.

Theologians and Qurʾanic interpreters, disillusioned by their misconceived concept of predeterminism implicit of divine compulsion reverse the interpretation of the two verses and claim their given order to be the reverse of their chronological sequence. They regard the argument of the unbelievers as an expression of contempt, deriding the Qurʾanic assertion in the subsequent verse ("If God willed, He would have guided you all aright."). [18]

We strongly reject this view in spite of the esteem in which these authorities are held. The literary sequence of the two verses in question appears to be chronological, and it makes a logical sense. The second verse accords well as an answer to the argument of the adversaries; and its initial part ("Say: To God alone belongs the reaching evidence") clearly suggests that the verse was an answer and a refutation to the argument of the unbelievers. We may also add that if the verse were meant as information of a divine fatalism, it would be fruitless and even harmful, especially at a time when the Prophet was eagerly inviting people to accept his mission.

It is therefore clear that the arguments of the adversaries, discussed here, attributing their mistakes and disobedience to the divine will, stemmed from their conviction, and were not uttered lightly. The Qurʾān, by quoting their argument and refuting it, affirms its advocacy of free will. On the other hand, its statements here and elsewhere [19] to the effect that God, had He willed, would have guided all aright was not meant to establish a doctrine contrary to free will. These statements were provoked by the argument of the adversaries who sought an

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[16] Cf ʿAbd Allāh b. Muslim, better known as Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 92-8; T. Nöldeke, "Ancient Arabs," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, I, 660; and Dr. Jawād ʿAlī *Taʾrīkh al-ʿArab qabla'l-Islām* (Baghdad, 1956), V, 413.

[17] Cf. S. 6: 148/149; 16: 35/37; 43: 20/19

[18] E.g., Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *K. al-Tamhīd* (Beyrouth, 1957), p. 284; Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, *Lumaʿ*, p. 114; and al-Bayḍāwī, *op. cit*, in treating S. 16: 35/37.

[19] E.g., S. 6: 35; 10: 99 and 11: 118/120.

excuse in the divine will, claiming that God's will was responsible for their attitude and deeds; but these verses rejected this argument on the basis that if it were from the divine will alone all would have been at one: believing and obedient to the Divine guidance. The Divine will is absolute, and it determines all creations in the universe, including providing man with limited power, with tools, judgment and choice between alternatives. Within the sphere of his own voluntary acts, man was left to exercise his wisdom; and the Divine Will did not extend in such a way as to constrain the human choice. Otherwise, all on earth would have believed and obeyed.

However, when the unbelievers persisted in their stubborn attitude and did not benefit from this reasonable explanation, the Qur'ān resorted to a sarcastic, acid style, hitting at their stupidity and obstinacy. Thus we read, e.g.:

> Hearts have they, but they understand not; eyes have they, but they see not; and ears have they, but they hear not. They are like cattle, even worse; they are heedless. S. 7: 179/178

In hammering at the adversaries in this sour style, the Qur'ān repeats their own objectionable argument, hinting at their own mistaken excuse, and hitting more emphatically at their unreasonableness:

> Even if we send down the angels to them, and make the dead speak to them, and gather against them all things in array, they will not believe unless God wills. S. 6 : 111
>
> And it is not for a soul to believe *except with the permission of God.* And He lays abomination upon those who do not reflect. S. 10 : 100
>
> And you do not choose (a straight path), unless God wills.[20] S. 81 : 29

Such statements are not to be taken literally; they condemn the adversaries in a satirical style. This method of quoting the disapproved words of the adversaries in satirizing them, is a familiar Qur'anic feature. S. 41 : 5/4, e.g., quotes the unbelievers as follows:

> And they say: Our hearts are under coverings from that to which you call us, and there is a deafness in our ears and there is a veil between us and you.

The Qur'ān retorts:

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[20] Although it is possible to regard this verse and two other similar verses, namely, S. 74: 56/55 and S. 76: 30, as having a sarcastic style aimed at hitting at the stupidity of the adversaries who sought an excuse for their faults in attributing them to God's will, they may mean to indicate that the human choice follows the urge of God and His preference when the individual chooses what God urges him to choose. This urge is provided in the preceding verses. One case, e.g., reads: "This is only a reminder; to whomever among you wishing to choose the straight path." S. 76: 29.

> And when you recite the Qur'ān, We place between you and those who do not believe in the Hereafter a hidden barrier, and We put coverings on their hearts and deafness in their ears lest they should understand it. S. 17 : 45f./47f.

The problem of understanding the next group of verses, quoted under 'd', has now been made easier. We can easily see that they belong to this sarcastic style. They speak of sealing the hearts, sealing the ears, placing a covering on the eyes and surrounding the enemies with barriers. There is no real sealing, deafening, covering or barricading. All is simply a sarcastic rhetorical style aiming at awakening the obstinate Meccan adversaries without impinging on the principle of free will.

In the last group of verses, given under 'e' above, the interesting word *qadar*—or a kin-derivative—is used, a word that has become a term indicating the idea of predestination and sometimes misunderstood as the term for an Islamic type of fatalism.

The word *qadar* is usually defined as 'determinism,' i.e., determining by God in eternity of all things and happenings.[21] The verses quoted are usually advanced as evidence for a doctrine of predestination.[22] Yet, if the texts in which the term occurs are carefully examined, it becomes clear that their context is the idea of *khalq*, i.e., creation by God. These texts, therefore, suggest a Qur'anic doctrine of *qadar* in relation to divine creation, i.e., the creation of the universe and all things therein. The term may thus be defined: *a full and precise plan determined by God in eternity, according to which the universe was created and is continued and maintained.* An edifice of any degree of magnitude or complexity needs an advanced well-measured architectural plan; and the world, being of the utmost degree of complexity, could not have existed and been so harmoniously sustained haphazardly. But a doctrine of *qadar* related to the theme of creation does not necessarily reject the principle of free will.

Thus, a doctrine of predestination in the above sense has its Qur'anic basis; and the word *qadar*, the root-meaning of which is 'measure,' is best suited as a term for this doctrine. Yet, as explained above, the context of these texts is *khalq* and divine work; therefore it is outside the scope of human acts, and thus a doctrine of *qadar* or predestination in the area of divine acts is not inconsistent with free will. Even if these texts are generalized and their theme is extended to human acts, in the sense that human acts are created by God, no such inconsistency arises. We examined earlier the Qur'anic use of the terms *khalq* and *ʿamal*, and found no conflict between God's creating human acts and man's doing them according to his choice without infringement on

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[21] Ismāʿīl b. Ḥammād al-Jawharī, *al-Ṣaḥāḥ* (Cairo, 1956), II, 786; al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿArūs*, III, 481; and al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit*, in his treatment of S. 20: 40/42.

[22] E.g., al-Bāqillānī, *K. al-Tamhīd*, Clause 520.

free will.[23] So, if *qadar* includes human deeds, it is in the sense that they, as to be chosen and done by man, and as foretold by God in eternity, were coordinated and related to certain details in the all-comprehensive plan of creation.

This subtle difference, however, was not discerned by the disputing parties when argument over the Qur'anic doctrine of *qadar* started during the first century of the Islamic era. In their enthusiasm to defend the principle of human responsibility and protect moral values against powerful evil forces, the liberal interpreters of the term, blinded to this difference, denied any relationship between *qadar* and human deeds. Their opponents, on the other hand, advocated a harsh interpretation of the concept of *qadar*. This, however, will be discussed in greater detail in Part II of this essay, in which the dispute, the factors leading to it and its results are examined.

To be continued

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[23] *Supra*, p. 209.

PLATO AND AL-FĀRĀBĪ: A COMPARISON OF SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are some of the parallelisms between al-Fārābī's and Plato's positions regarding political philosophy in general, and the ideal state and the ruler, in particular?

I have tried, so far as I have been able, to trace the Platonic sources of certain aspects of al-Fārābī's political philosophy. This process has revealed that some elements are Platonic, but that al-Fārābī has elaborated them, in some instances has refined them, and, above all, has woven them together for the first time in the history of Islamic thought in order to suit the Islamic ordinance. This study has also revealed that certain elements in al-Fārābī's political philosophy seem to be a development original to him and have no counterpart in Plato.

al-Fārābī's political philosophy, like classical political philosophy, starts with ends. It examines how men live and what they are, and it takes its bearings by how men ought to live, and how they ought to be. [1]

al-Fārābī tells us that man is a social and political animal "and by nature each man has to be bound with other men in everything he seeks. He, therefore, needs to associate with his kind and for this reason he is called the social or political animal." [2] He must, therefore, combine with others in communities: "Man belongs to the species that cannot accomplish their necessary affairs or achieve their best state, except through the association of many groups of them in a single dwelling." [3] This notion reminds us of Plato's view of man's needs and the state:

> So, having all these needs, we call in one another's help to satisfy our various requirements; and when we have collected a number of helpers and associates to live together in one place, we call that settlement a state. [4]

al-Fārābī subdivides communities into various sizes:

> Some human societies are large, others are of medium size, still others are small. The large societies consist of many nations that associate and cooperate with one another; the medium ones consist of a nation; the small are the ones embraced by the city. These three are the perfect societies. Hence the city represents the first degree of perfection. [5]

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[1] al-Fārābī, *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* (Cairo, 1948), pp. 102 f. (quoted hereafter as *al-Madīna*).

[2] al-Fārābī, "Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda," *Rasāʾil al-Fārābī* (Hyderabad, 1345 A.H.), p. 16 (quoted hereafter as "Taḥṣīl," *Rasāʾil*).

[3] Alfarabi, "The Political Regime," translated from the Arabic by Muhsin Mahdi in *Medieval Political Philosophy* (Glencoe, 1963), p. 32.

[4] Plato, *Republic* (II. 367E-372A), p. 56.

[5] Mahdi, "al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya," *Medieval Political Philosophy* (Glencoe, 1963), p. 32.

Here we observe certain parallelisms between al-Fārābī and Plato. al-Fārābī's theory of association corresponds, with qualifications, to Plato's *polis*. However, al-Fārābī went a step further than Plato and talked about a large association comprising the whole world and the middle-sized nation. This may well be due to al-Fārābī's Islamic environment; it agrees with the universalism of Islam as a way of life. al-Fārābī adds, in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila,* that the first association in which the highest good and the utmost perfection is attainable is the city-state, not a smaller political unit. Since man is guided by free will and choice, true happiness is attainable only in the ideal state (*al-madīna al-fāḍila*).[6] For only in it do men help each other in promoting good rather than evil. Only in cities and nations would the practice of noble things and the virtues which lead to true happiness be properly and commonly practiced.[7]

Plato's views on division of labor based on man's natural aptitude can be traced in al-Fārābī's emphasis on the need of many people, who must work together each according to his ability in order to satisfy one another's needs. Plato expresses this view in the *Republic:*

> You remember how, when we first began to establish our commonwealth and several times since, we have laid down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him.[8]

al-Fārābī's emphasis on cooperation and division of labor is shown in the following passage:

> The city and the household are each composed of different parts of a determinate number, some less, some more excellent, adjacent to each other and graded in different grades, each doing a certain work independently, and there is combined from their actions mutual help towards the perfection of the aim in the city or household, except that the household is part of a city and the households are in the city, so the aims are different. Yet there is combined from these different aims, when they are perfected and combined, mutual help towards the perfection of the aim of the city.[9]

al-Fārābī's comparison of the states (city, nations, cultivated world) to the body and its members corresponds to Plato's. Just as the members of the body cooperate to achieve and preserve perfect health, so the parts of the city, the city-states of a nation, and nations of the world, cooperate to guarantee and maintain happiness through virtue and

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[6] al-Fārābī distinguishes between true happiness and imaginary happiness.
[7] *al-Madīna*, p. 97.
[8] *Republic* (IV. 427C-434D), p. 127.
[9] al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, edited and translated by D. M. Dunlop (Cambridge, 1961), p. 37 (quoted hereafter as *Fuṣūl*).

good deeds.[10] In *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, al Fārābī confines his comparison to the city and thus comes closer to Plato than in his *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*. "The city and household may be compared with the body of a man."[11] What applies to individuals also applies to cities and nations—another idea corresponding to Plato's views in the *Republic*.[12]

In the ideal city teaching and education lead to virtue and the arts. Teaching leads to the speculative virtues, and education provides ethical virtues and practical arts. al-Fārābī devotes a few pages in "Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜāda" to a detailed description of the four-fold perfection in ethical, intellectual and speculative virtues, and practical arts, the possession of which lead to ultimate happiness.[13] Careful examination of al-Fārābī's views on this subject reveals parallelisms with Plato's view on education of philosophers and guardians in his *Republic*. al-Fārābī's members of the body are of hierarchical nature; at the top stands the chief (*raᵓīs*), that is, the heart. The rank of the rest of the members varies according to their proximity to the heart. It is the same with the state. When all parts of the state serve the purpose of the chief, we have the ideal state. But whereas the members of the body function involuntarily, the citizens of the state have their will and freedom to choose.

al-Fārābī distinguishes between the 'indispensable' city, which corresponds to Plato's, and the ideal city.[14]

> The city is sometimes 'indispensable' and sometimes ideal. The indispensable (or 'minimum') city is that in which the mutual help of its members is restricted to attaining merely what is indispensable for the continuance of man, his livelihood and the preservation of his life. The ideal city is that in which the inhabitants help each other towards the attainment of the most excellent of things by which are the true existence of man, his continuance, his livelihood and the preservation of his life.[15]

Here the indispensable city seems to be contrasted absolutely with the ideal, but it is in appearance only. al-Fārābī regarded four classes of states as opposed to the ideal city: the 'ignorant' city (*al-madīna al-jāhila*), the 'unrighteous' city (*al-madīna al-fāsiqa*), the 'misguided' city (*al-madīna al-ḍālla*), and the 'altered' city (*al-madīna al-mutabaddila*).[16] Of these, in principle, the 'ignorant' city does not know the true good, and follows false goods; the 'unrighteous' city knows the true good, but does not follow it; the 'misguided' city has a distorted view

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[10] *al-Madīna*, pp. 97-98.
[11] *Fuṣūl*, p. 37.
[12] *Republic* (IV. 427C-434D).
[13] "Taḥṣīl", *Rasāᵓil*, pp. 64-72.
[14] *Republic, op. cit.* (II. 369D)
[15] *Fuṣūl*, p. 39.
[16] *al-Madīna*, p. 109.

of true good and the 'altered' city formerly held the true view, but has abandoned it. It is quite obvious from the large space devoted to the description of the 'ignorant' city in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, that this city is the most important among the states opposed to the ideal city, and unlike the others, it includes a number of distinct types. [17] When, therefore, al-Fārābī speaks of the 'indispensable' city in contrast with the ideal, he is simply introducing one of many varieties of cities which, according to his theory, expounded elsewhere, are opposed to the ideal.

The ignorant cities are discussed briefly in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, more fully in the "Siyāsa" and not at all in "Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda." Plato classified these states according to their political constitution; al-Fārābī uses some of the same terms without showing much interest in the constitutions from the political point of view. al-Fārābī, however, distinguishes more subdivisions of the state than Plato:

> As for the citizens of the ignorant cities, they are political beings. Their cities and their political associations are of many kinds, which comprise (i) indispensable associations, (ii) the association of vile men in the vile cities, (iii) the association of base men in the base cities, (iv) timocratic association in the timocratic city, (v) despotic association in the despotic city, (vi) free association in the democratic city and the city of the free. [18]

The states mentioned so far by al-Fārābī all correspond to Plato's and four of them go back to Plato's *Republic* where they are called timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. [19]

To the Platonic cities, al-Fārābī adds three more ignorant cities, namely, the vicious (*fāsiqa*), the altered (*mutabaddila*), and the erring (*ḍālla*) cities. All these three terms occur in the Qurʾān and had, therefore, a definite meaning for a Muslim. Rosenthal, commenting on these cities, observes:

> It seems plausible to assume that Alfarabi introduced them deliberately, in order by this amplification to effect an assimilation of Plato's imperfect states to Islamic nations. It is also probable that the Muslim thinker understood 'right beliefs and convictions' and their opposite in both their Platonic and Islamic meaning. [20]

If we examine al-Fārābī's and Plato's conception of the ideal form of government, we find certain parallelisms and variations in their views. In *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, al-Fārābī admits four sources of authority when he refers to the ideal city. "The chiefs and rulers of this city are of four descriptions." [21]

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[17] *al-Madīna*, pp 126-131.
[18] *Medieval Philosophical Thought*, p. 42.
[19] *Republic* (VIII. 543 A-IX. 576 B).
[20] Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1962), p. 137.
[21] *Fuṣūl*, p. 50.

The first source of authority is the King in Reality in whom are combined six conditions: wisdom, perfect practical wisdom, excellence of persuasion, excellence in producing an imaginative impression, power to fight the holy war in person, and the absence of physical impediments which would prevent him from attending to the matters which belong to the holy war.[22] In *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* al-Fārābī speaks of twelve qualities (*khaṣla*) which the ideal ruler must possess. Such qualities are innate, while the conditions do not supervene until after maturity.[23] Among the qualities of the ruler laid down in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* are the following: the ideal ruler must possess an inclusive art—the art of ruling; he must be perfect, in the sense of being a philosopher; he must have the power of representing in words what he knows; he must have the power of guiding men to happiness; and he must have the power of carrying out actions.[24]

Here we observe al-Fārābī blending certain Platonic and Islamic qualifications of the ruler; he is more inclined towards Plato in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* and more towards Islam in the *Fuṣūl*. In *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* all the twelve qualities are derived from Plato's *Republic*.[25] al-Fārābī, in the *Fuṣūl*, is very Islamic in the concept of *jihād* (holy war) which is alien to Plato. He insists that the ruler would devise methods of political oratory and utilize them in order to support his own character and to persuade the citizens and princes of certain actions when necessary.[26] This, of course, runs counter to Plato's objection to rhetoric. The ruler described here appears to be modelled more on the Islamic than on the Platonic pattern.

Another source of authority in al-Fārābī's ideal city is the group.[27] al-Fārābī distinctly realizes the possibility that no one man will possess all the requisite conditions for ruling, in which case authority will have to be shared by a group. This group may be a substitute for the rule of the ideal king. In the "Siyāsa" al-Fārābī also envisages the rule of a group of "virtuous, good and happy people" in the following passage: "And when it happens that of these kings (*mulūk*) at one time there is a group (*jamāᶜa*) either in a city or a nation or several nations, all their group is like a single king (*malik*), because of the agreement of their plans and aims."[28]

The third source of authority is the chief of the city in whom are united the following qualities: the possession of knowledge of the ancient laws and traditions which the first generation of imams

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[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *al-Madīna*, pp. 105-107.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Republic* (485-487).
[26] "Taḥṣīl," *Rasāᵓil*, p. 72.
[27] *Fuṣūl*, p. 50.
[28] Mahdi, "al-Siyāsa," *Philosophy*, p. 50.

acknowledged and by which they ruled the city; the possession of excellent discrimination of the places and conditions in which those traditions must be employed according to the purpose of the earlier generations therein; the possession of the power to produce what is not found explicit in the old traditions; further, the possession of excellence of idea and practical wisdom in the events which happen one by one and are not such as to be in the ancient traditions, in order to preserve the prosperity of the city; and the possession of excellence of rhetoric and persuasion and production of an imaginative impression. At the same time he should be able to go on to the holy war. Such a one is called the king according to the law, and his rule is called lawful kingship. [29]

This is the second ruler for whom six conditions are laid down. Perhaps the most significant feature in the present passage of the *Fuṣūl* is the naming of the man who represents the third alternative as *malik al-sunna*, the lawful king. To my knowledge, this naming does not appear anywhere else in al-Fārābī's works, and the explanation of its appearance in the *Fuṣūl* could be looked for in the *Republic* of Plato. In the *Republic* it is characteristic of the right government of monarchy and aristocracy that the laws of the city are maintained. [30] In the *Politicus*, when one man rules according to the laws, he is called king. Probably it is the latter which is the original of al-Fārābī's naming of the lawful king and not the lawful king's conditions.

The fourth source of authority is the chiefs according to the law. [31] This source occurs when no man is found in whom all the above qualities are united, but they exist separately among a group, and they together take the place of the king according to the law. This seems to be a development original to al-Fārābī and has no counterpart in Plato.

In the final analysis of authority and ruler, it is necessary to explore more fully the notion of equating al-Fārābī's imam with Plato's Philosopher-King. In his "Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda" al-Fārābī observes that the philosopher, supreme ruler, prince, legislator, and imam is but a single man:

> So let it be clear to you that the idea of the Philosopher, Supreme Ruler, Prince, Legislator, and Imam is but a single idea. No matter which one of these words you take, if you proceed to look at what each of them signifies, among the majority of those who speaks our language, you will find that they all finally agree by signifying one and the same idea. [32]

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[29] *Fuṣūl*, p. 51.
[30] *Republic* (End of Book IV).
[31] *Fuṣūl*, p. 51.
[32] "Taḥṣīl," *Rasāʾil*, p. 79.

Proceeding to look at what each of al-Fārābī's terms signifies, we find that "the legislator is he who, by the excellence of his reflection, has the capacity to find the conditions required for the actual existence of voluntary intelligibles in such a way as to lead to the achievement of supreme happiness." [33] If this legislator intends to possess a craft that is authoritative rather than subservient, "the legislator must be a philosopher." [34] The name prince signifies "sovereignty and ability." [35] To be completely able, he has to possess the power of the greatest ability which comes from possession of art, skill, and virtue. "Therefore the true prince is the same as the philosopher-legislator." [36] As to the ideal imam "it signifies merely the one whose example is followed and who is well received; that is, either his perfection is well received or his purpose is well received." [37] The supreme ruler is "he who does not need anyone to rule him in anything whatever, but has actually acquired the sciences and every kind of knowledge, and has no need of a man to guide him in anything." [38] This supreme ruler knows what he ought to do. He is able to guide others into true happiness.

Therefore, when al-Fārābī asserts that the meaning of the philosopher, supreme ruler, prince, legislator, and imam is but a single one, he creates a synthesis between Plato's Philosopher-King [39] with the ideal Islamic ruler. It has been achieved by the Greek and Islamic requirements. As was suggested earlier, this synthesis represents al-Fārābī's great contribution to Islamic political philosophy.

The focus on law in both Greek and Islamic civilizations provided the nucleus of the synthesis. But we should realize the big distinction between the *Sharīᶜa*, a divinely revealed law to the Muslim, and the *Nomos* of the Greek, the Laws of Plato, in particular. The *Sharīᶜa* guaranteed two-fold happiness, here and hereafter. Philosophy alone enabled man to understand the meaning of that law.

Generally speaking, al-Fārābī concentrates on the philosophical qualifications of the first ruler, especially in "Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜāda." In *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, he briefly talks about the dominant position of the *Sharīᶜā* as the guarantor of happiness and perfection, without giving more details of it. This is not surprising to the writer, since al-Fārābī was occupied with Plato's arrangement in the *Republic*, although this applies more to *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, "al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya," and "Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜāda," which is mainly concerned with happiness. Since it emphasizes the role of the ruler in the ideal Muslim city, it is natural

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[33] "Taḥṣīl," *Rasāᵓil*, p. 79.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 78.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] "al-Siyāsa," *Philosophy*, p. 36.
[39] *Republic* (V. 471C-VI. 487).

that al-Fārābī should devote large space to the conditions and qualities of the ideal ruler.

In the last passage of "Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜāda" al-Fārābī discusses the nature of false and vain and counterfeit philosophers. The discussion is modelled after Plato's description of the false philosopher in the *Republic*.[40] The false philosopher is "he who acquires the theoretical sciences without achieving the utmost perfection so as to be able to introduce others to what he knows in so far as their capacity permits."[41] The vain philosopher is one "who learns the theoretical sciences, but without going any further and without being habituated to doing the acts considered virtuous by a certain religion or the generally accepted noble acts."[42] The counterfeit philosopher is "he who studies the theoretical sciences without being naturally equipped for them."[43]

In conclusion then, certain parallelisms between Plato's and al-Fārābī's views on political philosophy are explicit. These parallels are especially abundant in al-Fārābī's ideas on man's association, the virtuous city, its hierarchy, its ruler, and its opposites. When al-Fārābī equates the philosopher, first ruler, king, law-giver, and imam, he completes a synthesis between Plato's Philosopher-King with the ruler of the ideal Islamic city. This synthesis represents al-Fārābī's great contribution to Islamic political philosophy.

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[40] *Republic* (VI. 487B-497A).
[41] "Taḥṣīl," *Rasāᵓil*, p. 80.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VOLUNTARY MARTYRS OF NINTH-CENTURY CÓRDOBA

(Conclusion)

These Christian leaders, then, had devised and were implementing by 850-51 (before the martyrdoms!) a careful, comprehensive program calculated to enhance and maintain Latin-Christian culture among Córdoban Christians. Their aims neither required nor anticipated the martyrdoms. Yet it may be argued that they caused the martyrdoms, indirectly, because their assertion of Latin-Christian culture in open opposition to Arabic-Islamic culture sharpened the outlines of each culture, made explicit and obvious previously implicit and muted culture conflicts and thereby prepared a confrontation situation in which bearers of each culture maintain the truth of their, and the falsehood of their opponents', faith and culture with all possible reason, authority and invective. Such confrontation situations encounter or provoke legal sanctions. In ninth-century Córdoba Islamic law was rigorous at precisely that point where Christians believed Muslims vulnerable—with respect to Muḥammad. Derogation of Muḥammad, punishable by death under Islamic law, was for Christians a most convincing demonstration of the truth of Christianity and the falsity of Islam.[51] Muslim exaction of the death penalty did not deter successive Christians from making their statement and meeting their end. Monastic and penitential asceticism, awareness of a martyr's rewards, perceptions of God's will, examples of earlier martyrs, friendship and family relations and Muslim actions against 'secret Christians' combined with earlier stimuli to motivate successive demonstrators to their deaths. Opponents of the martyrs alleged a less worthy motive, spiritual pride, which Eulogius refuted with allegations of Muslim persecution of Christians, citing such items as invective and stones directed at priests, opposition to Christian use of bells, extraordinary (monthly) taxation, destruction of church buildings and imprisonment of clergy.[52] But Eulogius wrote from prison in 851 after the first wave of the martyrdoms and during a strong reaction against them, hence it is difficult to know whether those conditions preceded or followed the martyrdoms (apparently the first

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[51] The point of the derogation was to discredit Muḥammad's claim to prophethood, thereby discrediting his message and reasserting the truth of Christianity, *for the Christians*. It was not a missionary proclamation in the sense that term bears in contemporary scholarship. Cutler omits definitions of the terms he uses, but one may gain an introduction to contemporary usages by examining the following articles in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1967): "Mission," IX, 904-05; "Missions, Catholic," IX, 924-28; "Catechesis, Missionary," III, 215-18; and "Conversion," IV, especially 287-88. Richard E. Sullivan reviewed ninth-century missionary thinking in "Carolingian Missionary Theories," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLII (1956), 273-95.

[52] Eulogius, *Memoriale sanctorum* (hereafter *MS*), I, 20-21; *PL*, CXV, 752-56.

two preceded and followed, the last two followed, and the timing of the taxation remains unclear).

The martyrdoms began in 850, perhaps while Eulogius was in northern Spain, when a monk, Perfectus, was induced by a group of Muslims to speak his mind regarding Muḥammad and Islam, upon promise of immunity from prosecution. The vehemence of his denunciation prompted some in the group to break their oath and to report him to the governmental authorities who executed him April 18, 850 (the conclusion of the fast of Ramaḍān).[53] Approximately a year later another group of Muslims induced the merchant John to similar derogation of Muḥammad—his punishment was scourging rather than death. In that same year (851) Isaac, a former Islamic government official now a monk, came from his monastery before the *qāḍī*, asked of him an explanation of Islam, and upon receiving one interrupted with a denunciation of Muḥammad which brought death on June 3, 851, making him the first voluntary martyr. Within the week seven more Christians followed his example and experienced a similar death, as did three others in late July. A strong reaction against voluntary martyrdoms ensued, and those considered responsible for them, including Eulogius, were imprisoned, but pairs of martyrs died in October and November, 851 and January, 852. For six months no martyrs appeared, but in July two 'secret Christian' married couples and a Syrian monk met death, in August two monks met martyrdom, and in September four more Christians died for denouncing Muḥammad. A week after those last deaths, the Emir ʿAbd al-Raḥmān also died and was quickly succeeded by his son Muḥammad I (852-86) who had been raised by and was especially under the influence of Malikite *fuqahāʾ*. The accession of the new Emir, who was already disliked, prompted disaffected elements within the emirate, particularly the Christians in Toledo, to rebel.[54] Hence his Muslim faith, his Malikite upbringing and political necessity combined to make him desire a cessation of Córdoban Christian martyr-seeking. To that end he persuaded Christian leaders to convoke a council in December, 852. Testimonies concerning the council are obscure, but it apparently sought a compromise by agreeing to honor the previous martyrs, discouraging other Christians from seeking martyrdom, but creating no machinery or sanctions for preventing martyrdoms. And for nine months (Sept. 16, 852-June 13, 853) there were no martyrdoms.[55] During this time Eulogius, believing the mar-

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[53] *Ibid.*, II, i; *PL*, CXV, 766-70. The following chronological sketch of the martyrdoms is drawn from the subsequent sections of this work by Eulogius.

[54] Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire*, I, 291-95.

[55] Eulogius, *MS*, II, xv, 2; *PL*, CXV, 796. The date of the council is unclear, but both Franke, 106, and Colbert, p. 249, agree in dating it 852; Colbert's arguments for a December date appear convincing. Cutler dates it 851, citing no support, and therefore concludes the council was ineffective in halting the martyrdoms Eulogius, *loc. cit.* and Albar, *IL*, chapter 16, *PL*, CXXI, 530-31, briefly and vaguely discuss the council's actions.

tyrdoms at an end because of the council's decisions, wrote his *Memoriale sanctorum* to glorify the martyrs and explain their actions, while Albar composed an *Indiculus luminosus* to enlighten the Christian community regarding the martyrs' motives.

But in June, 853, five more martyrs appeared within three days, stimulated, Eulogius wrote later, by the taunts of Muslims regarding the Christians' lack of courage. Muḥammad I, infuriated, threatened to kill all Christian men and to sell Christian women into slavery—a threat his advisers with difficulty persuaded him not to implement. He then resorted to other tactics—removing Christians from government positions and military service, levying a special tax on Christians (partly because of difficulties in collecting taxes from the provinces), destroying Christian religious buildings erected since the conquest, and pressing Christians to convert to Islam (which many did).[56] Apparently these measures were successful, since only one martyrdom (July 11, 854) occurred in the following nineteen months, during which Albar composed a continuation of his *Indiculus luminosus* consisting of a description of Muḥammad as Antichrist and containing much derogatory material concerning Muḥammad and Islam. Four martyrs appeared in April, 855, five in spring and summer 856, and two each in 857 and 859. The last six of these were persons brought before the authorities by other Muslims, and one of the two in 859 was Eulogius.[57]

It is clear, both from the dates and from the contents of the works, that Eulogius and Albar wrote in response to the martyrdoms. That is quite different from saying, as some do, that they instigated or incited the martyrdoms. Their defense and praise of the martyrs, and their attacks and slurs against Islam, are directed toward Christians, for the purpose of informing, instructing and uniting them. Franke noted how Eulogius and Albar emphasized Christian unity in their writings, and although expressing their disagreement with those Christians of different views, took care to prevent their statements from making an irre-

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[56] Eulogius, *MS*, III, i-vii, *PL*, CXV, 800-05; the threat is at the end of this passage. Convinced the martyrdoms were concluded (*jam finisse opusculum credebamus*) because of the council's actions, Eulogius concluded (as he supposed) his work with a long prayer. Book III is obviously a later composition, stimulated by the unexpected appearance of new martyrs. Since Eulogius treats matters in chronological order throughout his work, it seems certain that Muḥammad I's threat was provoked by Fandila's martyrdom. Cutler, positing a "martyrs' movement" whose "leaders" sought political revolution and dating the council too early, gives Muḥammad I's quashed threat (erroneously cited) the status of policy in an attempt to explain why the "movement" was so quiescent at the precise time (the first nine months of the rule of a new and unpopular Emir) when revolution could best be launched, as Toledo demonstrated. Instead of "explaining" the evidence, his "hypotheses and guesses" cause him to contradict and distort it.

[57] Albar, *Vita Eulogii*, chapter IV-V, *PL*, CXV, 714-18. Cutler claims Eulogius defended the God-given right of Christian priests to proselytize among Muslims, though saying earlier in the paragraph (art, 326) that Eulogius defended the right of priests to receive and instruct converts from Islam. Leocritia, martyred shortly after Eulogius, was already a Christian before he harbored her.

mediable split among Córdoban Christians.[58] Since a division of the community would invalidate their efforts to reassert Latin-Christian culture, their care is comprehensible. Incorporation of the unexpected but dramatic martyrdoms into the context of their program presented a significant challenge, to which their longer, later writings were their successful response. Their conveyance of important and complicated ideas and events with emotion and fervor in good if somewhat ornate Latin demonstrated and furthered their emphasis upon Latin language and literature. The 'heresy' of Islam became the almost exclusive focus of their lengthy and influential attacks. And they showed in their works how the asceticism and Christian spirituality they championed contributed to, culminated in and benefited from the deeds of the martyrs. The same three features of their program were present before, remained constant during and gained importance after the martyrdoms. Eulogius symbolized and epitomized this intimate connection of thought and life, idea and activity in all his work and perfected it by his own martyrdom which (along with that of a Muslim maiden he had protected and instructed in Christianity) proved to be the last of the decade.

Briefly, then, the significance of the voluntary martyrs of ninth-century Córdoba was the crystallization and exemplification of an ideology which polarized relations between Christianity and Islam, between Latin-Christian and Arabic-Islamic culture into explicit and lasting ideological conflict.[59] Both ideology and utopia are, according to Mannheim, "situationally transcendent ideas" (accounts purportedly accurate but in some respects false or inaccurate of the situation in which a society or group finds itself) differentiated by the fact that "ideologies never succeed *de facto* in the realization of their projected contents" while utopias "succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one more in accord with their own conceptions."[60] Watt elaborated that distinction, useful for historical analysis, by asserting that "in practice . . . an ideology is the ideational system of a class which is content with the existing social and political system... while a utopia is the ideational system of a class which is dissatisfied with the existing system."[61] Utilizing this distinction Watt affirms that movements pass through preliminary stages in which there may be naive activity without ideation or ideation unduly developed

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[58] Franke, *passim*, especially 168-70.

[59] Franke, with his knowledge of Eastern Christian anti-Islamic polemic, noted several 'firsts' in the work of the Córdobans. If the recent arguments of Armand Abel concerning "Le chapitre CI du Livre des Hérésies de Jean Damascène: son inauthenticité," *Studia Islamica*, XIX (1963), 5-25, are accepted, the Córdobans may be judged to have still more 'firsts' to their credit in this field.

[60] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1936; citations from paperback edition, New York, 1968), pp. 194-96.

[61] W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society* (London, 1961), p. 254; what follows is from that page and pp. 81-86.

beyond activity (priority of ideation to activity appears especially in utopias) to secondary stages in which the question of adjusting ideation and activity to a new situation arises, and finally reach maturity in a marriage of ideation and activity. But finding Mannheim's distinction ultimately unsuitable for his purposes, Watt finally applies the term ideology to all "situationally transcendent ideas." In this sense ideology is characterized by a failure to apprehend the world as it really is, and by provision of moral justification for actions which, seen in a wider context, are immoral. Linked with such an ideological ideation is an inflation of ego-consciousness, which is bound up with awareness of separation from others; hence ideology is usually found in a group's conception of itself over against other groups. Using the term ideology in Watt's final sense, we see the Córdoban Christian activity conforms to his model and to Mannheim's utopia. Eulogius and Albar, as educated intellectuals dissatisfied with the existing system, sought change by teaching and writing (ideation developed beyond activity). The appearance of the martyrs (naive activity without ideation) and the change of rulers produced a new situation, to which the two responded by elaborating and intensifying the treatment of their previous themes, thereby ultimately wedding ideation and activity (a consummation epitomized by the conclusion of the martyrdoms with the death of Eulogius and his protégée).

Through life under Muslim rule, men with sufficient cultural and religious training to assess the situation competently and comprehensively perceived the two cultures as radically and totally opposed. From that perception, several conclusions followed. As Islamic political control facilitated conversions to Islam, so Christian political control was indispensable for the flourishing of Christianity. Since Islam was "irremediably hostile, remaining as the symbol of determined opposition to all that was Christian and contributing in this way by the force of contrast to form and to determine the awareness of a Christian unity which continued to call itself now and always *res publica christiana*," resistance to it must be a united and unified Christian resistance, religious-ideological as well as political-military, to achieve earthly success and to obtain divine aid.[62] As a protest against the existing order, utopian ideation is aware from an early stage of the need for disintegration of the existing social tradition. While the Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius promised Christians in Syria and Francia that the King of the Romans (aided by God, of course) would overcome Muslim ascendancy by political-military means, and the Charlemagne epic and the cult of Santiago reinforced that hope, the Córdoban leaders

[62] Watt, *ibid.*, p. 257, observes that Western pride in its thorough study of the Orient may be due to the West thinking about the Orient imperialistically and to the Western belief that knowledge gives power; the observation appears applicable to Eulogius and Albar. The quotation is from Raoul Manselli, "La Res publica christiana e l'Islam," *L'Occidente e l'Islam*, 125.

clearly thought that disintegration would be God's work—a position enhanced by the conviction that God permitted the existing order of Muslim ascendancy as punishment for Christian sins. Hence Albar portrayed Muḥammad as Antichrist, and carefully calculated the end of Antichrist's hegemony and the time of God's decisive apocalyptic act. [63]

Besides the Antichrist-apocalyptic theme, the Córdoban anti-Islamic writings convey both factual data and vicious polemic. Among the factual data are comments regarding Islamic toleration of and treaties with religious groups, use of the lunar calendar, permission to kill adversaries (one sense of *jihād*), opposition to religious images, belief in the incorporeality of God, and accurate details about the life of Muḥammad and early Islamic history. While the writers could assume much knowledge of these matters on the part of their local readers, Albar proposed to compose a work setting forth Muslim beliefs and practices. And of course the application of Muslim law was clearly understood and keenly felt. In polemic Muḥammad's claims to be a prophet are rejected (he offered no miracles, was inspired by the devil [an evil vulture with a golden mouth] and derived his teachings from Christianity) and his moral character slandered (both in the specific matter of the taking of Zayd's wife and in the more generalized allegations of superhuman sexual potency and lust, revolting to those sharing the austerities of monastic and penitential life). He is termed an animal (because of his illiteracy) and a preacher to animals, his excessive pride and the allegedly sexual nature of the paradise he preached are criticized, and the depiction of his death and the fate of his corpse are intended to discredit his prophetic claims completely. And Albar described the Muslims, in stark contrast to Christian monastic asceticism, as:

> swollen in pride, haughty with swollen hearts, languid in the enjoyment of carnal acts, gourmands in eating, usurpers in the seizing of things and greedy in the pillage of the poor, grasping without any feelings, liars without shame, false without discrimination, impudent with no modesty of mind, cruel without mercy,

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[63] The apparently contradictory patterns of intense human activity and extreme reliance on divine action are familiar phenomena in deterministic systems (examples from Calvinism and Communism readily come to mind, as does Watt's book *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* [London, 1948]). Albar (*IL*, XXI, *PL*, CXXI, 536), writing in A.D. 854, calculated Muslim hegemony had endured for 229 years and would terminate in 16 years, that is in 870, not 863 as Cutler (art., 329, n. 40) states. The Leyre Life dates Muḥammad's rise in A.D. 618 (Spanish era 656) and his death ten years later (Spanish era 666), cited by Eulogius, *Liber apologeticus martyrum*, 16, *PL*, CXV, 859. Southern, pp. 24-25, and Cutler emphasize the symbolism of 666 in conjunction with the biblical book of Revelation, but the Córdobans make no explicit reference to that number. Colbert, pp. 287-88, 335-36, elucidates the errors, stemming mainly from confusion of Islamic lunar years with Christian solar years, which produced the erroneous dates. The following survey of Córdoban anti-Islamic polemic is based upon the Leyre Life and part II, sections 21-35, of *IL*.

> usurping without justice, without honor or truth, knowing neither benignant affection nor the feeling for godliness, following modes and fads, foppish, sly, crafty, and besmirched with the dregs of all evils, not moderately so but mainly so, deriding humility as madness, spurning chastity as something dirty, detracting virginity as rust or mildew, trading upon the virtues of the soul with the vice of the body, showing their own morals in their dress and actions. [64]

The discrediting of Muḥammad and Islam always had the intention of persuading Christians rather than converting Muslims, hence the themes resemble those in Eastern Christian anti-Islamic writings. [65] Thus these Córdoban Christians, men who knew Islam and understood it rather well, by writing and acting for certain immediate practical purposes were important and probably decisive in the formation of the 'image' of Islam in the West.

In attempting to understand those purposes it is helpful to recall that men accept an ideation because they hold it to be true, and tend to regard as true those ideas which best support the course of action to which their interests lead them. Since human activity, for both individuals and groups, tends to be an integrated whole, based on a coherent view (both of particular situations and of the universe in general) accepted as true by those who act upon it, one way of influencing the activities of one's opponents is to show them mistaken about some point in their view of the universe or ideational system on the basis of a criterion which both parties accept. This search for a mutually acceptable criterion may lead by a process of argument and counter-argument between two differing groups to extremely recondite matters. But Eulogius and Albar rest their criticisms upon criteria acceptable only to Christians (the extensive citation from Scripture, which the Muslims viewed as corrupt is one striking example). [66] Thus the two Córdoban authors demonstrate the errors of Islam and the validity of Christianity, thereby increasing Christian solidarity and working in another way to realize the goal of unity among Christians.

In addition to those evidences of growing Christian unity and influence within Islamic Spain, the Córdoban events also affected other Christian territories. In 884 the relics of Eulogius and his protégée were translated to Oviedo, along with a manuscript of Eulogius'

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[64] *IL*, XXXI, *PL*, CXXI, 551; tr. Colbert, pp. 297-98.

[65] Franke, *passim*, relying on Georg Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur*, 3 vols. (Vatican City, 1949-51), indicates the resemblance of the two polemics and their direction toward Christians rather than Muslims. Cutler, seemingly unaware of these and other examinations of Eastern Christian writing regarding Muslims, erroneously terms this field of study an "uncharted wilderness."

[66] Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, pp. 263-66, discusses Muslim views of the Christian Scriptures.

writings, thus insuring that persons in the Asturias knew of the Córdoban developments. Apparently the Leyre Life of Muḥammad also circulated there.[67] And Christians from Islamic Spain moved north to occupy lands reconquered by Christians and abandoned by their former Muslim inhabitants. Some of the migrants were monks, who brought Mozarab liturgy (possibly including data concerning the martyrs) and monastic organization. Here they may have encountered refugees from north of the Pyrenees, fleeing from ninth-century foes and bringing with them Frankish feudalism and reformed (Smaragdan and later Cluniac) Benedictine monasticism.[68] Those movements and contacts, as well as the more usual ones of commerce, diplomacy and war, enabled communication of information, ideas and ideology between Córdoba and the Christian states of Western Europe to occur. That communication facilitated the incorporation of Christian Spain in the *res publica christiana*, through the circulation of the Charlemagne epic, the development of the pilgrim routes to Santiago, and the contacts of Gallegan with Mozareb and Benedictine monasticism. Thus by the end of the ninth century Santiago was an 'international attraction,' the Charlemagne epic was better developed, and writers of history in the Asturias viewed their topic ideologically. In the ninth-century revival of the Spanish historical tradition there are two separate strands of interpretation: the royal tradition (in the Chronicle of Alfonso III) with a political-military ideology which saw repopulation as a royal achievement, sought to exclude the clergy from government, and viewed reconquest as basically a military matter; and the clerical tradition (in the Chronicle of Roda) which saw repopulation as the Church's work, the clergy as having a right to an important share in the government, and the reconquest as God's achievement (as the Muslim conquest had been the result of His vengeance). The clerical party exhibited strong anti-Muslim passions, which led it to falsify Visigothic history.[69] Not confronted with the questions of *Realpolitik* which might require a monarch to negotiate with a Muslim ruler, churchmen espoused the religious-ideological view and had the intellectual and religious training to accept and transmit it.

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[67] *Breviarum Ovetensis*, cited in *España Sagrada*, X, 457.

[68] Aimé Lambert, "Astorga," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, IV, 1199-1226; Charles J. Bishko, "Salvus of Albelda and Frontier Monasticism in Tenth-Century Navarre," *Speculum*, XXIII (1948), 569-78, 584-88; Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, tr. L. A. Manyon (Chicago, 1961), pp. 186-87; Watt and Cachia, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Colbert, chapter IV and works therein cited.

[69] *Chronicle* of Alfonso III, *España Sagrada*, XIII, appendix VII (*PL*, CXXIX, 1111-24); *Chronicle* of Roda, ed. Manuel Gómez Moreno, "Las primeras crónicas de la Reconquista: El ciclo de Alfonso III," *Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia*, C (1932), 609-21; both in Zacarías García-Villada, *Crónica de Alfonso III* (Madrid, 1918). Distinction between the two traditions is best made by David, pp. 119-84, 313-28. The tradition of reconquest as the king's work informs the *Revelations* of Pseudo-Methodius, while reconquest as God's work is Albar's theme.

North of the Pyrenees opposition to Muslims as political-military foes was reinforced with the ideation of the *res publica christiana*, the ideas in the Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius and the Carolingian imperial ideal and its expansionism. But that formal and largely uninformed opposition to Islam was strengthened by ideology stemming from actual experience of life and death under Islamic rule and more knowledge of Islam and Muḥammad. If the Leyre Life reached Pamplona from southern Spain, as d'Alverny supposes, it could have contributed to that ideological development, despite the frequently hostile relations of Basques and Franks.[70] While Christians died in warfare against Muslims in eighth-century Francia, only in the ninth century were such deaths regarded as martyrdoms, a development possibly influenced by knowledge of the Córdoban martyrs. In 858 two monks of the future St. Germain des Prés, thwarted in their quest for relics in Muslim-devastated Valencia, and learning in Barcelona of the deaths of Christians in Córdoba "under ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān," went there and eventually returned to Paris with the remains of three of the martyrs. An account of their journey, written by the monk Aimoin, circulated in lands north of the Pyrenees and informed many of the Córdoban events.[71] No evidence exists of direct literary borrowing from Eulogius and Albar; Cutler's arguments for that collapse under scrutiny.[72] But there are increasing evidences in the tenth century of ideological hostility to Muslims. Liudprand, bishop of Cremona, who wrote his *Antapodosis* at the inspiration of the Spanish churchman Reccemund, castigates King Hugh of Provence for making a treaty with the Fraxinet Muslims in order to deal with a rival for the throne.[73] Clearly he

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[70] D'Alverny, 587-88.

[71] Aimoin, *De Translatione SS. Martyrum Georgii Monachi, Aurelii et Nathaliae ex urbe Corduba Parisios, PL,* CXV, 939-60.

[72] Cutler, art., 334-38. Since the Leyre Life had an independent manuscript tradition (see note 26 above) similarities to that Life in other writings can be explained without recourse to the Córdobans. The devouring of Muḥammad's corpse by dogs is mentioned by John of Seville in a brief life of Muḥammad which differs from the Leyre Life in other ways and may also have a different chain of transmission which does not involve the Córdobans. The change from dogs (polemically significant in Islamic Spain, since Muslims considered dogs extremely unclean, using "Christian dogs" as a frequent insult) to pigs, hated by Jews, suggests the close relationship between anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish polemic The alleged influences of the Córdobans upon the *chansons de geste* were discussed by C. Meredith Jones, "The Conventional Saracen of the Songs of Geste," *Speculum,* XVII (1942), 201-25 (cited by Cutler, diss, but omitted from art.). Jones noted the dogs-pigs shift and observed (224): "The newly converted Saracens in the songs have all the militant zeal of proselytes... The alacrity with which they accept Christianity is only matched by the conventionality of the lines in which the conversions are described," suggesting that what Cutler deems influence may well be literary convention. Mark of Toledo and St. Francis, both of whom came to Spain and had special reasons for seeking out and reading the works of the Córdobans, may be influenced by them Daniel's assertion (*Islam and the West,* p. 6) that "on the whole, the Martyrs' Movement has no close literary ties with later Western writers" remains valid.

[73] Liudprand, *Antapodosis,* V, 9, 16-17, tr F. W. Wright, *The Works of Liudprand of Cremona* (New York, 1930).

and his overlord, the emperor Otto I, considered it the duty of a Christian prince and head of the *res publica christiana* to oppose Muslims. As these Muslims became stronger after that abortive campaign of 942, Otto attempted to negotiate their removal by sending John, of the monastery of Gorze in Lorraine, in an embassy to the Spanish caliph ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān III. John's biographer observed "that sacrilegious and profane king, since he was a Saracen and was utterly alien from the true faith, ... vomited forth all sorts of blasphemy regarding Christ." [74] And the tenth century affords several examples of Christians uniting to defeat Muslims at various points in Europe.

It is tempting to suppose that when Pope John VIII (872-82) with Theophanes' "Life of Muḥammad" at his disposal (through the translation of Anastasius, the Vatican librarian), seeking Christian unity for the purpose of opposing Muslims and freeing Christian territory from them, writing out of the ideological tradition of the *res publica christiana*, the unity of *christianitas* which had developed in pre-Islamic times, and in contact with Oviedo wrote of those who died fighting Islam as martyrs, he was influenced by the Córdobans. [75] Certainly in him, in Liudprand and in John of Gorze's biographer, two strands of Christian ideology—the generalized idea of Western Christian unity and the more particularized one of the total resistance of that Christian unity to Islam—are commingled. Also suggestive of such a conjunction of ideologies is Pope Sylvester II who studied in the Spanish March, perhaps visited Córdoba, and held ideas of the political-ideological unity of Christians which led him and Otto III (whose father had fought Muslims and whose Byzantine ties through his mother directed his attention toward the Mediterranean) to the grand conception of the Restauratio Imperii Romanorum. [76]

Another locus of this conjunction is Cluny. The capture by Fraxinet-based Muslim raiders of the Cluniac abbot Maiolus produced a long-sought Christian unity in the Midi which achieved the elimination of that pirate nest (972). It also produced the (to that time) most knowledgeable writing about Islam north of the Pyrenees. [77] Utilizing its

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[74] *Vita Iohannis Gorziensis, MGH, Scriptores,* IV, 370.

[75] Letter in *PL,* CXXVI, 816. For an overview of John's attitudes toward Muslims, see Fred E. Engreen, "Pope John the Eighth and the Arabs," *Speculum,* XX (1945), 318-30.

[76] Manselli, *art. cit.,* traces that development. See also Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh, 1957; New York, 1966), chapter I.

[77] Ralph Glaber, *Historiarum libri V, MGH, Scriptores,* VII, 54. Glaber notes Muslim reading of prophets of Jews and Christians, and knows something of their genealogy from Abraham and of the claims of Muḥammad to be a prophet. Other evidence of Cluniac interest in Spain is provided by Galterius, *Vita Anastasii, PL,* CXLIX, 423-30; Cutler, "Who Was the 'Monk of France' and When Did He Write?" *Al-Andalus,* XXVIII (1963), 249-69; Paul Alphandéry, *La Chrétienté et l'idée de croisade,* I (Paris, 1954), part I chapter I; Marcelin Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne aux XIe et XIIe siècles* (Paris, 1949), pp. 17-47.

extensive resources and fortunate in its secular control, the Cluniacs renewed and enlarged the total approach to Islam practiced by the Córdobans. Study of Islam and Arabic, missionary expeditions to Islamic Spain, control of pilgrimage routes to Santiago, espousal of the values of the Charlemagne legend and of warfare against Islam, emphasis upon disciplined and vital spiritual life, and opposition to heresy characterized the order and placed it, perhaps consciously, in the Córdoban tradition.

The culmination of this historical and ideological development was holy war, in which a hopefully united Christendom confronted a supposedly united Islam (and Judaism!) thus legitimizing intolerance and glorifying martyrdom. Surely it is significant that Pope Urban II, a former Cluniac monk, after a visit to Cluny first preached the crusade in southern France, and that warriors from that area joined readily and numerously in the fight against Islam both in Spain and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus the acts and writings of those few Córdoban Christians, and the ideas and attitudes those acts and writings expressed, came to form an important strand of ideology which, when combined with the papally developed ideology of the *res publica christiana*, provided the motivation for the crusades, the outlines of the 'image' of Islam and Muslims most Christians had and in some measure still have, and the stimulus for Christian missions to Muslims, and thereby shaped subsequent European history in ways scholars are still elucidating.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE MODERN EGYPTIAN NOVEL*

Modern Arabic literature had its beginning in the second half of the last century, when the lands of the Middle East started to emerge, under the impact of the West, from their prolonged medieval stagnation.

Classical Arabic literature flourished during the first six centuries of Islam (7th-12th centuries A.D.), but when processes of decline set in, literary creativity too was sapped and virtually came to a halt. It was the confrontation and acquaintance with Western culture that stimulated a literary revival.

The Western cultural influence in the Arab lands was particularly noticeable in two places: in the Christian communities of Syria and in Cairo. In the Christian communities in Syria, a considerable number of young people learned European languages and were impressed by Western ideas as a result of the educational activities of the Christian missions. In Cairo there was a growing number of Egyptians who had been sent to Europe to acquire knowledge of Western sciences and technological skills, or had been trained in Egypt in the newly founded Western-type schools. Many of those young men were anxious to effect a cultural *renaissance* in their countries. The emergence of modern Arabic literature is an aspect of the work of these men. [1]

The literary movement in Egypt gained significantly by the fact that many of the Christian-Syrian or, as they are sometimes called, the Syro-Lebanese writers migrated from Ottoman-ruled Syria to Egypt, where they found greater freedom of expression. Thus the Egyptian literary scene became richer in talent and in cultural interests. In fact, the introduction of the novel into Egyptian literature is bound up with the activity of those Syro-Lebanese writers.

It must be recalled that classical Arabic narrative prose consisted of short disconnected anecdotes without any extended plot. [2] Nor was there in Arabic a tradition of epic poetry that could serve as a basis for the development of the novel. Thus in the field of fiction, Western literary models were all important, and the introduction of the novel *genre* into Arabic is an instance of cultural borrowing.

The above-mentioned émigré Syro-Lebanese writers, who were very active in journalism, translated or adapted novels from European languages—not always of the highest literary merit—and published them

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* For a general survey of contemporary Egyptian authors, see K. Schoonover in *M.W.*, XLV (1955), 26-36 and 359-370; also, XLVII (1957), 36-45. [Ed.]

[1] On the early stages of the development of modern Arabic literature, see H. A. R. Gibb, "Studies in Contemporary Arabic Literature," in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston, 1962), pp. 245-319

[2] Cf. G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, 2nd edition (London, 1961), pp. 98-99.

in installments in their journals. Most of the novels published in this manner were detective or love stories intended to whet the reader's curiosity and make him buy the following issues as well. Several of the Syro-Lebanese writers tried their hand at writing more serious novels. Notable among them were Jurjī Zaydān and Farah Anṭūn. The former composed a long series of historical romances taken from Arab history; the latter wrote novels of a philosophical-didactic nature, in which the story was merely a cloak for sermonizing on moral and social issues. One feature common to all the novels, whether serious or otherwise, by the Syro-Lebanese writers is that none of them depict the social reality of Egypt. At the same time, it would be wrong to belittle their importance, for it is owing to them that the novel as a literary form was made familiar to Egyptian readers and to the Arabic reading public as a whole. The following generation of writers who were themselves Egyptian-born were already able to make use of this form.

The first novel by a writer actually born in Egypt was published in 1914. This novel was *Zaynab* (a woman's name) by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal.[3]

The story can be briefly told: Ḥāmid, son of the village landlord, is attracted to one of the village girls, Zaynab, and has a rather innocent flirtation with her. Zaynab falls in love with a youth of the village called Ibrāhīm but is married by her parents to another young man. She is loyal to her husband and is torn between her true love and her duty, a clash which affects her health; and when Ibrāhīm, her loved one, is drafted into military service, her illness is aggravated and she dies. Parallel to this main theme there is a subsidiary plot: the love of Ḥāmid for his cousin, a town-bred girl. When his hopes for marriage with her are frustrated, he runs away from home.

In his critique of this story Gibb says: "The plot is, on the whole, too thin to sustain four hundred pages of type, and the book has other defects as a novel..."[4] It is overloaded with numerous lengthy descriptions of landscape scenery. It also abounds in reflections by young Ḥāmid on various social problems and social evils, especially the position of women. The young protagonist is critical of the outworn customs which, he believes, are at the root of the tragedy. His position reflects the attitude taken by the Egyptian modernists, who called for the emancipation of women.

Many critics both Arab and Western often acclaimed this novel as a 'realistic novel.' In a sense this definition of the novel as 'realistic' is justified, for, by contrast with the historical novels of Zaydān and the didactic novels of Anṭūn, Haykal's novel did deal with Egyptian social reality. However its 'realism' does not go any further than that. Its mode

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[3] The present discussion of *Zaynab* owes much to Gibb's analysis of this novel; cf. Gibb, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-294.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

is rather romantic; the village scenes are painted as idyllic, pastoral tableaux.

The author chose to publish the book anonymously; the subtitle of the original edition reads: "Country Scenes and Manners by an Egyptian Peasant." The author probably was embarrassed about disclosing his identity because of the autobiographical element in the book. He also may have preferred to publish his book anonymously because the novel had not been fully recognized by that time as a serious art form in Arabic literature. Whatever the reason, the second edition of *Zaynab*, published some fifteen years later, bore the author's name. In his introduction to the second edition Haykal recalls the circumstances under which he composed it: he was then a student in Paris and suffered from homesickness, and it was in this mood that he wrote *Zaynab*. This fact may account for the lengthy idyllic descriptions of the Egyptian countryside which overburden the book.

Zaynab quite obviously is the product of an inexperienced writer. However, its significance far transcends its intrinsic literary value: with it the novel became, so to speak, naturalized in Egyptian literature.

It should be recalled that the classically inclined literati in Egypt expressed resentment and distaste for this new genre. They argued that the novel was an alien importation and, furthermore, that there was no real need for this imported literary form, because the traditional forms of *risāla, maqāma* and *qaṣīda* were quite sufficient as modes of authentic literary expression.[5] However, that criticism had very little effect on the course of literary development.

Zaynab was the early forerunner of a whole series of novels by young Egyptian writers, all of whom were Haykal's contemporaries. Those novels were published fifteen to twenty years later than *Zaynab* and their literary technique is more refined; however, they share with *Zaynab* some common features. The hero is a young man who has received modern education and has become psychologically alienated from his environment. All those novels are, in a sense, confessions. Another central theme of *Zaynab* was to recur again and again in most subsequent Egyptian novels: the question of the inferior status of women and their seclusion in Egyptian society.

Haykal and the other authors of his generation played a leading role in the Egyptian cultural scene in the period delimited by the two world wars (1914-1945). The most important literary figure in this group of writers is Ṭāhā Ḥusayn. He also is the Arabic writer whose name is best known to Westerners. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn represents a fruitful blending of Arabic heritage and European education at its best. It is therefore of some interest to present a brief biography.[6]

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 296-398.

[6] For further information, see Pierre Cachia, *Taha Husayn*, London, 1956.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn was born in a village in upper Egypt in 1889. He became blind in early childhood, but nevertheless was able to prove his great capacity for learning. Having completed the traditional training in Qurʾān in his village, he was sent—a thirteen-year-old boy—to the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo, al-Azhar. In al-Azhar too, he came to be known for his brilliance, unusual memory and insatiable intellectual curiosity. After a couple of years in al-Azhar he became very dissatisfied with the outworn uncritical methods of learning and the tradition-bound outlook of the teachers. After some sharp disputes with his teachers in al-Azhar he left it to join the newly founded, European-style Egyptian University, where he studied Arabic literature under European orientalists. After receiving a doctoral degree in Cairo he was sent to continue his education in France where he studied classical literature and sociology and received another doctoral degree. Upon his return to Egypt he was appointed to teach at the Cairo University. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn had a very active career: in teaching at the university, in public discussions on controversial issues, in political activity and, of course, in writing. He was a very productive author with a wide and variegated range of interest: his works include studies of classical Arabic literature, translations from European languages, historical studies and historical romance, essays, short stories and novels.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn won his fame as a novelist by his autobiographical book *al-Ayyām* ("Days"). The first volume of this book describes his childhood in his native village, the second, his adolescent years at al-Azhar.[7] In another work of fiction, partly autobiographical, he tells the story of a young Egyptian intellectual whom he met at the university in Cairo. As the author (who tells the story in the first person) gets to know the hero of the story, he learns that they both come from the same village and, indeed, knew each other as boys. This may be a hint that the hero of this novel is in fact the alter-ego of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn. The name of this man is *Adīb*, a noun that can be translated as 'a man of letters'; *Adīb*, the name of the hero, is also the title of the novel.[8] It is quite obvious that Ṭāhā Ḥusayn gave his hero that name in order to signify that his protagonist is representative of Egypt's new intelligentsia. Adīb is alienated from the traditional way of life and is attracted to European culture. As an outstanding student at Cairo University he could be sent to complete his studies in France, but only unmarried students can go and Adīb is married. So Adīb divorces his wife and is free to go abroad. In France Adīb is morally confused; finding himself in a society where free social intercourse between men and women is standard, he is repeatedly attracted to amorous affairs

[7] *al-Ayyām* Part I was published in 1929; Part II, ten years later There are English translations of this book: Part I, *An Egyptian Childhood*, tr. by E. H. Paxton, London, 1932; Part II, *The Stream of Days; a Student at the Azhar*, tr. by H. Wayment, 2 nd revised ed., London, 1948.

[8] *Adīb* was published in 1935; French translation by Amina and Moenis Taha-Hussein, *Adīb, ou L'aventure occidentale*, Cairo, 1960

and does not persist in his academic program. The anxiety of Adīb intensifies when the war (World War I) breaks out; for him Paris is the peak and the quintessence of European civilization and now it is in danger of being conquered and destroyed. Adīb is crushed by his anxieties and ends in a mental hospital.

The despair which pervades this novel is by no means unique to Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's protagonist; most of the young intellectual characters in the Egyptian novels are morally and intellectually confused and forlorn.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn also attempted the composition of novels which successfully depict other aspects of the Egyptian society and present other types of characters. He wrote a novel called *Duʿāʾ al-Karawān* ("The Call of the Plover"). [9] This is a story of a curious relationship between a poor girl of Bedouin background and an engineer, in whose house she comes to serve as a maid. The elder sister of our heroine had worked before in the house of this engineer who was a rich, frivolous, young man; he had seduced her and when she became pregnant she left his house and was murdered by her uncle who, acting according to the Bedouin code of honor, wanted to save the family from disgrace. The younger sister had one desire, to avenge herself on the engineer for the disaster which he had brought upon her sister. But when she comes to his house as a maid he falls passionately in love with her. At first she rejects him with contempt but, gradually and after profound emotional struggle, she responds to his love. In the end, love prevails over hatred and class distinctions, and the two are duly married. The work excels in depicting subtle psychological turns and it has some beautiful lyrical parts.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn was the first Egyptian writer to produce a 'family saga'; in it he presents the life of a middle-class Egyptian family in a small town over a span of three generations around the turn of the century. [10]

What is the nature of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's greatness as a novelist? He has a remarkable capacity for grasping social milieu and has shown psychological perception which is compassionate as much as it is keen. On the other hand, he fails to build up his novels according to an architectonic plan. The excellence is in the *texture* rather than the *structure*. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn quite consciously treats language as the raw material of his art. His characteristic stylistic technique is the use of parallelism: many of his sentences are composed of two or three parallel parts. The parallel phrases can be synonymous, complementary or contrasting. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn works with his verbal tools like a carver. He carves the same line twice or thrice at slightly different angles to achieve greater

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9 Published in 1938; French trans. by Raymond Francis, *L'appel du Karaouan*, Lebanon, 1963.

10 The name of this novel is *Shajarat al-Buʾs* ("The tree of misery"), published in 1944. Cf. M. Milson, "Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's 'The Tree of Misery': A Literary Expression of Cultural Change," *Asian and African Studies*, III (1967), 69-99

precision or a finer shade. At the same time this stylistic technique has a strong rhythmic effect. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn is superbly equipped for this verbal art: he has a masterly knowledge of Arabic language and Arabic literature and uses this material expertly and lovingly to effect his aesthetic purposes. He is unique among modern Arabic writers in his approach to the art of language and his accomplishment in it—unmatched.

As we turn to the period following World War II we see that the novel has become a very popular literary form, and a new generation of writers has been producing a large number of novels. Many of these authors specialize in the novel form, unlike those of the previous generation who used this form only occasionally. One obvious reason for the remarkable growth in literary output is the tremendous increase in the number of readers.

Typical representatives of the postwar novelists (still active and popular) are: Iḥsān ᶜAbd al-Quddūs, Yūsuf al-Sibāᶜī and ᶜAbd al-Ḥalīm ᶜAbdallāh. Compared with writers of the earlier generation, they are more adept in the technique of narrative structure. However, when we consider the contents of their work we do not find it very inspiring. Their plots mostly present banal variations on the themes of 'one man and two women' or 'two men and three women.' Their style is equally banal and cliché-ridden.

When criticized for the depravity of the protagonists of their stories, these writers answer that their purpose is to expose and condemn those characters of the upper bourgeoisie who thrived under the *ancien régime*.

I would like to quote some of the observations of Dr. Louis ᶜAwaḍ, a well-known Egyptian critic, on these writers:[11]

> There we have *la vie en rose* type of fiction, or benevolent bourgeois criticism of the frailties of bourgeois society, or two dimensional descriptions of the untortured sexual behavior of the bourgeois animal. It was probably their militant and disenchanted individualism, so popular and so vigorous in the late 'forties and throughout the 'fifties that nipped in the bud the school of Social Realism in the field of fiction, eclipsed such fine but diffident talents as . . . [here ᶜAwaḍ mentions a few names] and made it extremely difficult for them to find a larger audience.

To be sure, ᶜAwaḍ's remarks are heavily ridden with Marxist terminology but, in substance, they are right.

A refreshingly new approach to the presentation of reality in literature is displayed in the novel *al-Arḍ* ("The Land") by ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sharqāwī. *Al-Arḍ* (published in 1954) is a story about the

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[11] Louis Awad, "Cultural and Intellectual Development in Egypt since 1952" in *Egypt since the Revolution*, ed. P. J. Vatikiotis (London, 1968), pp. 150-151.

life of the fellahin (peasants) in a small village. The location of the story is enough to distinguish this novel from most of the Egyptian novels which are set in Cairo or some other big city and depict the milieu of the upper bourgeoisie or the middle class. In style too, *al-Arḍ* is markedly different, for its author wrote all the dialogue in this book in the Egyptian colloquial rather than literary Arabic. This was a bold and interesting experiment. Other novelists, if they used the colloquial at all, used only few and scattered colloquial expressions in order to add some spice to their language. The consistent use of the colloquial dialect for all the parts of conversation in *al-Arḍ* was part of the author's attempt to present the raw reality as directly as possible.

al-Arḍ is based on the author's memories of his native village in Upper Egypt in the 'thirties. The story unfolds as seen by a thirteen-year-old boy, who returns to his village from Cairo for his summer vacation. It centers on the struggle of the villagers against a plan to build a road through their fields using up their land, a road that is to serve solely the interests of a rich landowner whose estate is adjacent to the village. The government favors the rich landowner and tries to force the villagers to surrender. They suffer arrest and torture with perseverance but do not give up their rights. al-Sharqāwī tells about the conflicts which the fellahin have with the government irrigation supervisors and between each other over water rights, and he describes their prejudices, fears, hunger and love.

The picture brought out in this novel is radically different from the picture of village life as presented in *Zaynab* (published forty years earlier), and al-Sharqāwī emphasizes this fact. This comparison is made in the novel *al-Arḍ* by the young protagonist. Here are his words: [12]

> Sitting near the water wheel I would recall in my mind the books which I had read during the summer. I used to remember constantly *al-Ayyām, Ibrāhīm al-Kātib*, and *Zaynab*. [13] And I used to see in my village many children whose eyes were eaten by flies as in the village where the author of *al-Ayyām* had lived.
>
> And I wished that my village also would be without hardships like the village where Zaynab had lived. There the fellahin do not quarrel over water and the government does not deprive them of irrigation rights and does not take away land from them nor does it send men in yellow uniform who beat them up with whips...
>
> And I wished that my village too would be like the village of Zaynab, where the men and women do not have blood and pus coming after they pass urine...

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[12] *al-Arḍ*, Cairo, 1954, pp. 343-344.

[13] *al-Ayyām* and *Zaynab* are, of course, the novels we mentioned above; *Ibrāhīm al-Kātib* is another well-known novel (pub. in 1931) by Ibrāhīm ᶜAbd al-Qādir al Māzinī (1889-1949).

As a boy, the author could imagine that Zaynab's village was real, but now he understands the bitter reality and can only speak with irony about this false picture of reality presented by a novelist of an older age.

After the 1952 revolution (and particularly after 1956) the call for 'literature with a message' became very popular with critics and novelists alike. The Arabic phrase expressing this slogan is *al-adab al-hādif*, and the idea behind it is that each literary work should serve a definite positive social goal. [14]

By way of an example of this current of literature I will comment here on one novel, written by Yūsuf Idrīs, one of the best known young Egyptian writers; it is a short novel called *al-ᶜAyb* ("The Fault") which was published in the early 'sixties. [15]

The setting is in some office of one of the government departments and its time is about 1960. [16] The story begins when five new girl employees join the department. No women have ever worked there before, and all the men in the department are puzzled by the new situation and consider it very funny. As they meet in the cafeteria the clerks exchange observations about the physical characteristics of the girls, "who should be crowned Beauty Queen among the five and who is the most elegant and who should be Leg-Queen." [17] The male officials all believe that the girls will not be able to carry out their jobs and will have to leave in a few weeks. It is quite clear from the writer's tone that he is critical of the attitude of the male officials to the girls and that he objects to the prejudicial views on women reflected in that attitude.

Now the story is focused on one of the five girls, assigned to work in one particular room with four men. This girl, called Sanāᵓ, has just completed her college training in business. She is intelligent and high-minded and eager to succeed in her work. After the first few weeks which are difficult, she becomes proficient in her work. She is, however, offended and annoyed by one of the clerks who makes immoral overtures to her; he is a rather repulsive character, and Sanāᵓ cannot but abhor him. When they become familiar with the work of the department, Sanāᵓ (as well as the other girls), learn that all the officials in the department are engaged in graft. The clerks in Sanāᵓ's room try to make her a partner in their corrupt dealings, but she indignantly refuses

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[14] The leading champion of this cause was Muhammad Mandūr, a prominent Egyptian literary critic (d 1965). He wrote numerous articles in the cause of *al-adab al-hādif*, e.g. "al-Iltizām wa-Masᵓūliyyat al-Adīb" (i.e., Commitment and the Responsibility of the Man of Letters), *al-Kātib*, No. 21 (December, 1962), pp. 13-15.

[15] Yūsuf Idrīs, *al-ᶜAyb*, Cairo (in the series of *al-Kitāb al-Dhahabī*), n.d.

[16] There are no dates nor allusions to significant public events in the story, but at one point the heroine dreams of having a *Naṣr* car, and the production of these Egyptian cars began only in 1959.

[17] Yūsuf Idrīs, *al-ᶜAyb*, p. 22.

to accept bribes, even though her family is in dire need of money. But hard pressed by her family's needs, she is trapped by a corrupt businessman and accepts a bribe. As soon as she has compromised her standards on this matter, she loses her morality completely: on the very same day she agrees to have an affair with the clerk who had previously approached her with immodest proposals and whom she had rejected; now she has fallen.

The social message of this novel is clear; it is an attack on graft, with a subsidiary message—a plea for fuller and truer emancipation of women. The literary accomplishment falls short of its laudable social message. The characters of the story are stereotypes and their inner conflicts are presented in simplistic psychological formulae; the language is drab journalese.

Fortunately, modern Egyptian literature can boast of a far more imaginative and inspiring kind of novel. I am referring now to the work of Najīb Maḥfūẓ. Najīb Maḥfūẓ (born in 1912) began his career as a novelist with historical novels set in ancient Egypt; having published three such novels, he turned to social-realistic novels set in contemporary Egypt. His fame reached its height after he had published (in 1956-7) his largest composition, a trilogy depicting the life of a middle-class Cairene family for three generations since World War I until after World War II. It will be remembered that the 'family saga' type of novel was first introduced into Arabic literature by Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and it is curious to note that in his trilogy Mahfūẓ takes up—chronologically—where Ṭāhā Ḥusayn left off in his 'family saga.'

One cannot possibly do justice to the work of Maḥfūẓ within the scope of this general survey; he published seventeen novels and three volumes of short stories. I will attempt to discuss briefly one of his short novels, *al-Liṣṣ wa'l-Kilāb* (i.e., "The Thief and the Dogs") published in 1961.

The narrative begins when the thief gets amnesty on the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution and is released from jail. He is a sad and lonely man; his wife has left him and married his former henchman, who became head of the gang when he went to prison. It is this former friend who had betrayed him and given the police information which led to his imprisonment. Now, out of jail, the thief hopes that his daughter, who was just a baby when he was confined, will love him but she does not recognize her father and will not let him hug her. He seeks help in another direction; he knows a man who is the chief editor of one of Cairo's leading journals, and hopes that with his aid he can become an honest citizen. The editor gives the thief some money and asks him not to bother him again. This act hurts the thief deeply, because before the revolution, when he was a poor boy and the editor a student of socialist convictions, the latter had told the poor boy that it is right to steal from the rich, for they stole their riches from the poor. But now the editor himself lives in a magnificent

villa that before the revolution belonged to one of the rich men of Cairo. The editor does not want to be involved now with the miserable thief.

The protagonist wants to avenge himself on those who betrayed him (whom he calls "dogs"): his former partner and the editor. He tries to kill his partner but instead shoots another man by mistake, and he fails also in his attempt to murder the editor. Hunted by the police, he finds refuge with and sympathy from two people—an old Sufi Shaykh and a prostitute who loved the thief in the past and continues to love him. He hides for some time in the room of the young woman, but one day she disappears, perhaps arrested by the police. The police track him down with dogs. He is now hiding behind the tombstones in an old graveyard, and after some exchange of shooting, is shot down by the police, while the barking of the bloodhounds is heard.

This story is a parable symbolizing the human condition as viewed by Maḥfūẓ. His protagonist is in a state of unrelieved alienation; he is estranged from society and he is without faith or hope. A sense of alienation is typical of all the protagonists of the recent novels by this author.

Maḥfūẓ seems to suggest here (as in other novels) that man may possibly be redeemed from his loneliness and anxiety by religious faith or the love of a woman. But these are not seen by Maḥfūẓ as easy solutions, for modern man usually can no longer understand the language of religion or may be unable to establish profound relations with a woman. This is in fact the case of the thief in this story. He accepts the refuge offered him by the prostitute and enjoys her graces; he even likes her, but fails to respond seriously to her love. The old mystic tries to offer him spiritual consolation with words of mystical love, but the thief cannot understand what these words mean, or perhaps the message seems to him remote and irrelevant.

Maḥfūẓ has an approach which could be termed existentialist; the questions with which he grapples (through his fictional characters) are death, love, faith. The search for meaning in life is the core of his work. He successfully draws upon the various resources of expression suggested by medieval Arabic literature, and at the same time he does not shun the use of colloquial idioms when this is required by the dialogue. Using such various linguistic elements, he is able to produce a literary prose which is vivid and supple.

Maḥfūẓ stands out as the most important Egyptian novelist of the present generation and his achievement will certainly have great influence on the work of the younger writers in Egypt and indeed in all Arab countries.

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TUNISIA: MODERNIZATION AND MODERATION

Today the Arab world is faced with political uncertainty at home amid the grim specter of another Middle East war. Even Lebanon, after enjoying a decade of political stability and economic progress, faces a political crisis fomented by Arab-Israeli tension. In this rapidly changing area one state in particular, Tunisia, has for many reasons been able to achieve a stability enviable throughout the Arab world.

Naturally, each Arab nation has certain problems peculiar to itself and national adaptations need to be made in the Tunisian model. However, the vigorous way Tunisia has attacked the problems of underdevelopment and the necessary political stability underlying these attacks presents a good example for the other Arab nations. The badly needed foreign capital, public and private, cannot be attracted easily by nations constantly under the twin sword of domestic and international crises. Political stability at home has allowed President Habib Bourguiba to realistically assess the Arab-Israeli crisis for the Arab world. Therefore, during the current domestic and international tension in the Middle East, Tunisia offers a solution through moderation.

Tunisia is an example of Arab realism in domestic politics. President Bourguiba has insisted that the present struggle is against underdevelopment and that all the energies and resources of the nation must be hurled into the battle. This means the commitment of wealth to a battle not waged with military might. The Ten-Year Development Plan must succeed and all policies domestic and foreign must enhance, not endanger, this plan. Speaking of how a foreign situation can affect domestic policy, Bourguiba said: "Since we are no longer able to admit ships inscribed on the black list after they have touched Israel, we must pay higher costs when it is necessary for the goods to go by Genoa to change boats." [1]

The major factors in the struggle against underdevelopment lie in the president, party, economic plan, and the Tunisian people. Throughout his career Habib Bourguiba has been realistic about politics and himself. Even in 1942 when he was being detained by the Axis and was offered inducements to cooperate with them, Bourguiba cautioned the Tunisian nationalists to remain loyal to the allies and said he would take the full responsibility for this policy. Today he readily acknowledges his temporary role in molding the nation: "...the sole ambition of Bourguiba, who is only 'passing through' on this earth, is to train men capable of holding the torch..." [2] Another function that the president performs admirably is to constantly remind the Tunisians that their struggle against underdevelopment must be waged with the constancy and vigor of their successful fight against colonialism. To Bourguiba

[1] Jean Duvignaud, *Tunisie* (Lausanne, 1965), p. 99.

[2] Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, Speeches of the President, "Dignity and Progress with Stability," December 29, 1966, p. 27.

ignorance, poverty, and disease are even more formidable enemies than the French colonialists. It is also important that the full weight and prestige of the president's office have been used to effect unpopular aspects of the economic plan. When the government felt compelled to bring private property under a state agricultural plan, Bourguiba explained: "It is inadmissible that individual rights should go against the general interest, the prosperity of the community and developments, without which societies such as ours cannot survive." [3] Later in the speech the president explained that all private property that was not being cultivated properly would be taken by the state.

Putting it negatively, the fact that President Bourguiba is not a bellicose, military dictator is a positive contribution to the modernization of Tunisia. He is a strong personality who is not afraid to make decisions and take decisive action, but he prefers dialogue to despotism.

The second ingredient to the Tunisian model is the economic plan. The plan under the able direction of Ahmed Ben Salah was started in 1962 and designed to run through 1971. It will require a total investment of 2.3 billion dollars and the maintenance of an annual growth rate of six per cent. In the ten-year period, 750 million dollars in foreign aid must be attracted to Tunisia.

To be successful, the plan needs extensive foreign loans and the reduction of domestic consumption. It is hoped that these requirements can be ameliorated in 1972 and that Tunisia will attain economic independence in 1973. The minimum income per capita per year should be 45 dinars ($ 98.10) in 1972 and 50 dinars ($ 109.00) in 1974. [4] The plan will transform the agricultural, handicrafts, industrial and educational life of the nation. It must have and fortunately does have the strong support of President Bourguiba.

In his recent book on Tunisian politics, the Swedish scholar, Lars Rudebeck concluded: "...the *Parti Socialiste Destourien* is more effectively becoming 'the motor of the state,' while Habib Bourguiba remains its chief conductor." [5] This is indeed true; without the power of the party the Tunisian experiment would be stagnant. After the promulgation of the plan in 1962 the major duty of the party on every level was the successful administration of the plan. All institutions of the state had to be under party control to insure success in the struggle against underdevelopment. The party was to insure that no factionalism could interfere with the economic progress of the state.

The Socialist Destour Party contains about 300,000 members (less than ten per cent of the population) but it reigns supreme as the only

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[3] Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, Speeches of the President, "Social Function of Property," January 17, 1962, p. 12.

[4] For a more detailed explanation of the plan see Pierre Rossi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba* (Tunis: Kahia, 1967), pp. 125-127.

[5] Lars Rudebeck, *Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1967), p. 257.

legal party in the country. The party and the government interact at all levels. President Bourguiba is the president of the party and the chief government officials are also members of the party's Political Bureau. The most basic unit of the party is the cell which usually organizes people according to their residence and is therefore called a territorial branch. When, in some instances, the cell organizes people according to occupation, it is known as a professional branch.

Despite the authoritarian nature of the political system Tunisia has not become a police state. There are several reasons for this. (1) President Bourguiba believes that the Tunisian people can be directed by education and persuasion instead of coercion. (2) No chief minister is a member of the military; the small military establishment is kept out of politics. (3) The various national syndicates representing labor, students, women, etc., are encouraged to debate within their organization, although the party has the loyalty of the syndicate leadership. (4) Discussion is encouraged within the party even at the regional and local levels. In addition to the above reasons, President Bourguiba has been very alert to the problems in Tunisia. For example, following the student riots in 1966, he established a sub-commission under the Commission for Ideological Studies of the Socialist Destour Party to study education at all levels. Speaking of the university as the source of future political leaders, Bourguiba said: "The destinies of a nation must not depend on a Head of State put in office by chance. It is therefore necessary for the cadres to attain such a level that it becomes impossible for mediocre persons to reach supreme office in a nation." [6]

Loyalty to the party and state is developed through the *Union Tunisienne de la Jeunesse* (UTJ) starting with the young pioneers through the *Fédération Nationale des Etudiants Destouriens* (FNED) on the university level. Opportunities are available for young men in the party which stresses growth. In 1964 the average mean age of governors was 45, in 1965 it was 39, and of the six new governors appointed since 1964 the average mean age was 35. [7]

In the hands of a less honest man the machinery of the party could support a dictatorship. However, Bourguiba has been sensitive to this problem even to the extent of supporting the right of political change:

> ... if an unfortunate combination of circumstances should put an unfit person into power, it must be impossible for him to stay in power for long. This is the sign of maturity in a people. Finding himself opposed by the vital forces of the nation, he must then either yield and rule in the national interest or resign. [8]

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[6] Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, Speeches of the President, "Building Up an Effective University," January 31, 1967, p. 9.

[7] Lars Rudebeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 106.

[8] Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, Speeches of the President, "Building Up an Effective University," January 31, 1967, p. 9.

The problem that the president does not resolve is the likelihood that the "vital forces of the nation" under the present system would be controlled by the very person you wish to depose.

The Tunisian people form the last element of our pattern. There was a danger that the Tunisians might become complacent after gaining their independence from France. It is hard to add the glamor to the struggle against underdevelopment that attended the fight against colonialism. The People must know why the success of the economic plan is worth a sacrifice. Through constant education by the party this message has reached the people and enthusiasm for the struggle has grown. President Bourguiba has expressed the mood as follows:

> An entire people is busy working. Selfishness is disappearing and a sense of initiative is growing. The State enjoys the people's confidence. Admittedly, individual action is restricted to a certain extent. Thus, no one today is free to administer his property badly. But these are small sacrifices when compared with those made to attain independence. [9]

No working model is perfect and Tunisia has experienced some difficulties in implementing the economic plan. The severe drought of 1966 resulted in a substantial drop in agricultural production. The fall in domestic production made it necessary to increase their imports which further disrupted their export-import imbalance. To lessen the effects of drought, Tunisia plans to drill 350 deep wells in the next five years; by 1972 this will add 100,000 acres of newly irrigated land and an additional 100,000 acres of irrigated land should result from a program of dam construction, watershed control, and shallow wells. [10]

Tunisia needs to overcome some difficulties in the area of foreign investment. It is hard to attract capital from abroad when the foreign exchange situation prevents liberal policies for the transfer of earnings. There is a movement underway to clarify laws that would grant certain tax and financial concessions to investors in tourism. Particularly since government capital for industrial development is scarce Tunisia is adopting a more liberal attitude toward private enterprises. [11]

In the *Atlantic,* Martin Page wrote that Bourguiba's "successes at home and his moderation abroad represent a challenge to Nasserism." [12] Not only, then, is Tunisia a model for a more feasible Arab domestic policy, but it also offers an example of a moderate and realistic foreign policy. Another conflagration in the Middle East could be disastrous for economic development and lead to political chaos in the Arab

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[9] Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, Speeches of the President, "Direct Contact, the Basis of My Action," January 3, 1967, p. 30

[10] Department of State, *Semi-Annual Economic Review, July, 1966-January, 1967.* Unclassified, p. 19.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 29.

[12] Martin Page, "Tunisia and Egypt," *Atlantic*, April, 1967, p. 28.

nations. Due to the interrelation of domestic and foreign policies it is important for the Arab world to study Tunisia's policy toward Israel. Indeed the 1967 Arab-Israeli war has forced the Arab states to re-evaluate their foreign and domestic policies. If the more radical point of view persists, the world can expect more bloodshed in the Middle East. Arab and Israeli realism rather than radicalism must prevail. Unless a settlement is found for the worsening situation, Palestinians through their militant al-Fatah might seize the initiative and refuse to respond to any pressure from the Arab governments. A more realistic approach to the Arab-Israeli problem was presented by President Bourguiba in March 1965. In a speech in Beirut, Lebanon, the Tunisian president criticized his brother Arabs for being too emotional in their approach to the Palestine question. Earlier in the Jordanian section of Jerusalem, Bourguiba said that the search for peace was urgent for the relief of Arab refugees and suggested that Arab relations with the Jews should be "on the basis of mutual respect." [13] In a press conference in Beirut, Bourguiba warned:

> You can continue to drug the masses with provocative slogans and unfulfilled promises, but at the rate things have been going for the past seventeen years, the Arabs have not made an inch of headway. It is time to abandon demagogy. War with Israel is impossible. The great powers, guarantors of the Jewish state, would stop us. I propose a solution without either winners or losers, for—and let us not forget this—we are at present in the position of losers. [14]

The road to political realism in the opinion of Bourguiba was through the acceptance of the 1947 United Nations partition of Israel confirmed when the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948. In the ensuing war Israel increased its territory considerably. Therefore Bourguiba called for the status quo *ante bellum* in an effort to muster world opinion and legality to the Arab cause. After the June 1967 war, he modified this point of view and did not insist on the 1947 boundaries for Israel. One of the major tenets of Bourguibism as a political doctrine is to bargain from a strong realistic position using legality and world opinion to harass your enemy. His tactics infuriated the Arab states and especially President Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt who considered opposition to Israel essential for unity within the League of Arab States.

On his return to Tunisia Bourguiba explained: "I have not changed my mind. Israel is a danger. It is even a catastrophe for the Arabs. But the negative position of the responsible Arabs accomplished nothing

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[13] *New York Times*, March 13, 1965.
[14] *New York Times Magazine*, June 6, 1965, p. 26.

but to reinforce the status quo." [15] Actually President Bourguiba was articulating a position held but rarely verbalized by the Arab leaders. Nasser on several occasions made similar statements, but has kept his policy on Palestine intentionally ambiguous. The liberation of Palestine has been used by the Arabs to support the illusion of Arab unity especially in periods of domestic difficulty. [16] This illusion was in danger of being shattered by Bourguiba. Although the Arab leaders realized the impossibility of eliminating Israel militarily, for the above reasons they would not state it boldly. Also, the physical proximity of Israel for the Eastern Mediterranean states and the Palestinian Arab refugees within their borders make the issue more real to them than it is to Tunisia. Economic and political instability within many of the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean looms as the greatest obstacle to a realistic position on the Israeli question. In contrast to the Eastern Arab states, President Bourguiba enjoys the political and economic stability at home that will allow him to expound an unpopular foreign policy abroad.

Factors other than realism have affected Bourguiba's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. His distrust of President Nasser led Bourguiba recently to call him "the evil genius of the Middle East." [17] This reflects the feuding that has marred the relationship between Tunisia and Egypt dating from 1955 when President Nasser sympathized with Salah Ben Youssef and his followers who tried to overthrow Bourguiba. Throughout the years other differences have kept the animosity alive. When West Germany shipped arms to Israel, Tunisia angered Nasser by refusing to break diplomatic relations with Bonn. In addition, while accusing the Egyptians of practicing "micro-imperialism," Tunisia withdrew recognition from the pro-Nasser government in Yemen. [18]

During the June 1967 war, President Bourguiba condemned Israel and offered help to his brother Arabs. Nevertheless, soon after the conflict, his dislike for Nasser was verbalized. "A monumental miscalculation," said Bourguiba in reference to Nasser's closing of the Gulf of Aqaba. [19] According to the Tunisian president, the Arab approach to Israel was "vain obstinacy," and the problem should be solved by the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelis thereby lessening the role of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. [20]

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[15] Rossi, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
[16] Ronald Steel (ed), *North Africa* (New York: H. W. Wilson Co, 1967), p. 97.
[17] *U.S. News and World Report* (interview with President Bourguiba), May 20, 1968, pp. 62, 63.
[18] Martin Page, "Tunisia and Egypt," *Atlantic*, April, 1967, p. 37.
[19] *Time*, September 29, 1967, p. 40.
[20] *U. S. News and World Report* (interview with President Bourguiba), May 20, 1968, pp. 62, 63.

While visiting the United States in the spring of 1968, President Bourguiba stressed the need for a just settlement of the Middle East problem with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 as the basis. This resolution which was passed unanimously would require Israel to withdraw from the territory conquered in the June war. It also would acknowledge ".... the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." [21] As stated above, support of this resolution represented a change in President Bourguiba's policy of trying to return to the 1947 Israel boundaries which would allow Israel less territory than was represented by the boundaries before the June war. Here again, President Bourguiba is realistic.

None of the Arab countries can afford to maintain large military establishments dedicated to the extinction of Israel. Money is too desperately needed for their internal economic development. The hard realities of the situation will force the Arabs to accept a conclusion vis-à-vis Israel similar to President Bourguiba's. Although the Arab leaders realize that the United States would not permit the physical eradication of Israel, it would not be politically astute for them to say so until public opinion in the Arab world is ready to consider another solution. The best hope for Middle Eastern stability after the 1967 war is Arab realism as exemplified in the Tunisian pattern.

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[21] *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 10, 1968, p. 754.

NOTE: Since this article was written, Ahmed Ben Salah was removed from office, tried and sentenced to prison for falsifying economic figures. The real pressure to get rid of Ben Salah came from the Tunisian farmers who resented the government's land nationalization. The trend now will be to private land ownership which is more consistent with their more liberal attitude toward private enterprise mentioned on page 250 of this article.

FAITHFUL TO MANKIND

Thoughts on the Unity of Mankind

Throughout the centuries innumerable men—and among them our greatest teachers and benefactors—have been concerned with and interested in the concept of the unity of mankind. Their thoughts and efforts were directed towards overcoming the various causes of disunity among men—especially color, caste, creed, sex, wealth, prestige, power. But history makes it equally clear how difficult it is honestly to accept 'humanity' as a factor common to all men. More than once this factor came to be considered as a normative quality that cannot be given to all men of all times. In this way one overlooked the basic truth that a man is a man in his own right, not by virtue of the humanity someone might condescend to recognize in him.

Even when and where there was doubt concerning the reality or even the possibility of a ***unity*** of mankind, some awareness of 'mankind' as a reality persisted. This cannot be surprising since, in essence, we and mankind are the same ("the Drop returning into the Ocean"). Thinking on problems of mankind is not done by anyone who is not a member of the human race. In such thinking, therefore, the race attains self-consciousness while at the same time, seen with regard to the individual person, the thinker projects his own image into infinity to represent the race (mankind is man's self-projection into infinity).

'Know thyself' has been acclaimed as a maxim conducive to Knowledge. It certainly is the only way to knowledge of fellow-men. It is only in the immediacy and clarity of one's self-image that the being of all other persons can be revealed. The One that is myself reveals the Many and the All in relation to which it is what it is and becomes what it seeks to be.

Some people may think that we are moving to a greater knowledge of human nature than any previous generation, since in our days we have the whole world 'at our fingertips' in statistics and documentaries. But on further reflection it becomes evident that our time has simply substituted one one-sidedness for another. Thinkers in earlier ages concentrated attention upon the Self. Consequently, evolving significations of the Self came to include a number of things—viz., the individuality of a particular person, the image of another person in the former's mind, the common denominator of all men, and the bond of union between God and mankind. In such a way the Self became a principle for the explanation of everything. This provoked great teachers and thinkers to denounce the Self—not so much because it tended to be all-explanatory, but because of the moral implications of devotion to it. They posited an antithesis between ***selfishness*** and ***humanity***. As an internal limit to both these extremes, the Self and Humanity (the One and the All), the Many (society) came in for

haphazard attention, for its knowledge was assumed to be contained within knowledge of the former.

By contrast, the modern mind conceives of Society as the datum to which the Self and the Race are related as merely extrapolate values. Hence, theories of Society show the strength as well as the weakness of the modern man's quest after the unity of mankind. Philosophies of the Self leave him unconvinced—not because he is necessarily more selfish than others were, but because the notion itself tends to lose all significance in his eyes. Nor is he inspired by visions of the unity of mankind in an unqualified sense of the term. Between these two extremes he places the problem of Society which he considers to be the only sphere in which Ideals find natural expression and development.

Therefore we have to admit, even in the second part of the twentieth century, that we know little of mankind as a whole. And the little that we do know has never found adequate expression. Unities which are attributed to God and to the Universe have generated forces which came to exercise a tremendous influence upon our lives. Where do we find traces of a similar influence from the unity that can be attributed to mankind? Of the two 'recognized' unities, that of the Universe is not quite relevant to our purpose at present. But a comparison between the unity of the Divine Being and the unity of mankind stands out as an essential and inescapable question to consider. The comparison is definitely unfavorable to the latter. Divine unity has received a name (monotheism) which is the ultimate or even the only principle of Faith in many great religious systems of the world. Nothing of the sort has happened to the unity of mankind. Devoid of a 'name,' that unity is unrelated to Faith. There is, however, no reason why this should be and remain so. The issue at stake is not the difference between the inner constitution of the Divine Being as set over against the human character, as if only commitment to the Divine unity can be called religious and not a similar commitment to the unity of mankind. The primary reason why the unity of mankind is normally unrelated to Faith is the limited interpretation of Faith as being in its very nature opposed to Reason. Moving beyond this notion, we can begin to see and understand Faith as the activity through which my self-consciousness bears witness to the truth of self-consciousness on the part of Others and of God. Seen in this light, God and mankind are the only two entities to whom we can be faithful. [1]

It is no simple matter to assess what happens to our self-consciousness in our thinking of God. One thing is quite clear, however; in thinking

[1] Faith is an act of surrender—i.e., surrender of exclusively 'own' rights or claim to Selfhood. In the beauty or power that can be attributed to the concept of Divine unity there is an adequate reward for the initial surrender or sacrifice which constitutes the act of Faith. But the idea of mankind reaccentuates Selfhood which tends to be self-rewarding. Therefore it remains unrelated to Faith and its power and beauty remain yet to come, if they come at all.

of Him 'we' are other than 'we' are in all other circumstances of our lives. But this otherness cannot be completely disowned. It is ours. To us, therefore, it is an Ideal or a Law.

The self-image that is projected into infinity, to represent all mankind, is not an indivisible unit or a 'windowless' monad. Before it travels abroad, it has already been in touch with foreigners. In it I see not what I am, but what I am in confrontation and contrast with You—i.e., a person other than myself, but known to me in a manner surpassed only by the immediacy and clarity of my self-consciousness. It is this latter aspect which is transferred into the infinite extension of mankind, so that 'they' are all like You to *me*. Such a thinking must lead to seeing myself as standing to a certain degree above or at least apart from the totality of the human race, a position which cannot be the starting point for a true understanding of mankind. On the contrary, I must try to think of the human race as an infinity of my own 'Selves' in different times and places. Divine unity is apprehended only in the apprehension of Divine being itself. The unity of mankind can in like manner be realized through the awareness that the self and the human race are one and the same.

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BOOK REVIEWS

al-Wādī al-Muqaddas. By M. Kāmil Ḥusayn. Cairo: Dār al-Maᶜārif, 1968

It was this reviewer's unique privilege to be introduced to *The Sacred Valley* in a personal conversation with its author; the subsequent reading of the book itself was all the more meaningful for Dr. Ḥusayn's earnest explanation of why he wrote it. He is concerned that young people are finding religious truth as traditionally expressed completely irrelevant to their lives today. So here he writes an intensely personal appeal, addressed directly to a reader, in which the two share in a search for the reality of faith in terms and ideas meaningful to modern life. The last lines illustrate this:

> I have spoken to you at length, presenting to you many things related to yourself, but without stopping to ask who you are. Upon finishing this conversation, I realize that in actuality I have been speaking to myself. Nevertheless I hope that there may be someone for whom this discourse will be helpful, as I feel it has been for myself (p. 207).

The term, "sacred valley," is never explained in the book, though in private conversation the author referred to Moses and the burning bush to clarify what he had in mind. [1] Basically, it is the place of "purification," [2] that location in time or space where man is in harmony with God and man, but even more important with his own created nature. It is the author's premise that man is created with an innate tendency toward a right relation to God. "The urge for purification is natural to man; rather, it is the very essence of his humanity" (11). "Evil is not natural for man, nor is there anything in evil to attract him to it" (13).

As in all the book, an analogy is made between this quality of created goodness and similar elements in the rest of creation. It is seen as an extension of the instinctive response found there—inanimate objects drawn by gravity, the flower, created to turn towards the light, or a bird, to fly up into the warmth of the sky (38 ff.). "You should know that purification is natural to the human soul, its origin being an innate created instinct within it, having as its goal the sacred valley" (22).

This premise is presented more thoroughly in an earlier book by the same author, *Waḥdat al-Maᶜrifa,* [3] in which Dr. Ḥusayn makes a careful progression through nature, starting with inanimate objects and moving on to man and, ultimately, God. Moral behavior is equated with the orderly life and mind, whereas sin is disorder, chaos. The same theme is used in the present book.

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[1] See the translation of an essay by Dr. Ḥusayn, discussing the exodus as a formative event in the life of the Jewish people, in *M.W*, XLIX, 1 (1959), 30ff. Though the call of Moses is not mentioned, the essay at least indicates the author's familiarity with the events in this part of Jewish history.

[2] One might speculate about the use of the reflexive or intransitive *taṭahhur* throughout, rather than the more direct, causative *taṭhīr*. The implication may be that it is a process in which man can participate, but not carry out on his own; in the last analysis, it is the work of God Or, nothing of the sort may be intended at all.

[3] Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa 'l-Miṣrīya. No date given, but approximately 1958.

> Order is basic to the psychological make-up, just as it is basic to the physical; chaos is the source of disturbance in both cases. Is not honesty order, and lying, chaos? Is not loyalty order, and betrayal, chaos? Likewise, marital fidelity is order but promiscuity, chaos; to respect the lives of other people is order, but to kill is chaos. This is a natural law about which there can be no question. If you can make the desires of your body and its impulses orderly, then your continuing presence in the sacred valley and the straight way will be completely natural (76).

Using an illustration from his own field, medicine, the author describes how certain glandular secretions are essential to the human body; then he moves on to other qualities—faith, love, etc.—which he insists are similar in the psychological well-being of a man. Without them he is not truly human, and emotional disturbance is certain to be the result. He calls these "deprivation elements," meaning those factors which, if they are lacking, will cause the same inner chaos in a man's life as that which results in his body because of some glandular deficiency (55, 171 ff.).

The apparent contradiction that mankind, for whom faith is the ***natural*** way, needs purification, is never solved in the book; it seems to be a dilemma with which the author himself is wrestling. For example, at one point he comments:

> You may object that the actions of people do not indicate that their innate instinct seeks guidance toward good. Actually, wrong deeds do not invariably indicate wrong in the nature of the one doing them. Is it not the nature of fire to give light? But at times it also becomes the source of smoke, darkening the world and suffocating people. That does not mean that this is its essential nature. Likewise, people may be good instinctively, but there occurs that which becomes a barrier for their light and warmth, corresponding to the fire's smoke (48).

In keeping with this analysis of man, the author rejects the assertion of some that mankind is "fallen," or has some tendency toward corruption (42); evil, he insists, is not intrinsic to man's nature. And yet the book concludes on a pessimistic note which suggests quite the opposite, that is, that the sons of Adam are, in fact, involved in the same choice which he made, and that most of them will go astray. The passage tells about men turning aside from the way to the sacred valley, in order to enjoy fruits which they imagine are along the road.

> But when they come to the trees they do not find on them what they had hoped for, and try to find their way back to the straight way and the sacred valley. Unfortunately, most of them go astray.
>
> In that they are repeating the sin of Adam, a sin from which almost none of his sons are free, from the time God created the world and all that is on it (206).[4]

[4] See the reviewer's fuller discussion of Adam in his essay translated as "The Story of Adam," *M.W.*, LIV, 1 (1964), 4-13.

Dr. Kāmil Ḥusayn writes as a convinced Muslim, from within the framework and terminology of Islam. Note, for example, the two terms used to describe man's created yearning for God, *al-istiqṭāb*, drawn from the terminology of science, and *al-fiṭra* (or occasionally, as an adjective with the first, *al-fiṭrī*), drawn directly from traditional Islamic analyses of man (37 ff.). Again, he describes the successive religions of revelation and the way they were adapted to the growing capacity of mankind for understanding divine truth. Judaism focused on God's punishment of evil, Christianity, upon His loving reward for good, and Islam combined both elements in its characteristic term, Mercy (*al-raḥma*, 147).

And yet he persistently attempts—and with a high degree of consistency—to rise above the narrow bigotry of any particular religion. He is especially penetrating in his analysis of the dogmatic, exclusivist point of view to which traditional religions come (78). In the long run, this general attitude may be the book's greatest single contribution to the inter-religious encounter. The perversions of religion he describes are to be found in all groups of religionists.

> I pray that you will not be disturbed by the enmity and hatred evident in the history of religious people. Most of this violence had a motivation which was purely of the world, or at the very least, was based on a desire to compel men to accept truth. Through most of history religion has been little more than a banner carried by those who fight against other men, just as they might bear the banner of loyalty to country, or personal honor. Religion had hardly any place except as a motto by which to persuade people they should fight others wholeheartedly. Religion is not responsible for all that people have committed in its name, through their long history (66).

Other chapters open with the same type of appeal, that the reader be undisturbed by the inadequacies and excesses to be found in the lives of religious people—their mutual distrust and suspicion toward those of other religious groups (62 ff.), or their rejection of those elements of life which contribute to its meaning and wholeness, such as beauty, art, the dance, etc. (69 ff.). A very perceptive analysis of *shirk* defines it not as crude polytheism or idol-worship, but rather a placing of any other loyalty or value before that of God. "How many people have been led astray by motives of loyalty to country, or of sacrifice, or honor. Actually, they were simply committing *shirk*" (89-90).

In all this the author is not referring to any specific religion, but to what can happen to religion generally. All faiths are essentially the same (29), and all are still the best known way for helping mankind to reach the sacred valley, despite their inadequacies (47). In one passage he cuts boldly across traditional religious lines by saying that there are three motives for moral action—fear, love and hope—each the special emphasis of a particular religious expression—Judaism, Christianity and Islam, respectively. Thus a man can be described as a 'Mosesite' or a 'Jesusite' or an 'Islamite,' not according to the religion to which

he nominally belongs, but by the motive which drives him to live in loyalty to God (30).

At the same time, the appeal always holds open the option of finding a way to the sacred valley by other than that of religion. To start with God as premise and work down to man's need for Him is no more meaningful than to start with man's nature and need, and work out to a conclusion including the Ultimate Being (134-5). The same free choice is offered about elements very dear to traditional Islam (as are those which correspond to them in Christianity, to be sure), the Qur'ān and prophethood. That is, if the reader does not feel able to accept the miraculous in prophet stories (92), or is troubled by literal interpretations of the Qur'ān (136), then he is urged to take these figuratively, rather than rejecting them completely, and thus be able to avail himself of the spiritual values to be found there.

The Christian reader cannot help but feel that Dr. Ḥusayn has been more than generous to Christian insights. He is as caustic about its failures as with any other religious group, [5] but he places its idea of all-inclusive love very high in his categories of essential human needs (159).

> The fullest expression of your love is love for God, on condition that its effect upon you is that you love those whom God loves, that is, all people. You cannot choose from among men those whom you think worthy of your love, nor make it available to those whom you believe God loves. That is for God to decide; your responsibility, if you truly love God, is to let your love fall on all people (160).

At another point he suggests that the natural impulse is to return evil for evil, then adds, "But if you want to rise above this, you may take the way of 'the left cheek,' if you are able to train yourself in it. It is the well-known Christian way, and only a very few have been able to achieve it" (93). [6] Again, one of the highest motivations for holiness is a martyr's death: "One whom you see has died for you." The subsequent application to the Shī'ite exaltation of al-Ḥusayn does not lessen the implications for the Christian and his parallel concept of crucifixion (159). In the other passage where the crucifixion is mentioned, the author lifts his discussion beyond the customary barren denial of it as a historical event. He insists that this is not the issue, but rather the far deeper one of whether cleansing and redemption take place for mankind as a result of it (138-9).

Dr. Kāmil Ḥusayn is best known for his earlier book, *Qarya Ẓālima*,

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[5] A further example of criticism singles out the different religions: "The Children of Israel went astray even though they had Moses and Aaron Christians did not form themselves into distinctive groupings until quite late, but when these were formed they immediately began to attack each other, as well as those outside Christianity. In doing this they negated all the teachings of Christian purity, and justified their actions by saying they were bringing victory to true doctrine. Muslims did not persist in a state of collective purification more than a very short time, after which they became divided, fighting and hating each other" (96).

[6] A further reference to the teachings of Christ is the author's explanation of His command to leave parents and family, to follow Him (138).

which deals with the corporate human wrong which led to the crucifixion.[7] It received a prize within the United Arab Republic as an outstanding work of literature, and has been made available in the West in the excellent English translation of Kenneth Cragg.[8] He also has an essay on the key term used to describe wrong, or injustice (*ẓulm*), which has been translated.[9]

Thus it is curious that despite the author's profound examination of human wrongness, his analysis of this aspect of man's nature is the most disappointing element of *The Sacred Valley*. Attempts to explain sin or evil are consistently inadequate— "reciprocal misunderstanding," or "corrupted relations between people" (13), or "weakness in their capacity for guidance" (18). And though the basic problem posed throughout is purification, it is never made clear what it is from which man is to be purified, nor how that is to be accomplished.

Christians have always insisted that what is wrong with man—the *ẓulm* of which he is capable, and which seems so much a part of him—can be seen adequately only from the perspective of the Cross. And yet Dr. Ḥusayn *has*, in fact, drawn as close to that event as many Christians, and has grappled with mankind's involvement in it, while still coming to quite different conclusions about the nature of man.

Is this not also a measure of the gulf still to be crossed between Muslim and Christian, before full mutual understanding can be achieved? And no matter what either side may feel about any particular aspect of Dr. Ḥusayn's analysis of religion and man, both are deeply indebted to him for this further attempt to rise above the closed dogmatism usually demonstrated by the separate faiths, and present a valuable new expression of faith for today.

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[7] Cairo, 1954.
[8] *City of Wrong*. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1959.
[9] "The Meaning of *Ẓulm* in the Qurʾān," *M W.*, XLIX, 3 (1959), 196-212

al-Kindī: The Philosopher of The Arabs. By George N. Atiyeh. Publication No. 6 of the Islamic Research Institute (Pakistan). Bahadurabad, Karachi: Al-Karimi Press, 1966. xvi + 272 pp.

In this book, Professor Atiyeh proposes to bring together the information that is available about al-Kindī's philosophy and works. He also attempts to define al-Kindī's philosophic position and to trace his influence on other thinkers. The opening chapter is devoted to the life and times of "the Philosopher of the Arabs." al-Kindī's understanding of the nature and scope of truth, his conception of the relation of philosophy to religion, and some aspects of his epistemology are presented in the second chapter. The following chapter contains a discussion of al-Kindī's metaphysics of being, the proofs of God's existence and the relation of God to the world. The next chapter surveys his conception of the soul, its nature and faculties, as well as his doctrine of the

Intellect. The last chapter deals with his ethical theory and concludes with a brief assessment of his place in the history of philosophy. The volume contains 124 pages of supplementary material, including an annotated bibliography of al-Kindī's writings and a translation of his short treatise on the Intellect.

The author considers "the Philosopher of the Arabs" as a link between the Greek and Muslim philosophers and as the founder of Arab-Muslim philosophy. The fact is stressed that it was al-Kindī who opened the door of philosophy to Muslim thinkers and introduced into the intellectual world of Islam the logic and scientific method of the Greeks, initiating a discussion within Islam on the problems of metaphysics, psychology and ethics. Dr. Atiyeh portrays al-Kindī as an independent, rather than original, thinker. "What he [al-Kindī] introduced in the field of pure philosophy contained only a few original ideas" (p. 10). And yet, the author also holds that al-Kindī "had his own views on the most basic problems of philosophy" (p. 142). While al-Kindī's metaphysics, according to Dr. Atiyeh, is Aristotelian, his ethical theory is Stoic. In the chapter on Ethics, perhaps the best part of the book, the reader is shown that al-Kindī reconciled Islamic legalism and Greek humanism. al-Kindī insisted that virtue and philosophy are not to be sought as ends in themselves, but rather as means to knowing God, for this is the only way to the attainment of true happiness. Man's participation in the divine nature endows him with a propensity to do good. Evil results from the triumph of passion over reason. The true values that are worthy of acquisition, according to al-Kindī, are moral and spiritual.

al-Kindī's "chief contribution... to Arab-Muslim philosophy," in Professor Atiyeh's judgment, "lies in his acceptance of Aristotle as great an authority on truth as the religious Law itself" (p. 137). This appraisal, however, is not quite accurate. It conflicts also with the author's own statement that al-Kindī enthroned "prophetic knowledge above the philosophical" (p. 32). By placing prophetic intuition at the top of his epistemological hierarchy, al-Kindī was able to maintain the primacy of faith and revelation and, with them, the religious Law itself. Certain transcendental truths of religion, according to al-Kindī, can neither be reached nor comprehended by reason. The truths about the creation of the world out of nothing and the resurrection of the body, for instance, can be apprehended only by prophetic intuition (Abū Rīda, *Rasā'il* I, pp. 272f).

Moreover, Dr. Atiyeh seems to underestimate the Neo-Platonic influence on al-Kindī. This is apparent in his statement that "al-Kindī differed from the other Arab-Muslim philosophers by drawing upon Aristotle rather than Plotinus for his approach to the fundamental problems of metaphysics" (p. 44). The philosophic stream in which al-Kindī navigates is actually a Neo-Platonic version of Aristotelianism. Having rejected Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, al-Kindī resorted to the Neo-Platonic principle of emanation (*fayḍ*) to explain the process of generation (Abū Rīda, *Rasā'il* I, p. 162). Like Plotinus, he defined the divine First Cause as the One who transcends all human qualities and must, therefore, be described in negative terms.

Dr. Atiyeh does not claim "to have written an exhaustive, least of all, a final study of al-Kindī and his contribution to philosophy" (p. xiii). But what he has written is a welcome contribution to the relatively new field of Islamic philosophy. To be sure, the book does not add anything particularly new to our present knowledge of al-Kindī's philosophic thought. Nevertheless, it can serve as a helpful introduction to his basic ideas and fundamental concepts. It should prove valuable especially to students who have no access to the original Arabic texts.

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Taʿlīm al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya fī Nigeria (Teaching the Arabic Language in Nigeria). By Salīm Ḥakīm. Baghdad: Ministry of Education and Guidance, Education Series No. 12, 1966. 131 pp. Photographs, bibliography, 100 Iraqi fils.

This book is based on a five-month study conducted by Ḥakīm in 1961 as a guest of Nigerian authorities. It starts with a description of the various kinds of Islamic schools, followed by an examination of the status and of problems of the teaching of Arabic, of the teachers of Arabic, and of books and syllabuses. The last chapter contains recommendations to the League of Arab States and to the Islamic Congress in Cairo. Almost half the book consists of fourteen short appendixes, which contain such diverse though related topics as the text of an address by the Jordanian ambassador to Nigeria, details of various Arabic curricula, illustrations of ten different Arabic scripts, and comments on Arabic education in Africa in general.

The book is well written, internally coherent, and informative. The historical association between the teaching of Arabic and of Islam is noted, and at the same time Ḥakīm points out that such an association has been a limiting factor to the widespread teaching of Arabic. Except for a small tribal group (the Shua) in the remote Lake Chad vicinity, Arabic is not an indigenous language, and at best it is a third language after the alien but essential English. Ḥakīm argues strongly for the introduction of books on Arabic as a foreign language, to supplant the intellectually unsatisfying children's books intended for Arabic-speaking youngsters. He advocates the following stages in the teaching of a foreign language: listening, speaking, reading, and writing. Not surprisingly, he finds an essential drawback to be the virtual absence of qualified teachers, not only those who themselves know Arabic well, but also those who are trained to teach Arabic as a foreign language. Ḥakīm's first three recommendations in fact are related to this last point.

This book is a useful contribution to inter-cultural communication and understanding, as well as to the linguistic pedagogical literature.

University of Northern Iowa BASHEER K. NIJIM
Cedar Falls, Iowa

Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940: Essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale. By Ali Merad. Paris and the Hague: Mouton and Co, 1967. pp. 472, paper.

Ali Merad's recent interpretation of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama between 1925 and 1940 is really two studies rather than one. The first 210 pages present a detailed institutional history of this organization and much biographical information about the most important Ulama leaders. This specialized narrative is carefully fitted into the context of the more general political, economic and social events of the same period, a context that has been superbly presented in some earlier works on Algerian and North African topics by Ch.-A. Julien and Roger Le Tourneau.

The second half of Merad's study—which, as already noted, virtually constitutes a second book—discusses the doctrinal aspects of the Ulama's reform movement. The author's analysis of their theological, social, and especially their cultural doctrines leads him almost inevitably to discuss once more the political involvement of this would-be religious movement. In so doing Merad quite correctly reflects an important characteristic of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama: while they sought to avoid direct involvement in political affairs, the Ulama could not do so. Their religious, social and cultural initiatives were quintessentially opposed to the French concept of assimilation and close association with the mother country. Perhaps in spite of themselves, the Ulama became the first effective Algerian nationalists active within Algeria itself.

These somewhat puritanical Muslims were led in their appeal for religious and cultural reform by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs, their most influential mover and the founder of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama. Merad often terms this group the Badesian movement, a reflection of the man's importance.

The resistance to Ibn Bādīs and the Ulama was not entirely European in origin. The leaders of certain Muslim brotherhoods were implacable enemies of the Association, as were the influential marabouts and the staff of official mosques who were appointed by the colonial government. These men were quite naturally opposed to reforms which, if popularly accepted, would have deprived them of followers and financial support. In addition, the reform-minded Ulama were usually better educated than their competitors who might, consequently, easily lose in a head-on conflict. In any case, Merad's study is neither an apologia for the reformist Ulama nor a defense of their enemies. *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie* is an objective and fascinatingly detailed interpretation of an important movement in recent Algerian history. It is indeed surprising that until the publication of this book, historians had produced only brief and sketchy articles on this engrossing subject.

Adding to the value of this volume is its organization. The bibliography, for example, appears between the introduction and the first chapter, a device that enables interested readers and particularly students to read the text with direction and a clear idea of the scholarly basis of the study. There should be no question of its value and its excellence, as Merad's book was published in collaboration with an impressive list of interested institutes and universities in France, Great Britain, Greece,

Turkey and the United States. Islamic scholars, historians and other students of colonial Algeria and Algerian nationalism, and Middle-Eastern specialists interested in Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism will certainly want to read it.

While the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama was a peculiarly Algerian movement, it was related to other Islamic and Arab developments. Merad has presented an effective, scholarly and interesting account of this organization. Finally, he has distinguished between the purely religious and the broader economic, social, cultural and political issues that are so often confusingly blended in many studies of the Muslim world.

The University of Georgia ALF ANDREW HEGGOY
Athens, Ga.

Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964. By Aziz Ahmad. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp xiv plus 294. $ 6.75.

Aziz Ahmad, Pakistani scholar and Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Toronto, has added a major contribution to his earlier volume, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment.*

In the present work the author studies the development of Islamic thought in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent during its most significant century, as it is represented by selected landmark figures. On the one hand there is the liberal stream stemming from Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, and including such thinkers as Chirāgh ᶜAlī and Muḥsin al-Mulk. On the other hand there is the traditionalist revival beginning with the historians, Shibli Nuᶜmānī, Amīr ᶜAlī, and Ḥālī, and moving to the development of revivalist schools, followed by the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism movements. Reflection on the ideas of Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, who "dominates Islamic religious and political thought in the twentieth century as did Sayyid Aḥmad Khān in the nineteenth" (p. 141), provides a bridge to the discussion of the Pakistan movement. The latter is the focus for the second portion of the volume. In this section the positions of Abuᵓl Kalām Āzād, Abuᵓl-Aᶜlā Mawdūdī, and Ghulām Aḥmad Parwīz are taken up. The dilemma of Islamic thought in Pakistan today is seen particularly in terms of the struggle between modernism and orthodoxy at the governmental level, while in India it relates to the nature of Islamic development in a religiously pluralistic society and in an avowedly secular state.

The strength of the volume rests in the erudite author's honest and successful effort to present the views of Muslim thinkers in their own terms. Despite the limitations of space he has managed in excellent fashion to introduce the thought of many of the significant Muslims of the period and in the area under survey. His wide acquaintance with the primary sources yields both depth and breadth to the treatment. Substantial portions of the materials are now available in English for the first time. Here, then, is basic information for the understanding of the development of Islamic thought in a critical section of the Muslim world.

The methodology selected by the author naturally involves limitations. We neither obtain a full picture of any one of the major individual personalities cited, nor do we gain a comprehensive sense of the over-all development. In addition, to formally polarize the discussion around the Pakistan movement not only reflects the cataclysmic significance of that event itself, but also illustrates the restrictions involved in the Islamic preoccupation with its political history.

The author's own view, though not developed in depth, is clearly expressed in the conclusion that the crux of the Islamic problem today is "humanistic." This results in the criticism of Āzād for reasserting God's suzerainty, leaving "very little for His man to achieve" (p. 185). He affirms that "in classical Islam, in the totality of the traditionalist and fundamentalist current attitudes, and in all Indo-Muslim modernist thought except that of Iqbāl, God and not man remains the key figure of the universe dominating man's political, social, economic and cultural life" (p. 271). This failure to reckon with man is, in effect, "the tragedy of modern Islam." As a result, "from within itself it has been able to recreate elements of a renaissance, but not of a reformation" (p. 272).

Minor criticism of this excellent volume will serve only to highlight its great merits. It is not clear how the extensive introduction to what is termed "the monumental assessment" of Anglo-Saxon civilization by an Indian Muslim traveller (p. 6 ff.) furthers the purpose of the volume. The frank but brief discussion of Christian missionary activities (p. 24 ff.) encourages us to look forward to a fuller treatment. It is interesting that the protection of the inheritance rights of converts to Christianity from Islam is regarded in terms of patronage. The author's penchant for the application of descriptive labels is noticeable—cf. the "composite fundamentalism" of Shāh Walī-Allāh, the "speculative fundamentalism" of Chirāgh ʿAlī, the "fundamentalist modernism" of Muḥsin al-Mulk, the "speculative neo-modernism" of Iqbāl, etc. It would have been helpful to have a definition of the author's understanding of the terms "fundamentalism" and "modernism." In view of his disapproval of Sir Sayyid's naturalistic presuppositions, is it really possible to say of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī that "opposed though he was to the extremism of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's speculations, his reformism followed the same principles" (p. 127)? While the religious history of man may be seen by Āzād in terms of devolution (p. 182), his over-all view of man's creative process is evolutionary. Some might find unduly harsh the judgment that "in religious thought he put the clock back, undoing much of the work of the Aligarh modernists and Iqbāl" (p. 184).

We may hope for future elucidation of "the overwhelming evidence" and "new light" shed by the Minto papers on the question of Muslim separatism (p. 66). Although as late as 1937 in elections "the Muslim League did not do so well in Muslim-majority areas" (p. 170), the existence of a "Muslim consensus" on the Pakistan issue is affirmed. At the same time it is also noted that the *ijmāʿ* of the *ʿulamāʾ*, who "vehemently opposed the Pakistan movement," was totally contrary to the *ijmāʿ* of the intellectual elite and the masses of the people (p. 193).

This amazing situation raises a series of unanswered questions for the reader, both as to the dynamics of the politico-religious situation and as to the understanding of the nature of *ijmāᶜ* itself. Was the antipathy of the *ᶜulamāᵓ* to the Aligarh movement and to the western-minded leadership of the Pakistan movement so intense as to provoke this reaction? Was the influence of Āzād so profound that "he had no difficulty in converting the *ijmāᶜ* of the *ᶜulamāᵓ*" (p. 184)? Does a situation in which the *ijmāᶜ* of the Islamic community by-passes the opinion of the religious leadership make possible the continuing use of the description "consensus"? In view of the constitution-making dilemmas of Pakistan, must we not say that the *ijmāᶜ* noted as appearing in the decade before Partition was largely a negative one?

We are grateful to Professor Ahmad for a volume that not only meets a long-felt need in an eminently satisfactory and scholarly way, but at the same time is also provocative for our further thinking.

Malappuram
Kerala, India

ROLAND E. MILLER

Islam in China. By Yang I-fan. Hong Kong: Union Press, 1957. 83 pp. 8 illus. **Moslem Unrest in China.** Hong Kong: Union Press, 1958, 67 pp. 4 illus.

Two helpful booklets which will assist us to understand what has happened to the Muslims under the People's Republic of China have come to our notice. The first of these books to appear gives the briefest summary of Islam in China from the eighth century until the present, but most of the book is a statement of the Chinese Communist attitude toward the Islamic minority. The thesis is illustrated from statements in the press. The last chapter concerns the opposition which builds up as the Muslims realize the promises made by the People's Republic at the beginning were not carried through. The second book is mainly an explanation of the last chapter of the first book and drawn from what happened in 1958. The twelve pictures in the two books are mostly from Sinkiang.

These accounts contain excellent material on what happened among the followers of Muḥammad for nearly a decade after Mao Tse-tung took over the government of China in 1949. The mistakes made caused much apprehension among the Muslims—this in spite of the admonition given to the First Army when it entered the Northwest in the summer of 1949.[1] For example, in these orders the second item reads: "In the Muslim houses do not eat pork, mule or horse meat; eat only beef, sheep or lamb which you must request the *ahung* to slaughter for you." But, according to Yang I-fan, the government broke down the dietary laws (p. 66). The pressure the government put on the Muslims was slower than on other ethnic groups because of the sensitiveness of the Muslims

[1] From the *Hankow Yangtse Daily — Han-k'ou Chang-chiang Er-pao*, Aug. 5th, 1949, quoted in *Friends of Moslems*, XXIV, 1 (Jan., 1950), 7.

and the wish of the rulers to be on good terms with the Muslim countries of Western Asia. It was in 1958 that the conflict between the Muslims and government came to a head. Following that year there seemed to be less conflict because of the government repressive action.

These books were written by someone in Hong Kong and based on reports appearing in mainland papers. Only in the first book are we given the name of the author, Yang I-fan. We have the record of a Hong Kong Muslim by the name of Yang I-fei who may be the same person or a relative.

The author or authors make the point that the People's Republic of China considers the Muslims as an ethnic minority and tries to ignore the religious influence. It would seem the writers are not clear about the use of the term *Hui*. The distinction is made between *Hui* and *Uigher*; the former is used for the Muslims in China proper and the latter for those in Sinkiang. Also they quote the figure of ten million for the total number of the followers of Muḥammad which is the figure the People's Republic uses. Before 'Liberation' the Muslims claimed between thirty and fifty million.

In *Islam in China* there are several statements that one could challenge. For example: "turbans are customary." In most parts of China proper a Muslim would seldom wear a turban except in the mosque enclosure. Even in Kansu and Ningsia, normally one would see only a few men on the street wearing turbans. In the second book (p. 14) reference is made to the concentration of Muslims in Kansu and Hopei areas. What about Tsinghai, Ningsia and Yunnan provinces in which there are more Muslims in each province than in Hopei? Also in *Moslem Unrest in China* (p. 15) the author states that "the Muslims first came to China at the time of Genghis Khan" while in *Islam in China* the statement is made that the followers of Muḥammad came to China in 627. The latter is the accepted date by Muslims for the arrival of Wan Ko-sz at Canton.

Regardless of these and other questionable statements, the two books do add to our knowledge of what has taken place in the People's Republic of China since the Communists assumed power in 1949 and up to 1958. Since the latter date we have little authentic news of what has really happened. The Cultural Revolution has not helped the cause of Islam in China.[2] We fear that much damage has been done to the physical plant upon which Islam depends. The assessment of that dark period is yet to be made.

Both of these books are a contribution to our knowledge of the decade of the People's Republic after its establishment. Neither author, however, seems to write with sufficient personal knowledge of Islam in China before 'Liberation' or acquaintance with the history of early Islam in China.

CLAUDE L. PICKENS, JR.

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[2] Reported by the *Ceylon Daily News* of the 12th of November 1966, the Red Guard formed a new organization called "the Revolutionary Struggle Group for the Abolition of Islam."

Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History. By Ludwig Ademac. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 168 pp. Appendixes, 61 pp. $ 7.00.

This meticulously researched volume documents the successful struggle of a backward, fractious, tribal society to win full national status and this during the heyday of European imperialism. It provides an example of diplomacy practiced as a high art by what might seem to be most unlikely practitioners. The Afghan Emirs possessed almost none of the instruments that were essential to effective diplomacy during an era when tribal levies were succumbing to machine guns, mass production, and global communications. They could not count upon a large population, any modern industry, a professionally organized army, or more than a handful of Afghan leaders with international experience. Professor Ademac thus probes the reasons for Afghanistan's emergence from European overlordship to full independence while the fate of nearly every other non-Western people continued to move in the opposite direction. His effort is important because of Afghanistan's career in an imperialist era, because it offers data and insights on Afghan national development, and because its strengths and weaknesses are instructive on the challenges to research and interpretation posed by recent Central Asian history.

It is pre-eminently a study based upon original research, depending primarily upon the Indian National Archives, although the fascinating chapter on the Niedermayer expedition of 1915-1916 is largely based upon materials in the Auswärtige Amt in Bonn. Ademac is blessed with facility in the languages required for unraveling the skein of several of the linguistic/cultural forces at play in Central Asia.

The study displays the evidence surrounding several episodes which ultimately lead to full Afghan independence. The method is to let this evidence speak largely for itself. Thus, aside from an introductory chapter and one other chapter which gives an analysis of Abdur Rahman's foreign policy strategy, Ademac makes relatively little effort to interpret, explain, or make surmises about the many acts and postures of the large cast of protagonists who come into his narrative. He concentrates instead on baring the record of events and maneuvers created by the conflicting aims of the British, Russians, Germans and Afghans. While this method is generally successful in delineating sequence of events, it has left several points obscure. We learn little about the roles of internal Afghan politics or of the Pan-Islamic movement upon Afghan foreign policy, nor are the motives of Russian Bolshevist overtures to Afghanistan and activities in Turkestan made clear. Relying primarily upon British Indian sources, Ademac is understandably much more thorough in covering British moves and motives.

Habibullah's and Amanullah's efforts to build upon the foreign policy established by Abdur Rahman receive primary attention. Abdur Rahman's aim is defined as independence which is to be achieved by policies of isolation and balance between the millstones of Russian and British ambitions. Habibullah is observed at work trying to maintain the same quasi-client relationship with the British established by his father. His success in fending off British attempts at further penetration is made plain in a chapter on the Anglo-Afghan jockeying which

led to the Dane mission of 1905. However, the relaxation of the Russo-British rivalry in Central Asia and elsewhere which followed the Czar's humiliation by Japan faced Habibullah with the threat that his giant neighbors might now cooperate in disposing of Afghanistan bilaterally, perhaps on the Persian model of partition. His coolness toward the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention on Afghanistan is examined in this connection.

World War I provided Habibullah with his last major diplomatic test. Steering between German blandishments and Anglo-Russian threats, Habibullah brought off a highly complex balancing act between the Pan-Islamic and pro-German sympathies of part of his court and the geo-political realities of Allied strength. The most successful chapter deals with Habibullah's success with the contradictory policies of supporting fugitive Indian nationalists, entertaining the Niedermayer group, allowing Turkish incitement of the frontier tribes (against the British), and permitting Mahmud Tarzi to publish anti-British editorials in *Sirāj al-Akhbār* while assuring the British of his neutrality. He was successful to such a degree that the British expected to reward him handsomely, but his assassination in February, 1919, dramatically altered events.

The concluding chapters discuss Amanullah's efforts to achieve legitimacy, primarily through manipulation of the forces of nationalism —Indian and Afghan—and Pan-Islamic resentment of the Allied treatment of Turkey in 1919-1920. His efforts led to the 1919 frontier war with British India; to an ambivalent relationship with the Bolsheviks as champions of "anti-imperialism," but also as rivals for control of the Trans-Oxus region; and to the achievement of formal Afghan independence. This is an extremely complex web and here Ademac's narrative method serves less well. Only cursory attention is given to the Russian and Pan-Islamic sides of Amanullah's concerns. His moves and purposes in dealing with the British at the Mussoorie Conference and later at Kabul are less than clear. Yet the overall significance of this seemingly chaotic stream of events is more certain in Ademac's conclusion:

> The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 freed Afghanistan from British suzerainty and marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Afghanistan. While Afghan rulers were successful in preserving their independence, they were unsuccessful in their big-power aspirations. The Third Afghan War was an attempt at reestablishing Afghanistan's former frontiers with India, of redressing what the Afghans felt was a great injustice to them... (After the treaty) Amanullah gave up all attempts of territorial aggrandizement and turned his attention to internal reforms and the development of his country.

The study demonstrates that several persisting factors played major roles at each important turn in Afghan relations: the bellicosity of the tribes who straddled the Durrand line, Afghan needs for rifles, Russian pressure for Afghan trading and political relations, and the constantly recurring clashes of viewpoint between the Indian and British Governments on how to handle Afghan relations. But despite

the care with which he has developed the record of events, Ademac has not been able to present persuasive conclusions on why the British and the Russians acted as they did vis-à-vis Afghanistan between 1919 and 1921. Nor was he able to achieve one of his main objectives as stated: "My purpose is... to describe and analyze Afghanistan's foreign policy from formulation to execution under three Afghan rulers." Of execution there is much in the narrative including direct reference to perhaps fifty policy statements by the Emirs and a collection of the main diplomatic documents of the era included in the appendixes. The question of formulation of Afghan policy unfortunately, and probably necessarily, remains obscure. No coherent picture emerges of the interplay of internal faction, interest or opinion in the establishment of foreign policy. Disagreement and rival ambition within the royal family and among high court officials, and Afghan foreign trading groups are mentioned, but their influence on particular decisions is not closely examined. To take one instance: Habibullah allowed his council to speak for him when he declined to commit himself officially on the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Ademac implies this to be an example of a deliberate diplomatic device on his part, but was it, at least partially, an example of officials taking initiative in shaping national policy?

This book's contributions make it an important addition to the study of recent Afghan history. Its defects are those which must accompany a venture into largely uncharted territory.

University of Northern Iowa RICHARD S. NEWELL
Cedar Falls

Liqā' ʿind Bawwābat Mandelbaum (Meeting at Mandelbaum Gate). By Aḥmad Fawzī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Baghdad: Ministry of Education and Guidance, Modern Books Series, No 17, Dār al-Jumhūriyya, 1967. 106 pp. Photographs, bibliography, 200 Iraqi fils.

This book consists of a series of not clearly connected chapters which deal with various aspects of the city of Jerusalem. The introductory chapter is an intense expression of sorrow and dismay at the division of Jerusalem into Jordanian and Israeli sectors. The formalities for crossing Mandelbaum Gate are briefly described. An eighteen-page chapter gives a date-and-name history of Jerusalem starting with the Jebusites, and this is followed by a dozen pages on events between 1947-50, both in Palestine and in the United Nations. The next chapter deals with "Jewish attacks on al-Aqṣā Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre" and catalogs damage to religious places caused by Israel activity. Next is a twenty-five-page chapter containing a sketchy history of the municipality of Jerusalem since the first few decades of Islam, though with much more detail on mandated and Jordanian Jerusalem. A dozen pages follow on progress in Jordanian Jerusalem between 1948 and 1965. The concluding brief chapter recaptures the tone of the introduction by lamenting once more the Israeli presence and anticipating the non-existence of the state of Israel.

Perhaps the main value of this book lies in its availability as an

illustration of a 'popular' Arabic book intended for an Iraqi public which knows little about Jerusalem, does not expect much, and has strong anti-Israel feelings.

University of Northern Iowa BASHEER K. NIJIM
Cedar Falls, Iowa

Paintings From Islamic Lands. Edited by R. Pinder-Wilson. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1970 187 pp. $7.95

The reader of this compact volume of ten essays may at first feel rebuffed in the sense that he has been invited to an exotic banquet where he is neither included in the conversation nor introduced to those who speak.

Both the reader and the book would benefit from brief biographical notes about the ten authors. Even the jacket is devoid of this information although the clue lies in the comment thereon by Don Aanavi, Assistant Curator of the Department of Islamic Art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art: "The book is important, for nothing of its kind has as yet been published. And it is significant, because it assumes a good deal of scholarship, and shows better than any other publication that studies in Islamic painting are as developed and sophisticated as in any other field." He goes on to say that this point has been reached only in the last decade so that presumably the supply of Islamic scholars is now adequate to form a closed corporation.

The first essay on "A manuscript from the Library of the Ghaznawid Amīr ʿAbd al-Rashīd" addresses itself to other scholars in Islamic history and literature but does analyse the calligraphy in a thoroughly informative and detailed manner. Because of the monochromatic illustrations throughout the book all graphic descriptions strain to be explicit. The author, S. M. Stern, offers eight illustrations of calligraphy and illumination where the lack of color reproduction is less felt than in the miniature paintings of the essay by O. Grabar, "Notes on the Iconography of the 'Demotte' Shah-Nama." The illustrations offered for a comparative study with those of the Demotte manuscript are labelled with titles and sources but the Demotte pages are only titled and numbered to correspond with the text where there is no immediate mention of their locale.

Sofie Walzer, in "The Topkapu Saray Manuscript of the Persian Kalīla Wa-Dimna" not only includes the locale in the title but in the opening words of the essay:

> The Topkapu Saray Library in Istanbul possesses a manuscript of the Persian translation of Kalīla wa-Dimna, dated 816/1413 ... In this article I hope to show that the manuscript was produced in Shiraz and is related to the Muzaffarid school of the preceding decades and is, on the other hand, a precursor of manuscripts made in Shiraz, such as the famous Shāh-nāma in the Bodleian Library... copied for Ibrāhīm Sulṭān ibn Shāh Rukh.

This essay is the longest in the book but so crisply organized that it reads swiftly and so lyrically descriptive that even the lack of color

reproduction does not dim the imagery. Sofie Walzer couples an intense interest in the subject with fine craftsmanship in writing.

E. Grube, writing out of the depth in background as curator of the Islamic Department of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, communicates a great deal of technical, historical and esthetic information in the relaxed, confident prose of "Herat, Tabriz, Istanbul, The Development of a Pictorial Style." His comparative analysis is suave and the illustrations deftly chosen to develop the theme and animate the text with exciting subjects. Because, as the author says, "the basic elements of the style which is the subject of this paper are a preference for a subdued palette of gray and brown tones, and an emphasis on the calligraphic element in design," absence of color in the illustrations is scarcely noticed. Most of the paintings discussed are landscapes populated with real and fantastic animals interacting with each other: "monkeys have escaped into a tree from the approach of a lion or dragon, dragons glower at one another from behind trees or rocks, cranes attack turtles that try to escape into ponds . . ."

Some of the book's best descriptive writing is in "A Copy of the Rawzat Al-Ṣafā with Turkish Miniatures" by G. M. Meredith-Owens who deals with a hybrid Persian-Turkish manuscript in the British Museum's collection. His concern is almost entirely with the visual and a terse reportorial style transports the reader into the paintings: "Women and other onlookers gaze apprehensively from behind battlements. The face of a man with protruding teeth occurs in this scene and reappears in others. Two types of trumpet are shown, one straight and one curved. The ground is coloured blue-grey, and the stone masonry and bricks of the town walls indicated."

In "L'école de Shiraz et les origines de la miniature moghole," A. S. Milikian Chirvani was inspired by the discovery of a single page of miniature painting whose date (c. 1450) precedes the work produced at Fathpur Sikri under the patronage of Akbar between 1570 and 1580. The earlier work already shows a fusion of Persian style (*"l'utilisation du pavillon dans la composition"*) with Indian characteristics, notable in physiognomy (*"le type aux yeux allongés"*). So much of the Persian influence clung to the seventeenth-century Mughal painting that the author sees its influence on Indian painting as *"plus profonde"* if not indelible.

"Late 16th and early 17th century painting at Bijapur" is examined by Douglas Barrett through a maze of historical sites, incidents and personages, of whom Atish Kahn is the liveliest. Atish Kahn was the beloved pet elephant of Ibrahim II and was eulogized in the text and immortalized in the paintings from Bijapur.

R. Pinder-Wilson, who edited the book, has also written "An Illustrated Mughal Manuscript from Ahmadabad." He lists and comments on forty-three miniatures which appear to be the work of a single artist illustrating a Persian version of the Kalīla wa-Dimna. Now in the British Museum, the human and animal characters are rendered with wit and a flowing freedom that contrasts strangely with the stiff Mughal conventionally landscaped backgrounds.

M. Idris Siddiqi, in presenting "An Illustrated Manuscript from

Sind," shows more interest in the history, geography and demography of the state of Sind than in the paintings produced there but does offer some fascinating technical information regarding the textile industry in Thatta and a glossary of terms relating to costumes shown in the paintings. The miniatures, he says, "are the creation of a period when the Mughal order had been replaced by the vigorous Kalhora rule. They possess a rough country vigour, a simplicity and fresh charm characteristic of folk art."

The final essay, "Qajar Painted Enamels" by B. W. Robinson, holds the most interest for the producing artist in its detailed study of the esoteric art of decorative enamel painting prevalent in Persia between 1790 and 1880. It is interesting that while contemporary aesthetes view Persian miniature painting with delight and would classify the enamels as "camp," Comte de Rochechouart, a cultured French traveller of the mid-nineteenth century, reversed this opinion. He rhapsodized over the enamels and described their technical processes in admiring detail whereas the miniatures made him "*grincer les dents.*" The lack of color in the illustrations for this essay in particular makes the reader grind his teeth.

This work is a valuable distillation of knowledge on this subject in spite of the lack of color accompaniment and its assumption of scholarship in Islamic history and literature and it should stimulate the tyro whose intentions are serious to search for firm foundations to put under future study of Islamic painting.

Hartford, Conn. ISABEL S. FAIRCHILD

Ten Muslims Meet Christ. By William McElwee Miller Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1969, pp. 147. pa. $ 1.95

Seldom do Muslims change their religious loyalties. But here are the biographies of ten men and women who, born and raised in Islam, decided to become Christians. Their lives before and after conversion are depicted. They themselves relate the reasons for their momentous decisions. The scene is Iran during the last century and a half.

Dr. William McElwee Miller, the author, with the editorial assistance of William N. Wysham and contributions from many who knew the converts personally, is eminently qualified, by observation and experiences covering more than four decades in Iran, to record these biographies.

He opens with Dr. Ibrahim Sa'eed (d. 1942) the physician [see F. G. Coan, "Mullah Sa'eed of Sena," *M.W.*, XXVIII (1938), 66-75], and closes with Mahmud Jalily, government official in Teheran (d. 1969). Between them are Sa'eed's brother, evangelist, martyred at Tabriz; Nozard, "remade by the power of Christ"; Merat-us-Sultan, chief of police; Jalil Qazzaz, teacher, calligrapher, translator, poet; Khadijah, daughter of a book-binder, poetess and dreamer; Hasan (Mansur), who quit opium after acquaintance with the Gospel of Matthew and ever thereafter tramped over all Iran to spread "the seed"; Nasrullah, who came

to Christianity after having tried Baha'ism; and still others mentioned by name.

In none of these will one find a hint of conversion for profit. On the contrary, in full sincerity they changed their faith at the cost of various disabilities experienced by converts in other lands and times. They faced perils knowingly because they found in Christ what their souls had been seeking. These are tales of true courage which should inspire men of all faiths who take religion seriously. Presented by artists on TV, they would surpass in thrill most of the 'westerns' and of course bring more good to humanity.

This reviewer considers it not irrelevant to comment here that while the world of Islam frowns upon missionary efforts to convert, the hostility, sometimes violence, provoked stems not from personal animosity but from an interpretation of fundamental Islamic thinking which disallows conversion out of Islam under any circumstances. Opposition encountered consequently is not to be construed as bigotry or fanaticism, but as loyalty to the paternal or national faith. If 'bigotry and fanaticism' of this kind be guilt, then Christianity cannot escape the same accusation. On the other hand, Muslims respect, sometimes admire, Christians who are sincere in their own faith, and disrespect those who are not.

The inquisitive reader will wonder what were the influences and forces at work to bring about these conversions. Missionaries of course were often involved. But other agents operated. Obvious was the influence of the example of other Iranian Christians: honesty, forgiveness, humility, longsuffering, tolerance, sincerity, piety, concern for others, service. Where controversy was in vogue, K. Pfander's *Balance of Truth* (*Mīzān al-Ḥaqq*) had weight. This appeared in several cases. In every instance the Bible seemed to be supreme in influence. Converts became Bible-centered Christians. Nozard wrote that the Bible was "my treasury, my riches, my library, my recreation, my joy, the remedy for my hopeless spiritual pains . . ." (p. 63). That the spirit of God was at work to guide and strengthen is indubitable. They believed firmly in intercessory prayer. Above all, the personality of the man Jesus as he is portrayed in the Gospels attracted as no other force could. In some instances there was the background preparation of Islam itself, especially mystical Islam (Sufism), a foundation that should not be discounted in evaluating the forces that operate on the soul. Observable, furthermore, are such experiences as dreams, visions, illuminations, ecstasy, healings, even levitation.

It should be noted that converts did not de-nationalize themselves. On the contrary, they continued with increased fervor to further the welfare of Iran and her people. Religion was separate from politics.

Dr. Miller's book evokes the question of intellectual and religious liberty. If humanity enjoyed 100 per cent freedom, change of faith would be no problem to society. But humanity, still in its infancy, is striving toward that goal. Progress is slow and arduous, but sure. Notwithstanding all that may seem to indicate the contrary, it appears to this reviewer that Iran enjoys more religious liberty than many other lands, and continues to move forward in that direction.

These biographies preserve for future generations of readers of all faiths the record of thoughts, sayings and deeds of heroic men and women who are worthy of commemoration. Their deeds cannot be redone. But the spirit of God which worked in them will continue to work in all who are receptive to it.

Winfield, Kansas ELMER H. DOUGLAS

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Grants by the Ford Foundation:

American Friends of the Middle East — $ 165,000 grant, for support of overseas educational services. American Friends of the Middle East is a private organization that provides a bridge between the United States and the Middle East by coordinating specialized training in the United States for professionals from the area, by providing Arab and American educational institutions with educational materials, and by publishing the magazine, *Mid East.* Through its overseas centers, located in Beirut, Cairo, Teheran, and Amman, it has carried out a programmed English instruction project in the Sudan, technical assistance in Syria and the United Arab Republic, and emergency fund raising for Palestinian refugees. Its largest overseas activity is operation of a counseling and placement service for Middle Eastern students seeking advanced education in the United States.

Central Asian Research Centre — $ 60,000 grant, for research on Central Asia and peripheral areas. The center, located in London, analyzes and assesses trends and developments in Soviet Central Asia and adjacent areas. Special attention is paid to such questions as Soviet nationalities policy, population trends, education, and the role of Islam in the region. The center recently has extended its research to include Soviet and Chinese policies in Asia and Africa.

Traveling Exhibits of Middle East Arts and Crafts. — Middle East Exhibits and Training, Inc. (MEET) is a non-profit, all- volunteer corporation which prepares and circulates exhibits to museums and universities throughout the United States. Through the universal language of arts and crafts, MEET seeks a deeper and clearer appreciation of the Arab people. Wherever possible the exhibits, three of which are described below, give the history behind the use of materials and designs. MEET, with headquarters at 1761 N Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, is a member of the World Crafts Council and the American Association of Museums.

Its latest exhibit, "Arab Accents in Interior Design," shows how Arab crafts can be used in decorating and furnishing American homes. Enlarged photographs of actual interiors supplement the collection of items gathered from the thirteen Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Rugs, metalwork, carved and inlaid wood all find their places in this scheme. One of the handsomest pieces is an antique copper toiletry case from Iraq, and another is an Algerian blanket in muted stripes. A critical panel, with representatives from craft and interior design groups, advised MEET on the composition and technical aspects of this exhibit.

"Arabian Motifs, Ancient through Modern," featured the creative expression of seven Arab countries. Three types of motif—calligraphic, geometric and arabesque—are portrayed in patterns from medieval times to the present. Jewelry, textiles, costumes, and objects of glass, metal

and wood are included. An ancient brocade cape is paired with a modern piece of brocade. A traditional Bethlehem costume of 100 years ago reflects in its embroidery many stitches used in other ways today. A leather and parchment Muslim prayer book, 200 years old, shows calligraphy with illumination as it has been done for centuries.

"Introducing Arab Life," designed primarily for young people, includes children's paintings and objects showing everyday life of people in North Africa and the Middle East. The paintings, from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon, concentrate on family life, sports, school and community life. Musical instruments, postage stamps, games and a model of an oil derrick are also included.

The Link, January/February, 1970

Errata, July-October 1969 issue: page 326 and list of "Reviewers of Books" in the Index.

Please change A. H. JONES to A. H. JOHNS.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

I. General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries. History of Islamic Studies.

II. Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.

III. Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs. Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.

IV. Theology. Movements, sects; Shīʿa. Philosophy. Sciences.

V. Sufism. Sufi Orders. Saints.

VI. Law. Politics; state; government. Nationalism. Socialism. Economics.

VII. Arabic and other relevant languages. Literature, culture, art. Education. Universities.

VIII. History of Muslim peoples, generally and in various areas (including studies on pre-Islamic period). Islam in modern history.

IX. Islam and other religions, civilizations, philosophies and ideologies.

X. Christianity and Islam (from a Christian point of view). The Church in Muslim environments.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	*American Anthropologist,* Journal of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C.
A.A.W.	*Afro-Asian Writings,* Cairo.
A.B.	*Analecta Bollandiana,* Bruxelles.
Ac As.	*Acta Asiatica,* Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture, The Tōhō Gakkai, Tokyo.
Afr.	*Africa,* Journal of the International African Institute, London.
Afr. A.	*African Arts,* University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Afr. M.	*African Music,* Journal of the African Music Society, Roodepoort, Transvaal, South Africa.
Afr. R.	*Africa Report,* Washington, D.C.
A.H.R.	*The American Historical Review,* Washington, D.C.
And.	*al-Andalus,* revista de las Escuelas de Estudios Arabes de Madrid y Granada.
A.Q.	*Anthropological Quarterly,* Washington, D.C.
Ar.	*Arabica,* Revue d'Etudes Arabes, Leiden.
Aram.	*Aramco World Magazine,* New York.
Arch.	*Archaeology,* Archaeological Institute of America, New York.
Ar.Or.	*Archiv Orientální,* Journal of the Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.
A.S.	*Asian Survey,* Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California.
A.S.B.	*African Studies Bulletin,* Boston University, Boston, Mass.
A.S.R.	*African Social Research,* University of Zambia, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

B.A.E.O.	*Boletin de la Asociacion Española de Orientalistas,* Madrid.
B.C.I.I.S.	*The Bulletin of the Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies,* Henry Martyn Institute, Lucknow, India.
B.I.I.S.	*Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies,* Alligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
B.O.	*Bibliotheca Orientalis,* Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, Leiden.
B.S.N.	*Behavior Sciences Notes,* Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, Conn.
B.S.O.A.S.	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London.
Bus.	*Bustan,* Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kultur, Politik und Wirtschaft der islamischen Länder, Wien.
C.A.D.	*Centre of Arabic Documentation Research Bulletin,* Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
C.A.J.	*Central Asiatic Journal,* International Periodical for the Languages, Literature, History and Archaeology of Central Asia, The Hague-Wiesbaden.
C.E.A.	*Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,* Ecole pratique des hautes études, Sorbonne, Paris.
C.H.M.	*Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale,* Paris.
Civ.	*Civilisations,* Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, Bruxelles.
C.O.C.	*Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain,* Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris.
Cont.	*Continuum,* Chicago.
Crit.	*The Criterion,* Journal of the Islamic Research Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
C.S.S.H.	*Comparative Studies in Society and History,* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Daed.	*Daedalus,* The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
D.I.	*Der Islam,* Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients, Berlin.
Dial.	*Dialog,* a quarterly journal of theology, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Diog.	*Diogenes,* The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, Paris and Montreal.
E.M.M.	*Evangelisches Missions Magasin,* Basel.
E.M.Q.	*Evangelical Missions Quarterly,* Springfield, Pennsylvania.
E.M.Z.	*Evangelische Missions-Zeitschrift,* Stuttgart.
Enc.	*Encounter,* Christian Theological Seminary, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Eth.	*Ethnology,* International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
E.V.	*Eglise Vivante,* Louvain.
F.A.	*Foreign Affairs,* New York.
Fr.	*Frontier,* London.
H.L.R.	*Harvard Law Review,* Cambridge, Massachusetts.
H.R.	*History of Religions,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
H.T.	*Hespéris Tamuda,* Rabat, Morocco.
I.A.	*International Affairs,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
IBLA	*Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes,* Tunis.
I.C.	*Islamic Culture,* The Islamic Culture Board, Hyderabad-Deccan
I.C.Q.	*India Cultures Quarterly,* School of Research, Leonard Theological College, Jabalpur, M.P., India.
I.J.M.E.S.	*International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Middle East Studies Association, New York.
I.E.J.	*Israel Exploration Journal,* Jerusalem, Israel
I.L.	*Islamic Literature,* Lahore.
In.As.	*Indo Asia,* Stuttgart.
Ind. Q.	*India Quarterly,* New Delhi.
Int.	*Intisari,* Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Ltd., Singapore

I.P.Q.	*International Philosophical Quarterly,* Fordham University, New York.
Iqbal	A Journal of the Basm-i Iqbal, Lahore.
Iqbal Rev.	*Iqbal Review,* Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
I.Q.	*The Islamic Quarterly,* The Islamic Cultural Centre, London.
I.R.	*The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs,* London.
I.R.M.	*International Review of Missions,* W.C.C., Geneva.
I.S.	*Islamic Studies,* The Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi
ISIS	Quarterly journal of the History of Science Society, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
I.T.	*Islamic Thought,* The Research Circle, Aligarh.
J.A.	*Journal Asiatique,* Societé Asiatique, Paris.
J.A.A.R.	*Journal of the American Academy of Religion,* Chambersburg, Pa.
J.A.H.	*The Journal of African History,* Cambridge University Press.
J.A.O.S.	*Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Baltimore. Maryland.
J.A.S.	*Journal of Asian Studies,* Ann Arbor, Michigan.
J.C.S.	*A Journal of Church and State,* Baylor Univ., Waco, Texas.
J.E.A.	*The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology,* London.
J.E.S.	*Journal of Ecumenical* Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
J.E.S.H.O.	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Leiden.
J.H.I.	*Journal of the History of Ideas,* New York.
J.H.P.	*Journal of the History of Philosophy,* University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
J.J.S.	*The Journal of Jewish Studies,* Jewish Chronicle Publications, London.
J.J.Soc.	*Jewish Journal of Sociology,* London.
J.N.E.S.	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* Chicago, Illinois.
J.P.H.S.	*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society,* Karachi.
J.R.A.	*Journal of Religion in Africa,* Leiden.
J.R.A.S.	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland,* Royal Asiatic Society, London.
J.R.H.	*The Journal of Religious History,* Sydney University Press, N.S.W.
J.S.S.	*Journal of Semitic Studies,* Manchester University Press.
J.Th.S.	*The Journal of Theological Studies,* Oxford.
J.W.H.	*Journal of World History,* Paris.
Ka.	*Kairos,* Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie, Salzburg.
Lig.	*Ligarzas,* Dept. of Medieval History, Valencia University.
M.A.S.	*Modern Asian Studies,* London.
M.D.	*The Muslim Digest,* International Monthly of Muslim Affairs, Durban, South Africa.
M.E.A.H.	*Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos,* Universidad de Granada.
M.E.F.	*Middle East Forum,* The Alumni Association, American University of Beirut.
M.E.J.	*The Middle East Journal,* Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
M.I.	*Man in India,* A quarterly anthropological journal, Bihar, India.
Mid.	*Midway,* A Magazine of Discovery in the Arts and Sciences, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
M.N.C.	*Le Monde non-Chrétien,* Paris.
Mus.	*Le Muséon,* Revue d'Etudes Orientales, Tijdschrift voor Oriëntalisme, Louvain.
N.C.C.R.	*National Christian Council Review,* Nagpur, Maharashtra, India.
Nu.	*Numen;* International Review for the History of Religions, Brill, Leiden.
O.C.	*Oriens Christianus,* Heft für die Kunde des christlichen Orients, O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.
O.C.P.	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma.
O.M.	*Oriente Moderno,* Istituto per l'Oriente, Roma.
Or.	*Orient,* Paris.
ORITA	Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies. Univ. of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Ors.	*Orients*, Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, Brill, Leiden.
Or. Suec.	*Orientalia Suecana*, Uppsala.
P.A.	*Pacific Affairs*, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
P.E.W.	*Philosophy East and West*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
P.F.	*The Philosophical Forum*, Boston, Mass.
Ph. St.	*Philippine Studies*, Manila.
P.O.C.	*Proche Orient Chrétien*, Jerusalem.
P.Q.	*Pakistan Quarterly*, Karachi.
Pr. Af.	*Présence Africaine*, Revue Culturelle du Monde Noir, Paris.
P.S.B.	*The Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.
R.C.A.J.	*Royal Central Asian Journal*, The Royal Central Asian Society, London.
R.E.I.	*Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
R.E.J.	*Revue des études juives*, Historia judaica, Mouton, 's-Gravenhage.
R.H.	*Revue Historique*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.H.R.	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.I.E.I.	*Revista del Instituto du Estudios Islámicos en Madrid*, Madrid.
R.M.	*Rythmes du Monde*, Le Bulletin des Missions, Paris et Bruges.
R.Q.	*Revue de Qumran*, Paris.
R.R.	*The Review of Religions*, Rabwah.
R.S.R.	*Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, Strasbourg.
R. St.	*Religious Studies*, London.
S.E.A.J.	*The South East Asia Journal of Theology*, Singapore.
S.I.	*Studies in Islam*, Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi
S.I.L.	*Studies in Linguistics*, Anthropology Research Center, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
Spec.	*Speculum*, A Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
S.P.N.C.	*Secretariatus pro non-Christianis*, Città del Vaticano.
S.S.R.	*Sociology and Social Research*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
St. in C.R.	*Studies in Comparative Religion*, Tomorrow Publications, Ltd.
St. Isl.	*Studia Islamica*, Paris.
Surv.	*Survey*, A journal of Soviet and East European Studies, London.
Sy.	*Syria*, Revue d'Art Oriental et d'Archéologie, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
Th.	*Theology*, London.
V.I.	*The Voice of Islam*, Karachi.
W.I.	*Die Welt des Islams*, Leiden.
W.M.	*Worldmission*, New York.
W.M.L.M.	*World Muslim League Magazine*, Singapore.
Z.D.M.G.	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, Wiesbaden.
Z.M.R.W.	*Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*, Aschendorff, Munster.
Z.R.G.G.	*Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte*, Brill, Köln.
Zy.	*Zygon*, Journal of Religion and Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.

I. *General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries. History of Islamic Studies.*

1091 ALOIS MUSIL'S REISEN NACH ARABIEN IM ERSTEN WELTKRIEG. Georg Sauer. *Ar. Or.*, XXXVII, 2 (1969), 243-263.

1092 THE CONTENTS OF "THE KITĀB AT-TĀJĪ" MANUSCRIPT OF ABŪ ISḤĀQ IBRĀHĪM AṢ-ṢĀBĪ. Moḥammad Ṣābir Khān. *I.S.*, VIII, 3 (1969), 247-252.

1093 ETHNOLOGIE DU MONDE ARABE ET ISLAMOLOGIE. Joseph Chelhod. *L'Homme,* IX, 4 (1969), 24-40.

1094 FÜNF JAHRZEHNTE SOWJETISCHE ARABISTIK. Wiebke Walther. *B.O.*, XXVI, 1-2 (1969), 34-45.

1095 THE HERITAGE OF ISLAM IN THE MODERN WORLD (I). Hamilton A.R. Gibb. *I.J.M.E.S.*, I, 1 (1970), 3-17.

1096 UN MANUSCRIT MAMLŪK ILLUSTRÉ DU ŠĀHNĀMA. Norhan Atasoy. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 1 (1969), 151-158.

1097 MARX ET ENGELS SE SONT-ILS INTÉRESSÉS AUX QUESTIONS ISLAMIQUES? G.-H. Bousquet. *St.Isl.*, XXX (1969), 119-130.

1098 A NOTE ON ASPECTS OF SOCIAL LIFE AMONG THE JEWISH KURDS OF SANANDAJ, IRAN. Paul J. Magnarella. *J.J.Soc.*, XI, 1 (1969), 51-58.

1099 THE RENAISSANCE OF ISLAM. Ali Muḥammad. *R.R.*, LXIII, X (1969), 387-403.

1110 ROYAL DISHES AND DRINKS UNDER AKBAR AND JAHANGIR. Bazlur Rahman Khan. *J.P.H.S.*, XVII, 3 (1969), 145-160.

II. *Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.*

1111 ANCIENT ARAB RELIGION. L. Faruqi. *I.L.*, XV, 7 (1969), 17-37.

1112 UN ASPECT INTÉRESSANT DE L'APOLOGÉTIQUE CORANIQUE: LE RAPPEL DES BIENFAITS D'ALLĀH ET SES CONSÉQUENCES. G. Wagner. *Ar.*, XVI, 1 (1969), 1-14.

1113 EFFECT OF *TAUBA* (REPENTANCE) ON PENALTY IN ISLAM. Syed Muᶜazẓam Ḥusain. *I.S.*, VIII, 3 (1969), 189-198.

1114 HADITH. ITS SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS VALUE. Abdullah Knoun. *I.C.*, XLIII, 3 (1969), 215-231.

1115 ᶜILM-UL-HADITH AND MYSTICISM. Muḥammad ᶜUbaidul Akbar. *I.L.*, XV, 6 (1969), 15-29.

1116 MARRIAGE IN PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIA. A.R.M. Zerruqe. *I.L.*, XV, 8 (1969), 43-63.

1117 QUELQUES REMARQUES SUR LA RACINE *FTN* DANS LE CORAN ET LA PLUS ANCIENNE LITTÉRATURE MUSULMANE. Jean-Claude Vadet. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 1 (1969), 81-101.

1118 "THE ŠĪᶜITE QURʾĀN," A RECONSIDERATION OF GOLDZIHER'S INTERPRETATION. J. Eliash. *Ar.*, XVI, 1 (1969), 15-24.

III. *Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.*

See also nos. 1165, 1168, 1187.

1119 CONDITION FÉMININE ET RAPPORTS SOCIAUX. Jean-Paul Charnay. *C.O.C.*, LXXVII (1969), 4-6; LXXVIII (1969)e 4-7.

1120 ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF FAMILY PLANNING. Moḥammad Saleem. *I.S.*, VIII, 3 (1969), 253-261.

1121 L'ÉVOLUTION MODERNE DU DROIT DE LA FAMILLE EN PAYS D'ISLAM. Chafik Chehata. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 1 (1969), 103-114.

1122 THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL FORMS IN A NORTH MOROCCAN VILLAGE. William D. Schorger. *A.Q.*, XLII, 3 (1969), 263-286.

1123 THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA. ITS HISTORY, RITES AND PHILOSOPHY. AL-GHAZALI ON THE MEANING OF THE HAJJ. Muḥammad Hamidullah. *I.R.*, LVII, 9 (1969), 17-34.

1124 POLITICS AND ISLAMIC MARRIAGE PRACTICES IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT. Joyce Aschenbrenner. *A.Q.*, XLII, 4 (1969), 305-315.

1125 QUR'ANIC JUSTIFICATION FOR JIHAD. David A. Craig. *B.C.I.I.S.*, III, 2 (1969), 13-25.

1126 THE SALAT IN ISLAM: SOME HIGHLIGHTS IN MUSLIM CHILDHOOD. Lamin O. Sanneh. *B.C.I.I.S.*, III, 2 (1969), 26-37.

1127 SOCIOLOGY OF THE QURAN. Basharat Ali. *V.I.*, XVIII, 1 (1969), 42-53; XVIII, 2 (1969), 113-120; XVIII, 3 (1969), 205-212.

IV. *Theology Movements, sects; Shīᶜa. Philosophy. Sciences.*

See also nos. 1118, 1137.

1128 FATALISM. Intiṣār-al-Ḥaq. *I.S.*, VIII, 3 (1969), 225-245.

1129 FOI ET RAISON DANS LE MUNQID DE GHAZÂLÎ. R. Caspar. *IBLA*, No. 124 (1969), 215-240.

1130 L'IǦMĀᶜ CHEZ ᶜABD AL-ǦABBĀR ET L'OBJECTION D'AN-NAẒẒĀM. Marie Bernand. *St.Isl.*, XXX (1969), 27-38.

1131 INTRODUCTION À LA PENSÉE ISLAMIQUE CLASSIQUE. Mohammed Arkoun. *J.W.H.*, XI, 4 (1969), 578-614.

1132 MIR SAYYID MUḤAMMAD NUR BAKHSH. Muḥammad Riaz. *J.P.H.S.*, XVII, 3 (1969), 177-190.

1133 SOME FEATURES OF THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES IN ISLAM. H. J. J. Winter. *I.R.*, LVII, 9 (1969), 13-16.

1134 TAFTĀZĀNĪ'S VIEWS ON *TAKLIF*, *ČABR* and *QADAR*: A NOTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES. Z. I. Ansari. *Ar.*, XVI, 1 (1969), 65-78.

V. *Sufism. Saints*

See also no. 1115.

1135 L'AUTOBIOGRAPHIE (*FAHRASA*) DU SOUFI MAROCAIN AḤMAD IBN ᶜAĞĪBA (1747-1809), II and III. J.-L. Michon. *Ar.*, XVI, 1 (1969), 25-64; XVI, 2 (1969), 113-154. (See also no. 889.)

1136 IS SECLUDED LIFE ESSENTIAL FOR REAL SUFISM? Syed Muzaffaruddin Nadvi. *I.L.*, XV, 6 (1969), 31-37.

1137 SCHOLASTICISM AND MYSTICISM IN ISLAM. Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Whahhab Bukhari. *I.R.*, LVII, 7-8 (1969), 22-28.

VI. *Law. Politics; state; government. Nationalsm. Socialism. Economics.*

See also nos. 1121, 1122, 1124, 1183.

1138 THE ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF TURKISH GUILDS. Gabriel Baer. *I.J.M.E.S.*, I, 1 (1970), 28-50.

1139 THE BAʿTH—IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE. Gordon H. Torrey. *M.E.J.*, XXIII, 4 (1969), 445-470.

1140 BLOCAGES ÉCONOMIQUES ET CRISE SOCIALE AU LIBAN. Raymond Delprat. *C.O.C.*, LXXV (1969), 5-12.

1141 THE CENTRAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY OTTOMAN REFORM MOVEMENT BEFORE 1876. Stanford J. Shaw. *I.J.M.E.S.*, I, 1 (1970), 51-84.

1142 THE CONCEPT OF *AL-UMMAH AL-ISLAMIYYAH*. THE BASIS OF THE EARLY MUSLIM POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. ʿAdnan Muḥammad Abu Ghazaleh. *I.R.*, LVII, 9 (1969), 37-38, 40.

1143 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL THOUGHT IN HANAFI TEXTS. Yaʿakov Meron. *St. Isl.*, XXX (1969), 73-118.

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Except where otherwise stated, the writers of articles and reviews are alone responsible for the opinions expressed.

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IN THIS ISSUE

Dr. Muḥammad Abdul Rauf continues his discussion of "The Qurʾān and Free Will," examining how the differences of views with regard to this subject led to the creation of disputing schools of theology.

We are glad to welcome several new contributors to our journal. Dr. Mohamed al-Nowaihi, Professor of Arabic Language and Literature at the American University in Cairo, offers a re-interpretation and re-evaluation of the Prophet Muḥammad. Although, as the title indicates, this article should not be read as if it represents the traditional and also in our time more common interpretations of the Prophet, the editors decided to publish this *re*-interpretation as a potentially significant contribution to the ongoing discussion, in which we would equally welcome the participation of those who follow the more traditional line. Professor Frank A. Stone, of the School of Education at the University of Connecticut, introduces in his article the tension between the Muʿtazilite and the Ashʿarite positions as relevant to a discussion of Muslim education. Dr. Naseer H. Aruri, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Southeastern Massachusetts University, contributes a comprehensive political study of Kuwait. The article by Dr. A. L. Motzkin, Senior Lecturer in Arabic at the University of Haifa, is based on his research on documentary materials from the Cairo Geniza. The documents are in Judaeo-Arabic and portray the state of intercultural and intersocial relations in the Middle East during the high middle ages.

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THE QUR'ĀN AND FREE WILL

(Conclusion)

II

EARLY DISPUTE OVER FREE WILL: ITS BACKGROUND AND RESULT

Our treatment of the position of the Qur'ān on the question of determinism and free will in the first part of this article (*M.W.*, LX, 3 [1970], 205 ff.) has demonstrated that the Qur'ān firmly holds man to be a responsible free agent, doing and producing his own works at will. Consistently with this, fatalistic tendencies in the pre-Islamic fashion were condemned. Yet, it was also found that the Qur'ān contains the notion of *qadar*, in the sense of 'pre-determining' divine acts and creations, and coordinating these to human deeds and activities as foretold by God in eternity.

We strongly feel that the term *qadar* must have conveyed to the early Muslims to whom the Qur'ān was first addressed the meaning given above—one which does not encroach upon the principle of human freedom. This position seems to have also prevailed for the period of the Orthodox Caliphate (11-40/632-661). Stories are told in which the second Caliph punished a thief seeking an excuse in *qadar*,[24] and the fourth Caliph told an inquirer who wondered how he could anticipate rewards for his acts if they were *muqaddara*:

> Perhaps you are thinking of a binding *qadar*. God commands His creatures to follow voluntarily; and he prohibited and warned them. He did not send His Messengers playfully and did not reveal His book to His creatures senselessly. This is the argument of the unbelievers.[25]

But when this young community of faith was subjected to a violent series of shocking events—starting with the murder of the third Caliph and resulting in the painful civil wars and the rise of the Umayyad Caliphate which was accompanied by unspeakable sufferings and misfortunes—a new situation was created and a scapegoat was sought in the use or misuse of the term *qadar*.

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[24] Ibn Murtaḍā, *al-Munya wa'l-Amal* (ed., T. W. Arnold, Leipzig, 1902), p. 8.
[25] ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū'l-Ḥadīd, *Commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha* (Beirut, 1954), IV, 375 f.; and Ibn Murtaḍā, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Even the fourth Caliph himself, who became a victim of these misfortunes, began to react in utterances reminiscent of pre-Islamic fatalistic expressions, ascribing to Time the acts of striking with calamities and bringing about misfortunes, and seeking consolation in *qadar*.[26] His eulogist, Bakr b. Ḥammād, began his ode with the words:

> Say to Ibn Muljam, even though *qadar* is inevitable, You have demolished the great foundations of the religion of Islam.[27]

The political upheavals and the misfortunes they brought about seem to have disposed the psychology of the Muslim public to resignation to some sort of inevitability, and prepared their mentality to unconsciously develop a fatalistic notion of *qadar*, tacitly leading to a gradual process of misinterpreting the term. These misfortune-sufferers sought to vent their intense emotions. They searched for comfort under the shelter of *qadar* in adverse circumstances, especially where the role of man was not prominent. The eulogist of ᶜAlī, for instance, did not bring in *qadar* to exonerate the murderer, but to seek some solace in attributing the end of ᶜAlī's life, after all, to God.

The reign of Muᶜāwiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, and that of his unpopular son Yazīd, witnessed the growth of a deliberate attempt to link the concept of *qadar* more closely with human acts. While ᶜAlī discouraged speculation over *qadar*[28] although he sought comfort in it in distress, Muᶜāwiya justified his unpopular actions by attributing them to *qadar*. He is said to have told ᶜĀ'isha, the widow of the Prophet, referring to the nomination of his son as successor: "...and the matter of Yazīd is a *qadar* among the *aqdār* of God; and people have no choice in what concerns them."[29] Subsequent Umayyad rulers and governors were also said to be of the habit of attributing their licentiousness and iniquities to *qadar*.[30]

In addition to the rulers' attempt at closely linking their very human acts and *qadar*, many events in the early period of the Umayyad reign profoundly contributed to conditioning and conducing the mentality of the Muslim subjects so as to attach a fatalistic notion to the concept of *qadar*.

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[26] al-Ṭabarī, *Taᵓrīkh* (Cairo, 1963), V, 63; Abūᵓl-Ḥadīd, *op. cit.*, IV, 77; and Abūᵓl-Maḥāsin al-Taghribardī, *al-Nujūm al-Ẓāhira* (Cairo, 1929), I, 111.

[27] Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr al-Qurṭubī, *al-Istīᶜāb fī maᶜrifat al-aṣḥāb* (Heyderabad, 1319 A.H.), II, 482

[28] ᶜAlī is reported to have said: "*al-Qadar* is a dark path, so walk not in it; it is a deep sea, so step not into it; it is a secret, so interfere not with it." Cf. Abūᵓl-Ḥadīd, *op. cit.*, IV, 507.

[29] Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma waᵓl-Siyāsa* (Cairo, 1937), I, 192. Ibn Murtadā therefore assumes in *al-Munya*, p. 5, that the doctrine of *jabr*, compulsion, 'fatalism,' appeared during the reign of Muᶜāwiya, but as will be discussed below, *jabr* as a distinct doctrine did not mature until about the turn of the first century of the Muslim era.

[30] Ibn Qutayba, *al-Maᶜārif* (Cairo, 1960), p. 441.

The treacherous murder of ʿĀlī, the sad death of his elder son, al-Ḥasan, rumored to have been caused by an Umayyad device, the coercion of the nation to swear an oath of fealty to Yazīd, the brutal murder of al-Ḥusayn, the mutilation of his body, the ruthless treatment of his young and female dependents, the humiliating defeat at al-Ḥarra, the plunder of the town and the shameless rape and the harsh treatment of the surviving companions, the siege of Mecca, and the shelling and burning of the Kaʿba, were all supreme acts of violence particularly suffered by the Muslims of the Hijaz, who were regarded by later generations as the custodians of religious and theological scholarship. In their loneliness and perpetual suffering, they were in need of solace and diversion, and they could find this in religious observances, especially the recitation of the Qur'ān and meditation on the meaning of many texts which they applied to their own misfortunes. Such a Qur'anic statement as, "Say, 'All is from God'" (S. 4: 78/80), although the theme was the refutation of a claim ascribing certain misfortunes to the Prophet, was extended to their suffering from the injustices of their rulers. Moreover, the Qur'anic call for patience and fortitude in distress [31] was also applied to the misfortunes resulting from the oppression of the authorities, [32] although the context was the misfortunes of the wars with the enemies of the faith.

This extension of Qur'anic exhortations to their predicaments suffered at the hands of the rulers must have given that generation some consolation and comfort in anticipation of rewards and compensation in a world to come. After all, forbearance and resignation to misfortunes coming from God involve God's pleasure; and whatever takes place as God's creation and deed, even if it involved hardship, might be for the ultimate benefit of man. [33] This interpretation of these Qur'anic texts, and in addition to it the effect of the pre-Islamic poetry with its elements of fatalism—poems which the Arabs of that time loved to repeat and sing—appears to have prepared the credulous Muslim public, at the time when an open dispute started over the meaning of *qadar* and its relation to free will, to accept a fatalistic interpretation of the word partly because of the absence of an authoritative definition of the term.

The open debate over the subject of *qadar* had assumed serious dimensions by the year 70 or 71/690-691. This can be taken from the

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[31] E.g., S. 2:155 f./150 f.

[32] An instructive line by ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa in his lonely exile from al-Kūfa, as related by al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, VI, 158 f. reads:

"My enemy has wrongly sent me away from my home
But I have to acquiesce to the will of Allāh and His decree."

[33] This trend may have had something to do with the popular interpretation of the term *islām* in the sense of 'submission.' Cf. M. A. Rauf, "Notes on the Qur'anic Use of the Terms *islām* and *īmān*," *M W.*, LVII, 1 (1967), 94-102.

renowned tradition related by Muslim and others. Muslim's version reads:

> Yaḥyā b. Yaᶜmur said, "Maᶜbad al-Juhanī was the first to speak of *qadar*.[34] It happened that I and Ḥumayd b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān went on pilgrimage. We thought of seeking to meet one of the Companions and ask him about what these people were saying about *qadar*. So we happened to meet ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb when he was about to enter the Mosque. ... I asked: O Father of ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān. In our midst some people have emerged who read the Qurᵓān and seek to reach the bottom of knowledge... They claim there is no *qadar* and that the matter is spurious." ᶜAbd Allāh answered, "If you meet them inform them that I dissociate myself from them and they are dissociated from me."

ᶜAbd Allāh then goes on and relates on the authority of his father a long *ḥadīth* in which Gabriel is supposed to have come to the Prophet assuming a human form and to have asked the Prophet about the meaning of *islām*, *īmān* and *iḥsān*. Believing in *qadar* was given as an element of *īmān*.[35]

Apart from the question of the degree of its authenticity, this tradition confidently indicates that the dispute over the term *qadar* and its relation to free will had become an important issue during the lifetime of ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar who died approximately in Shaᶜbān, 73 A.H., three months after the death in battle of ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr.[36] Since ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar seems to have died before the pilgrimage season of 73 A.H., and since Mecca was besieged by al-Ḥajjāj during the previous season of 72 A.H.,[37] we feel safe in asserting that the meeting between Yaḥyā b. Yaᶜmur and ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar, if it ever had taken place, had to be in or before 71 A.H.

While we can assert that the debate over *qadar* and free will had matured by 71 A.H., the exact date of its beginning is difficult to determine. It may be, however, as sometimes suggested, that the incon-

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[34] The claim that al-Juhanī was among the earliest to speak about *qadar* is corroborated by many other authors. Cf. Ibn Qutayba. *al-Maᶜārif*, p 484; and ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Samᶜānī, *K. al-Ansāb* (Leyden, 1912), p. 146a

[35] Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Qushayrī, better known as 'Muslim,' *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo, 1349 A.H.), I, 150-157. Cf. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan* (Cairo, 1950), IV, 208 f.; and Ibn Māja, *Sunan* (Cairo, 1952), I, 24

[36] Abū Jaᶜfar Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb, *K. al-Muḥabbar* (Heyderabad, 1942), p. 24; and Abū Zakariyyā Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawāwī, *Tahdhīb al-Asmāᵓ wa'l-Lughāt* (Ed., Wustenfeld, 1842), p. 360. On account of this detail, this report inspires a sense of precision and authenticity and makes it preferable to the other dates given by Dhahabī in his *Tadhkira* (Heyderabad, n.d), I, 33, which puts Ibn ᶜUmar's death in early 74.

[37] We are even informed that Ibn ᶜUmar was with al-Ḥajjāj during this season to lead his men in the performance of the rites of the pilgrimage on the instruction of the Caliph ᶜAbd al-Malik. Accordingly, he was not in Mecca then. Cf. Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-Nihāya*, VIII, 329.

clusive assault on Mecca by the Umayyads and the burning of the Ka'ba in 64/684 prompted speculation over whether or not this could have occurred by the decree, *qadar*, of God,[38] and in this way served as a spark leading to the outbreak of the debate.

When the question of *qadar* and its relation to human acts was raised in one manner or another, interested elements in the community favored a fatalistic interpretation that would exonerate evil-doers from their misdeeds. Outraged by this misuse of the concept of *qadar*, especially by unscrupulous rulers and governors who attributed their oppressive sins to *qadar*, certain conscientious scholars reacted by denying a relationship between *qadar*, i.e., divine determinism, and the area of human deeds and human choices. In their view, human deeds are not covered by *qadar*. They are produced or done and brought about by the individual and his independent free choice without the involvement in any way of predestination or divine determinism.

This outright—although partial—denial of *qadar* in relation to human deeds offended the public mind which had been saturated with fatalistic inclinations. Moreover, at least from the point of view of the opponents, this denial imposed limitations on the concept of divine omnipotence.[39] Led by governmental elements who exploited the situation to their own advantage, they condemned these champions of a liberal interpretation of *qadar* as heretics, and called them, ironically, the *Qadarites*.[40] A number of traditions attributed to the Prophet, foretelling the coming of these heretics and condemning them, were produced.[41] The large majority of the community believed itself to be more in conformity with the original teachings of the faith and therefore called itself the *Sunnites*. The sharp mutual opposition and condemnation resulted in the hardening of the line adopted by each party. The Qadarites exaggerated their views in a manner that shocked the Muslim public. The Sunnites, on the other hand, exaggerated their views into a harsh fatalistic interpretation.

While the popular views, which acquired in the course of time an authoritative orthodox status, are widely reflected in the literature of Qur'anic exegesis and the works of the Sunnite theologians, the position of the Qadarites is best expounded in a message believed to have been sent by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī to the Caliph in reply to a letter from

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[38] Ahmad al-Safārīnī, *Lawā'iḥ al-Anwār al-Bahiyya* (Cairo, 1323 A.H.), p 251.

[39] Note the words, "They claim that there is no *qadar* and that the matter is spurious," in the *ḥadīth* of Ḥumayd b 'Abd al-Rahmān related above.

[40] al-Ash'arī, *Luma'*, pp. 90 f, justifies naming them as such by the fact that they, according to him, attribute to themselves the privilege of decreeing their deeds.

[41] Reference may be made to the various collections of *Ḥadīth* in the chapter entitled *qadar*. Cf. Shaykh 'Alā' al-Dīn b. 'Alī, *Kanz al-'Ummāl* (Heyderabad, 1945), I, 104 f., 120-124 and 325-327; and Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Shaykh, *Fatḥ al-Majīd* (Dār Miṣr Press, 1326 A.H.), pp. 433 ff.

the latter.[42] The ascription of this message to this renowned theologian who flourished in the latter part of the first Islamic century is disputed by some Sunni authors,[43] but there are firm grounds for believing that the document was from al-Ḥasan's pen.[44] Irrespective of whether the document was written by al-Ḥasan or by one of his contemporaries, it well sets forth the views of the Qadarites.

The Umayyad Caliph, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. Marwān (d. 86/705), on whose order some outspoken upholders of the Qadarite views, like Maᶜbad al-Juhanī, are said to have been executed,[45] told al-Ḥasan in his letter:

> We have come to know of an interpretation of *qadar* by you which we never heard from the Companions of the Prophet whom we happened to meet, or through the authorities who have expired.[46]

He asked him whether he had heard these views from any of the Companions, whether they were the result of his own reasoning, or whether he had derived them from the Qurᵓān.[47]

al-Ḥasan begins his long reply by saying:

> The Companions did not argue about what we now maintain because they were agreed on it; but we began to raise this matter when people started to deny it, following their misleading lusts and evil desires and playing with the words of the Book of God.[48]

The author then devotes a great effort to disproving the claims that forbidden acts were decreed by God. He says such acts as disbelief, according to the Book, are disliked by God,[49] and continues:

> And God is not such as to decree an act then be displeased with what He has decreed.[50] *Thus transgression and injustices are*

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[42] H. Ritter, "Studien zur Geschichte der islamischen Frömmigkeit, I, Ḥasan al-Baṣri," *Der Islam*, XXI (1933), 67-82. Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *al-Munya*, pp. 13 f.

[43] Abū'l-Fath Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal* (Cairo, 1961), I, 47. He likes to ascribe it to Wāṣil b. ᶜAṭāᵓ, but it is absurd Wāṣil was born in 80 A H, and the Caliph with whom the correspondence is supposed to have been made, namely, ᶜAbd al-Malik, died six years later

[44] The style is al-Ḥasan's familiar style; and the argument depends heavily on the Qurᵓān and does not reflect doctrines developed later. There are also traditions related by Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī which imply al-Ḥasan's involvement as a Qadarite. Moreover, some ideas incorporated in the argument, like the interpretation of *qaḍāᵓ* in the sense of commanding occurs in other speeches traced to al-Ḥasan.

[45] al-Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, I, 17; Ibn Murtaḍā, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.; al-Samᶜānī, *Ansāb*, p. 146a; Ibn Qutayba, *al-Maᶜārif*, p. 484; al-Taghrībardī, *Nujūm*, I, 222; and Ibn al-ᶜIbrī, *Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, p. 191.

[46] Ritter, *Der Islam*, XXI (1933), 67.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *Ibid.*, 68. Cf. Ibn Murtaḍā, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[49] S. 39:7.

[50] This, in our view, is not a valid argument. al-Ḥasan establishes a positive relationship between God's pleasure and the inclusion of an act in His plan of *qadar* as if this inclusion necessarily implies the coming of the act by the work

> *not from acts predestined by God,* but the meaning of God's decreeing is His Command.[51]

Referring to those who were probably behind the sending of the letter by ᶜAbd al-Malik, al-Ḥasan says:

> And they argue concerning God's knowledge and say: God knew that some people will disbelieve, and therefore cannot believe because God's foreknowledge becomes an obstruction. What they say amounts to the claim that God requires His servants to do what they cannot do, and to leave what they cannot afford to leave; but God exposes their lie when he says: "God does not require a soul to do what is beyond its ability." [52] It is only that God knew that disbelief would occur from them by their own choice and by their following their desires. They compare this with God's foreknowledge of their becoming short or tall, etc., but it is not so. These [physical features] are God's acts which are not preceded by their choice, and they have no power to change them. As for disbelief, God foretold that they would choose it by following their desires, and knew that if they disliked it they would leave it, and that they have an ability with which He endowed them in order to try them. [53]

> God's saying: "No accident befalls on the earth or in yourselves but it was in the Book before We created it," [54] does not apply to disbelief or belief, or to obedience or disobedience. It applies only to such things as properties, souls and harvests. [55]

> Let it be known, O you Commander of the faithful, that God is too just to blind a person and then say to him: "See, otherwise I shall punish you," or deafen him and then command him: "Hear, otherwise I shall punish you," or strike him dumb and then command him: "Speak, otherwise I shall punish you." [56]

From the above quotations, the essential elements of the Qadarite position can be clearly deduced. They admitted the validity of a doctrine of *qadar* covering all divine creations but excluding the area of

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of *qadar* alone with no choice on the part of man. This inclusion of the human acts in the divine plan of *qadar* derives from God's foreknowledge of the free choices of man in time.

[51] Ritter, *Der Islam,* XXI (1933), 49

[52] S. 2:286. We agree with al-Ḥasan's argument here. God's foreknowledge which merely reflects what would happen does not imply a sense of compulsion.

[53] Ritter, *Der Islam,* XXI (1933), 77.

[54] S. 57:22.

[55] Ritter, *Der Islam,* XXI (1933), 74. We agree with the argument of al-Ḥasan here. The verse speaks of misfortunes which are outside the scope of human voluntary acts.

[56] *Ibid.,* 81.

human deeds. Man, according to them, brings about his own acts by his own free choice; he even 'creates' them, and thus they apply the term *khalq* to the work of man. When the term *qadar* or its equivalent *qaḍā*ᵓ (or one of their derivatives) is applied to human acts in a Qurᵓanic passage, they interpret the term in the sense of 'commanding.' [57] In their opinion, a denial of free will and of human responsibility would be inconsistent with the notion of divine justice.

The Sunnites, on the other hand, maintained that the term *qadar* was a comprehensive concept, applicable both to the divine and to human deeds. Excluding the area of human acts from the concept would be, in their view, a limitation inconsistent with God's omnipotence. Although they may not have denied free will explicitly, their severe condemnation of the liberal interpretation of the term as well as the licentious behavior of their patrons—seeking shelter under the cover of *qadar*—implied a vigorous denial of free will in reality.

In our view, neither party was perfectly correct. The exclusion of human deeds from the concept of *qadar* by the Qadarites was unnecessary for the protection of divine justice and the principle of human responsibility. It easily provoked their condemnation and popularized the views of their opponents. Yet, the inconsistencies implicit in the harsh interpretation of the Sunnites, on the other hand, became apparent later when it was pushed to its conclusion with the rise of the Jabrites and some extremists among the Murjiᵓites. The term *qadar*, in its Qurᵓanic use, is a comprehensive concept but does not infringe on human freedom.

The crisis of the Qadarite 'movement'—which flourished during the last four decades of the first century of the Islamic era [58]—is widely reflected in the *Ḥadīth*, [59] since some Companions of the Prophet survived until that time. The voice of these Qadarites was gradually drowned by the terrific tide of public and official opposition against

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[57] *Supra*, n 51

[58] As can be taken from relevant works, we may count the following personalities as prominent Qadarites: Maᶜbad al-Juhanī, ᶜAtāᵓ b. Yasār, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ghaylān of Damascus and his associate Ṣālih, Qatāda b. Daᶜāma, Ḥumayd al-Ṭawīl, Wahb b Munabbih, Makhūl b ᶜAbd Allāh, ᶜUmar al-Maqṣūṣ, and ᶜAmr b. ᶜUbayd. Cf. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Maᶜārif*, p. 625; and Ibn Murtaḍā, *al-Munya*, pp 24 f. In counting al-Ḥasan we depend on the grounds mentioned earlier confirming his authorship of the message sent to ᶜAbd al-Malik, n 44 above He is also counted as a Qadarite by Ibn Murtaḍā in his *al-Munya*, p. 14; and he credits him in p. 12 with the saying that *qadar* covered everything except sins. Ibn Qutayba reports in *al-Maᶜārif*, p. 441, that al-Ḥasan repented or changed his mind; but we cannot easily agree that a man of such independent thinking and of such great prestige would have just yielded to the pressure and accepted the popular views. He might have become more discreet by avoiding the argument about the subject. Ibn Murtaḍā says that al-Ḥasan merely stopped talking about it under threat; *al-Munya*, p. 14.

[59] *Supra*, n. 41 However, other hadiths were brought forward condemning the opponents of the Qadarites and calling them Jabrites Cf. Ibn Murtaḍā, *op. cit.*, pp 8-10.

them. They also gradually distintegrated either by death—violent [60] or natural—or by 'repentance,' [61] although their doctrine survived and was held by the succeeding generations of rationalist theologians.

By the time the literature on the history of Muslim thought began to be written, other divisions of Muslim theologians had arisen, other questions were tackled and fresh ideas and doctrines were developed and upheld. In writing about these thinkers and sects, authors indiscriminately applied the term *qadarite*— which had by then acquired a derogatory sense—to any theologian upholding the principle of free will along with other thoughts and doctrines, although the Qadarites proper, who held no views at variance with those of the rest of the community apart from their interpretation of *qadar*, had disintegrated by the turn of the first century. It is therefore important, in reading this literature, to guard against this error and to give due consideration to the context.

The dispute over the meaning of the term *qadar* was a major factor in the rise and growth of the early Muslim sects. It led, as has just been seen, to the division of the Muslim theologians into a group of Qadarites holding a liberal interpretation of the word, and a majority extending the term to all happenings in the universe including human deeds.

Among the Sunni majority there were elements actively promoting an attitude of 'deferment,' *irjā'*, in judging sinners, especially those in official circles. It was against this attitude of defending the oppressive acts of wicked rulers that the Qadarites were apparently reacting. The philosophy of the Deferrents, Murji'ites—of not condemning sinners so long as they maintained the faith—was apparently sparked by the Kharijite doctrine of condemning sinners as unbelievers, started by Nāfi' b. al-Azraq, on breaking away from 'Abd Allāh b. al-Zubayr in 64. [62] Thus the outrageous behavior of the rulers seems to have prompted the rise of the harsh doctrine of the Kharijites, the tolerant reaction of the Murji'ites, and the defense of free will by the Qadarites.

The doctrine of the Murji'ites is in large agreement with the Qur'anic statement regarding the possibility of divine forgiveness for believing sinners. [63] They were therefore tolerated by the Sunni majority at first; but when the Murji'ites began to exaggerate their philosophy, minimizing the importance of the law, and thus threatening the Islamic moral bases and moral values, they began to be regarded as a separate heretical sect. The phenomenon of the Murji'ites,

[60] Ma'bad al-Juhanī was killed by al-Ḥajjāj on the order of 'Abd al-Malik; so was 'Umar al-Maqṣūṣ.

[61] Ibn Qutayba, who said that al-Ḥasan changed his mind, *supra*, n. 58, ascribes the same to Wahb b. Munabbih, *al-Ma'ārif*, p. 625. Qatāda is also said to have repented Cf. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Udabā'* (Cairo, 1936), XVII, 9.

[62] al-Ṭabarī, *Tā'rīkh*, VII, 57 f.

[63] S. 4:48/51.

although they were contemporaries of the Qadarites, was not so widely reflected in early Traditions,[64] apparently because of this late condemnation.

The Murji'ites' attitude of defending sinners was later given a more eloquent exposition by Jahm b. Ṣafwān, regarded by al-Ash'arī as a Murji'ite,[65] who explains his position in outright fatalistic terms. He says:

> No one acts in reality except God alone. It is He Who acts; and men have their acts ascribed to them merely metaphorically, in the same way as it is said the stone moves, the sphere revolves and the sun sets. But it is God Who does all this with the stone, the sphere and the sun. God only created in man a power, and with this power action is produced, and a will and choice for specific actions, as He created his height whereby he is described.[66]

This daring position of Jahm offended the orthodox who condemned Jahm and his followers as the *Jabrites*, i.e., 'fatalists.' The position of the Jabrites, however, clearly exposed the danger which lay in the attitude of the Sunnites, which did not reconcile the doctrine of *qadar* with the principle of human freedom, thus threatening the idea of divine justice and human responsibility. This position was further exposed and bitterly criticized by the vigorous sect of the Mu'tazilites who appeared as a separate group in the early part of the second century, and who condemned the Sunnites as Jabrites.[67]

Awakened by these movements to the inconsistencies of their position, the Sunnites began then to reconcile their interpretation of *qadar* with the postulate of human responsibility and divine justice. Rejecting the Jabrite theory of compulsion and repudiating the Mu'tazilite philosophy attributing the creation of human deeds to man, they introduced the concept of *kasb*, 'acquisition,' as the foundation of human responsibility.[68] As the element of involvement of man in the production of his deeds, *kasb* became widely acknowledged through the works of later influential theologians such as Abū'l Ḥasan

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[64] al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Cairo, n.d.), I, 18, relates one *ḥadīth* in which Abū Wā'il, a Companion who died in 82 A.H., was asked about the Murji'ites, and he answered that his fellow Companion, 'Abd Allāh b. Mas'ūd, informed him that the Prophet said, "Cursing a Muslim is a deviation and fighting him is disbelief." The first part of this seems to be directed against the Qadarites and the last is levelled against the Kharijites.

[65] *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn* (Cairo, 1950), I, 197.

[66] *Ibid.*, 312. Cf. 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq* (Cairo, 1910), p. 128; and al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal*, I, 87.

[67] al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal*, I, 85.

[68] W. Montgomery Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (London: Luzac, 1948), pp. 62-65.

al-Ash'arī,[69] who also analyzed it as *istiṭā'a,* 'ability,' or *qudra ḥāditha,* a created power that exists and works simultaneously with the eternal power. This kind of 'reconciliation' assumed a degree of refined depth when they attempted to relate this element of acquisition to the coming into being of the act.[70] However, these subtle and hair-splitting solutions, none of which has received universal acceptance, do not quite correspond with the simple and clear Qur'anic position which clearly acknowledges human freedom and categorically attributes human deeds to man.

Thus, while the recurrence of violence and the frequency of human failure during the early part of the Umayyad rule—covering the fifth and sixth decades of the first Islamic century—stimulated speculative discussions among Muslims, bearing the seeds of different theological thoughts, the seventh decade of the century was apparently the age which witnessed the founding of the theological schools. Some of these schools gave birth to further divisions, and thus this period seems to have produced the trends which would determine the whole history of Muslim thought during the succeeding ages.

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[69] William Thompson, "Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam, A Critique and Appreciation," *M.W.*, XL, 3 (1950), 210. Cf. Ash'arī *Luma'*, pp. 37 ff.

[70] William Thompson, *M.W.*, XL, 4 (1950), 282 ff.

TOWARDS A RE-EVALUATION OF MUḤAMMAD: PROPHET AND MAN *

"In addition to the festivity, we should try to learn more about the life of the Prophet and the Divine Message which he brought," declares the notice of this celebration which has been sent out by the Harvard Islamic Society. True enough; but let us, then, not be content to repeat the uncritical reports and assertions which are usually reiterated by Muslim preachers on this occasion. First of all, let us try to sift fact from fiction. For instance, in Muslim lands speakers and celebrants in mosques and homes would now be reading stories of *Mawlid al-Nabī* which purport that the birth of the Prophet was presaged and accompanied by certain cataclysmic events in the heavens and on earth. Stars came near the earth until they almost fell down. The palace of the King of Persia was shaken and fourteen of its battlements collapsed. Persian fires, which had been continuously burning in Zoroastrian temples for a thousand years, were extinguished. Lakes dried up and valleys were flooded. A light came out of the Prophet's mother and illuminated all the palaces of Syria. The stories go on to claim that the Prophet was born fully circumcised and with his placenta already separated from his navel. When he fell down to the ground, he prostrated himself in worship of God and his fully-opened eyes were fixed on Heaven. He brought the most extraordinary good luck to his wet-nurse and her people, and during his infancy he grew at a rate never before achieved by a human child, so that when only two years old he was a strong, sturdy lad. When he was a few years old the Archangel Gabriel descended from Heaven and split his chest open, took out his heart, removed a black clot from it, washed the heart in a gold vessel with pure ice, returned it to his chest and sewed the chest up. During his childhood, a light cloud accompanied him wherever he went, protecting him from the heat of the sun. [1]

Several other reports of a similar nature are given. But some of these stories go back even to the beginning of time and claim that God created Muḥammad as a pure light before He created any other human; that that light was placed in the loins of Adam and from him

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* An address delivered to the Harvard Islamic Society on the occasion of *Mawlid al-Nabī* (Prophet's Birthday) Rabīᶜ al-Awwal 12, 1388 (June 8, 1968).

[1] For Muslim literature on *Mawlid al-Nabī*, see, e.g., the article "Mawlid" in (*Shorter*) *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and A. Jeffery, ed., *Islam-Muhammad and his Religion* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 226. Easily accessible are the relevant passages in Ibn Ishāq's *The Life of Muhammad* (transl. by A. Guillaume; London: O.U.P., 1855), pp. 68-73. For a Western summary of many of the birth-stories, cf. Tor Andrae, *Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde* (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1918), pp 28-39, 52 ff.

descended via pure, chaste wombs into one noble ancestor after another until it reached Muḥammad's father, in whom it showed as a white, luminous mark in his forehead until he had placed it in Āmina, the Prophet's mother. Muḥammad's birth fifty-three years before the Hijra was therefore only the incarnation in human form of that First Creation. [2] This part of the stories—which are all fabrications of a later date—is clearly jealous emulation of what the Christians say about Jesus the Christ. The mischief of such fairy tales, which, admittedly, give great joy to the credulous masses, is not merely that they arouse the derision of non-Muslims; their greater mischief is that they distract the Muslims themselves from the true character and merit of Muḥammad and the faith which he brought to mankind. Unlike certain others before him (and after him), he was not a miracle-monger. Neither in the promulgation nor in the propagation of his religion did he resort to any physical miracle whatever, deeming it sufficient to recite the revealed verses of the Qur'ān and to appeal to the hearts and minds of sensitive, thinking men. As the Qur'ān explicitly and repeatedly portrays (see, for instance, S. 17:90-93/92-95), he steadfastly refused to succumb to the enticement of his people in Mecca and their repeated challenge that he perform a miracle to prove his divine mission—a sure sign of his integrity, especially if one realizes the cruel mockery and contempt which he suffered on account of that refusal.

Having cleared Muḥammad's biography of the crop of myth and legend that has overgrown it, let us then—especially with a view to non-Muslim readers—not be satisfied with repeating the claims which only Muslims can accept and which they see as the precondition for belief in the Islamic religion. We Muslims believe that Muḥammad was the greatest and last of the prophets and apostles of God. We also believe that his character reached perfection. On neither of these claims does the majority of mankind agree with us. Nor does that majority follow us when we go on to affirm that the birth of Muḥammad was the greatest event in history; the most munificent blessing which God gave to man; the decisive act which flooded the earth with light and guidance after total darkness and error, established right in the place of wrong, spread knowledge and mercy among mankind instead of ignorance and savagery—and other such expressions which, in stereotyped terms little better than clichés, we are wont to repeat especially on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday.

It should be obvious that we shall not help the cause of our faith nor persuade the rest of humanity to learn more about the character of its founder so long as we are content to make such claims. Let us, therefore, concentrate on finding the common ground on which all men of reason and good will should meet. Owing to the limited space

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[2] Andrae discusses at length the pre-existence and *logos* notions found in Sufi writings; *Die Person Muhammeds*, Chapter VI *passim*, esp. pp. 313-357.

available here, I can only touch upon two major questions: the question of Muḥammad's truthfulness, and that of his character. In tackling each, let us pay attention to the views that have been expressed by non-Muslim writers, in order to note the radical change which has occurred in recent decades.

As to the answer to the question of Muḥammad's truthfulness, it is time to realize that whether he was or was not a true prophet of God is entirely a matter of belief, which depends, firstly, on people's acceptance or rejection of the mere existence of God; secondly, on their acceptance or rejection of the idea of a God who calls on certain men to communicate His message to mankind; and thirdly, on their conviction regarding both the form and content which that communication must have in order to be acceptable. We would therefore only be wasting time and effort if we attempted to prove our particular stand on any of these three points to people who do not share our conviction; for all these questions are beyond proof in the correct sense of the word 'proof': factual demonstration and rational argument. There is, however, a question which is, I think, open to objective assessment, and which is of paramount importance, since it decides men's basic attitude to Muḥammad, irrespective of their acceptance or rejection of his mission. This is the question of his own sincerity.

At another occasion [3] I described how the earlier non-Muslim scholars firmly believed that Muḥammad was a deliberate impostor, "a conscious charlatan who fabricated the Qur'ān while fully realizing it was his own composition." [4] If he were such a person, he would, of course, only merit the strongest condemnation and the utmost repugnance of mankind. However, with the passage of time, several factors combined to change this extreme denunciation. Modern methods of historical research developed, enabling scholars to make more objective assessments. There was a gradual lessening of the motives of prima facie animosity which activated the early Orientalists, who were mostly Christian or Jewish scholars intent upon proving the a priori fallacy of Islam and the exclusive validity of their own creed. Other scholars entered the arena of historical research, and treated all religion with an equally open mind. Original sources on the life, sayings and actions of Muḥammad were increasingly available, both in the original Arabic and in good Western translations. Now, although many uninformed people still repeat the old accusation, the great majority of writers and speakers on the subject no longer have any doubt of Muḥammad's complete sincerity. Whether he was a true prophet or was only deluded, he himself was fully genuine in his spiritual search and became utterly

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[3] In an address to the Harvard Islamic Society on the occasion of *ʿId al-Fiṭr*.

[4] Carlyle referred in 1840 to the then prevalent view of Muḥammad as "a scheming Impostor, a Falsehood incarnate, ... his religion ... a mere mass of quackery and fatuity." Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (New York: John Wiley, 1849), p. 39.

convinced that what he heard was the true revelation of the true, invisible God. [5]

Let me begin with an argument recognized by several Western scholars themselves, as I formulated it earlier:

> First of all, there is his white-hot faith in the existence of the omnipresent and invisible God: a faith which burned in all his pronouncements and which never abated in the whole history of his career. This is too passionate and overpowering to emanate from a mere mountebank. Then there is the stupendous anguish which he underwent in his search for the true God, that long and agonizing search . . . .[6]

It is important to realize that when that search culminated in his hearing the voice of Gabriel in Mount Ḥirā', at the age of forty, he did not hasten to believe in his revelation or become convinced of it overnight. He passed through a period of considerable doubt and fear, terrified lest it be only the wicked trick and cruel jesting of Satan, and he needed the wholehearted support of his faithful wife Khadīja to overcome his fears. I venture to suggest that this was an attestation of his integrity; a deliberate impostor bent upon deception would not have gone through those agonizing terrors. Furthermore, a careful reading of the early suras of the Qur'ān shows that, even after he was convinced of the the authenticity of his revelation, it was only with great reluctance that he accepted the awesome burden of his mission, and only after he was driven by an overpowering sense of the duty which he could not shirk.

Furthermore, the Qur'ān contains a number of terrifying verses denouncing those who fabricate words and claim they are God's and threatening them with damnation and dire chastisement. Here is one such instance:

> If he [Muḥammad] had fabricated any sayings and falsely ascribed them to Us, We should certainly have seized him by the

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[5] Carlyle pleaded in his famous lecture of May 8, 1840, for the recognition of the hero's sincerity, "a deep, great, genuine sincerity," "the kind he cannot speak of, is not conscious of: nay, I suppose, he is conscious rather of insincerity" (*op. cit.*, p. 41). This "characteristic" of all men in any way heroic Carlyle saw as definitely applying also to Muhammad. Perhaps the best known examples of a discussion of Muḥammad's sincerity in this century are Leone Caetani, *Annali dell' Islam*, II, Tomo I (Milano: Ulrich Hoepli, 1907), pp. 464-476 (§ 132—§ 138) and H. Lammens, "Mahomet, fut-il sincère?" *Recherches de Science religieuse*, II (1911), 25-53, 140-166.

An important contribution to this discussion in the following decade was Tor Andrae's biography of the Prophet, first published in 1932 (Engl. translation 1936). Cf. his remark, "Mohammed regarded his call with the utmost sincerity"; ***Mohammed, the Man and his Faith*** (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960 and reprint), p. 178.

Probably the most significant more recent discussion of "The Man and His Greatness" is found in W. Montgomery Watt, ***Muhammad at Medina*** (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 321-335 (on his sincerity esp. pp. 325 f.).

[6] In the address referred to in note 3.

> right hand, and had cut through the vein of his neck, and none of you would have saved him. (S. 69: 44/47)

Reading those burning verses, it is almost impossible to believe that Muḥammad himself was consciously one of those whom the verses so fervently condemn. In this connection, we may remember how terrified Muḥammad was lest through faulty memory he forget or alter some of the words revealed to him, so much so that he needed God's reassurance and comfort several times on this question (see, for instance, S. 87: 6-8; also 75: 16-19).

The Qur'ān also records accusations made by the Quraysh against the genuineness of his revelations. Some of these accusations claimed certain people as Muḥammad's accomplices who helped him to manufacture the Qur'ān (see, for example, S. 16: 103/105). It is difficult to believe that Muḥammad would have had the courage to record those accusations, and in such detail, had he not been convinced of their wrongness. Moreover, the Qur'ān records some mistakes committed by Muḥammad, and rebukes him for them, sometimes in quite a sharp tone which caused him great chagrin. One of them was that sometimes he weakened and thought of giving in to or compromising with the idolaters, even of altering the revealed verses a little to please them and gain their friendship. (See, for instance, S. 17: 73-75/75-77, [7] the last of which verses sternly declares that, had Muḥammad succumbed, God would have made him taste of woe in life and woe in death, and Muḥammad would then have found no helper against God.) This, again, is strong evidence of his complete belief that what he heard were the very words of God which he was not at liberty to suppress or modify no matter how much they hurt him.

It is equally significant to remember the history of the severe hardship, persecution and mortal danger which he faced and accepted for some twenty years in the fulfillment of his mission. Impostors do not usually last so long or survive such trial. Any of these facts may not in itself be conclusive, but I submit that no honest thinker can deny that their cumulative evidence is overwhelming.

Even so, attempts have been made to explain them away. When Western scholars who had no belief in the existence of God or in divinely sent messengers could no longer doubt Muḥammad's utter sincerity, they sought to account for the remarkable phenomenon of his mission by various medical or psychological theories. [8] Since they

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[7] Another important illustration is the 'occasion' of S. 53 · 1-20; see e.g. Guillaume, *Life*, pp. 165 ff.

[8] Other scholars joined them, e.g., A. Sprenger, *The Life of Mohammad, from Original Sources* (Allahabad [India]: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1851), pp. 77 f., 105-114; Duncan Black Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909; reprint, Beyrouth: Khayats, 1965), p. 33.

did not believe in divine inspiration per se, their attempts were understandable. What surprises and grieves one is to see some Christian and Jewish scholars following in the same track. When one carefully considers the imputations that are still made against Muḥammad's prophetic revelation, one may come to the conclusion that they do not so much injure Islam as shake the foundation of theistic belief itself. Such facile explanations are: an unbalanced and apoplectic, or epileptic, nervous system; a schizophrenic personality; hallucinations out of a wild and distorted imagination; a suprasensitive and diseased psyche; a down-rush from the superconscious, etc., etc.

There is not one of these rationalist explanations that cannot be levelled with equal plausibility at the other prophets and religious leaders accepted by believers in other religions. Let us admit the fact that all those visionaries were unusual or supersensitive in some way—we may here remember what Carlyle in his *Heroes and Hero-Worship* said on this question [9]—and yet this does not necessarily invalidate their visions. In fact, it may be argued that unless they were exceptionally attuned they would not have been able to see and hear what they quite factually saw and heard. We cannot simply equate them with those who are definitely sick, physically or physiologically. In any case, as regards Muḥammad, all such presumptions of his physical or mental disease are fairly easily discredited by his great success as a practical leader and founder of a new state, in which difficult role he is admitted to have displayed consummate skill, tact and wisdom. The attitude now prevalent among non-Muslim scholars is that there can be no doubt about Muḥammad's sincerity. Indeed, we find that certain Christian scholars, such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Kenneth Cragg, [10] concede that Muḥammad was not merely honest in his conviction of his prophecy, but must have been a true prophet of God receiving God's revelation in some sense or another, though not necessarily in the orthodox, literal sense understood by Muslims.

If we now move from the question of Muḥammad's prophecy to that of his character, we notice again a considerable change in the picture made of him by non-Muslim scholars. Formerly, concomitant with their accusation of deliberate charlatanism, the portrait they drew of his total personality was black indeed, with hardly one relieving virtue. He was depicted as an ambitious mountebank, bent on sheer self-aggrandizement, blown up by insufferable vanity and consumed with devouring greed. Nothing but the most ignoble motives impelled him

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9 *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, pp. 41 f. and elsewhere ("At all moments the Flame-image glares in upon him; undeniable, there!—I wish you to take this as my primary definition of a Great Man..." [on Muḥammad:] "...an earnest confused voice from the unknown Deep.")

10 Cf. Wilfred C. Smith, *Questions of Religious Truth* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 37-62: ("Is the Qurʾān the Word of God?"). The author discusses Cragg's position on p. 57, with a reference to Cragg's most widely known works.

to do whatever he did, and lust and lechery were accorded the loftiest place among his heinous sins. A cruel tyrant he was, unforgiving and vengeful, tricky and treacherous—in short, a very monster who calls forth only the revulsion and abhorrence of mankind. Little wonder that his name was changed from Muḥammad, the Praised One, to Mahound, the Prince of Darkness. [11]

However, the same processes in the world of scholarship as those noted above slowly acted to bring about a gradual tempering of that extreme picture, and now it is changed in many respects, some of them basic. In place of that forbidding portrait of a savage, grasping, vindictive despot, there is now a profile of an essentially kind man, affectionate and tender-hearted, modest and unassuming, with several lovable and indeed noble traits in his character. Perhaps the greatest thing which demonstrates his true essence was the fact that he was especially kind to all lowly and despised people: slaves and servants, women, children and orphans.

Even when he was at the summit of his success and power, he helped his house-folk in the performance of their menial duties. He darned his clothes and cobbled his sandals. He never found fault with his servants or rebuked them for any mistake. His personal servant Anas b. Mālik relates that in ten years of service to Muḥammad, the Prophet never struck him, never said one harsh word to him, and never even frowned in his face. He greeted children with a grave *al-salāmu ᶜalaykum* when he passed them, and often stopped and talked with them, asked them about their games and questioned them about their toys. He commiserated with a small boy on the death of his pet nightingale. [12] A little girl would come and pull him by the hand, and he would not pull his hand away, but would go with her to see what she wanted to show him. A woman slave would ask him to keep her company on her various errands in Medina, and he would consent. Once a woman with a defective mind came and said she wanted him; he got up, took her to one side, listened to her and conversed with her until she had poured out all she wanted.

Muḥammad never declined an invitation to a party, even from the meanest of his men. Nor was he ever a kill-joy: he often laughed with people and did not consider it beneath his dignity to exchange jokes with them. However, he was normally silent, not the silence of haughtiness, but of shyness. As one of his companions said, "he was more

[11] Cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, p. 324. For this whole subject of the Western images of Islam, see especially Norman Daniel's *Islam and the West. The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1958) and *Islam, Europe and Empire* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966).

[12] A reference to the pet nightingale story and a short discussion of Muḥammad's tenderness towards and fondness of children can be found, e.g., in Watt's *Muhammad at Medina*, pp 322 f. An interesting and detailed comparison of various traditions on the nightingale incident is given by R. Marston Speight in his unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (The Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1970), "The *Musnad* of al-Ṭayālisī," pp. 107-110.

shy than a virgin inside her apartment." كان أشدّ حياء من العذراء في خدرها When he entered an assembly of his followers, he did not select a prominent place, but sat in whatever place was immediately available. He hated his companions to stand up when he entered, so they eventually learnt to keep their seats. He refused to recline while eating, though they assured him he would find it more comfortable; that, he said, was the manner of kings when they ate. He was always quiet and soft-spoken, never loud; even his laughter was gentle and never boisterous. He smiled more than he laughed, and he had a constant, gentle smile; one of his contemporaries said, "I never saw anybody smile so constantly." He never cursed or used foul language, although obscenity was the normal manner of speaking in that time among the Arabs. Even some of his closest friends and followers, not excluding the gentle Abū Bakr, in a number of recorded anecdotes, used what we would now consider course or indecent language; but Muḥammad, not once.

The Prophet never punished out of mere retaliation for a personal slight or injury. All his punishments, of believers and unbelievers alike, were for crimes committed against the public weal or infringements of the promulgated law; and even here his life contains acts of clemency in which he put mercy above justice. Especially remarkable in this respect was his great reluctance to inflict upon adulterers the prescribed punishment of death by stoning. A man or woman would come and confess having committed that major sin and ask "to be purified"—i.e., by the due punishment. Muḥammad would first pretend not to have heard the confession. After repeated insistence from the confessor, he would say, "Perhaps the man is drunk and does not realize what he is saying." In the case of one woman, who insisted on her rightful punishment, he said she might be pregnant and it would not be just to kill the innocent embryo. The woman went away and eventually came back with a newborn babe in her arms, but Muḥammad said he must allow her a few years to suckle her young one and bring it up. In considering the punishments he dealt to the enemies of his cause, we must not forget, first, that they were political actions made necessary by the conditions of the time; second, that none of them was excessive or unacceptable by the usages or mores of that time. And his life was crowned with his supreme act of forgiveness, when, in his hour of final victory upon the conquest of Mecca, he forgave his most bitter and dogged adversaries, those who had denied him the right to worship his God is his own way, who had long persecuted him and had caused him to flee his native place and seek refuge with strangers. According to the rules of war prevalent then, and for centuries afterwards both in Asia and in Europe, he could have put them all to the sword.

To appreciate the full extent of his clemency, patience and forbearance, however, it is good to realize that he did not suffer only from

the persecution of the unbelievers, but suffered a great deal from the rudeness, uncouthness and quick temper of many of his own followers. It is necessary to remember the state of the Arabs at that time, still near the wild and vehement character very justly dubbed by the Qurʾān *al-Jāhiliyya*.[13] In their violence and quickness to anger, they often talked insultingly to the Prophet, but he never answered back; in fact, his capacity to suffer fools was amazing. Once a nomad came and, evidently to draw Muḥammad's attention, pulled him by his mantle until he almost fell down, and the mantle left a mark round his neck. Muḥammad looked at the nomad, laughed apparently at his violent way of calling his attention, and said, "What is it you want?" The nomad said, "Muḥammad! Give me some of the money you have got." Muḥammad said to his followers present, "Give him." (Notice how this person rudely addressed the Prophet by his bare name, not by his ***kunya,*** patronymic, as the polite custom of the Arabs dictated, nor by the usual يا رسول الله 'O, Apostle of God' adopted by the believers.) More than once a nomad would come and, in the usual offensive way of the bedouin, make an accusation against Muḥammad which would prove to be unjust. But Muḥammad would neither retaliate nor even mete out the just punishment; and he would stop his companions, who often wanted to kill the culprit, from molesting him in any way.

Only in the most gentle way did he correct peoples' mistakes. A bedouin entered the mosque in Medina and urinated in it. When Muḥammad's companions started to shout at the man, he asked them not to be rough on him, called him over, and gently explained to him that mosques were not suitable places for such actions, but were meant for the reading of the Qurʾān, the remembrance of God, and prayers. Then he called for a bucket of water and poured it over the urine. When proven wrong in an argument, even when his disputant was insolent, Muḥammad would admit his mistake and rectify it without any false pride, and would apologize profusely as well. Once he had forgotten to pay back something he owed to a nomad. The man came to Muḥammad, violently pulled Muḥammad's mantle until it fell away from his shoulders, and accused him in quite an offensive way of deliberate dilatoriness. ʿUmar, enraged by the rough handling and insult done to the Prophet, called the man an enemy of God, and said he wished he could cut off his head. Meanwhile, the Prophet was looking at ʿUmar في تؤدة وسكون "quietly and calmly." Then he smiled and said to ʿUmar: "He and I need something else. I need that you order me to pay back

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[13] T. H. Weir stated in his discussion of "Djāhilīya" in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1st ed. and *Shorter Encyclopaedia*) that the meaning of *Jāhiliyya* is rudeness, roughness, boorishness rather than 'ignorance.' The article "Djāhiliyya" in the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (by the Editors) points to the fact that the Qurʾanic occurrences of *jāhil* (nine times) and *jāhiliyya* (four times) "scarcely permit of their sense being precisely determined."

my debt properly, and he needs that you order him to demand his dues in a proper manner." Then he ordered ʿUmar to take the man, pay him the debt, and add to it twenty measures of dates to compensate him for the fright he [ʿUmar] had caused him.

When he did get angry, the only reaction he showed was that his face reddened. All he would then do was to turn his face away from the person who angered him. When he was pleased, however, his whole face beamed as if irradiated with light, "like a mirror reflecting the sun," in the words of a companion. When he conversed with somebody, he turned with his whole body to him. He never was the first to leave a companion, or take his hand away from a handshake, or pull his head away from a tête-à-tête. These, however, were not points of mere superficial good manners which might have no deeper significance; they obviously sprang from a tender and truly humble nature. There is no surer indication of the depth of his humanity than his extreme kindness to animals. Passing by a bitch with puppies—and this was on the critical march to the conquest of Mecca—he stopped to warn his men not to disturb her and her litter; and, in order to make sure this was carried out, he posted a man by her. He sought to teach kindness to his people, a people who then were cruel in their treatment of the dumb creatures.

No wonder those rough people ended by giving Muḥammad a love and devotion greater than any leader of men can hope to receive from his followers. Even this was attributed by the Qurʾān to the mercy of God:

> It is by the mercy of God that thou hast been gentle with them. Hadst thou been harsh and severe-hearted, they would have scattered away from thee. Therefore, forgive them and ask God's pardon for them, and consult them in all affairs. (S. 3 : 159/153)

So much for the vain, cruel and vindictive tyrant. As to his greed and egotism, no reader of his biography can fail to be struck by his great abstemiousness and frugal habits of living. To the end of his days, even after the great riches resulting from the conquests began to accrue to the Muslims, he kept those same habits. He refused to eat bread made of refined flour, and never allowed himself to eat wheat bread on two successive days. Of barley bread—the cheapest then—he did not once have his fill; and he never ate gravy with bread more than once a day, nor combined any two of bread, dates and meat in one meal; in fact, he never had two full meals on the same day. He abstained from ever making personal use, either for himself or for any member of his family, of the *zakāt*, the tithe of alms paid by Muslims into the treasury. The proceeds of the land received as his share of the booty he always distributed among the needy. It is sufficient in this respect to note that, despite that great wealth, he himself died

not only poor, but virtually penniless. One of his companions said: "He left neither a gold coin, nor a silver coin, nor a man-slave, nor a woman-slave, nor a sheep, nor a camel." [14] In fact, at the time of his death, his coat-of-mail was mortgaged with a certain merchant for thirty measures of barley which he had purchased to feed his large family.

Thus died the man who had conquered all Arabia, and to whom one-fifth of the great spoils was paid. I have concentrated on those aspects of his character which would now be readily admitted by non-Muslim-scholars. This is not to say that they agree with us Muslims in every point of our evaluation of Muḥammad. And, in my opinion, when those scholars differ with us, it is not always they who are in the wrong and who have to change their view. For just as we fabricated those fables about the birth of our Prophet, we have indulged in certain exaggerations and outright inventions regarding his qualities. We have claimed for him a perfection which is not given to any human, not even the prophets. If we ever aspire to have a saner and truer estimation of him, one that is capable of discovering his real and demonstrable virtues, our point of departure must be the realization that neither he himself claimed perfection, nor did the Qur'ān claim it for him. In fact, such a claim, vaunted by such modern books as the one entitled محمّد : المثل الكامل *Muḥammad: the Perfect Ideal* [15] is utterly blasphemous by the strict tenets of monotheistic Islam which ascribe perfection to God alone. For, states the Qur'ān: ولله المثل الأعلى "God's is the loftiest example" (S. 16:60/62). And again: ولله المثل الأعلى في السموات والأرض "His is the loftiest example in the Heavens and on the Earth" (S. 30:27/26); notice this "and on the Earth." When the Qur'ān (S. 68:4) describes Muḥammad as having "a great character," it did not say that he had the greatest. Both the Qur'ān in many verses, and Muḥammad himself in many sayings, stress again and again his fallibility, and the inevitable shortcomings of his human nature. The Qur'ān orders him: "Say: I am only a man like you" (S. 18: 110; cf. also 41:6/5). And again: "Say: Glory be to my Lord!

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[14] This is not literally true, for he left some milch camels, as well as certain possessions of land which—as stated before—accrued from his share of the booty. The commentators explain the discrepancy by saying that what is meant is that he possessed no capital which he utilized in trading So we may still agree that the general picture accorded with the following mnemonic verse, listing the private possessions left by Muḥammad:

مخلّف طٰه سبحتان ومصحف .·. ومكحلة سجّاد تان رحى عصا

"The legacy of Ṭāhā (a popular name given to Muḥammad) was: two rosaries, a copy of the Qur'ān, a kohl-pot, two praying carpets, a hand-mill and a walking stick."

[15] By Muḥammad Aḥmad Jād al-Mawlā, 5th printing, Cairo, 1961.

Am I more than a man, a messenger?" (S. 17:93/95). Muḥammad also said: "I am only the son of a woman from the Quraysh who used to eat strings of sun-dried meat." (This *qadīd* was one of the staple foods of poor nomads in the desert.) The correct Islamic creed about *ʿiṣmat al-anbiyāʾ*, immunity of the prophets, is that this immunity applies only to matters connected with their integrity as receivers and pronouncers of the message of God.

It has been said by scholars of comparative religion that, owing to the great pains Muḥammad took to stress his mere humanity, he was the only founder of a great religion who succeeded in preventing his people from deifying him after his death. But if the Muslims have abstained from counting Muḥammad a god, they have not abstained from making ridiculous claims on his behalf. In these claims they were, of course, limited by their own environmentally-conditioned concepts. When those concepts changed with the change of human ethics and the development of human conscience, some of their inventions did grievous harms to the good name of the Prophet. Witness the extravagant claim that he was given the sexual power of thirty men, or sixty men; and that he would go round his wives, eleven in number, in a single night, or a single day, or a single hour of the day or night. Much of the accusation of lust that has been levelled against him by many Western writers was based on such Arab or Oriental fantasy. Here is one illustration. Sir William Muir himself, who does his best in his biography of the Prophet[16] to be fair in his final evaluation of the Prophet, quotes uncritically this saying ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās: "Verily the chiefest among the Muslims was the foremost of them in his passion for women." Then he comments: "...a fatal example imitated too readily by his followers..." My humble comment on Muir is: a sad example of how even the best Orientalists sometimes too readily accept the figments of the popular imagination of the Arabs. For it is quite palpable that that saying is purely an a priori deduction: since Muḥammad was the chief Muslim who had to epitomize their ideals, he must have been the most sexually potent. So it was not a case of the Muslims imitating their Prophet's example, but rather the converse: a case of their re-creating the character of Muḥammad according to their then accepted mores.

Those writers, in all too readily accepting the popular notions, found it easy to forget the salient facts about Muḥammad's marriages: that for twenty-eight years, and those the years of his utmost vigor, from the age of twenty-five to the age of fifty-three, he had only one wife (for twenty-five of those years, she was the considerably older Khadīja); that his marriage to ʿĀʾisha in the first year of the Hijra was quite obviously a way of expressing his gratitude to her father, his

[16] William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet*, IV (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1861), 310 f. William Muir, *The Life of Mohammad* (new and revised edition by T. H. Weir; Edinburgh: John Grant, 1912), p. 515.

first, closest and most faithful follower among men, who made with him the perilous flight from Mecca to Medina, the First Companion Abū Bakr; and that all his other marriages were either a similar homage to a close friend, a way of giving shelter to a friend's widow, or one of the most effective ways then practiced to placate a powerful enemy and induce a defeated tribe to forget its humiliation—much as the custom of matrimonial alliances among the reigning dynasties was in medieval Europe. So clear is this fact that Montgomery Watt has concluded: "It is not too much to say that *all* Muḥammad's marriages had a political aspect." [17] Futhermore, with the exception of ʿĀʾisha, none of his wives was an unmarried maiden; and not one of them did he marry against her will. Indeed, in one case the woman he had just married showed reluctance to come to him; or, in another version of the anecdote, استعاذت من رسول الله asked for God's protection from him. Muḥammad answered her: عائذ الله منيع "Inviolable is the one who asks for God's protection," and immediately returned her to her tribe untouched.

These are the bare historical facts about the marriages of the man who has been condemned as a profligate voluptuary, and whose own followers helped unwittingly to smear him. When we on our side have lessened our exaggerations and abjured our fabrications, and when the others have gone further in their exploration of the true Muḥammad as prophet and man, unhampered by the residue of their old prejudice and misconception, what, then, will be the common ground on which all men of sanity and good faith can meet, on which, indeed, a by no means negligible minority of thinking men of various races and creeds already agree?

Whether one accepts or rejects his mission, there can be no doubt that he was an earnest and dedicated searcher after the divine truth, who became profoundly and honestly convinced that God had chosen him to convey His message to mankind. This alone discredits both the contemptuous expressions and the angry, condemnatory tone that used to be adopted towards him by either believers in other creeds or negators of all creeds. All those who value human dignity, and who have the capacity to honor and respect man's incessant search after the spiritual truth, even though they may not agree with the forms or the results of that search, cannot help but have the deepest respect for Muḥammad. And, when they read of his anguish and torment both in his search and in the fulfillment of his call, that respect will surely mount to sympathy and compassion. Then, when they consider his many sterling qualities, and realize that essentially he was a largehearted man, a man of genuine humility, with one of the sweetest and meekest of natures, they may agree that, despite his imperfections,

[17] *Muhammad at Medina*, p. 330.

or perhaps more correctly because of his human imperfections, here was one of the noblest and most lovable of men. In short, they may simply agree with the Qur'anic statement quoted above, a verdict addressed to Muḥammad while he was meeting with steadfast patience and forbearance the rabid vilification and persecution of the idolaters:

"Truly thou hast a great character." (S. 68:4) وإنّك لعلى خلق عظيم

Cairo, U.A.R. MOHAMED AL-NOWAIHI

THE MUSLIM "FAITH AND REASON" DISCUSSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ISLAMIC EDUCATION

Muslim scholasticism has often hampered adaptation of Islamic secondary education to new conditions. One example was the Ottoman *medrese,* which declined to the point that: "Every discipline which recognized free discussion and thought was accused of heresy and dropped from the curriculum as being philosophy, *felsefiyat,* and *therefore at cross purposes with religious orthodoxy.*" [1] This type of educational impass between Muslims who emphasize revelation and those who are committed to reason has a long history in Islam.

The dialogue concerning revealed and rational knowledge which dominated medieval Islamic educational theory started when the Muᶜtazilites became involved in a debate with Sunnī opponents who began to use similar scholastic methods. The Muᶜtazilites defended reason's unaided powers:

> [They believed in] the rationality of religion ... [in the] *lumen naturale* which burns in the heart of every man, and the optimistic view of a rational God who has created the best of all possible worlds for the greatest good of man who occupies the central place in the universe. [2]

Opposing this view was the outlook of the orthodox scholastic theologians [3] who stressed God's sovereign will which is absolutely free and completely unknowable beyond the knowledge revealed in the Holy Qurʾān itself.

From Syrian sources, Muslims acquired Arabic copies of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle,* actually, as is well known, Books IV-VI of Plotinus's *Enneads.* From this and from Proclus's *Elements of Theology,* al-Kindī (born c. 850) produced a commentary on Aristotle. In fact, this was a neo-Platonic treatise in which the concept of *nūr* (light), which al-Kindī had related to the Qurʾanic passages mentioning light, was associated with *ᶜaql* (intelligence).

> The soul (*nafs*) is a pure intellectual substance (*jauhar ᶜaqlī*), incorporeal and immortal, which descended from the world of intelligence to the world of sense and corporeality. The intellectual substance dwells eternally in the world of intelligence, from

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[1] İlhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey: 1920-1940* (Bloomington, Indiana. Indiana University Publications, 1968), p. 11.

[2] Simon Van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut* (London: Luzac & Co, 1954), p ix.

[3] Cf. Van den Bergh's remark on the Ashᶜarites: "They hold the middle way between the traditionalists who want to forbid all reasoning on religious matters and those who affirm that reason unaided by revelation is capable of attaining religious truths"; *Ibid,* p. x.

> which it cannot depart, but it falls short of the pure and passionless intellect in that it conceives a desire to give birth to the forms which are present to itself, and desire begets pain until it accomplishes its desire in the world of perception. Out of this desire the soul is formed. Therefore, the soul is intellect: sometimes it is in a body and sometimes it is external to it. [4]

al-Kindī's teaching regarding the emanations of light or intellect resulted in a heightening of Aristotle's distinction between *active intellect,* the intelligence which contains all intelligibles outside of the soul, and *possible intellect,* each person. He is teaching that there is but one active mind in all of humanity. Each person is mentally activated from this single external source. Thus, existence and essence, being and becoming have been separated and al-Kindī's man can have no truly original thought, natural reason or real responsibility.

al-Fārābī, a Turkish thinker who died in 950, also was a commentator on Plato and Aristotle. He developed the mode of *active* and *possible intellect* in a manner reminiscent of the Platonic three-fold social ideal in *The Republic.*

> [al-Fārābī] distinguishes three grades of intellectual capacity... They correspond respectively to (1) sense perception, (2) ideation or perception, which operates with remembered (mentally perceived) images, and (3) pure reason, or the capacity for thought. In few men is the last of these (potentially) present in such measure that by union with the active intellect... it can rise to actual reason. It is on this highest plane that philosopher and prophet join hands. [5]

al-Fārābī declares that the philosopher conceives and utters truth in its pure form. The prophet receives it in figures and similitudes which he then utilizes in order to convey his truths to others. This doctrine creates a hierarchy of mental capacity, in which the speculative philosopher alone possesses the capacity for pure reason. This view came down to Averroes in the Muslim debate, and was adopted by his Latin disciples. It formed one of the main points against which the Thomists argued.

A dichotomy between God, the first cause, and the world which is the result of emanations from this prior source, runs through the sequence of *Muᶜtazila*-inspired philosophers. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna),

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[4] Alfred Guillaume, "Philosophy and Theology," in Thomas Arnold and A. Guillaume, *The Legacy of Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 252 f.

[5] T. J. DeBoer, "Philosophy (Muslim)," in James Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), IX, 882

who acknowledged his inspiration from al-Fārābī in his autobiography, [6] exhibits this tendency in his *al-Risālat al-ʿArshiyya.*

> Certainly, the Universe emanated from Him in due succession of order and media. So when we say that this act emanated from Him through a reason, and that that reason was of Him also, this implies no imperfection in His activity; on the contrary, totality emanated from Him, and unto Him... First was Intelligence; then Soul; then the Body of Heaven; then the materials of the four elements in their forms. Then there is a mounting up from the lowest to the noblest; the noblest of all ending at a degree parallel to the degree of Intelligence. [7]

This conceptual model, in which intelligence is the bridge between perfect form and the material world, neatly favored the intellectual. It is not surprising that rejoinders were soon voiced to this philosophically advantageous notion. Traditional Muslim fundamentalism was in a sense one of the protests, but it merely condemned *Muʿtazila* without really coming to grips with it.

The Muslim philosophers met their match in al-Ghazālī. His attack was so devastating that the Greek philosophy was never able to stage a major comeback within Islam. Paradoxically, however, the very notions which this *ḥujjat al-Islām* (Islam's convincing proof) sought to eradicate were diffused by his descriptions of them which he made in order to refute them. al-Ghazālī leveled five main criticisms at the views of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. He argued that these philosophers had failed to prove their un-Islamic theses regarding an emanated world, a God who was ignorant of particulars, and the impossibility of an afterlife. He condemned their allegorical scriptural interpretations and explained how their philosophy had failed to meet his own personal needs. [8] Christian polemicists later utilized all of his first four points. al-Ghazālī, however, ended by rejecting philosophy by turning to the solace of mystical union with God. The Thomists, rather than following his lead by jettisoning philosophy, first tried to purge it and then baptized it.

al-Ghazālī's mood is reflected in his doctrine of light, which he describes as:

> 'knowledge from on high,' ...the *nūr Allāh* which God 'casts' into the heart, 'that which is attained without mediation between the soul and its Creator, ...the radiance from the Lamp of the Invisible [which is] shed upon the heart which is pure...' [9]

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[6] Arthur J. Arberry, *Avicenna on Theology* (London: John Murray, 1951), p. 12.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[8] George F. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* (London: Luzac & Co., 1961), p. 5.
[9] Margaret Smith, *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic* (London: Luzac & Co., 1944), p. 222.

His was a basic commitment to direct inspiration, unfettered by reason. al-Ghazālī's treatise *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) illustrates his notion of the principal use of reason. In it, he launches an intellectual attack on the philosophers' arrogant claim to possess superior wisdom. In part, al-Ghazālī protests against their confidence in personal intelligence rather than relying on social consensus. This declaration is placed in a philosopher's mouth:

> '...I am not one of the ignorant common people that I should enter within the narrow confines of duty. On the contrary I am one of the wise, I follow wisdom, and therefore see clearly (for myself) so that I do not require to follow authority.' [10]

al-Ghazālī ridicules this faith in individual reason by defending the traditional Muslim emphasis upon the authority of the community of believers, except when this is mitigated by direct mystical insight.

Of course, so powerful an attack on Muᶜtazila views required a reply. It is surprising that almost a century passed before Ibn Rushd (Averroes), born at Cordova, Spain, in A.D. 1126, entered the fray on the side of the philosophers. His *Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl* (The Book of the Distinction of Discourse) studies the connection between theology and philosophy in order to defend speculation from its detractors. Averroes argues that although common men must accept religious authority, the elite class which possesses the capacity for *qiyās burhānī* (demonstrative reasoning) may philosophize. Any apparent conflicts between reason and revelation which may ensue, Averroes believes, can be reconciled by interpreting scripture allegorically. However, these elucidations must be hidden from the masses, for whom they would be merely confusing. Thus, religious doctrines were considered to be only partial and symbolic expressions of pure philosophical truth.

Averroes's method in his *Faṣl* is that common in medieval courts of law. Philosophy had been condemned by al-Ghazālī and that judgment was now being pressed in the West by the Ashᶜarite scholars. After stating the charges, Averroes makes his legal retort. He maintains that the Qurʾān bids man to reflect upon the natural universe. The results of such observation and speculation cannot be contradictory to revelation.

> Now since this religion is true and summons to the study which leads to knowledge of the Truth, we the Muslim community definitely know that demonstrative study does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what scripture has given us; for truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it. [11]

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[10] W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazālī* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), p. 72.

[11] Hourani, *Averroes*, p. 50.

In this passage, Averroes appeals to *ijmāᶜ*. But, basic to his ringing affirmation of a 'single truth' is the conviction that it is obtained primarily by reason.

Averroes goes on to argue that allegorical interpretation is permitted by common consensus. After discussing three types of scriptural texts, of which only one permits limited allegorization, he treats a fourth type.

> The fourth [class] occurs where the premises are based on accepted ideas or opinions, without being accidentally certain, and where the conclusions are symbols for what it was intended to conclude. In these cases the duty of the elite is to interpret them allegorically, while the duty of the masses is to take them in their apparent meaning. [12]

The philosopher is thus given great freedom to discover new meaning within the written revelation, provided he is discreet in publicizing his findings. This results in a strangely two-faced position.

> To explain the inner meaning to people unable to understand it is to destroy their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its place. The result is unbelief in learners and teachers. It is best for the learned to profess ignorance, quoting the Qurʾan on the limitations of man's understanding. [13]

Averroes's other famous treatise, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), attacked al-Ghazālī's attempts to undermine the philosophers' rationale. Recognizing that *being* and *becoming* pose the central issue in the conflict between theologians and philosophers, Averroes charges that theology has transferred the mystery of becoming to the mystery of God. But this fails to explain how spirit enters matter. Averroes defends a concept of eternal matter, which in itself contains the potentialities of all which can or will occur. He argues for natural causality rather than Divine providence.

> I say: To deny the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things in sophistry, and he who defends this doctrine either denies with his tongue what is present in his mind or is carried away by a sophistical doubt which occurs to him concerning this question. For he who denies this can no longer acknowledge that every act must have an agent. [14]

The cause and effect relationship which Averroes posits is assumed by most modern educators. But it must be recalled that this view precludes belief in the doctrines of physical resurrection and miracles.

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[14] Van den Bergh, *Averroes*, p. 318.

For this reason, Averroes's philosophy posed a threat to his Ashᶜarite opponents, who succeeded in convincing the Caliph Abū Yūsuf to declare a complete ban on philosophy in 1196-97.[15] Averroes's views were practically eradicated among Muslims during his lifetime. Not until modern times have they been revitalized so as to decisively influence Islamic education.

The concepts which have been traced were termed Averroism when they burst in upon Christian thinkers. But in being shifted to the Latin camp, the focus was altered because the gulf between revelation and reason was less great. Thomas Aquinas was able to use Aristotelian principles in order to create a harmonious relationship which preserved a philosophical realm while maintaining the ultimate truth of theology. However, Averroes holds the unique distinction of being the sole medieval Muslim thinker who directly influenced Europeans, although, as has been demonstrated, many of his views have antecedents in al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Avicenna.[16]

Viewed from the perspective of their intellectual stance, both the positions of the *mutakallimūn* and that of the Sufis, for whom al-Ghazālī was an inspiration, were radical movements. The theologians were radically committed to their Qurᵓanic source of revelation, the mystics to their path of meditation. These became the dominant forces in Islam until recent times. The more moderate Ashᶜarite posture itself succumbed to literalism after destroying the philosophical position of the Muᶜtazilites. So, cut off from its sources of speculative reason, Islamic education tended to become pedantic and rigid.

The resulting *medrese,* which came to be associated with stagnant scholasticism,[17] has required basic alterations when Muslim societies engaged in modernization. One pattern of change, that adopted in Turkey, was characterized by the late A. Adnan Adivar, in these words:

> The Republic has never ceased to declare itself the citadel of scientific positivism and of the positivist school of thought. The entire mechanism of the state, by common accord, has been trying to put into its different institutions the positivist formula—the Good, the Beautiful, and the True—as a new doctrine...
> At the present moment the New Thought has assumed much the same position as was formerly occupied by the old Islamic dogma.[18]

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[15] *Ibid.*, pp. xxi f.
[16] Cf. Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 342.
[17] Halide Edip Adivar's views in *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1935), p. 52, are another instance of this interpretation.
[18] Adam Adivar, "Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, I, 3 (1947), 279.

This approach, although rooted in intellectual developments subsequent to Averroes, essentially takes his position by thoroughly subordinating revelation to reason. The philosophical outlook, scientific positivism, is intended to replace the theological world view in the schools.

A modern alternative to this radical solution for the historic tension between revelation and reason in Islam can be illustrated in the work of Muḥammad Iqbal. He writes that:

> ...the facts of experience justify the inference that the ultimate nature of reality is spiritual, and must be conceived as an ego. But the aspiration of religion soars higher than that of philosophy. Philosophy is an intellectual view of things; and as such it does not care to go beyond a concept which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system. It sees reality from a distance, as it were. Religion seeks closer contact with reality. The one is theory, the other is living experience, association, intimacy. [19]

It is not difficult to recognize the similarity between this position and the Thomistic synthesis between faith and reason. Iqbal declares: "The Ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual and its life consists of its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunity in the natural, the material and the secular." [20] Where this conviction shapes education, the Muslim contributions to Thomas Aquinas's formulation have re-emerged to again permit a dynamic interchange between faith and reason in Islamic education.

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[19] Muḥammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1960), pp. 26 f.
[20] K. G. Saiyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1938), p. 78.

KUWAIT: A POLITICAL STUDY

I. Introduction

A traditional society less than a quarter of a century ago, Kuwait is today the world's foremost welfare state. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1938, Kuwait was a community of tradesmen, pearl-divers, seafarers, shipbuilders and nomads. Its sudden emergence into prominence seems to have shattered the fabric of this society creating a host of social, economic and political problems. Economic expansion brought into being a new middle class and a complex division of labor thus necessitating an adaptation of the country's institutional concepts. The influx of a foreign skilled labor force evoked defensive measures on the part of the government introducing, in turn, a sharp cleavage between citizens and aliens, and causing political fragmentation. Economic expansion also brought the envy of neighboring countries, forcing Kuwait to adopt certain measures on the domestic and regional scenes to permit change, and thereby insure her stability and survival. And, above all, the sudden wealth of Kuwait confronted the government with the simple question of how to distribute this wealth, and what to do with the surplus of savings which far exceeds the amount that it can profitably invest at home.

This paper discusses the nature of the challenge presented by the transitional stage and examines the capacity of the system to meet the challenge and political demands associated with social change.

II. Historical Background

The term 'Kuwait' is a diminutive form of *kūt*, a rectangular structure designed as a fortress as well as a port headquarters, where ships are refueled and equipment and weapons are stored.[1] Kuwait was built by the Emir of the Banū Khālid tribe who ruled the area lying between Samāwa in Iraq and Yamāma in Najd and comprising Qaṭar, Baḥrain, al-Ḥasā and Kuwait in the mid-seventeenth century. The Ṣabāḥ family, which rules Kuwait today, is a branch of the famous ᶜAnza tribe of Najd which was forced by warring tribesmen to leave and settle in Qaṭar, but then were driven to Kuwait, a tiny fishing village, around 1711.[2] Their leader, Ṣabāḥ b. Jābir was elected ruler by the notables in 1756, thus establishing the dynasty in power today. His Kuwaiti subjects engaged in pearl-diving, fishing, sailing and trading. By the mid-eighteenth century Kuwait had become so important as a commercial center that her businessmen and sailors were

[1] ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz al-Rashīd, *Tārīkh al-Kuwait* (History of Kuwait), Beirut, n.d.
[2] *Ibid.*

among the most successful in the area. They imported rice, tea, sugar, lumber, and spices from India and Yemen and re-exported them to Iraq, Persia, the Hejaz and Syria.

Situated strategically on the overland route between India and Europe, Kuwait did not fail to attract the Western mercantile powers who struggled with one another for the domination of trade. Britain's interest in the Gulf dates back to the aftermath of her Seven Years' War (1756-63) with France over India. Emerging victoriously from that war, England embarked on an attempt to insure communication lines between Bombay in India and Baṣra on the Gulf. The urgency of this attempt was underscored by the Ottoman domination of the Red Sea. The Suez Canal had, of course, not yet been constructed. England's first contact with Kuwait came in 1841 when an agreement was reached between the two to insure the safety of the sea and combat slave trade.[3] Fifteen years later, British naval units passing by Kuwait offered to 'protect' her against foreign invasions but were refused by Shaykh Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ on the grounds that such an accord would violate certain commitments he made to the Ottoman Empire. At this time Kuwait was not under Ottoman sovereignty, but in 1871, the Grand Vizier, Midḥat Pasha, stopped in Kuwait, and proclaimed it officially an Ottoman district (*Qażā*) attached to the governorate (*Vilāyet*) of Baṣra.[4] He designated Shaykh ᶜAbd Allāh al-Ṣabāḥ District-Commissioner and exempted Kuwait from military service.

The Agreement of 1899

Despite the incorporation of Kuwait into the Ottoman Empire, Britain succeeded in reaching an agreement with Kuwait under ᶜAbd Allāh's successors. Shaykh Mubārak assumed the reign after he assassinated his brother Muḥammad, who was loyal to the Ottoman Sultan, in 1896.[5] The sons of the murdered ruler fled Kuwait and pleaded their case to the Ottoman authorities who were inclined to challenge Mubārak's regime for a variety of reasons. First of all, Mubārak was an ally of Ibn Saᶜūd against the Sultan's ally, Ibn Rashīd. Moreover, he felt that the Arabs had a more legitimate claim on the caliphate than the Ottoman Turks. Suspicious of Mubārak, the Sultan issued a proclamation ordering his exile from Kuwait with the choice of an appointment to the Ottoman Consultative Assembly in Istanbul or residence in another sector of the Empire with an annual salary of 150 pounds.[6] Mubārak required assistance from the British Resident in the Gulf, and at the same time reaffirmed his allegiance to the Sultan reminding him of his ancestor's traditional

[3] Husayn Khalaf Kharzᶜal, *Tārīkh al-Kuwait al-Siyāsī* (Political History of Kuwait) (Beirut, n.d.), I, 117.
[4] *Ibid.*, 118.
[5] *Ibid.*, 159.
[6] *Ibid.*, II, 56.

loyalty. But the Governor (*Vālī*) of Başra dispatched a contingent to forcibly remove him from Kuwait. Mubārak immediately requested and received British military assistance thus frustrating the Sultan's effort to exile him. This incident confirmed the fact that an agreement had in fact been concluded between the British and Mubārak.

Initially, Britain was reluctant to enter into an agreement with Kuwait for fear of alienating the Sultan. But due to Russian expansionist tendencies towards the Gulf, and especially when Russia requested permission from the Sultan to construct a railroad between Tripoli and Kuwait, Britain felt a threat to her interest. Alarmed at the prospect of having a Russian port in the Gulf, Britain decided to conclude the agreement which Mubārak had been urging. Lord Curzon of India entrusted the British Resident in the Gulf to sign the secret agreement on January 23, 1899, and pay Mubārak the sum of 15,000 Rupees upon his signature.[7] Curzon ratified the Agreement on February 16.

The Agreement gave Britain full control of Kuwait's external affairs, Mubārak agreeing to bind himself and his successors against accepting any representative of a foreign government, or selling, leasing, or mortgaging any piece of land within his boundaries to any foreign government without the consent of Britain. In the following year, Mubārak signed another agreement in which he pledged not to permit the manufacture of weapons in Kuwait. Later, Britain moved another step to solidify its position in Kuwait by adding to the 1899 Agreement a clause of protection; and in 1903 Lord Curzon visited Kuwait for the first time and appointed a Political Agent there who was to be responsible to the British Resident in the Gulf.[8] At the same time, Britain issued a unilateral declaration regarding any attempt by a foreign power to establish a military or commercial base in the Gulf as contrary to her interest and to be opposed by force. This declaration was directed against Germany and Russia, both of whom had made overtures to Kuwait concerning railroads or treaties of protection. Britain set up a post office in Kuwait in 1904 and received a written pledge in the same year from Mubārak against permitting the establishment of any other post office by a foreign power.

Mubārak knew where the power lay and remained faithful to his treaty obligations. But neither he nor Britain failed to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty over Kuwait. When he was reprimanded by the Muslim press for establishing ties with Britain, Mubārak utilized the prestigious Cairo magazine, *al-Manār*, to publicize the Sultan's attempt to exile him from Kuwait.[9] But Mubārak emphasized his loyalty to

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[7] Text of Curzon's letter in *Ibid.*, 126 f.; Text of the 1899 Agreement, 128 f.
[8] *Ibid.*, 137.
[9] Article by Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, XVI, 398.

the Sultan despite the latter's attempts to depose him, saying: "The son should not stop obeying his father because the father treats him harshly." Mubārak continued to pay dues to the Ottoman Empire and mediated several disputes between the Porte and other dissident rulers. He donated to various Ottoman projects such as the Hejaz railway and raised funds in Kuwait to support the Empire's war with Bulgaria in 1912-1913.

The London Agreement, 1913

In return for Mubārak's recognition of Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait, the Government of the Sultan refrained from interfering in Kuwait's internal affairs and acknowledged her treaties with Britain. This understanding was formalized in the London Agreement concluded between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1913.[10] Article 5 stated that the Emir of Kuwait is autonomous in Kuwait and several offshore islands, including Būbiyān, Failaka, Warba and others.

When the First World War broke out, Mubārak offered to help Britain and was asked to occupy three of the offshore islands, to cooperate with Ibn Saᶜūd, and help in conquering Baṣra. In a letter to the Emir, dated November 3, 1914, Britain pledged to recognize Kuwait as "an independent government under British protection."

By the time of Mubārak's death in 1915, Kuwait was an exclusive domain of Britain and the Ṣabāḥ family. As long as the Emir was in full control of the domestic situation, Britain's interference was neither desirable nor profitable. Adequate guarantees of British hegemony in Kuwait were already in existence in the series of treaties concluded between 1899 and 1913. Furthermore, Kuwait agreed in 1913 to admit a British admiral and to give him the necessary assistance to locate oil in Burqan. Britain was to have the sole franchise if oil was found.

Independence

British control of Kuwait's foreign affairs was terminated on June 19, 1961, when the British government announced the termination of the "obsolete and inappropriate" treaty which it had concluded with Shaykh Mubārak of Kuwait in 1899. Kuwait was proclaimed an independent state.

No sooner had this announcement been made than the Iraqi government, under ᶜAbd al-Karīm Qāsim, laid claims to Kuwait stating publicly its intent to 'liberate' it. Qāsim appointed ᶜAbd Allāh Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ, Ruler of Kuwait, *Qā'im-maqām* under the governor of Baṣra, just as a former ruler of Kuwait, also known as ᶜAbd Allāh al-Ṣabāḥ, had been appointed to the same position by the Turkish Grand Vizier in 1871.

[10] Khazᶜal, *op. cit.*, 145.

The subsequent dispatch of British troops to Kuwait, in accordance with a request by its Ruler, evoked Iraqi accusations that Kuwait was a base for Western imperialism. To counter these allegations, the Ruler accepted the replacement of British troops with an Arab League contingent representing monarchical as well as republican regimes. Almost simultaneously, Kuwait was admitted to membership in the Arab League and later in the United Nations.

The Kuwait-Iraqi dispute which led to a convening of the Security Council of the United Nations, will be explored at a later stage in this article.

III. Political Environment

Kuwait stands in the northwestern corner of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. It is a country of 5,800 square miles, whereas the Neutral Zone (administered jointly with Saudi Arabia) has an area of 2,000 square miles. According to the latest census, in 1965, the population amounted to 467,789 and it is now estimated at 650,000 [11]

Stretching over an area of undulating flat desert devoid of sufficient water for farming, Kuwait offered its early inhabitants few and meagre resources. They turned to the sea and in time became the Gulf's most prosperous businessmen. The Kuwait society was composed of three social classes: the ruling Ṣabāḥ dynasty, an oligarchy of wealthy businessmen, and a laboring class which engaged in fishing, pearl-diving and shipbuilding. The number of pearl-divers was estimated at 10,000 in 1922, and Kuwait's merchant fleet comprised some 800 ships.

Economic Conditions

The discovery of oil in abundant quantities has made Kuwait a super-affluent urban society providing a uniquely attractive market for labor, technical and managerial personnel from other countries.

Since the first exports of oil began in 1946, this commodity has become the dominant feature of the economy, providing some 93 per cent of government revenue. [12] The oil revenue has increased from $ 500,000 in 1946 to $ 728,000,000 in 1968-69. The country sits on top of the largest proved reserve of the cheapest oil in the world, about seventy billion barrels, compared with forty billion in the United States. Today, Kuwait ranks fourth among oil producers. Petroleum income has created revolutionary changes. It has effected a rise in the annual per capita income from $ 50 in 1946 to $ 3,550 in 1968, the world's second highest. [13] It has enabled the country to create the

[11] *Kuwait Welcomes You* (Kuwait: Government Printing Press, n.d.), p. 3.
[12] United Nations, *Industrial Development in the Arab Countries* (New York, 1967), p. 92.
[13] United Nations, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East* (New York, 1967), p. 3.

world's most generous welfare state. It has an education system and health service which are totally free. The annual government expenditure on education and health exceeds $42 million and $34 million, respectively. There is one physician to every 700 people. The government pays each poor person a salary of up to $75 per month, while it tries to find him employment. If the government cannot provide employment for him, it offers him a capital of $500-600 to open a shop of his own.[14] For those with limited incomes (less than $420 per month), the government has embarked on an ambitious home-financing project which enables them to own homes on a twenty-five-year loan.

The huge income has enabled the country to acquire technological innovations and to use them productively. There is a determined movement in Kuwait to diversify the economy in preparation for the day when oil revenues may decline. Oil wealth provides momentum for a more general industrialization and agricultural development. At present, however, the manufacturing industry remains an insignificant element in the economy, accounting for only three per cent of the GNP.[15] To stimulate manufacturing, the government has built an industrial park at Shuʿaiba, a two-mile coastal stretch south of Aḥmadī port, and created the Shuʿaiba Industrial Development Board as an independent public authority to direct the park. Industrial enterprises receive cheap financing facilities through the Credit and Savings Bank whose capital was subscribed entirely by the government. The Industrial Law of 1965 exempts local industries from import duties on capital goods, and offers them tariff protection, subsidized water and power rates, and preference in government purchases.[16] Moreover, the government participates materially in industrial research undertaken by prospective enterprises. Since Kuwaiti private investors are inclined to invest in low-cost, quick-yielding projects such as real-estate or commerce, the government had to invest in long-range industrial projects. The government's share in the capital of most industrial enterprises ranges between 38 and 80 per cent. This has led to several big joint public and private enterprises which include the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, the National Industries Company, the Asbestos Company which manufactures pipes and sheet for the construction business, and several other companies.

The government industrial policy thus aims to utilize the country's natural resources and create opportunities for investing money at home. It is designed to reduce Kuwait's dependence on imported prod-

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[14] Kuwait Ministry of Guidance and Information, *Kuwait Today : A Welfare State* (Nairobi, Kenya, n d), p. 18.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[16] Text in *al-Kuwait al-Yawm: al-Jarīda al-Rasmiyya* (Kuwait Today: The National Gazette), No. 86 (June 29, 1965). This is the *Proceedings* of the Kuwait National Assembly, hereafter referred to as *Proceedings*.

ucts at a time when imports per head exceed those of any other country. Reduction of dependence on oil as the single source of foreign exchange is another aim of this policy.

Kuwait's first five-year plan (1966-1971) assigns priority to the diversification of the economy through industrialization. There are certain factors which hinder the attainment of this objective, such as the absence of raw material other than oil and natural gas, the narrowness of the home market, high labor costs, shortage of technical and managerial skills, and the absence of motivation for a Kuwaiti to become an industrial worker since the government provides plenty of employment opportunities.[17] On the positive side, however, Kuwait has vast supplies of capital, a favorable geographical situation, abundant cheap natural gas as a source of power and access to a great variety of refined petroleum. Of great importance is the government's liberal policy regarding import of labor and freedom to send out earnings and profits.

In addition to investing in big industrial ventures, the government has circulated its huge income in land, purchased at inflated values, for the purpose of road construction, office-building, and income redistribution. Some $ 1.5 billion have already been spent to buy land, affecting about 20,000 families. On the negative side, this policy has resulted in enriching some of the wealthy merchants who had speculated in real estate. Yet about 83,000 houses have been built on government purchased land.

Another method of circulating government revenue was the establishment of a large civil service which consumes more than a quarter of the entire budget.[18] With the government being the largest single employer, well over a half of the population in Kuwait depends on wages paid by the state. Government employees account for 47 per cent of the labor force of 184,000.

Unlike most countries in the region where savings are encouraged to decrease dependence on foreign aid, Kuwait has a surplus of savings exceeding the economy's productive investment capabilities. The excess of savings over investment is about 100 per cent. About 47 per cent of the national savings in Kuwait are used in local investment; the remaining 53 per cent are invested abroad. With over $ 1 billion, the Kuwait Investment Board is the largest single investor of the London Stock Exchange. About $ 250 million are invested in the United States and an equal sum is placed elsewhere.

The Communal Structure of Politics

The startling speed with which Kuwait changed from a community of tradesmen and pearl-divers to a booming oil center created funda-

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[17] *Industrial Development in the Arab Countries*, p. 106.
[18] See *Kuwait Today: A Welfare State.*

mental problems that lay behind the spectacular physical change. On the eve of its rise to prominence, Kuwait lacked one of the most essential elements of the modern state—trained personnel. This item had to be imported from abroad, and preference was given to Arab countries. In less than two decades, the non-Kuwaiti share in the total labor force rose to 77 per cent. This percentage tends to be lower in the government sector because the government adheres to a stricter policy of employing Kuwaitis. They make up 44 per cent of the 86,000 government employees and receive 46 per cent of the total government salaries and wages. But despite this and the fact that top executive and administrative posts are reserved for Kuwaitis, the affairs of state are largely operated by non-Kuwaiti Arabs. Though officially not policy-makers, this trained personnel dominates the fields of education, law, medicine, engineering, industrial planning and finance. A Palestinian was recently appointed to supervise Kuwait's huge foreign investments.

The presence of this alien group, constituting 53 per cent of the population, has had a two-fold impact on political development in Kuwait. On the one hand, it has prompted defensive measures by the government giving greater privileges to its citizens who have become a minority in their own country, which, in turn, evoked a resentment by this alien elite. Those measures have contributed to the alienation of this elite which functions as the backbone of this rapidly changing society. They perpetuate political fragmentation and retard the process of integration essential to a healthy political development. On the positive side, the resident alien serves as an instrument for mobilizing the society for rapid political modernization. He belongs to the salaried middle class which has traditionally spearheaded the movement of modernization in the modern Middle East.[19] He is a 'cultural mediator' whose role in social change is indispensable and inescapable.

In order to explore these tendencies which result from the influx of foreign skills into the country, we must delineate the 'safeguards' assumed by the government on behalf of its citizens. Foremost among these was the naturalization decree of December 1959, restricting citizenship only to those who lived in Kuwait continuously from 1920 on and their descendants. The law was amended in 1960 enabling Arabs to be naturalized after ten years of residence from the date of promulgation. Non-Arabs may be naturalized after fifteen years. To insure against wholesale naturalization, the law stipulated that only fifty persons are to receive citizenship in any one year. Moreover, the Electoral Law of 1962 excludes from voting rights naturalized citizens who obtained their naturalization less than ten years prior to the date of promulgation.

[19] See Fakhri Shehab, "Kuwait: A Super-Affluent Society," *Modernization of the Arab World*, eds. J. H. Thompson and R. D. Reischauer (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1966), pp. 134-138.

In the field of business and industry, the government insured certain privileges to its citizens. The Imports Law of 1964 confines the right of importation to citizens, partnerships providing all members are citizens, and stock companies in which Kuwaiti capital is not less than 51 per cent.[20] Likewise, the Law of Industries of 1965 limited the right to establish industrial firms to Kuwaiti nationals, who may be the owners, managers, or the majority on boards of directors. Licenses may be withheld from any firm not employing at least 25 per cent citizens. Exemptions are made however, given the fact that Kuwaiti industrial workers account for no more than 2.5 per cent of the nation's proletariat.

In the civil service, Kuwaiti graduates are exempted from entry examinations, administered by the Civil Service Commission to all other applicants. They are also exempted from certain degree requirements and have exclusive rights to certain top executive and administrative posts.[21] Pension privileges, social security benefits, free building sites, and mortgage loans are reserved to citizens.[22]

The government also used the policy of land purchase as a device to circulate its oil wealth among Kuwaitis. Wealthy merchants who anticipated the establishment of public projects bought sizable plots and later sold it to the government at inflated values.

Although these measures have been successful in achieving the goal, i.e., guarding the new affluence, their contribution to widening the gap between the citizen and the resident alien cannot be underestimated. The latter group remains envious and their allegiance to the state is minimal. Their lack of participation in the political life of the country and their less privileged socio-economic status make them a potential threat to stability; and this fact, in turn, could retard political development. Whereas the resident aliens are by and large more accultured to modern ways, the Kuwaiti nationals are more privileged in terms of political influence. In this respect, the communal situation here is basically not dissimilar to that in Jordan or Nigeria where the political elite originates in the more traditional sector.

Within the context of this fragmented political culture, the alien majority are subject to the state but not psychologically members of the nation. As long as this identity crisis persists, legitimacy will be difficult to achieve. Yet on the other hand, the mere existence of the alien elite with roots entrenched in the new middle class is a stimulus to modernization.

IV. The Political Structure

Kuwait's early political structure was a traditional one in which effective power was vested in an autocratic ruler who was traditionally

[20] Text in *Proceedings*, No. 84 (May 18, 1965), pp. 35 f.
[21] *Kuwait Today: A Welfare State*, pp. 158 f
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-24.

chosen from the Ṣabāḥ family. Governmental institutions were almost nonexistent. The tribal structure of Kuwait permitted the town notables to offer the ruler advice. The ruler also availed himself of British counsel, despite Britain's recognition of Kuwait as 'an independent Government' and her announced policy against intervention in domestic matters.

Soon after independence was granted in 1961, Kuwait adopted a constitution which reflected a greatly expanded and more diverse political structure.

The First Kuwait Constitution

A Constituent Assembly of twenty members was elected in December, 1961. No member of the ruling family was among the seventy-four candidates contesting for seats. The Assembly drafted Kuwait's first constitution which was promulgated on November 11, 1962, and acted as the nation's first parliament.[23] Kuwait was declared a hereditary Emirate held in succession in the descendants of Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ. The Emir was empowered to designate his successor subject to a majority vote in the National Assembly. Legislative power was vested in the Emir and the National Assembly. The Emir appoints and dismisses the cabinet. The Constitution imposed restraints on the Emir's legislative powers by giving the National Assembly authority to override the Emir's veto by a two-thirds vote. It also limited the time he had to confirm or reject legislation to thirty days, and in case of urgency to seven days. Members of the Assembly may ask questions of any minister concerning any policy matter and request a debate on those questions. The Assembly may return a vote of no confidence in any of the ministers but not the Cabinet as a whole or the Prime Minister. Ministers are not allowed to vote in a vote of confidence. Should the Assembly deem it impossible to cooperate with the Prime Minister, the matter may be referred to the Emir who could either relieve the Prime Minister or dissolve the National Assembly. The National Assembly cannot be dissolved two consecutive times on the same grounds.

The Emir's authority in the realms of finance and foreign affairs was also curtailed. Article 141 stipulates that the budget shall be debated at the National Assembly "head by head," and that no allocation of any of the public revenue may be assigned without the Assembly's approval. In foreign affairs, Article 70 grants the National Assembly power to ratify treaties pertaining to peace, alliances, natural resources, and financial commitments.

The Constitution recognizes the basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and guards against illegal searches and seizures. It also recognizes the principle of the 'equal protection of the

[23] Text of the Constitution in Abid A. Al-Marayati, *Middle Eastern Constitutions and Electoral Laws* (New York, 1968), pp. 200-230.

law.' Education and employment are rights guaranteed for Kuwaitis in the Constitution.

The Constitution inevitably changed some of the basic assumptions of the old patriarchal order. For the first time in Kuwait's history, the people were allowed to participate through their representatives in the political system, and to exercise restraint on the hitherto unchallenged executive authority.

Parliamentary Development

Upon the promulgation of the Constitution, an electoral law was adopted giving the right to vote to all Kuwaitis over twenty-one years of age, except those who had been naturalized less than ten years before the adoption of the Naturalization Law in 1959.[24] Elections for the newly created National Assembly were held on January 23, 1963. Some 205 candidates competed for the fifty seats, and about 17,000 participated in the voting. The New Assembly and Cabinet, which convened on January 29, 1963, to hear the first speech by the Ruler, reflected some of the changes which the Constitution seemed to imply. Unlike the Supreme Council, the new cabinet comprised ten members of the royal family and five non-royal members, mostly merchants.[25] The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Crown Prince. The National Assembly was mainly composed of merchants, a majority of whom came from the prominent families of the eastern and southern sections of the city. It is significant, however, that about one-fourth of the deputies were liberal nationalists who favored the policies of Egypt regarding Arab unity, non-alignment, and liberation from foreign economic domination.

Prior to independence, the cabinet was known in Kuwait as the Supreme Council, composed exclusively of Ṣabāḥīs, members of the Emir's family. It was responsible to the Emir who appointed and dismissed members checked only by the internal politics of the ruling dynasty.

Constitutional government changed these assumptions by allowing the National Assembly to scrutinize the fairness of executive policy, and to cause the resignation of ministers. Ministers have thus lost the privilege of being above reproach. Neither could they feel secure solely because the Emir appointed them.

V. The Political Process

1. Politics in a Traditional Society

Benevolent Autocracy

Before independence, the ruler was the final arbiter in most disputes, though he often consulted with the community elders in conformity

[24] Text of Law in Abid A. Al-Marayati, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-242.
[25] *Proceedings*, No. 1 (April 23, 1963), pp. 1-3.

consultative assembly which was embodied in the petition.[28] The first Consultative Assembly was composed of twelve members who were chosen in exclusive meetings of merchant-notables of the eastern and southern sections of the city. The Ruler agreed to convene the Assembly whenever he deemed it necessary. But the meetings of the Assembly contributed very little to the enhancement of democratizing the political structure of Kuwait. Seldom did the Assembly arrive at a consensus. Instead of facing the Ruler as a united body to check his authority, the Assembly was paralyzed by the personal feuding of its members, who were not accustomed to tolerating political opposition, or abiding by majority rule. The Assembly disintegrated from within and finally ceased to function.

This abortive attempt was followed by similar attempts in 1934 and 1936.[29] A Municipal Council and a Council of Education were established on the basis of limited elections. The latter was later dissolved by the Ruler and the Municipal Council resigned in protest. A new Municipal Council failed to win the acceptance of the opposition which was beginning to appear. The opposition was represented by an underground committee of twelve notables. Part of its operation was carried out in Iraq where the press could be utilized to publicize the movement's objectives. Leaflets were also printed in Iraq and distributed in Kuwait. Finally, in 1938, the opposition, calling itself the "National Bloc" decided to confront the Ruler with its demands and grievances. Apparently, the Ruler became concerned about the activities of the National Bloc, and in what appears to be an attempt to co-opt them, he expressed readiness to hear their case. The Bloc drafted a manifesto and conveyed it to the Ruler through a delegation of Kuwaiti notables.[30] The manifesto reminded the Ruler that the people of Kuwait had pledged their allegiance to him on the understanding that his government would be based on consultation, a precept of Islam. It not only blamed the Ruler for its absence from government, but included the "people" and "circumstances" as well. The Ruler was assured that the aims of the Bloc were limited to reform through the re-establishment of a consultative assembly.

The second Consultative Assembly, which convened in 1938, was no more successful than the first. It, however, went one step beyond to promulgate an 'Organic Law' for Kuwait for the first time.[31] The nation was declared the source of authority which it exercised through elected representatives. The Consultative Assembly was given power to ratify treaties, agreements and franchises (the oil franchise had been offered to the Anglo-Iranian and Gulf Oil Companies in 1934).

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[28] Rashīd A. al-Farhān, *Mukhtaṣar Tārīkh al-Kuwait* (A Short History of *Kuwait*) (Cairo, 1960), pp. 80-91.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-94.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 96 f.

Yemen extended on March 3, 1963.[35] In less than a month of the date of recognition, however, Kuwait concluded a financial agreement with Yemen through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.[36]

Moreover, the Nationalist bloc won a majority vote in the Assembly for a resolution deploring French atomic tests in Algeria and requesting the government of Kuwait to assist Algeria in its attempts to nullify the military restrictions imposed by the Evian Agreement with France.[37] One of the most daring attacks on the government by the opposition came in 1965, after the delivery of the Amīrī speech to the Assembly on January 5, 1965. The speech reaffirmed the government's policy of non-alignment, but in the course of debate, the opposition accused the government of delivering the Amīrī speech merely for public consumption. Referring to the government-announced policy of non-alignment, Dr. Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, a leading figure in the opposition movement, questioned governmental support of local newspapers identified with pro-Western monarchical regimes and critical of republican governments in the Arab world. Another deputy challenged the government to recognize communist China if it truly claims to follow a policy of non-alignment, and to revise the oil agreement in order to attain economic independence.[38] In an attack on the Minister of Defense and Interior, who was also the Emir's son, the same deputy questioned the supervision of equipping the army by what he called "English spies" in the Kuwait London Embassy. Another deputy claimed that the people were dissatisfied with the army because the Defense Department excluded the educated youth from military service. That the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Guidance were the favorite targets of the parliamentary opposition is but one illustration of the degree of political change in Kuwait since the promulgation of the Constitution. These ministers are the most influential not only in the Cabinet, but also in the ruling family. Such criticism of Ṣabāḥīs had not been known in Kuwait's political life before independence.

Following the death of ᶜAbd Allāh Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ, Emir of Kuwait, on November 24, 1965, the opposition bloc in the Assembly objected to the conservatism of his brother and successor, Ṣabāḥ Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ. Succession did not follow the traditional principle under which the Jābirs and Sālims alternated in the position of Ruler. Eight members resigned on December 10 charging that the Assembly had lost the faith of the people. The election of a new overwhelmingly conservative Assembly in January 1967 raises the question of whether the

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[35] *Ibid.*, No. 3 (May 14, 1963), p. 3.
[36] *Ibid.*, No. 5 (May 28, 1963), p. 4.
[37] *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 43.
[38] *Ibid.*, No 88, p. 75.

elections had been rigged. The nationalist bloc, which had assumed the role of opposition since the inception of constitutional government in 1963, was reduced to only four members. Dr. Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, the most vocal member in the opposition, was defeated by the publisher of *al-Raʾy al-ʿĀmm*, an anti-nationalist, pro-monarchist newspaper. There were twenty-six new members in the Assembly, mostly independent, right wing, and loyal to the government.

The Cabinet: Merchants, Middle Class and the Ruling Family

The constitutional era saw a transformation of political power in which the Cabinet was democratized in the sense that executive power was no longer a monopoly of the ruling family. The Cabinet was opened to the merchant oligarchy and secondarily to the new middle class. The first cabinet following independence included twelve Ṣabāḥīs and three merchants.[39] The latter held the portfolios of Justice, Health, and Labor-Social Affairs. In the second cabinet which was formed at the inauguration of the National Assembly on January 28, 1963, the number of non-Ṣabāḥīs was increased to five against eleven Ṣabāḥīs. The additional portfolios for non-Ṣabāḥīs included Ports-Customs and State. In the third cabinet, the portfolios were divided equally with the merchants adding the portfolio of Post-Telegraph, Water-Electric, and the Muslim *Waqf*. The sensitive posts of Finance, Interior, Defense, Exterior, Guidance, Education and Public Works remained vested in members of the royal family. The Prime Minister was by tradition the Crown Prince. He held no portfolio, and almost like the Emir, remained beyond criticism.

The third cabinet was significant not only in terms of the balance it reflected among the merchant oligarchy and the ruling family, but also in terms of the balance within the ruling family itself. It may be recalled that the rivalry between the Jābir and Sālim branches of the Ṣabāḥ family started after Mubārak's death. The Jābirs held four seats in the third cabinet, and the Sālims held four including the prime ministership. But the significant portfolios of Finance, Defense and External Affairs were all held by the Jābirs. The Interior Minister, Saʿd ʿAbd Allāh al-Sālim, son of the Emir, was unhappy with the influence wielded by the Jābirs headed by the Finance Minister, Jābir al-Aḥmad. In the next cabinet, formed on December 6, 1964, the number of Ṣabāḥīs was reduced from eight to five with the loss weighted against the Jābirs. The Jābirs lost the Defense portfolio, which was given to Saʿd ʿAbd Allāh al-Sālim, who also held the Interior portfolio and emerged as one of the strongest men in the cabinet. In the meantime, the number of merchants in the cabinet increased. Some deputies in the Assembly decided to challenge this

[39] *Ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 1 f.

VI. Foreign Affairs

Unlike other monarchies in the region, Kuwait pursued a foreign policy which was not strictly based on cooperation with the West. The government saw a middle course in inter-Arab politics and in East-West rivalry as the best approach to insure survival and stability. The usefulness of this approach was demonstrated during the crisis of June 1961 when the Prime Minister of Iraq, ᶜAbd al-Karīm Qāsim laid claim to Kuwait on the grounds that it is "an integral part of Iraq." Kuwait, as we have seen, immediately invoked its treaty with Britain by requesting troops. A similar request was made to Saudi Arabia, and troops from the two countries entered Kuwait on July 1st, 1961. On the next day, the Security Council of the United Nations convened to discuss Kuwait's complaint that Iraq threatened its independence, and Iraq's complaint that the presence of British troops in Kuwait constituted a menace to its own independence. Britain based its presence on treaty obligations which, it claimed, left her "no alternative but to respond positively." This position, backed by the Western powers, was vehemently opposed by the Soviet Union which vetoed a British-sponsored resolution that would have given legitimacy to the presence of foreign troops in Kuwait.

The United Arab Republic opposed the presence of British troops in Kuwait, but in the meantime, it upheld Kuwait's independence. Having failed in its attempts to dislodge British troops by means of a Security Council resolution, the United Arab Republic succeeded in transferring the forum to the Arab League. Kuwait gained admission to membership in the League on July 20, and this in itself helped to assure Kuwait independence. An agreement was negotiated by the Arab League whereby an Arab contingent would replace British forces in Kuwait. The contingent which arrived on September 10 represented an equal number of Saudi and Egyptian troops, as well as troops from Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia. In accepting this arrangement, Kuwait was relieved of making the arduous choice between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A middle course has been charted for Kuwaiti policy in inter-Arab politics. This course was further cemented by normalizing relations with republican Iraq after the Baᶜth uprising against the Qāsim regime. Congratulatory messages were dispatched to the new regime in Baghdad by the Emir, the Foreign Minister and the National Assembly; and a delegation visited Baghdad. The new Iraqi regime recognized the "independence and full sovereignty of the State of Kuwait," in an accord signed by both governments in Baghdad on October 4, 1963.[43] A week later, the Emir of Kuwait approved a loan of $84 million to Iraq.[44] Similar loans were extended to the United

[43] *Ibid.*, No. 28, pp. 10 f.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Arab Republic, and development funds were extended to Arab countries irrespective of ideology.

Kuwait plays an important role in Arab economic development. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) was established in 1962 to provide Arab countries with long-term, low interest loans (2.5-3.5% for 15-25 years) for their development programs.[45] It started with a capital of $ 120 million from the General Reserve Fund whose income does not form part of the budget. Since then, the capital has been increased to $ 560 million and loans amounting to $ 187.6 million have been granted to several Arab states (see Chart).

Distribution of KFAED Loans

Sector (Million KD)

Country	*Transport*	*Power*	*Irrigation*	*Industry*	*Total Million KD*	*Percentage*
Algeria	7.50 2.50	—	—	—	10.00	14.9
Jordan	—	—	4.00	3.00	7.00	10.4
Lebanon	—	2.40	—	—	2.40	3.5
Morocco	—	—	7.35 2.70	—	10.05	14.9
Sudan	7.00	—	5.07	1.70	13.77	20.5
Tunisia	—	4.00 4.60	2.00	—	10.60	15.8
U.A.R.	9.80 3.50	—	—	—	13.30	19.8
Total	30.30	11.00	21.12	4.70	67.12	
Percentage	45.00	16.40	31.40	7.00		

In addition to transfers from KFAED, the Kuwait government grants Arab countries funds directly from the General Reserve Fund. Over $ 600 million, including the war subsidies to Egypt and Jordan, have already been paid.

The Constitution of Kuwait proclaims the state to be "part of the Arab nation."[46] Thus, when war erupted in the Middle East in 1967, Kuwaiti troops fought in Sinai and remain until this day on the Suez Canal cease-fire line. The largest part of the $ 365 million annual Arab subsidy to Egypt and Jordan is contributed by Kuwait. Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which serves as an umbrella for the various Palestinian commando groups, operates openly in Kuwait and enjoys official backing. Kuwait was one of the first countries to encourage the evolution of a Palestinian personality, and to take a strong stand on the right of Palestinians to self-determination on their own soil. Economic aid to Tunisia was suspended by Kuwait after Bour-

[45] *Kuwait Today: A Welfare State*, pp. 14 f.; also see *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East*, p. 6.
[46] Article I.

guiba made his controversial statement on Palestine in 1965. This posture was dictated by two considerations—the existence of more than 80,000 Palestinians in Kuwait, and the genuinely nationalist feeling of its new middle class and merchants. In supporting Arab nationalism, however, Kuwait is careful to avoid commitments which could jeopardize its existing financial and political arrangements. Kuwait must, for the time being, continue to pump oil to the West; yet it was the first to honor an Arab request to stop its flow in the wake of the 1967 war in the Middle East. The subsequent restoration of oil shipments to the West, in accordance with the decisions of the Khartoum Summit Conference, enabled Kuwait to support the war-devastated economies of Egypt and Jordan.

In addition to serving as a financier for the region's economic development, Kuwait has been attempting to play the role of a mediator. It mediated in the dispute between the United Republic and Saudi Arabia over Yemen in 1966. Kuwait also used its good offices to restore harmony to Saudi-Iranian relations strained over Bahrain early in 1968. With considerable influence in the Gulf affairs, Kuwait is encouraging the Trucial states to retain the federation of the Arab emirates as a guarantee of stability after the expected British departure in 1971.

In international politics, Kuwait is similarly pursuing a 'middle course.' Under prodding by the National Assembly, the government issued a policy statement on April 9, 1963, in which it promised to reconsider the treaty of mutual support and consultation with Britain. [47] The term of this treaty ends in 1971, and Kuwait has already given the three-year statutory notice.

Relations with the communist world are cordial; cultural and trade agreements have been signed with most of them. In a detailed policy statement dated May 29, 1963, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Kuwait non-aligned for the first time, and pledged to work closely with the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations. [48] The delegation of Kuwait condemned South Africa's policy of apartheid, Rhodesia's minority rule, American intervention in Vietnam, and colonial rule in Aden, South Arabia and Oman. [49] A strong plea was made for the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations to "achieve universality." Kuwait's foreign policy can be summed up as a combination of non-alignment, friendly relations with the West, deep involvement in the Arab struggle against Israel, accommodation with Arab nationalism, and friendship with traditional monarchies in the Arab world. This answers Manfred Hal-

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[47] *Proceedings,* No. 8, p. 3.
[48] *Ibid.*, No 16, pp. 22-24.
[49] General Policy Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September, 1966, in *Kuwait,* published by the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations.

A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY JEWISH PHYSICIAN IN JERUSALEM

(A Geniza Portrait) *

Abū Zikrī was Judge Elijah's [1] eldest son, though not his eldest child. [2] He was named after his paternal grandfather, [3] notwithstanding the old man's being still alive. Unlike his younger brother he is referred to in letters exclusively by this name and not by the Hebrew version of it, [4] possibly because it was sufficiently close to the Hebrew to pass as a Hebrew nickname and probably because Elijah's father was better known by his Arabic name; his grandmother and father, attached as they were to the grandfather's name, and wanting to hear as well as pronounce it as often as possible, constantly used it.

His age is unknown, but we may safely assume he was born in Egypt [5] ca. 1197: his younger brother Solomon was a mature man of at least 20 in 1220 and his father, Elijah, was born ca. 1165. [6] Abū Zikrī was married, and his wife's name is not mentioned, but she was most probably a relative. No mention is made of children.

Abū Zikrī was a physician. He was referred to as al-Sadīd, [7] 'the sound,' a title frequently given to doctors. The sequence of his letters and those addressed to him is difficult to establish, but we know that he went to Jerusalem at least twice, once accompanied by his wife, [8] once alone; [9] when alone he was there for a lengthy period and spent a most unhappy time. In his letters he mentioned that he was, at various times, ill, [10] having an affair, [11] working unusually hard and being often dejected on account of his solitude. [12]

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* This paper is based on records from the Cairo Geniza. There are over one hundred letters and documents which in one way or another touch upon the life of the family of Abū Zikrī's father, the Judge Elijah, son of Zechariah, of Old Cairo The documents are currently in the possession of a large number of libraries. Unless otherwise indicated, the document is in the Cambridge University Library. I am grateful to Professor S. D. Goitein for his comments and for encouraging me in my work on the Geniza. He is, of course, absolved of any responsibility for this paper.

1 See preceding footnote.

2 NSJ 29, Verso, Margin, Line 2

3 Elijah B. Zechariah's Arabic name: Abū'l-Faraj b Abū Zikrī.

4 Except in Taylor-Schechter (hereafter T.-S.) 8 J 16, *f.* 3, written however by Abraham the son of Solomon the Yemenite Rabbi, who also exhibits his lack of intimacy with the family by referring to Elijah as Yeshūᶜah, a common Hebrew version of Abū'l-Faraj.

5 Most likely in Alexandria, whence his father was called to serve as a member of Abraham Maimūnī's court

6 See my paper "Elijah b. Zechariah, a member of Abraham Maimūnī's court," in *Revue des études juives,* CXXVII, 4 (1969), 339-348.

7 E.g., T.-S. 13 J 8, f.23, line 27.

8 T.-S. 8 J 41, f.8.

9 NSJ 29.

10 T.-S. 8 J 16, f.3.

11 ULC Or. 1080 J 124.

12 Oxford, ms. Heb. c 28 (2876), f.56.

He was an educated man. Physicians generally were, and in fact, a person attracted to secular learning more often than not became a physician both because that was the only practical livelihood for a man of this bent and because a major portion of the curriculum of a medical student was devoted to general secular education.[13] Abū Zikrī's letters show him to have been endowed with a dry sense of humor, but sufficiently pleasant to make us believe that he was a popular doctor with a firm but humane bedside manner. His religious training was not lacking and he could call upon his ample store of learning to come up with an apt turn of phrase from Jewish sources.[14] His handwriting is that of a doctor as well as of an intellectual, whose snobbery makes an illegible hand *de rigueur*.

He was a softhearted and softheaded man. Attached to his father, mother[15] and even his sibling rival Solomon (see below), he had the good-hearted and kind man's common weakness of character and appetitive nature. He was hard neither on others, including his petty brother, nor himself, and his feelings ruled him rather than he them. He permitted his brother Solomon to win over his father's affection by gross flattery[16] and he harbored ill feeling against neither father nor brother. He made some effort to obtain a pension for his father from the Sultan[17] and was always unusually concerned about the well-being of his mother and brother.

But Abū Zikrī shared a short temper with his younger brother. In a letter from his father sent to Jerusalem, the latter entreats Abū Zikrī to be civil to people in general and to his brother in particular.[18] We know that Abū Zikrī lived the life of the metropolis and that was bound to cause friction between the two brothers.[19] As a physician with a good position he allowed himself a certain measure of contempt in his dealings with people, probably out of proportion to his standing, or the general dissatisfaction would not have reached his father's ears. That this was Abū Zikrī's weakness is brought out by the judge's quote from scripture.[20] Abū Zikrī was vain on account of his position and his disproportionate income. Nor was he very pious. But he was intelligent. *Verbum sat sapienti*, more or less ends Elijah's injunction.[21]

An unusual episode in Abū Zikrī's life is contained in ULC Or. 1080 J 124. This letter was sent by Solomon to his father in Old Cairo. Solomon was visiting Jerusalem at the time. It is quite likely that he

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[13] Cf. S. D. Goitein, "The Medical Profession in the light of the Cairo Geniza documents," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XXXIV (1963), *passim*.
[14] Cf. NSJ 29, *passim*.
[15] NSJ 29, line 18.
[16] T.-S. 8 J 15, f.1.
[17] NSJ 29.
[18] Oxford ms. Heb. d 66, f.57.
[19] ULC Or 1080 J 124.
[20] Jeremiah 9: 22-23.
[21] Oxford ms. Heb. d 66 (2878), f.57 top of page, upside down.

went there for one of the main holidays, but his trip had the additional motive of investigating the reported misdeeds of Abū Zikrī. It appears that several trustworthy citizens of Jerusalem had either orally or in writing warned Elijah that his son the doctor was having an affair with a lady of not very high repute. The lady was not Jewish and that itself justifies Solomon's journey; upon ascertaining the truth of these allegations, it was his task to compel his brother to desist from these by whatever means necessary. ULC Or. 1080 J 124 is an incomplete letter and we may glean from it only that Solomon did go to Jerusalem, did find to his sorrow that this state of "affairs" indeed existed and—by far the most terrible consequence of it—that it was widely known in the city. He attempted with no avail to bring his brother to his senses, for "Love is a raging fire." Using harsh words—threatening the intelligent and worldly Abū Zikrī—alienated him completely. We may easily imagine the parochial, pious Cairene tutor and bookseller attempting to dissuade his physician brother living at the court from engaging in the most common practice of keeping a woman. Such words as *shefikhūt dāmīm* (spilling of blood) [22] make no impression on Abū Zikrī. It is the great shame not only for Abū Zikrī but derivatively for his father the religious judge and his whole family. We do not know the end of the affair, but we may be justified, since we hear nothing more about it, in believing that in time it subsided.

Abū Zikrī's partiality to the pleasurable life has further evidence. In addition to the shady episode just related he was reluctant to travel in winter (i.e., the rainy season), by no means dangerous in Palestine, nor extraordinarily cold, but merely uncomfortable, wet, muddy, and gloomy. [23] Although—as stated above—he was concerned about securing from other sources an *iṭlāq* (pension) for his father, he did not even travel for this purpose. Support from others was needed, for —as Abū Zikrī stated in an apologetic way—his own resources were meager, due to the general recession the country was undergoing.

But Abū Zikrī was attached to his mother. He solicitously demanded to know about his mother's condition. He was very concerned that Elijah had neglected to mention her or to send greetings from her in any of his letters to his son. Abū Zikrī wanted to know about her immediately upon Elijah's receipt of his letter. This neglect on the Judge's part is indeed unusual, for even had she travelled from the capital we could expect Elijah to tell his son about it.

For reasons which remain unclear, Abū Zikrī wished to transfer the scene of the action in the matter of the pension to Cairo. There, a certain Sa'd al-Dīn b. Kwjd/rā, a man of influence, owed Abū Zikrī a favor for a service rendered by Abū Zikrī, probably some free (or at any rate successful) treatment. Abū Zikrī now intended to call in

[22] I.e., this transgression is likened to murder.
[23] NSJ 29, line 9.

his notes. He was, however, reluctant to approach the governor ʿImrān in Alexandria, though prodded by his father to do so, his excuse being that the governor no longer enjoyed the Sultan's confidence and favor, as witnessed by his salary having been recently cut by al-Malik al-Kāmil. "The governor is now no better than a commoner," says Abū Zikrī. While he did not mind writing to Cairo, he refused to act in Alexandria and to approach either the Sultan or his viceroy. We may conclude that he did not wish to complicate his relationship with these important personages, with whom he had daily dealings in regard to his private practice, with a favor to his father in old Cairo, and was probably embarrassed at the thought. The situation however was different in Cairo where his father, such as he was, was well known to the authorities, and where a note from Abū Zikrī would hardly be likely to harm his own affairs.

Abū Zikrī wanted to return to Cairo, and asked his father to prepare the ground by finding him a position or setting him up in practice. He mentioned some well-known physicians whom he wished his father, the Judge, to contact.

That Abū Zikrī was not his father's favorite is certain. Though absence is said to make the heart grow fonder, we have several reasons to believe that their relationship was far from smooth, and that Solomon enjoyed his father's trust, confidence and affection in spite of Abū Zikrī being the elder. From the document ULC Or. 1080 J 124 we adduce several insights as to the diverse personalities of the father and his two sons and the interplay of their relationships. To Judge Elijah, Abū Zikrī's libertarian way of life and, we assume as a corollary, his unorthodox views and observances were particularly distasteful. Abū Zikrī, who in spite of divorcing himself from the community at large felt quite close to his family, complains bitterly about his father's total silence towards him;[24] four letters of Abū Zikrī to the Judge go unanswered. We permit ourselves to deduce that Elijah would constantly defer the unpleasant, perhaps even painful, task of writing to his bright but irreligious son. In T.-S. 8 J 15, f. 1, we have further evidence for Elijah's feelings toward Abū Zikrī. In this remarkable document the Judge makes a living bequest of almost all his books as well as all his copper vessels to brother Solomon. While it is true that Solomon has greater need of his father's religious volumes—he is a teacher, his brother a physician—there is really no good reason why he has greater need of the household utensils. Indeed Solomon is more his father's son. He imitates his ways. He is active in the community. He is, if in a humble way—also like his father—a religious scholar. He

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[24] Oxford, ms. Heb. c 28, f.56. Cf. lines 8-10: "Oh my master! You have forgotten me—as if I were not your son whom you have brought up—you do not even answer my letters." Elijah was notoriously lax in keeping up with his correspondence, but four unanswered letters from his son call for additional explanation.

is a notary, he is a sometime cantor, he is versed in Hebrew and Arabic, but above all he is pious. Elijah is not an outstanding scholar and his natural taste runs then to obedient Solomon in preference to engaging but erratic brother Abū Zikrī.

But the document is written in Solomon's hand and we might have assumed that he wrote it in order to induce his father to sign it. Yet the language of the document is unusually strong; in addition to repetition of the usual formulae about the donor's health and sanity at the time of the gift, he repeats twice the phrase *laysa li-aḥad fīh šay* (they belong to no one else); and once, the telling phrase *laysa li-akhīh fī dhālik šay* (his brother [i.e., Abū Zikrī] has no rights upon it [books and vessels]). The document may have been inspired by and conceived in a moment of ire, perhaps on being informed of a new incident in Abū Zikrī's series of shenanigans, but there is no doubt that it clearly shows the unhappy relationship between Elijah and his elder son.

A final word: the books are given to Solomon even *illam yakun mu'allim* (if he does not remain a teacher), a clear indication with perhaps a touch of irony. Elijah did not even permit Abū Zikrī to console himself by imputing to his father motives in the gift occasioned by his brother's choice of profession. In 8 J 15, f.1 he clearly declares his preference of Solomon to Abū Zikrī. It may be that this state of affairs was not always so. In a previous letter, written immediately after Elijah's first visit to Jerusalem, the Judge addresses his son as *al-walad al-'azīz* (the dear son).[25] Though this may be taken to show that friendlier relations existed between father and son, too much stress should not be laid on a mere polite greeting.

Abū Zikrī was a moody man. In most of his letters he is in an extremely depressed state, and his illnesses are compounded by his touchiness. At the point of writing Oxford ms. Heb. c28, f.56 he must have been in Jerusalem for an extended period, away from both his parents and his wife. He was so emotionally upset as to speculate that he may die without seeing his kin again, and so asks them to come to visit him, a most extraordinary request in view of his father's position, his mother's age, and the difficulty of the trip. Keeping in mind the expected equanimity of a physician, we may conclude that Abū Zikrī had an uneven personality. Abū Zikrī, however, was a great favorite of his mother's family. In one letter[26] he is the only one to be greeted *kthīr laysa qalīl* (much not little) showing the preference shown by Abū'l-Faraj and the rest of the family in Alexandria to him.

Judge Elijah travelled often to Jerusalem; we have indications that the family is Palestinian in origin.[27] He may have made a habit of 'going up' to Jerusalem for the High Holidays. While in T.-S. 13 J 18, f.7 Elijah is returning from Jerusalem while his two sons are there, in

[25] Oxford, ms. Heb. d 66, f.57.
[26] Oxford ms. Heb. c 28, f.64, Verso, line 10.
[27] Cf. above, p. 344, n.4.

T.-S. 13 J 7, f.26 Solomon is writing to Abū Zikrī from Cairo that the old man had just returned to the capital from Jerusalem, clearly another trip. T.-S. 13 J 7, f.26 is in fact subsequent to many previous letters, e.g., NSJ 29, from which we infer that Abū Zikrī is about to make a change of scenery and to attempt to find employment in Egypt. A hint as to the rough going in Jerusalem is provided by Solomon, who obviously in reply to the first letter from Abū Zikrī in which the latter, being safely back in Egypt and out of reach of the provincial authorities in Jerusalem, could finally relate his experiences there, voices his and Elijah's astonishment at the doings of the "evil men, damn them." [28]

Abū Zikrī's marital life was rather stormy. Aside from his celebrated affair (we know about only one), he himself is almost totally silent [29] about his wife or children and it is only from letters written to him by others that we learn that he was married at all, and that always either in the form of admonitions by an uncle to return to his wife, or by his brother who is happy at the recent auspicious turn of events in his marriage reported by Elijah on returning from Alexandria. [30]

Abū Zikrī the physician was engaged in business, usually in the form of a partnership with the rest of his family. We know that he shared in the wine-selling business of his father and brother, but we may conclude that he was the silent partner. [31] He may have been connected with the cheese business reported by his brother. [32] Nevertheless he was not so deeply involved in diverse transactions as both his father and brother, partly because of the nature of his profession, partly on account of his frequent absences from Cairo.

From the twenty-seven letters or documents in which Abū Zikrī is mentioned, a clear picture emerges of the life and character of that thirteenth-century physician. Physicians belonged to the upper middle class: they travelled widely, lived well, had an excellent education. As a concomitant to their profession they transcended class and were welcome in all strata of society.

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[28] T.-S. 13 J 7, f. 26, line 26.
[29] For an exception see NSJ 29 Verso, line 18.
[30] Cf. 13 J 7, f.26, line 9, Verso, line 3.
[31] Arab Box 18 (1) f. 127.
[32] T.-S. 13 J 7, f.26 lines 13-20

BOOK REVIEWS

Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of Ibn ʿArabī. By Henry Corbin. Translated from the French by Ralph Manheim. Bollingen Series XCI. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969. vii plus 406 pp. 5 plates. Index. $ 10.00.

Henry Corbin writes like a missionary for esoteric religion, as witness these lines:

> ...we should like to communicate something of this spirituality as we have experienced it to those who are seeking along the same path... It concerns the most secret and most profound life of the soul... To those who seek an encounter 'alone with the Alone,' ...to those Ibn ʿArabī and his school will unquestionably have much to say (pp. 5-6).

No one can accuse the author of lack of sympathy with his subject. Ibn ʿArabī, the great Spanish theosophist, provides the basis for this book, but Corbin combines his thought with that of the Shiʿites to make what is nothing short of a passionate apology for arcane spirituality.

Made up of two independent essays and an extensive introduction, the book is nevertheless unified by the methodology and thesis of its author. As a phenomenologist of religion he describes the mysticism of Ibn ʿArabī and shows its kinship with Shiʿism. He makes some suggestive remarks about the relationship between Christian mysticism and Sufism, but he does not emphasize this aspect of the comparative viewpoint. His thesis is that Sufism, as expressed by Ibn ʿArabī, points out in a most impressive way the significance of an esoteric interpretation of Islam (p. 77). As foils to this recondite system he sets up the abstract monotheism of scholastic Islam and Christian incarnational theology.

A prospective reader should be forewarned that the expression, "Creative Imagination," in the title of this book has nothing to do with imagination in the usual understandings of the word; that is, it is neither the human faculty which produces fantasy nor the source of artistic creation. The word refers rather to a poetic capacity which is distinct from either sensate or intellectual perception. The title pertains directly only to the essay which constitutes Part Two, "Creative Imagination and Creative Prayer." In Part One, "Sympathy and Theopathy," the author interprets Ibn ʿArabī's understanding of the divine attributes as the expression in man of God's loving initiative, born of His desire to be known. Life for the mystic is charged with nostalgic desire in response to this divine yearning, but such desire is at once different from its object and identical with it. That is, man is a manifestation of God and his every response Godward is also a divine self-manifestation. This doctrine is not monistic, says Corbin, since the love movement between God and man is dialogical, and since each mystic is concretely differentiated, while at the same time joined to his Beloved in a transcendent sympathetic union.

In Part Two the role of *khayāl,* or gnostic imagination, is described.

By it creation takes place, for the creature's being is a manifestation of the divine imagination. Creation is a theophany (*tajallī*) of imaginative power. Prayer is a recurrence of creation as the worshiper and the worshiped share their roles in intimate dialogue. The highest science is that of the heart, and its practitioners create through their *himma*, or dynamic intention, an open-ended symbolic structure which may be called the mystics' dogma.

Corbin cites the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* more than any other work by the Spanish mystic. This emphasis adds to the value of his book, for the other large work on Ibn ᶜArabī's mysticism, *El Islam Cristianizado* by Miguel Asín Palacios, almost completely ignores the *Fuṣūṣ*. The section of notes, taking up 103 pages of *Creative Imagination*, contains many valuable excerpts translated from the *Fuṣūṣ* as well as from other works. In the part of the first essay entitled "The Dialectic of Love," the author concentrates on that section of the *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* from which Asín Palacios translated large extracts for his study. Also we find Corbin drawing on the *Futūḥāt* in the last section of the second essay entitled "Around the Mystic Kaᶜaba," a subject which has been carefully interpreted by Fritz Meier in the *Eranos Jahrbuch*, XI (1944), 187-214. Finally, it is a passage from the *Futūḥāt* which provides the basis for an exposition of the science of the imagination (pp. 216-20).

It seems almost idle to find fault with a magnificent book such as this one. The author is to be congratulated for imparting the mystical message of Ibn ᶜArabī with rare force and with consummate artistry. Unfortunately, he tends to overstate his arguments, even as was the case in his previous ground-breaking work, *Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique* (cf. *MW*, LV [1965], 158). Abstract monotheism and incarnational theology cannot be as bad as he makes them out to be. And one wonders if he has not overplayed the centrality and clarity of the concept, "creative imagination," in Ibn ᶜArabī. There is a hint that this might be the case when after a short treatment of the idea, in which its metaphysical and psychological aspects are mingled (pp. 216-20), the author turns to the concept of *himma* and devotes about twenty-four pages to it, calling it the "creative power of the heart" (p. 220). It is well to consider the brief and cautious words of A. E. Affifi on the vague use of *khayāl* in Ibn ᶜArabī (*The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dīn-Ibnul ᶜArabī*, pp. 129-31), in seeking a balanced view of its place in the mystic's system. The vocable, *khayāl*, is not cited in al-Kāshānī's lexicon, *al-Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya*, and this scholar was one of the most important expositors of Ibn ᶜArabī's thought. Neither is the word found among the 202 terms listed by Ibn ᶜArabī in *al-Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya* (appended to *Kitāb al-Taᶜrīfāt* by al-*Jurjānī*). This criticism does not materially affect a positive evaluation of the whole book, for, as has already been stated, the title, "Creative Imagination," refers directly to only a part of the work.

By linking Ibn ᶜArabī with the currents of Shiᶜite philosophy that continued to thrive after the demise of *falsafa*, Corbin has once more brought the non-Muslim world into vital touch with a little understood and richly variegated tradition. His book is nothing if not pro-

foundly evocative. In wisely refraining from a schematization of Ibn ᶜArabī's ideas he has boldly thrust his mystic into the arena of universal human experience. By a fitting paradox the hidden elusiveness of this spiritual psychology and metaphysics does not keep them from casting just enough universal light to quicken a sympathetic response from the 'orthodox' and the 'heretics' of all schools.

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The Theology of Unity. By Muḥammad ᶜAbduh, translated from the Arabic by Isḥāq Musaᶜad and Kenneth Cragg. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1966. 164 pp.

That the world has had to wait until the second half of this century for an English translation of Muḥammad ᶜAbduh's seminal work *Risālat al-Tawḥīd* is almost incredible. It is a matter for rejoicing that the lack has now been made good by the combined efforts of Isḥāq Musaᶜad and Kenneth Cragg. The translators came together when Isḥāq Musaᶜad, an Egyptian clergyman, spent a year of study at St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, England, then the Central College of the Anglican Communion. Kenneth Cragg, who contributes the Introduction, was its Warden.

Risālat al-Tawḥīd is surely ᶜAbduh's most outstanding work. In relatively short compass, it comprehends the whole gamut of Islamic thought in its quest for renewal. As Kenneth Cragg says in his Introduction, "All the points are here—the bane and blight of *'taqlīd'*; the ready 'harmony' of faith and reason; the pragmatic vindication of Islamic history; the Divine omnipotence served by human energy; the paradox of the Prophet's illiteracy and surpassing status; the success of primitive Islam; the disservice done by actual Muslims to proper Islam and the call to present discontent in the cause of true renewal."

Muḥammad ᶜAbduh is at his most impassioned when belaboring the Obscurantists and Traditionalists. "Islam," he says, "will have no truck with traditionalism, against which it campaigns relentlessly, to break its power over men's minds and eradicate its deep-seated influence. The underlying bases of *'taqlīd'* in the beliefs of the nations have been shattered by Islam." The reader of this work will scarcely avoid the conviction that ᶜAbduh commits the error he so roundly castigates in others. There is here a tendency to avoid difficult questions and a refusal to face squarely some awkward problems (e.g., whether the Qurᵓān was created or not). Dogmatic assertion takes over from reason all too often, despite the author's declared abhorrence of such an approach. Nonetheless, this is a book of major importance. It signposts the path that subsequent thinkers have followed. Some have turned aside into ways that Muḥammad ᶜAbduh would himself eschew. All owe much to the impetus of the thoughts here expressed. It is cause for gratitude that the need for an English version has now been so admirably met.

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Arabic Literature. By I. M. Filshtinsky (Translated from the Russian by Hilda Kasanina). U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Institute of the Peoples of Asia, "Nauka" Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental Literature. Moscow, 1966. 244 pp. Bibliography. Index.

La littérature arabe. By André Miquel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, "Que sais-je?" series No. 1355, 1969. 122 pp. Bibliography. Index.

These are two introductory surveys of the history of Arabic literature. Encompassing one thousand and five hundred years of literary history in a little book of one hundred or two hundred pages is wellnigh impossible, let alone properly dealing with its many problems. This is recognized by the two authors and reflects itself in their method of treatment.

Filshtinsky has opted to shorten the scope of his subject matter by being selective and by ending his study at the end of the eighteenth century. Miquel, on the other hand, while dealing with the whole span of the literary history of the Arabs up to contemporary authors of the 1960's, assumes a more interpretive approach that tries to analyze trends rather than record details. Filshtinsky uses detail to inform; Miquel uses detail to explain. While the former may stand to err in deciding upon the judicious quantity of information to be supplied, the latter may stand equally to err in interpreting facts depending on personal predilection and judgment.

Both authors, however, have done a great job within the limitations they set themselves. Both also have blended information with interpretation to the degree permissible by their respective plans. They are to be commended on this score.

The two books purport to study Arabic literature in its most strictly limited meaning, i.e., beautiful prose and verse expressive of thoughts and emotions. They understandably shun the encyclopaedism of a Brockelmann or a Sezgin for whom literature would be everything written, including philosophy, theology, law, philology, science, and so forth. The form of what is said should be aesthetically as important as the content of what is said before it qualifies to be called literature in the strict sense of the word. Miquel considers much of Arabic historiography and geography worthy of the name literature, especially what partakes of the nature of belles-lettres or *adab* in its form and subject matter. Filshtinsky does not include Arabic history or geography in his study and limits himself to a stricter understanding of his field.

Filshtinsky follows a chronological design and divides his book into two unequal sections: I—Arabic Literature of Antiquity (5th-7th Century), and II—Medieval Arabic Literature (End of 7th to 18th Century). While Miquel does not disregard chronology, he divides his book into four chapters: I—The conquering literature, II—The literature of encounters, III—The literature of memory, and IV—The literature of the Rebirth. The titles of the chapters suggest the thematic concern of the author and his sweeping bird's-eye view of Arabic literature.

In his interpretation, Miquel introduces an interesting notion which, though not fully tenable, is possibly worthy of notice. I am referring

to the idea, introduced in his Chapter III entitled "Littérature du souvenir," that literary activity in the age of decadence busied itself with rehash, restatement, encyclopaedic and lexical complication not because—as Filshtinsky and other historians usually say—the Arabs had lost their creativity but rather because they were trying feverishly to record the treasures of a civilization which they felt was being threatened. The ornate, flowery style heavy with tropes, superfluous complexities and embellishments which was adopted by the literate Arabs was, in Miquel's view, an expression of the attempt to hold on to the national language that seemed to be beleaguered by odds. The illitérate masses likewise hung on to their folk literature in this period of political disarray because it retained what they considered to be memories of a culture in danger and embodied the values that Arab popular heroes of the past were made to convey to future generations. In other words, the intellectual torpor of the age of decadence is explained away by Miquel who sees in it an ingenious way in which a nation was preserving its identity and safeguarding its future by refusing to die or to permit the national heritage to die.

No such interpretation worries Filshtinsky when writing of this period. His concern here is to describe and analyze the contents of the literature of decadence, not its purpose.

It seems to me, however, that, when dealing with the Qurʾān, Filshtinsky is either misinformed on certain points or is unwittingly falling prey to subjective judgments. On pages 50-51, he writes:

> Two conceptions exist concerning the authorship of the Koran. By some researchers it is regarded as the collective creative work of several persons over a period of some decades. According to them, analysis of the book and its style leads to the hypothesis that it consists of several layers, reflecting various stages of Arab history, only the earliest of which relates to the lifetime of Muhammad. But most researchers (among them the author of this book) claim that Muhammad was himself the author of the Koran, which is simply a collection of the prophet's sermons (didactic stories, canonical rules and prayers) addressed to pagans who had not yet embraced the Muslim faith, or to neophytes.

I wish that Filshtinsky had documented his statement here and that he remained, as elsewhere in the book, a scholarly observer who records the belief of Arab critics, not his own. For it is known that, to Muslims, the Qurʾān was revealed to Muḥammad by God and was not the product of Muḥammad or any other human being.

Filshtinsky also seems to misunderstand the theological doctrine of the creation of the Qurʾān that was such a burning issue in the ninth century. Speaking of this Muʿtazilite doctrine of the creation of the Qurʾān, he says on page 85: "So deeply rooted had it become that the government even began to persecute orthodox theologians who denied the creation of the Koran by man and the freedom of human will."

The issue, as is known, is not whether the Qurʾān was created *by man* or not. Orthodox as well as Muʿtazilite theologians maintained that the source of the Qurʾān was God but they differed whether the

Qur'ān was co-eternal with God or was created by Him when revealed to Muḥammad in history.

One final remark which may or may not be important. It is the correct English usage to write God with a capital letter when referring to the Supreme Being worshiped in Monotheistic religions. Filshtinsky has invariably written it 'god' in his book, though the Arabic equivalent he correctly wrote as 'Allah.' In Arabic, 'Allah' is not capitalized. Whether in Russia capitalization is not the rule, I confess ignorance.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation ISSA J. BOULLATA

Qaid-E-Azam Jinnah as I Knew Him. By M. A. H. Ispahani. Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1966. 244 pp. Rs. 20/-.

Mirza Abol Hassan Ispahani (Mīrzā Abū'l-Ḥasan Iṣfahānī) is a prosperous Pakistani businessman, and a member of a Persian family which has produced several eminent men after its emigration to the Indian subcontinent. When Pakistan came into existence in 1947, he was appointed by its creator and the first governor-general Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāḥ) to be the first Pakistani ambassador to the United States. From the work under review, it would seem that he had known Jinnah for a long time, though it was difficult, even impossible, for anyone to know him more than superficially.

Like several other 'veteran' personalities of Pakistan, like Chawdharī Khalīq al-Zamān and Chawdharī Muḥammad ʿAlī before him, Mr. Ispahani has also decided to write about the phase of the creation of Pakistan and its early years, bringing into relief his own role and position. Ispahani has done this through a 'personalized' political sketch of Jinnah, which, however, is neither profound nor unfamiliar. The informational value of Ispahani's book from an academic point of view is therefore minimal. Its documentary value consists of the reproduction of correspondence between Jinnah and himself. Essentially, it is a polite, banal, superficial and personal correspondence and it touches political history merely peripherally. All the same, its publication is welcome, because all documentation is welcome as possible source material for future historians.

By Pakistani standards the quality of printing and paper is very good; and Mr. Ispahani has a simple, unpretentious, readable style.

Toronto, Canada AZIZ AHMAD

The Youth of Haouch el Harimi, a Lebanese Village. By Judith R. Williams. Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs XX. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1968. 146 pp. 2 maps.

Haouch el Harimi is a Sunni Muslim village located in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon, not far from the main Beirut-Damascus highway. It is a relatively poor village, with most of the land owned by absentee landlords and cropped by tenant farmers of varying economic levels.

Mrs. Williams, an anthropologist, has made two field studies of the village, one in 1949-50 and the other in 1963-64. During the latter trip,

she interviewed almost all of the youth who were 15 to 18 years old. Her study will be examined here not for its contributions to the discipline of anthropology, but for its value to the students of the Middle East.

Village youth are important in the Middle East. More than half of the people in the Middle East dwell in villages. More than half of the total population are less than twenty years old. Thus, the youth of villages form the largest single segment in the population, and deserve close study simply because of their number.

Village youth are important in other ways. Obviously, the youth of today are the adults of tomorrow. Their experiences and the attitudes they develop in childhood and adolescence will affect their actions as adults.

Unfortunately, not very many studies have been centered upon the village youth, who have often been merely walk-on parts in more general studies. Mrs. Williams has, in contrast, concentrated on this major group.

An added and most valuable dimension of the study is the attention given to the effects of change. Throughout the Middle East, the process of changing from traditional Middle Eastern ways to 'modern' European ways is going on rapidly. In no part of the Middle East is the process more rapid or more nearly universal than in Lebanon. The process is most advanced in Beirut, but it has also begun to dominate Zahle, the local city near Haouch. The Christians of Lebanon have been more thoroughly changed, but the Muslims are now not far behind.

Another aspect to this is that Lebanon is a small country. The material evidences of prosperity—the outward and visible signs of Europeanization—are readily visible in autos, nightclubs, summer villas, and general *la dolce vita*. In a larger country, these evidences would be less visible, concentrated mainly in a distant capital.

When Mrs. Williams made her first visit to Haouch in 1949-50, the village had been only lightly touched by change. At the time of the second visit, the process was in full flood. That which is now occurring in Haouch will be repeated—with variations—in the countless other villages of the Middle East in the next two or three decades.

The author opens with an examination of birth, infancy, and childhood in the village. Change from traditional ways has begun to occur. Able as a woman to speak to the women of the village, Mrs. Williams found "open interest in limiting the size of families and talk of the wisdom and desirability of fewer children." At the time of the first visit, Haouch was sufficiently isolated that no help was available in an emergency; now, for a difficult delivery, the village midwife can telephone a doctor to drive to the village. The adoption of surface aspects of modernity is illustrated by the use of the nursing bottle, "a rare sight" at the time of the first trip, but now "extremely common." It is "usually a pop bottle with a large and flabby nipple with which no sanitary precautions are taken." Traditionally, the period of infancy has been filled with "supernatural dangers," but "the belief in the supernatural is no longer universal," and some take active steps

to protect the infant and mother, instead of relying upon magic.

Childhood seems to be a rather dull time. The first-born boy, the eldest girl, the youngest child, all have some special status or responsibility, but the rest are lumped into an "undifferentiated, anonymous group of intermediate children." They spend little time in structured play and most of their time in "aimless, listless milling about."

The major part of the study is concerned with adolescence. In this period, changing conditions have made the differences between the life patterns of boys and those of girls more marked. For example, at the time of the first visit, most of the youth received no education at all, with only a few boys briefly attending the quite inadequate local school. Now, the level of the school has been raised considerably. Most of the boys spend at least some time in the school, and a number go on to schooling elsewhere. In contrast, only a few girls attend, and that just briefly.

An economic difference has also grown up. The sons of wealthier peasants are able to go to advanced schools, and as a result form a separate social group from the less educated poorer boys. Again in contrast, the girls, without the educational differentiation, are "more democratic" in their friendships.

A second differentiation that has grown up recently is the ability to visit cities. In 1949-50, "boys and girls alike were largely confined to the village." Now, the boys visit Zahle about once a month: "What they see is enough to feed their discontent and make them wish for a life other than what they know." Here again, economic differences creep into this new situation: the richer boy is much freer than his poorer compeer to go the Zahle, to go on his own decision, and to go unaccompanied by an adult.

The girls, in contrast, go more rarely to Zahle, about once every three months (the poorer girls less frequently). The decision to go is made with the family, and the girl is always accompanied by an adult.

Not everything has changed from traditional ways. Both boys and girls at least allege adherence to traditional values in choice of spouses. The family, as a whole, is still expected to play the dominant role in the process of selection and timing, and cousin marriages and in-village marriages are still stated by the youth as preferred.

Some changes were found. The age of marriage is moving upwards. In 1949-50, over half the women who were married had been married by the time they were eighteen; in 1963-64, less than one-tenth of the fifteen to eighteen year-olds were married. There were hints of other changes to come in attitudes. For the young men, "marriage means closing off the escape routes—Brazil, the cities...," and many would choose "Sao Paulo rather than marriage to the familiar Haouch cousin-bride." Another is changing standards for a bride: many wanted an educated girl, non-existent in the village.

Another field in which traditional patterns are generally unchanged is that of work. From an early age, the girls have many tasks both in the house and in the fields, the latter often for pay. The boys, especially in the upper income groups, have less demands made upon them, and do less work for pay. But change has occurred here too;

the boy expects more, and more is expected of him. "For the boy there is increasingly the awareness, if not the actual availability, of alternatives... A few years of education, his family's relative prosperity or nothing more than his reluctance exempt him from the traditional and available work of the man."

Thus, a major impact of the introduction of even the limited amount of change in Haouch has been to give boys and girls different life ambitions. The girls still have village ambitions—marriage, parenthood, and honored old age. Improved education and increased contact with the city have given the boys non-village ambitions, often unrealistic ones of becoming doctors or teachers or army officers, anything to escape the village and live well. The girl's life cycle has an upward sweep of esteem; the boy's "reaches its apex with his birth as a male."

Mrs. Williams concludes with comments on the personal effects of these changes. The opportunity for competence, even without social esteem, that is given to the girl is psychologically more beneficial than the high esteem that is given to the boy without opportunity to perform culturally useful tasks" (or, one might say, the new tasks brought by the changing culture). The problems created may be "personally devastating," especially as they occur at adolescence. We all live by dreams; to have them smashed is tragic. Mrs. Williams suggests that the kinship structure may find its real *raison d'être* by acting to protect the individual from the effects of these problems.

The study has other implications, for example in planning. Many Mediterranean countries, including Lebanon, have ambitious programs for preventing rural depopulation, primarily by raising rural income. Both the goal and the means belong to the Europeanized planners, natives of the cities who know little of the village. The goal and the means should be re-examined in the light of the ideas suggested by this study of Haouch. If the rural people—or at least the young men—want to move to the city, should the planners, using their own value judgments, attempt to discourage them? Is raising rural income effective in preventing an exodus from the villages?

It is possibly unfair to say that anthropologists once seemed to concern themselves almost entirely with puberty rites and kinship terms in 'primitive' tribes. It is certainly no longer true. Increasingly they are offering much of value to Middle Eastern studies. One most valuable gift is their concern for the individual in society. Instead of viewing society as a uniform or statistical mass, as many social scientists do, the anthropologists have a keen and lively awareness of the role of the individual and of the variety among individuals. Mrs. Williams has illustrated this in her valuable study. Her careful examination of a small unit suggests many hypotheses about the present and future of Middle Eastern society as a whole.

University of Maryland
College Park, Md

JAMES HUDSON

The United States and the Arab World. By William R. Polk. Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1969.

Professor Polk's book, which was well received when it first appeared in 1965 (See the review by Ralph E. Crow, *M.W.*, LVI [1966], 121-123. Ed.) has been enlarged in the new edition by several maps, a new preface and three additional chapters. It is a useful book, and one of the best parts of it is the new preface which dwells effectively on problems of perception and comprehension encountered by Western observers of Arab affairs, as well as by the Arabs themselves in studying their own society.

A reviewer of the 1965 edition described it as "...a remarkably comprehensive guide." It is surely that, and the new material increases its value to those concerned with the modern Middle East. All the important facts seem to be there, and in presenting them, Professor Polk's idealism and concern for the welfare of the Arabs comes through strongly. And yet the book is in a sense weakened by his assumption that his own ideals are those of his (and the reviewer's) country. It may very well be that President Truman saw America's aim as helping "...the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens" (p. 267). Yet the Point Four program has been dependent on the hard economic fact that it has generated export orders for American industry, and business for American air and steamship lines. Today a deflationary economic policy threatens its survival and menaces such programs as the UN Relief and Works Agency, which may have been motivated by idealism but which are eminently realistic politically.

In describing Public Law 480 as an effective "...instrumentality of American foreign policy" (p. 289), Professor Polk for once abandons the lofty moral tone with which he usually describes that policy and 'tells it like it is.' One could wish that the author, with his extensive experience in the formulation of Middle Eastern policy (and all the 'inside' knowledge that implies) might say a bit more about the quest for power and a bit less about the quest for social transformation. It is to be hoped that Professor Polk will write such a book. He would thereby contribute to a more hard-eyed appraisal of America's Middle Eastern policy, and cause more Americans to question actions (and inaction) which result in the United States being increasingly identified as the enemy of the Arab people. An Arab politician and intellectual, a socialist who has for many years been at the center of Arab affairs, recently suggested to the reviewer that the United States Government should cease talking about the needs of expectant peoples, the quest for social justice and all the other flowery phrases which are scattered throughout commencement addresses and State Department press releases on the Middle East. Instead, he argued, they should start and end each day by asking, "How can we best promote America's interests in the Middle East?" It should not be difficult to answer that question, and if the answer is acted upon, it will do more for the expectant peoples *and* for the United States than Point Four, P.L. 480 and all the other nostrums combined.

Professor Polk provides the standard explanations for American support for the founding of the state of Israel. He is quite correct in doing so but if the reviewer may employ the hindsight provided by our Vietnam experience (as Professor Polk does in another connection) and by our now being over two decades removed from the establishment of Israel, he may then ask for something more. It is a cherished national myth that the United States is a democracy, and therefore did we not take pride in implanting another 'democracy' in the Middle East? To be sure. But when did we cease thinking in those terms, and when did our increasingly militant society begin to admire a nation which seems able to do something which we have been incapable of accomplishing—of providing military solutions to political problems? Professor Polk may not agree with the premise given nor with the question posed. Moreover, the suggestions he makes (pp. 345 ff.) for bringing peace to the Middle East are admirable. Yet no international agency will be able to implement one of them until the United States Government re-evaluates its interests in the area and, indeed, ceases to give the impression (as Russell Baker described it) that the only two Great Powers in the world are South Vietnam and Israel.

American University of Beirut JOSEPH J. MALONE

The British in the Middle East. By Sarah Searight. New York: Atheneum, 1970. xvi plus 215 pp. With copious illustrations at regular intervals. $ 12.50.

The title of this intriguing book is somewhat misleading, for the term 'Middle East,' so far as the British are concerned, was unknown till the Second World War was nearly half-way through. The one country in the (so-called) Middle East described in this book that never flags for interest in personalities is Persia (Iran). Most people would have thought the main concern to be political involvement, but this has been wisely eschewed. This means the one adverse criticism rapidly fades into the background, though it is abundantly evident that more than one route to India ran through this area. What is more, this book should find a place in the libraries of Embassies from Cairo to Tehran.

British interests dating from three hundred years ago were primarily commercial, though the explorers are not forgotten. The circle of Britons who found the way eastwards—the Turkish Empire was then supreme politically—was wider than Cromer, Burton or Lady Hester. The cities, too, are well depicted—Isfahan, Constantinople and Aleppo (known in the first Elizabethan days). Pilgrimages, too, were becoming more organized, at times in the Holy Land better called 'tours,' with the growing fame of Cook's. Then there were the scholars and artists—much owed to the latter in profusely illustrated pages. Though the chapters in many cases have headings which must make some readers wonder what they contain, the reason comes to light in due course. It would be well to look at the relevant groupings of pictures before reading the chapters. They help to make the book worthy of the price, and you see what Lane of the Dictionary looked like; or

the great Muḥammad ʿAlī; or why Nineveh meant so much to Layard; or grasp something of the 'Suez' imagination of de Lesseps. These teaching 'visual aids' number over a hundred.

There is not much to be found about Islam though the whole context is the Muslim world; yet, in a sense we have the story of the transition period of Islamic-Christian relationships from the bad old days of the Crusades to the more understanding period of the late nineteenth century onwards with the gradually expanding mutual approach through 'dialogue.' All the characters mentioned in these pages (their vignettes or cameos of quality)—bespeaking industrious research and judgment—must have returned with some change in outlook and discernment, especially those who penetrated the Heart of Arabia (in advance of Philby)—Pitt who went because he couldn't help it, Burton in disguise, and Doughty in his refusal of disguise. The author is wise not to go beyond the outbreak of World War in 1914; if she does in another volume, there may well be more revelations to be made known. We are grateful for what she has done, as must be the lesser known personalities to have found a deserved niche in British history, in a Middle East that needs understanding and appreciation with the revival of its greatness, as this book in word and picture clearly demonstrates. One last emphasis; it was in these centuries that European scholarship was enriched historically, botanically, linguistically, to which the acquisitions of European Museums contributed with their treasures from the lands of the Middle East.

Redhill, Surrey, England ERIC F. F. BISHOP

A Middle East Reader. Edited by Irene L. Gendzier. New York. Pegasus, 1969 xl plus 475 pp. Maps, bibliography.

To present the contemporary Middle East in a balanced and coherent light is a gigantic task at best. Irene Gendzier, an Associate Professor of History at Boston University and a Research Associate at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, has undertaken that difficult assignment. Working from the premise that few people really have detailed knowledge of "the labyrinthian world east of the Mediterranean," Miss Gendzier has tried to give a complete picture of the Near East as it evolved since the end of World War II. Even the author apologizes for not tracing the roots of Arab nationalism and of the Palestine question back to World War I, but, in view of her excellent choice of readings no apology is necessary. It is all too evident from her selections why that portion of the world is in conflict and subject to daily deadly confrontation.

In the introduction Miss Gendzier states that in preparing this book of readings, balance was the keystone. The reading selections measure up to that expectation. Reflecting no special cause or no particular bias, this work explores all the sides for such explosive issues as "the Transformation of Ideology in the Arab World," "the Problem of Arab Unity," and "the Moment of Truth: Toward a Middle East Dialogue." Each contribution was given by a man who was well qualified to present his special argument. Malcolm Kerr, David ben

Gurion, and Moshe Dayan are only a few of the authors used by Miss Gendzier in compiling this work.

Of special importance are the selections dealing with the ideological aspects of the developing Middle East and of the Palestine problem. Too often, for the casual observer of the Near East, the tendency is to dismiss the Arab and the Israeli causes as examples of pure emotionalism. Miss Gendzier has taken special care to include selections which explain the changing ideologies of the two sides. This particular approach, scholarly and enlightening, makes this work certainly desirable for the non-expert. Change, the editor states, is a hallmark of the region, but it is clear that change is based on revolutionary and nationalistic philosophical concepts.

The bibliography, however, leaves something to be desired. There is a very brief bibliography at the end of the collection. It stimulates the reader's interest, but it is too short. A more complete section would have certainly added to the value of this endeavor. The footnotes are all grouped at the end of the book, after a brief biographical chapter. Since Miss Gendzier deals with twenty-nine different readings, it would have been better to place the footnotes at the bottom of each page or at the end of each individual reading. These few weak points do not detract in any great degree from the over-all effectiveness of the work and should be considered as minor.

The concluding selection ends with a plea for "mutual confidence... a lasting peaceful coexistence." Obviously, Irene Gendzier has tried to dissect a complex problem, shed scholarly light on a situation, and point the way toward Arab and Israeli confidence and coexistence. One must first understand a problem before attempting to solve it, and this book of important readings will aid in the general comprehension of the Middle East and its special circumstances. For this reason, *A Middle East Reader* is valuable contribution to the understanding so necessary for peace in that area.

The University of Mississippi JAMES J. COOKE

Middle East: Past and Present. By Yahya Armajani. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970. vii plus 412 pp. Maps, bibliography, index.

In his preface, the author states that he has a two-fold purpose in writing this text on the Middle East. A professor of Middle Eastern history with twenty years experience, Armajani saw the need for a text that would be coherent, direct, and accurate. As a native of the Middle East, he believes that his second purpose should be to present a view from the inside rather than from the outside. Working on the premise that a Near Easterner can offer more in the way of clear insight into the area, Armajani tries to add that extra dash of personal involvement.

Certainly Armajani accomplishes his first goal. Readable, concise, and factual, his effort does rise above the usual dry textbook treatment. Emphasis is placed on the recent historical period, and only one-fifth of the work is devoted to the Middle East before the rise and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire. The great attention paid to the development of the region since 1815 only makes the author's

endeavor more attractive. His chapters on modern Iran display a special awareness of the poor treatment that this state has received in other surveys of the area. Perhaps more could have been done to show the link between North Africa and the Middle East, especially in the 1950's and 1960's. Certainly, in a study of Nasser's diplomacy, a mention of the U.A.R.'s position and influence in the Maghrib would have been welcomed.

The second expressed purpose for writing a text which looks from the inside out is partly obscured by the obvious limitations imposed by the necessity of making it suitable for the general student. The sections dealing with Israel and the various Arab-Israeli conflicts are free of bias, polemics, and emotionalism. Well-balanced and expertly presented, the turmoil in the Near East is one of Armajani's major concerns, but he remains dispassionate. Perhaps, this is a 'moderate' looking out. If there is any one aspect which makes his work appealing, it is his unemotional examination of the continuing controversy and the deeply felt hatreds of the contemporary Middle East.

Armajani has included an excellent set of maps which complement his text. Too often maps seem to be the stepchildren of textbooks, but this is not the case here. Each chapter has its own good, selected bibliography, and for the student nothing could be more vital and helpful. Many well-chosen illustrations enhance the historical presentation.

The last chapter, dealing with the diversity and uniformity in the Arab World, makes this book especially desirable as a text. Armajani explodes what he calls "the myth of Arab unity." The Arab peoples' search for identity is frustrated by their basic lack of unity. Diverse in many areas, they fail to stand united on many pressing and critical social, economic, and military issues. This helps to explain the basic failures of the Arab armies to be effective against the Israeli military forces.

In his conclusion Armajani points out that the people of the Middle East have many attributes. They are, he writes, "impractical, naive, arrogant, rigid, innocent, and inconsistent—all at the same time." The strength of *Middle East: Past and Present* is simply that Armajani has taken these conflicting threads and has woven them into a coherent historical tapestry. Scholarly and readable, this text deserves a special consideration in the area of Middle Eastern history.

The University of Mississippi JAMES J. COOKE

From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967. By Nadav Safran. New York: Pegasus, 1969 xvii plus 452 pp. Maps, charts, index.

To find a logical, systematic study of the Arab-Israeli conflict, free of bias and emotion, is almost an impossible task. Since 1948, thousands of volumes, all with varying degrees of accuracy and objectivity, have been written concerning that explosive situation. Emotionalism, the author indicates, has obscured the basic reasons for the deadly confrontation in the Middle East. Nadav Safran, a professor at Harvard University and author of at least three books on the region, has

attempted, with great success, to shun polemics and prejudices and to explore the fundamental issues surrounding that twenty-two-year-old conflict which has often endangered world peace. Combining a political scientist's love for the obvious evidence of the comparative chart and a historian's dedication to the truth, Safran has fully accomplished his purpose. No mere catalog of events, battles, or diplomatic moves, his book is a coherent and complete investigation into the root causes of the constant hatred and constant warfare between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The author maintains that the conflict in the Middle East has developed "...through a number of critically different identifiable phases." The critical turning point occurred in 1948 with the founding of the state of Israel and the first Palestine war in the same year. Since 1948 is the watershed in Arab-Israeli relations, Safran devotes only a small amount of space to the basic causes of the conflict. This approach allows the bulk of the material to center on the years of violent confrontation up to the June 1967 war.

Of vital importance to any clear understanding of the problems of the modern Middle East is Safran's section IV, "The Dynamics of the Arms Buildup: Defense Expenditures," and section V, "The Arms Buildup: Evolution of the Armed Forces." The author's purpose in presenting such an intensive picture of the expanding military is obvious: there is great danger of the conflict developing into a massive clash between the great powers.

The term "arms race," according to the author, is a misleading term when applied to the whole of the Middle East. After the June 1967 war, the expansion of the military became a contest of endurance between Israel and Egypt. This put a great strain on the economies of both states, and also to a lesser degree, the few other Arab countries which were involved. By the use of extensive tables and charts, Safran concludes that Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria spent in 1964 a higher percentage of "...their GNP on defense than any other country except the Soviet Union... the United States, Britain, and France."

The future of the region is, in the author's mind, uncertain, dependent on such factors as nationalism, governmental policies, and the relationship of the states of the Near East to the great powers. Safran makes no prediction in regard to an ultimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, by his coherent presentation of the facts and his precise interpretation of the statistics, the author shows the magnitude of the problem. Nadav Safran makes it abundantly clear that there are no simple solutions to this menacing situation. The author is also very fundamental in his approach to makeshift peace or spectacular plans for ending the conflict. To be successful, any blueprint for peace must be carefully constructed and fairly applied to all sides. *From War to War* gives the necessary facts for a complete comprehension of the situation, and for this reason it is worthy of consideration as a major contribution to the understanding of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

The University of Mississippi JAMES J. COOKE

The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics. By R. Vaidyanath. New Delhi: People's Publishing House (P) Ltd., 1967. xiii plus 297 pp. Rs. 30/-.

The 'Islamic Frontier' in Central Asia has been studied in recent years in several significant works published outside the Soviet Union. There is, to begin with, Geoffrey Wheeler's *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* in the *Asia-Africa Series* of Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London, 1964) using mainly Western and only a few Russian sources with an undercurrent of Western anti-Soviet propaganda bias. Then there is Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay's *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1967) on a canvas broader than Central Asia, more profound in research and more objective in analysis. These same qualities characterize other works in the field by Professor Bennigsen and Mme Lemercier-Quelquejay. The work under review is a most welcome addition to the existing literature in English on modern Central Asia.

Dr. Vaidyanath is a Reader in the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, an institution patronized by the Government of India. On the other hand, the publisher of the book, the People's Publishing House, is known to have links with the Communist Party of India. This ambivalence of the 'situation' of the book is reflected in its treatment of its subject. On the one hand it is a work of genuine scholarship and on the other it is almost identifiable with Soviet historiography, but without its propaganda bias, or its apologetics.

Compared to the other studies of Soviet Central Asia referred to above, this work has a somewhat different scope and a different objective. It confines itself to a study of Soviet nationalities policy between the years 1917 and 1936. Based almost exclusively on Russian sources, it does not indulge much in Soviet-oriented or Western-oriented historical value-judgments; refreshingly, it concentrates on a wealth of actual historical detail. At the same time, it is the first work of its kind to make available to the Western or 'neutral' reader a history of modern Soviet Central Asia as it is known to the Russian student. It was written outside the Soviet Union, by an Indian, presumably a Hindu; it therefore does not show any inherent quasi-Muslim, communist or anti-communist bias. It is an instance of 'third world' scholarship, with an objective array of facts which all students of Central Asia will find useful.

But the exclusive dependence on Soviet sources has, of course, its major and minor drawbacks. The major drawback is the narrowness in treating the theme and the lack of that breadth of vision and analysis one meets in Bennigsen, even in Wheeler. The minor handicap is that it ignores or underrates such elements of history which the controlled Soviet historiography deliberately ignores, but which are significant from the viewpoint of Asian and Islamic history in general—for instance, the episode of Enver Pasha's involvement in the Basmāchī resistance. It also does not treat in depth other movements of Muslim or regional resistance to the Soviet stranglehold, which Western historiography of Central Asia tends to emphasize.

Toronto, Canada AZIZ AHMAD

Iranian-American Diplomacy. By Mehdi Heravi. Brooklyn, New York: Theo. Gaus' Sons, Inc., 1969. 161 pp.

Dr. Mehdi Heravi, who teaches Political Science at Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee, has written an incisive study on Iranian-American relations based primarily on American archival materials and Department of State publications. The period covered is the formative years 1883-1945.

The author discusses the important contribution of American missionaries, who first arrived in Iran in 1830, and their role in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There is a well-written exposition of Russian-British rivalry in Iran and Iranian efforts to counterbalance the Anglo-Russian dominance of their country by seeking American support. A review of the activities of the Shuster mission and the two Millspaugh missions makes interesting reading. The role of Iran in the First and Second World Wars is presented against a broad background of Great Power policies. The Soviet threat to Iran in 1945-46 and the beginnings of American support for the preservation of Iranian territorial integrity are described briefly but effectively. Reference is also made to the dynamic leadership of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was to build a strong and united Iran in the following decades. This book will be welcomed by students of Iranian affairs.

University of Teheran FIROUZ BAHRAMPOUR

A Bibliography of A.U.B. Faculty Publications 1866-1966. Compiled and edited by Suha Tamim. Beirut: American University of Beirut Centennial Publications, 1967. xxxii and 401 pp.

The contribution made by the American University of Beirut to 'the Whole Life of Man' is underlined as one goes through the pages of this book. Here are references to published works and articles which cover a vast field of scholarship in all the varied categories of knowledge represented by the Faculties of this institution.

A full list of publications of those members who are on tenure appointment, as well as of Presidents and Vice Presidents, are given. Others have those of their publications noted which were prepared and/or published while they were at the University. Publications of the faculty of the Syrian Protestant College (the name of the University until 1920) are given in full in the case of those who served for a minimum of five years; otherwise, only their publications during membership are listed.

This reviewer has already proved the utility of this collection in tracing a theme which is engaging his interest at the moment. Any scholar concerned with the Middle East would almost certainly find this compilation of value in his researches in one way or another, and this may well be true for others not specifically interested in this area, for here are pointers to scholarship of world-wide significance. All in all, this work forms another fitting tribute to those who have helped to earn for the A.U.B. its high reputation as a reservoir of sound learning through a hundred years.

All Saints' Church G. C. HANDFORD
Beirut

L'arabe classique: Esquisse d'une structure linguistique. By Henri Fleisch, S. J. Beyrouth: Dar El-Machreq, Imprimerie Catholique, 1968. 271 pp.

This is a new and revised edition of Father Fleisch's book on the linguistic structure of classical Arabic, first published in 1956 by the same publishers.

By 'structure,' he understands the meaning given to it by Benveniste and not that of Bloomfield accepted by the majority of American linguists. This means that he believes structure is the arrangement of the whole in parts and the solidarity shown by the parts of the whole which mutually condition themselves to one another.

In accordance with this understanding of structure, Father Fleisch treats a variety of aspects of the Arabic language. Although he calls his study "a sketch," it actually embraces a wide range of linguistic research that includes the phonetics, the morphology and the syntax of the language. In point of fact, his book is divided into three parts, each dealing with one of these fields of study.

The first part on phonetics (pp. 15-48) is the shortest. The second part on morphology (pp. 49-163) is the longest and constitutes the main contribution of the book. The third section on syntax (pp. 165-235) is newly written, and, together with a few paragraphs in the earlier parts, is a welcome addition to this new edition.

Under phonetics, Father Fleisch examines the sounds of Arabic vowels and consonants in various combinations and syllables, and derives general tendencies of the language for certain repugnances or propensities. With equal sensitivity to the language, he describes the accent of Arabic words but does not formulate any rules for it, due to an excessive prudence which leaves this field still untilled.

Under morphology, Father Fleisch studies in detail the characteristics of classical Arabic in forming nouns and verbs and he gives careful attention to internal flexion which he considers the main source of semantic multiplication. He does not neglect to study word-formation by the use of the few prefixes and suffixes inherited anciently by Arabic from its Semitic origins. Internal flexion remains, however, the chief characteristic of the language in his opinion. That is why he considers natural and reasonable the ordering of entries in Arabic dictionaries under root forms rather than alphabetical forms of words.

On page 228 he says:

> Arabic is a magnificent example of a language of internal change. The system is Semitic, that is true; but nowhere in the Semitic [languages] does it appear with such clarity and such development.

Under syntax, Father Fleisch examines both the simple sentence and the complex sentence in Arabic. He studies the verbal as well as the nominal constructions of a sentence and brings order to the understanding of nominative, accusative and genitive cases. Case declension in nouns and conjugation change in verbs bring precision to Arabic which otherwise could be deficient or in need of complicated processes for equal precision.

He ends the book by a quotation from an earlier work of his in which he says:

> The language of Arabic poetry, by the wealth of its grammatical forms and the nicety of expression of its syntactic relations, marks the highest point of development of the Semitic languages.

This is a serious study of the classical Arabic language by a well-qualified Semitic scholar which I highly recommend. The only reservation I have is one I personally have also of other Western linguistic works of Arabic and other Semitic languages where the root *qtl* is used throughout with all its derivations to exemplify word-formation. This root conveying the idea of 'killing' is simply horrible. A look at Father Fleisch's "Form Index" (pp. 253-255) suggests a massacre with its 208 forms of killing. Couldn't another root be used, such as *slm* which conveys the idea of 'peace and safety,' if the root *fʿl* used by Arab grammarians and conveying the idea of 'doing' is to be discarded by Westerners for reasons that Fleisch explains on page 36 to be difficulty of pronunciation and transcription?

The Hartford Seminary Foundation ISSA J. BOULLATA

Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century. By W. F. Abboushi. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1970. 319 pp. Maps, index, bibliography.

A combination of political science, history, and economics, W. F. Abboushi's attempt to explain the political systems of the contemporary Middle East accomplished the task. Abboushi, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, took the varied threads of the Middle East and wove a coherent, concise, and informative cloth. His major purpose was to concentrate on only a few countries of the region which he felt represented the whole of the Near East. Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were the nations included by Abboushi in his study. Diversity, the author claimed, is one of the hallmarks of the Middle East. This made the writer's task only more difficult and demanding, but despite the confusion inherent in such a work, there emerged a unified survey of the governments of the Middle East.

Abboushi went beyond the political scientist's passion for a mass of statistical charts and examined the historical development of each state. Realizing that governments are as much the products of their history as they are of doctrine, he successfully attempted to relate each modern state to its own experience and national evolution. His chapters dealing with post-World War One Turkey, Political Zionism, and Nasser's Egypt, deserve special praise for their careful and balanced approach. Never is one state or ideology championed while the others are condemned. Obviously not a polemist, Abboushi explored all sides of the basic issues with clarity and critical objectivity.

Adding over-all strength to his work are the sections dealing with the economies of the various Near Eastern states. What emerged is a picture of a great diversity of wealth and production. The Arab

states, the author writes, are struggling with serious economic problems, while the Israeli economy is healthy and productive. Perhaps, Abboushi hints, one of the underlying conflicts in the Middle East is the bloody clash between the haves and have-nots.

There are a few weaknesses in Abboushi's work; however, they do not detract measurably from his effort. The inclusion of more material on North Africa, as a part of the Arab world, would have added to the general presentation. Seldom does Abboushi mention Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, although these four states have had a certain amount of influence on the events in the Middle East. The Algerian Revolution and the *coup d'état* in Libya influenced the recent development of the Near East. Since this work is aimed at the student in Middle Eastern studies, one also regrets the lack of substantial information on Saudi Arabia. Considering the detailed analysis of the other states, these omissions, however, can be excused.

The author included excellent detailed maps, but there are too few of them. The borders of the state of Israel have changed considerably since 1948, and maps should have been added to show these important alterations. The scarcity of maps does not negate Abboushi's work and one area which serves as a counterbalance to the lack of maps is the extensive bibliography. Recent and complete, this vital part of a scholarly work will serve as a valuable aid to the student of the Middle East.

The publishers claim that Abboushi's work "is a general introductory book for undergraduate... courses on the Middle East." Certainly the work lives up to this expectation. W. F. Abboushi has written a book that is worth consideration as a major contribution to Middle Eastern Studies.

The University of Mississippi JAMES J. COOKE

Etudes Arabes: Feuilles de Travail. Rome: Institut Pontifical d'Etudes Arabes. No. 24, 1er tr. 1970. pp. 82.

This number of *Etudes Arabes,* like many others since the Pontifical Institute of Arab Studies began their publication in 1962, is very stimulating. Although the balance between modern and classical texts has not been maintained in this number, having been tipped in favor of the latter, the contents remain a challenging selection for the serious student of Arabic and Islamic literature. It is true the various contributions have all been ably translated into French and adequately annotated, but the subject matter lays particular demands on the intellectual abilities of the student.

The first passage, continued from No. 23, is a very provocative article by the Arab writer Nadīm al-Bīṭār that originally appeared in *Mawāqif* of January-February 1969. In this study al-Bīṭār advocates a revolutionary ideology for the Arab world and an end to the metaphysical ideology that has been the basis of its traditional existence. He makes no attempt to hide his hostility to religion and believes that the movement of history is one in which the consciousness of man

frees itself continuously and increasingly from metaphysical assumptions and religious values.

The second text is an extract from Ibn Sīnā's epistle known as *al-Risāla-al-Aḍḥawiyya,* edited and translated by Francesca Lecchetta (Padova, 1969). In it, Ibn Sīnā argues against the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body, since Christians believe in no bodily pleasures or tortures in the next world.

The third contribution is from an un-edited text by a thirteenth-century Muslim writer of Spain called *al-Qurṭubī,* who quotes from an unknown Christian Arabic book of Toledo called *Tathlīth al-Waḥdāniyya* (The Trinity of Unicity). The portion presented is made up of the quotations from the Christian apologist who explains the Trinity in Muslim terms of divine attributes as Power, Knowledge and Will and argues against more attributes to God since they would be only derived from those three.

The fourth selection is the funny story of al-Kindī extracted from *Kitāb al-Bukhalā'* of al-Jāḥiẓ. The French translation of René Dagorn differs from Charles Pellat's *Livre des avares* in understanding a couple of points.

The fifth passage continues to present the forty hadiths of Nawawī with his commentary. The hadiths here given are the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th, very well translated and annotated by Louis Pouzet.

The sixth passage is an extract from *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr* of al-Rāzī, with an exegesis of S. 4:3 concerning polygamy, superbly translated and annotated by M. Borrmans.

At the end of this number, there are the usual bio-bibliographical cards on modern authors, this time dealing with three persons of the nineteenth-century Arab renaissance, viz., Nāṣīf al-Yāzijī, Buṭrus al-Bustānī and Salīm al-Bustānī.

Although *Etudes Arabes* is not a printed periodical but a folder of unwieldy separate stencilled work-sheets, its readers among students of Arabic have many things in it to be grateful for.

The Hartford Seminary Foundation ISSA J. BOULLATA

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

The Institute of History of Medicine and Medical Research has been established in New Delhi, India, to promote medical education and research; to study the history of medicine and to undertake research thereof; to undertake scientific appraisal of the principles and practices of the various systems of medicine; and to collaborate in kindred activities with other national or international organizations with similar objects. It offers for the first time, not only in India but in all of Asia, a vivid portrayal of the evolution of medicine from the prehistoric and protohistoric times to the modern world. The foundation stone was laid by the late Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru in November 1962.

The Museum and the Library, which form the first phase of the Institute, were inaugurated on February 14, 1970 by the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Museum contains a wealth of material in the form of statues, busts, replicas, tablets, models, maps, charts, photographs, drawings, surgical instruments, chemical apparatuses, etc., which chart the growth of medical theory and practice in all the great civilizations of the East and West—from ancient Mesopotamia to the present. The Library contains several thousand printed volumes on medicine, history of medicine, pharmacy, science and technology. The most significant feature of this specialized library is its collection of manuscripts in many languages.

To facilitate research the Institute has formed the following seven departments:

1. Department of Theory and Philosophy of Medicine
2. Department of Rural and Domestic Medicine
3. Department of History of Medical Education
4. Department of Psychological Medicine
5. Department of Health and Sanitation
6. Department of Food and Nutrition
7. Department of Pharmacy

Envisioned for the future, on the ninety-acre campus, are a hospital, research laboratories and colleges of medicine and pharmacy.

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SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

I. General and Miscellaneous. Manuscripts, libraries. History of Islamic Studies.

II. Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.

III. Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs. Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.

IV. Theology. Movements, sects; Shīʿa. Philosophy. Sciences.

V. Sufism. Sufi Orders. Saints.

VI. Law. Politics; state; government. Nationalism. Socialism. Economics.

VII. Arabic and other relevant languages. Literature, culture, art. Education. Universities.

VIII. History of Muslim peoples, generally and in various areas (including studies on pre-Islamic period). Islam in modern history.

IX. Islam and other religions, civilizations, philosophies and ideologies.

X. Christianity and Islam (from a Christian point of view). The Church in Muslim environments.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	*American Anthropologist,* Journal of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C.
A.A.W.	*Afro-Asian Writings,* Cairo.
A.B.	*Analecta Bollandiana,* Bruxelles.
Ac. As.	*Acta Asiatica,* Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture, The Tōhō Gakkai, Tokyo.
Afr.	*Africa,* Journal of the International African Institute, London.
Afr. A.	*African Arts,* University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Afr. M.	*African Music,* Journal of the African Music Society, Roodepoort, Transvaal, South Africa.
Afr. R.	*Africa Report,* Washington, D.C.
Afr. S.	*African Studies,* Johannesburg, So. Africa.
A.H.R.	*The American Historical Review,* Washington, D.C.
And.	*al-Andalus,* revista de las Escuelas de Estudios Arabes de Madrid y Granada.
A.Q.	*Anthropological Quarterly,* Washington, D.C.
Ar.	*Arabica,* Revue d'Etudes Arabes, Leiden.
Aram.	*Aramco World Magazine,* New York.
Arch.	*Archaeology,* Archaeological Institute of America, New York.
Ar.Or.	*Archiv Orientální,* Journal of the Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.
A.S.	*Asian Survey,* Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California
As.A	*Asian Affairs,* New Series (formerly R.C.A.J.), Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London.

A.S.B.	*African Studies Bulletin,* Boston University, Boston, Mass.
A.S.R.	*African Social Research,* University of Zambia, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
B.A.E.O.	*Boletin de la Asociacion Española de Orientalistas,* Madrid.
B.C.I.I.S.	*The Bulletin of the Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies,* Henry Martyn Institute, Lucknow, India.
B.I.I.S.	*Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies,* Alligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
B.O.	*Bibliotheca Orientalis,* Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, Leiden.
B.S.N.	*Behavior Sciences Notes,* Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, Conn.
B.S.O.A.S.	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London.
Bus.	*Bustan,* Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kultur, Politik und Wirtschaft der islamischen Lander, Wien.
C.A.D.	*Centre of Arabic Documentation Research Bulletin,* Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
C.A.J.	*Central Asiatic Journal,* International Periodical for the Languages, Literature, History and Archaeology of Central Asia, The Hague-Wiesbaden.
C.E.A.	*Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,* Ecole pratique des hautes études, Sorbonne, Paris.
C.H.M.	*Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale,* Paris.
Civ.	*Civilisations,* Institut International des Civilisations Différentes, Bruxelles.
C.O.C.	*Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain,* Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris.
Cont.	*Continuum,* Chicago.
Crit.	*The Criterion,* Journal of the Islamic Research Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
C.S.S.H.	*Comparative Studies in Society and History,* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Daed.	*Daedalus,* The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
D.I.	*Der Islam,* Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients, Berlin.
Dial.	*Dialog,* a quarterly journal of theology, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Diog.	*Diogenes,* The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, Paris and Montreal.
E.M.M.	*Evangelisches Missions Magasin,* Basel.
E.M.Q.	*Evangelical Missions Quarterly,* Springfield, Pennsylvania.
E.M.Z.	*Evangelische Missions-Zeitschrift,* Stuttgart.
Enc.	*Encounter,* Christian Theological Seminary, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Eth.	*Ethnology,* International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
E.V.	*Eglise Vivante,* Louvain.
F.A.	*Foreign Affairs,* New York.
Fr.	*Frontier,* London.
H.L.R.	*Harvard Law Review,* Cambridge, Massachusetts.
H.R.	*History of Religions,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
H.T.	*Hespéris Tamuda,* Rabat, Morocco
I.A.	*International Affairs,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
IBLA	*Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes,* Tunis.
I.C.	*Islamic Culture,* The Islamic Culture Board, Hyderabad-Deccan.
I.C.Q.	*India Cultures Quarterly,* School of Research, Leonard Theological College, Jabalpur, M.P., India.
I.J.M.E.S.	*International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Middle East Studies Association, New York.
I.E.J.	*Israel Exploration Journal,* Jerusalem, Israel.
I.L.	*Islamic Literature,* Lahore.
In.As.	*Indo Asia,* Stuttgart.

Ind. Q.	*India Quarterly*, New Delhi.
Int.	*Intisari*, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Ltd., Singapore.
I P.Q.	*International Philosophical Quarterly*, Fordham University, New York.
Iqbal	A Journal of the Basm-i Iqbal, Lahore.
Iqbal Rev.	*Iqbal Review*, Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Karachi, Pakistan.
I.Q	*The Islamic Quarterly*, The Islamic Cultural Centre, London.
I.R.	*The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs*, London.
I.R M.	*International Review of Missions*, W.C.C., Geneva.
I.S.	*Islamic Studies*, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad.
ISIS	Quarterly journal of the History of Science Society, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D C.
I.T	*Islamic Thought*, The Research Circle, Aligarh.
J.A.	*Journal Asiatique*, Societé Asiatique, Paris.
J.A A.R.	*Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Chambersburg, Pa.
J.A.H.	*The Journal of African History*, Cambridge University Press.
J.A.O.S.	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore. Maryland.
J A.S.	*Journal of Asian Studies*, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
J.C.S.	*A Journal of Church and State*, Baylor Univ., Waco, Texas.
J.E.A	*The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, London
J.E.S.	*Journal of Ecumenical* Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
J.E.S.H.O.	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Leiden.
J.H.I.	*Journal of the History of Ideas*, New York.
J.H.P.	*Journal of the History of Philosophy*, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
J.J.S.	*The Journal of Jewish Studies*, Jewish Chronicle Publications, London.
J.J.Soc.	*Jewish Journal of Sociology*, London.
J.M.A.S.	*Journal of Modern African Studies*, Cambridge, England.
J.N.E.S.	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Chicago, Illinois.
J.P.H.S.	*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi.
J.Q.R.	*The Jewish Quarterly Review*, The Dropsie University, Philadelphia, Pa.
J.R.A.	*Journal of Religion in Africa*, Leiden.
J.R.A.S.	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, Royal Asiatic Society, London.
J.R.H.	*The Journal of Religious History*, Sydney University Press, N.S.W.
J.S.S.	*Journal of Semitic Studies*, Manchester University Press.
J.Th.S.	*The Journal of Theological Studies*, Oxford.
J W.H.	*Journal of World History*, Paris.
Ka.	*Kairos*, Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie, Salzburg.
Lig.	*Ligarzas*, Dept. of Medieval History, Valencia University.
Machriq	*Al-Machriq*, Beirut.
M.A S.	*Modern Asian Studies*, London.
M.D.	*The Muslim Digest*, International Monthly of Muslim Affairs, Durban, South Africa.
M.E.A.H.	*Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos*, Universidad de Granada
M E F.	*Middle East Forum*, The Alumni Association, American University of Beirut.
M.E.J.	*The Middle East Journal*, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
M.I	*Man in India*, A quarterly anthropological journal, Bihar, India.
Mid.	*Midway*, A Magazine of Discovery in the Arts and Sciences, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
M N.C.	*Le Monde non-Chrétien*, Paris.
Mus.	*Le Muséon*, Revue d'Etudes Orientales, Tijdschrift voor Oriëntalisme, Louvain.
N C.C.R.	*National Christian Council Review*, Nagpur, Maharashtra, India.
Nu.	*Numen*, International Review for the History of Religions, Brill, Leiden
O.C.	*Oriens Christianus*, Heft für die Kunde des christlichen Orients, O Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.

O.C.P.	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma.
O M.	*Oriente Moderno,* Istituto per l'Oriente, Roma.
Or.	*Orient,* Paris.
ORITA	Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies. Univ. of Ibadan, Nigeria
Ors.	*Oriens,* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, Brill, Leiden.
Or. Suec.	*Orientalia Suecana,* Uppsala.
P.A.	*Pacific Affairs,* University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
P.E.W.	*Philosophy East and West,* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
P.F.	*The Philosophical Forum,* Boston, Mass.
Ph. St.	*Philippine Studies,* Manila.
P.O.C.	*Proche Orient Chrétien,* Jerusalem.
P.Q.	*Pakistan Quarterly,* Karachi.
Pr. Af.	*Présence Africaine,* Revue Culturelle du Monde Noir, Paris
P.S.B.	*The Princeton Seminary Bulletin,* Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.
R.E.I.	*Revue des Etudes Islamiques,* Paul Geuthner, Paris.
R.E.J.	*Revue des études juives,* Historia judaica, Mouton, 's-Gravenhage
R.H.	*Revue Historique,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.H.R.	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
R.I.E.I.	*Revista del Instituto du Estudios Islámicos en Madrid,* Madrid.
R.M.	*Rythmes du Monde,* Le Bulletin des Missions, Paris et Bruges.
R.Q.	*Revue de Qumran,* Paris.
R.R.	*The Review of Religions,* Rabwah.
R.S.R.	*Revue des Sciences Religieuses,* Strasbourg.
R. St.	*Religious Studies,* London.
R.T.P.	*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie,* Lausanne.
S.E.A.J.	*The South East Asia Journal of Theology,* Singapore.
S.I.	*Studies in Islam,* Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi.
S.I.L.	*Studies in Linguistics,* Anthropology Research Center, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
Spec.	*Speculum,* A Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
S.P.N.C.	*Secretariatus pro non-Christianis,* Città del Vaticano.
S.S.R.	*Sociology and Social Research,* University of Southern California, Los Angeles
St. in C.R.	*Studies in Comparative Religion,* Tomorrow Publications, Ltd.
St. Isl.	*Studia Islamica,* Paris.
Surv.	*Survey,* A journal of Soviet and East European Studies, London.
Sy.	*Syria,* Revue d'Art Oriental et d'Archéologie, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
Th.	*Theology,* London.
V.I.	*The Voice of Islam,* Karachi.
W.I.	*Die Welt des Islams,* Leiden.
W.M.	*Worldmission,* New York.
W.M.L.M.	*World Muslim League Magazine,* Singapore.
Z.D.M.G.	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* Wiesbaden
Z.M.R.W.	*Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft,* Aschendorff, Münster.
Z.R.G.G.	*Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte,* Brill, Köln.
Zy.	*Zygon,* Journal of Religion and Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.

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1196 Les Études islamiques en Roumanie. Maria-Mathilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 2 (1969), 351-361.

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1202 Nature and History for Religious Faith—an interdisciplinary conversation. A. Boroffka, G. J. Cowling, M. S. El-Garh, W. R. G. Horton, E. B. Idowu. *Orita*, III, 1 (1969), 3-13.

1203 Notas sobre la Jardinería árabe en la Espana musulmana. James Dickie. *M.E.A.H.*, XIV-XV, 1 (1965-1966), 75-87.

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1205 Stèles funéraires de la region de Harar et Dahlak (Éthiopie). Madeleine Schneider. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 2 (1969), 339-343.

1206 Two Small Collections. A. J. Arberry. *I.Q.*, XIII, 1 (1969), 9-15.

II. *Pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad. The Qurʾān. Ḥadīth.*

1207 The Ancient Beduins of Arabia. Shams-ud-Dīn Aḥmad. *I.L.*, XV, 12 (1969), 39-44.

1208 The Concept of Man in the Quran. Iqbal Ahmad Ansari. *I.T.*, XIII, 1 (1969), 12-29.

1209 The Revolutionary Teachings of the Holy Qurʾan. Hāfiẓ ʿAbbādullah Fārūqī. *I.L.*, XV, 12 (1969), 23-37.

1210 Synonyms and Homonyms in the Qurʾān. A. J. Arberry. *I.Q.*, XIII, 3 (1969), 135-139.

1211 ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth. M. Z. Siddiqi. *S.I.*, V, 4 (1968), 197-211.

III. *Religious Instruction. The Mosque. Religious Duties and Devotional Life. Ethics and Customs. Attitudes towards magic, etc. Sociology of Islam.*

See also nos. 1246, 1265, 1269.

1212 Le chapelet islamique et ses aspects nord-africains. M. S. Belguedj. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 2 (1969), 291-322.

1213 Einige koranische Grundlagen islamischer Eheordnung. E. Gräf. *Bus.*, X, 2-3 (1969), 42-55.

1214 LAS FIESTAS PROFANES Y RELIGIOSAS EN EL REINO DE GRANADA. Mojtar ᶜAbbadī. *M.E.A.H.*, XIV-XV, 1 (1965-1966), 89-96.

1215 FROM VILLAGER TO TOWNSMAN IN TURKEY. Paul J. Magnarella. *M.E.J.*, XXIV, 2 (1970), 229-240.

1216 RELIGION OF ISLAM AND FAMILY PLANNING. Zohurul Hoque. *I.R.*, LVIII, 1 (1970), 6-11, 40.

1217 THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF MOSLEM FAITH. R. Caspar. *S.P.N.C.*, XIII, 1 (1970), 25-38.

1218 SALAT AND ZAKAT IN ISLAM. Khalifatul Masih, III (Trans. A. G. Soofi.) *R.R.*, LXIV, 3 (1970), 69-78; LXIV, 4 (1970), 103-112.

IV. *Theology. Movements, sects; Shīᶜa. Philosophy. Sciences.*

See also nos. 1208, 1278.

1219 ABU AL-QĀSIM AL-QUSHAIRĪ AS A THEOLOGIAN AND COMMENTATOR. Rashid Ahmad (Jullandri). *I.Q.*, XIII, 1 (1969), 16-69.

1220 AFZALADDIN KASHANI, PHILOSOPHE IRANIEN (XIIᵉ-XIIIᵉ S.). Karim Modjtehedy. *Or.*, XII, 45-46 (1968), 55-66.

1221 THE BAMIDELE MOVEMENT IN YORUBALAND. A. R. I. Doi. *Orita*, III, 2 (1969), 101-124.

1222 THE BELIEFS OF THE ISMAILIS— A SHORT ACCOUNT. Muᶜizz Goriawala. *Orita*, III, 2 (1969), 83-91.

1223 DIEU, LA CRÉATION ET LA RÉVÉLATION EN ISLAM. Roger Arnaldez. *R.T.P.*, VI (1969), 353-361.

1224 ÉTUDE SUR LA POLÉMIQUE ISLAMO-CHRÉTIENNE. QUI ÉTAIT L'AUTEUR DE *AL-RADD AL-ǦAMĪL LI-ILĀHIYAT ᶜĪSĀ BI-ṢARĪḤ AL-INGĪL* ATTRIBUÉ À AL-ǦAZZĀLĪ. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. *R.E.I.*, XXXVII, 2 (1969), 219-238.

1225 LES FONDEMENTS THÉOLOGIQUES ET HISTORIQUES DU DIALOGUE ISLAMO-CHRÉTIEN. Simon Jargy. *R.T.P.*, VI (1969), 362-375.

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1228 THE KHĀKSĀR MOVEMENT. Y. B. Mathur. *S.I.*, VI, 1 (1969), 27-62.

1229 IBN KHALDUN: AN INTERPRETATION. S. Dabydeen. *I.Q.*, XIII, 2 (1969), 79-101.

1230 "THE MEDICINE OF THE SOUL" AMONG ARAB PEOPLES. Salim ᶜAmmar. *I.R.*, LVIII, 1 (1970), 14-19.

1231 A NOTE ON AVICENNA'S THEORY OF THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL. Lenn Evan Goodman. *P.F.*, New Series, I, 4 (1969), 547-554.

1232 ON THE SOUL, BY IBN SINA. Translated with an Introduction by Lenn Evan Goodman. *P.F.*, New Series, I, 4 (1969), 555-562.

1233 PALANPUR AS A MISSIONARY BASE OF THE MAHDAWĪS. Qamar Uddin. *S.I.*, V, 4 (1968), 232-257.

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